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This study explored the changes which occured in a sector of the U.S. 
steel industry during the period 1945 to 1985. The study is an attempt to 
provide a different form of explanation for the changes which occured -- 
different from that provided by the conventional strategic management 
analysis: the steel industry did not adapt to a changing environment. 
This study addressed a series of questions in searching for an 
understanding or explanation of how those in the steel industry made 
sense of their world; and how that sense-making provided a rationale for 
actions taken, while at the same time limiting the consideration of possible 
alternative actions. 
In general, the findings outline a series of punctuation points within 
the narratives told by the steel leaders for their organizations. These 
narratives, and the points at which the themes change, provide a 
framework for strategic actions. In the case of U. S. Steel the course of 
action of the 1980s marked the completion of earlier themes and actions, 
t 
rather than the adaptation of a firm to particular environmental changes. 
vn 
The United Steelworkers narrative evolved from that developed by a 
group essentially outside the industry and needing to prove its value to its 
members, to one devised by a group inextricably part of the industry - 
whose input is needed to "save" the industry. 
The punctuation points for each organization frequently do not mesh, 
creating a circumstance in which one organization is responding to theme 
the other has abandoned. Additionally, the punctuation points of the two 
organizations almost never coincide with the change points determined by 
an outside observor. 
Among the significance of this study is: 
• it provides evidence of the influence of organizational history 
on the evolution and formulation of strategies. 
• the interpretive perspective which underlies this project 
provides a different approach to researching and 
understanding how an organization's strategy develops 
and evolves. 
• it utilizes methods from history and narrative analysis in a 
longitudinal study to analyze archival data to understand the 
evolution of strategies in a particular industry and subset of 
organizations. 
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The American economy of the late twentieth century is in a state of 
transition (Reich, 1983; Hearn, 1988). The basic manufacturing industries, 
long the centerpiece of U.S. business, are giving way to the service sector 
and the newer high technology industries. Imports of manufactured goods 
- steel, automobiles, and electronic equipment - to name only a few, have 
risen sharply, as domestic employment in these industries has fallen 
(Bluestone & Harrison, 1982; Hearn, 1988). 
Public concern over this transition is apparent in the titles of articles 
found in almost any issue of Business Week, Fortune, or Forbes in the 
1980s; such as -"Are Service Sector Jobs Good Jobs?", "America’s Deflation 
Belt", "The Koreans are Coming", "The Toughest Job in Business: How 
They're Remaking U.S. Steel", and "Downsizing Detroit: The Big Three's 
Strategy for Survival". This concern has brought with it a cry for 
protectionist legislation from the business community and assistance in 
retraining and relocating workers from the unions. 
How did America's basic industries find themselves in this position? 
In the 1950’s the automotive industry was the largest in the world, 
competing with no one. The U. S. steel industry was larger than all other 
steel industries combined, accounting for over 57% of the world's 
production in 1947 (Hogan, 1971). If, in the space of thirty years these 
mature, well-capitalized industries, could fall into hard times; what is the 
future of the current high technology industries in which the economy 
1 
places so much faith? Can we, through studying the history of America's 
basic industries, learn lessons which can be applied by managers in other 
contexts? 
Problem Under Consideration: 
What Has Happened To The American Economy Since World War n? 
In attempting to understand and analyze the problems of America’s 
basic industries in the post World War II era, strategic management has 
essentially relied on three forms of explanation. Each form of explanation 
has focused on a different unit of analysis ranging from the industry to the 
internal political operations of the organization. These three analytical 
approaches will be briefly discussed below in terms of their basic 
assumptions and the form of explanation they offer for the current 
condition of basic industry. Finally, the possibility of a different form of 
explanation of "what happened to the American economy?" will be 
discussed. 
The Life Cycle Approach 
The life cycle approach is grounded in industrial organization 
economics (Caves, 1980; Wiliamson, 1975) and takes as its focus the 
industry as a whole. This approach understands industries as experiencing 
a life cycle moving from growth through maturity and decline. The 
strategic management research within this perspective centers on the 
identification of the appropriate strategies for firms in the different phases 
of the industry life cycle (Porter, 1980; Harrigan, 1985). This perspective 
concentrates on the forces operating in an industry which "are crucial to 
developing competitive strategy" (Porter, 1980: 156), specifically buyers, 
suppliers, substitute products, the threat of new entrants into the industry. 
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and the intensity of competition. According to this viewpoint the role of 
the strategic manager in a particular organization is to analyze and predict 
the changes occuring in the industry and to formulate a competitive 
strategy which allows the organization to take advantage of those changes. 
The life cycle approach understands the problems of America’s basic 
industries as essentially caused by the mismatch between an organization's 
strategy and the life cycle phase of the industry. As the industry moves 
into decline - a natural phase of the evolution of the industry - managers 
should develop an appropriate end-game strategy (Harrigan, 1980). 
Among the generic strategies which this approach recommends for 
organizations in declining industries are: pursuing market dominance, 
holding patterns, shrinking selectively, harvesting the investment, or 
divestiture (Harrigan, 1985). This approach does not deny that there is 
pain associated with the transition to decline, but assumes that managers 
can anticipate the problems of decline and develop a set of options within a 
portfolio of strategies to cope with the decline. 
The Contingency Approach 
The contingency approach focuses on the relationship between a 
particular organization and its environment. This approach understands 
the decline of a particular organization, or set of organizations as a series of 
inappropriate strategic decisions on the part of top management (Crandall, 
1981; Lawrence & Dyer, 1983). The focus of much of this literature is on 
"fitting" the organization to its environment (Schendel & Hofer, 1979; 
Quinn, 1980; Andrews, 1987). The organization, or more specifically the 
strategists, should assess organizational strengths and weaknesses and 
match them against environmental opportunities and threats. It is the 
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strategy and actions of the firm, and particularly the decisions of top 
management, which arc blamed for shortsightedness and failure to adapt 
to a new environment; when the success of others is held up as an 
example of how things should have been (Barnett & Schorsch, 1983; 
Crandall, 1981; Lawrence & Dyer, 1983). 
The contingency approach understands the problems of basic industry 
as the mismatch between an organization's strategy and environmental 
conditions. Decline is not viewed as necessarily a natural phase of the 
evolution of an industry. Instead, the contingency approach views decline 
as essentially organization specific; that is, the focus is on the problems of a 
particular firm rather than on decline as it affects the industry as a whole 
(Andrews, 1987). Strategists should be able to "manage for the long-term", 
to be the "director of corporate purpose" (Andrews, 1987: 13). This 
approach requires strategists to be able to develop plausible scenarios and 
develop strategies to guide the firm through each scenario. In steel for 
example, strategists should heve foreseen the globalization of the industry 
and the concommitant decline in the use of steel, and thus developed 
appropriate plans to deal with these contingencies. 
The Incrementalist Approach 
The incrementalist approach takes as its focus the internal operations of 
the firm. This approach understands the decline of an organization in 
terms of the inability of top management to gain a commitment to a 
particular course of action or, as having selected and locked into a 
particular course of action too early (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1970; Quinn, 
1980; Wrapp, 1967). Here, the strategist is not searching for a "fit", or 
equilibrium state, between the organization and the environment; but is 
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instead concerned with retaining the flexibility to react and adapt to 
changing environmental conditions. "This school suggests that the limits 
to human and organizational rationality relegate the policymaker to the 
role of arbiter or reactor, exploiting openings as they occur amidst the furor 
of political maneuvering in order to make incremental steps toward some 
goal" (Bourgeois, 1984: 586). 
This approach understands the problems of basic industries as resulting 
from a number of conditions. First, the strategist may not have helped the 
organization retain the flexibility necessary to change as conditions 
changed. That is, the strategist may have committed the organization to a 
particular course of action from which it was difficult, if not impossible, to 
deviate. Second, the strategist may not have been politically astute enough 
to manage the process of formulating and implementing a plan, and thus 
allowed the organization to flounder. Finally, the strategist may simply 
have exploited the "wrong" openings, and not discovered this in time to 
change direction and exploit the "correct" openings in the environment. 
Thus, in steel, strategists may be described as having focused on a particular 
strategic response to the environment while neglecting the possibility of 
other responses as new openings appeared. 
Commonalities Among The Three Approaches 
All three of these approaches analyze an industry or firm from the 
perspective of an "outsider", or observor of the industry or firm; rather 
than from the perspective of one actively involved in the industry or 
organization. Further, in none of these three forms of explanation does 
the concept of industry include organizations other than the corporations 
assumed to comprise a particular "industry". Unions for example, are 
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never included in the definition of industry in these three analytical 
approaches, thus arbitrarily limiting the consideration of the "forces" 
affecting the industry. 
In general, the industry, the organizations comprising the industry, and 
the environment in which those organizations find themselves, are, in 
these three forms of explanation, assumed to simply exist as if preordained 
(Andrews, 1987; Porter, 1980). This in turn, leads to an assumption that 
within certain constraints strategists can "discover" a common set of 
opportunities and threats within the environment and position the 
organization to react or adapt to these changes. 
Within this general set of assumptions these analytical approaches 
attempt to account for the current state of America's basic industries as a 
failure on the part of management (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983; Reich, 1983). 
Industries may naturally decline (Porter, 1980, 1985) but as noted above, 
managers can choose more or less appropriate approaches to managing an 
organization in a declining industry. Additionally, it is the task of the 
strategist in all of these approaches to find the best "fit" between the 
organization and the environment. That is, as changes in the 
environment occur it is up to top management to direct the organization 
into the appropriate adaptation. 
As noted earlier, all of these approaches take the perspective of the 
"outsider" — the observor or analyst of the industry or organization. 
Additionally, analyses of industries or organizations within these forms of 
explanation are generally post hoc. The explanations provided — the 
industries are in decline and management has not properly managed that 
decline; or management has failed to properly adapt the organization to 
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the environment — are thus written with the benefit of hindsight by those 
not involved in decision-making in the industry or organization at the 
time the strategies are formulated. 
These explanations provide some understanding of the relationship 
between the organization and its environment; the impact of the political 
forces operating within the organization on strategy formulation and 
implementation; and the influence of industry forces and trends on 
organizational strategy. Additionally, these explanations provide the basis 
for general models of the relationship between organizations and their 
environments, and the relationships of organizations and industries. 
These models can be useful analytical tools for both the researcher and the 
practitioner when attempting to understand the elements involved in 
formulating strategies. 
The lessons frequently derived from these models however — the 
failure of management to recognize industry decline and deal with it, or 
the failure of management to adapt to environmental change -- are often 
of little use to managers caught in a situation and faced with need to make 
some decision about the future of the organization. Assessing the 
environment, developing and evaluating alternative courses of action, are 
time consuming and costly actions. "Fitting" the organization to the 
environment assumes a degree of knowledge and rationality which the 
observor may have in hindsight, but may be unreasonable to expect the 
participant to have at the time. 
The current forms of explanation thus provide an external analysis of 
what went "wrong" — that is, why are America’s basic industries as weak as 
they apparently are —, as well as the ability to recognize that a certain course 
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of action works well in certain conditions. In analyzing and explaining the 
current state of basic industry in the U. S. these analytical approaches are 
able to place blame for "mistaken" decisions and to point out what went 
wrong and when (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982; Hearn, 1988). They appear 
unable however, to provide much insight to a strategist currently deciding 
on the corporate future. The models developed from these forms of 
explanation certainly provide an analytical framework, but they do not 
provide guidance in how to avoid the mistakes of the past. Knowing that 
the current state of basic industry is the result of a series of mistaken 
decisions may be of interest to the researcher, but it is of little practical help 
to the strategist attempting to avoid the same scenario. 
An Interpretive Perspective 
If the conventional forms of explanation provide post hoc lessons from 
"outside" the industry and organization, is there another way of 
understanding which may provide different lessons? The conventional 
analytical approaches certainly provide an explanation for the problems of 
America's basic industries, and by extension for the problems of the 
American economy. However, while they point out decision errors, they 
do not help us to understand why these decision errors may have occurred. 
Strategists are left with the need to avoid similar errors without guidance, 
or understanding, as to how to avoid those errors. 
This study takes an interpretive perspective (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), 
rather than the functionalist perspective taken in much of the 
conventional strategic management literature. In taking an interpretive 
perspective this project is concerned with "obtaining an understanding of 
the subjectively created social world 'as it is’ in terms of an ongoing 
8 
process" (Burrell & Morgan: 31), rather than "the effective regulation and 
control of social affairs" (Burrell & Morgan: 26) which marks the 
functionalist perspective. This study is an attempt to discover how those 
in the steel industry understood their world and explained the actions they 
undertook in order to understand why steel industry leaders, faced with a 
set of events made the choices they did. 
The current state of basic industry in the U. S., and the American 
economy in general, can be attributed to many factors. Decisions made at 
"choice points" are always constrained both by conditions at the time, and 
by the cognitive biases and limitations which affect all decision makers. 
The lessons drawn from discovering how those in the industry understood 
the elements involved in making a particular set of decisions provide a 
different form of "advice" for strategists than those derived from analyzing 
what went wrong and telling people not to repeat those mistakes. The 
interpretive perspective, by providing insights into the rationale behind 
the strategic actions taken can provide strategists with an understanding of 
the influence of cognitive biases and limitations, as well as organization 
and industry history on the decision-making process. 
The Case of the U. S. Steel Industry 
In many respects the U. S. steel industry is representative of the general 
state of basic industry in the U. S. in the 1980s, and by extension stands as a 
symbol of many of the common concerns about the general state of the 
American economy. Both the firms and the union have participated in 
the transition from an industry which built new capacity to meet increased 
domestic demand in the 1940s and 1950s to an industry in the 1980's faced 
with continual plant closings and a decline in union membership from 1.5 
9 
million to approximately 700,000 members (USS Annual Reports, 1945- 
1985; USWA Convention Proceedings. 1945-1985). The 1985 filing for 
Chapter 11 by LTV (the nation's second largest steelmaker and #43 on the 
Fortune 500 in 1985), and U.S. Steel's (USS) 1986 reorganization into a firm 
of four freestanding divisions with an accompanying name change to 
U.S.X. highlight the changes the industry is experiencing. 
The fate of the U. S. steel industry continues to be of interest to the 
American public and politicians, as well as the business community. 
Within the last few years there have been a number of stories which 
emphasize the changing nature of the industry as a whole, and in 
particular the changes in union-management relations. Among these 
have been Wheeling-Pitt's attempt in 1985 to gain wage concessions from 
the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) through the use of Chapter 
11 - an attempt thwarted by the courts; and the lengthy strike in 1986 and 
1987 by the USWA against USS. 
The most important story, for the industry and the economy 
throughout the 1980s however, has been the continuing attempt by U. S. 
Steel management to remake the company. The purchase of Marathon Oil 
in 1982 was part of a process of shifting U. S. S. away from its dependence 
on steel to a position in 1988 where the Corporation's predominant 
business is energy, with steel comprising less than 30% of revenues. This 
shift on the part of the firm which is still the nation's largest producer of 
steel, in a direction which may someday take the company out of the steel 
industry, has far-reaching implications for the industry, the economy, and 
labor. 
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The increasing emphasis on the energy segment, leading finally to a 
corporate reorganization, has been accompanied by an increasingly tough 
attitude towards the union. This is evident in the 1986 strike - the 
settlement of which was followed by an announcement by USX that it was 
closing one-fourth of its remaining steelmaking capacity (Wall Street 
Tournal 1987). It is also evident in the attitude of steelworkers that the Ex 
in USX is them (Business Week, 1986). The transition of USS to USX; the 
reversion of union-management relations to the tough talk of the 1940s; 
the possibility of costly strikes unknown in the industry since 1959; the 
increased talk of Chapter 11 filings on the part of some of the weaker firms; 
all in a sense mark the completion of a transition from a domestic industry 
which was a world power to the possible disappearance of that industry, 
and the resultant loss of jobs. For, if USX chooses to leave the industry, the 
USWA will in effect, also leave the industry. 
Conventional Strategic Management and the U. S. Steel Industry 
Steel and the American Economy 
The changes which have taken place, and continue to take place, in the 
American steel industry, have been the subject of a number of studies. In 
part as noted above, this interest in the fate of the steel industry, reflects a 
broader interest in the fate of the American economy. As Jones (1986) 
points out 
For industrialized or industrializing countries of the world, 
steel is more than an industry; it is a state of mind. Steel is 
economic strength, the symbol of burgeoning 
industrialization . . . Steel is finally the product of a vital, 
robust workforce,. . . Thus, a downturn in the domestic steel 
industry typically provides highly visible, dramatic evidence 
of a downturn in tne entire economy;. . . The steel industry 
has, through its stark association with economic conditions in 
general, become an indicator of national economic well-being 
(Jones, 1986: 1-2). 
The steel industry, and assessments of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
of strategies followed by the major firms in the industry, thus serves in 
many studies as a sort of proxy for assessing the changes taking place in the 
economy as a whole (Tiffany, 1988; Jones, 1986; Barnett & Schorsch, 1983). 
The Life Cycle View 
In general, those authors writing within the life cycle perspective would 
view the current condition of the steel industry as part of a natural 
decline of the importance of manufacturing — part of a general progression 
from agriculture to manufacturing to services that every economy can 
expect to pass through (Reich, 1983; Bluestone & Harrison. 1982). This 
perspective is evident in the work of Thurow (1988) and others who 
simply state that at least "some part of the steel industry .... should and 
will move-off to low cost foreign producers. ..." (Thurow, 1988: 298). 
Americans should recognize that "Policies to protect declining industries 
are not only failing to promote new investment but in fact are dragging 
down the rest of the American economy" (Reich, 1983: 183). Thus, the U. 
S. should simply allow the declining basic industries (like steel) to 
disappear from the economic landscape rather than invest more money in 
their survival. 
The Contingency Approach 
The contingency perspective generally blames the management of the 
steel companies for their failure to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions. 
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According to the consensus of most studies of the subject, the 
primary reason for the postwar decline of steel can be found in 
managerial inefficiency and arrogance. Greedy and narrow¬ 
minded corporate managers, attempting to maximize 
short-term shareholder profits in a near-monopolistic setting, 
led the industry down a path to destruction because they 
refused to acknowledge the longer-term implications of this 
policy. Or so we are told. (Tiffany, 1988: viii). 
This position is evident in the the analysis of the industry in many 
previous studies — for example Lawrence & Dyer’s Renewing American 
Industry (1983) and Barnett & Schorsch's Steel: Upheaval in a Basic 
Industry (1983). These authors, and others (Crandall,1981; Hayes & 
Abernathy, 1980) focus on the strategic errors made by management in 
failing to respond to increased international competition, and slower 
domestic growth in demand, by adopting new technologies and 
rationalizing the domestic industry. Barnett & Schorsch (1983) go so far as 
to identify "the principal strategic error of the American steel industry in 
the 1950s" as "the failure .... to target its investments toward performance 
improvements" (p. 37). 
Unlike the life cycle approach which, as noted above, proposes that the 
industry simply be allowed to fade away, the contingency approach 
assumes that the managers who have allowed the industry to decline can 
now be taught to manage the revival of the industry (Lawrence & Dyer, 
1983). Managers "must face the facts. A realistic diagnosis reveals that the 
problems are high man-hours per ton, high yield losses, high maintenance 
costs, inefficient utilization of raw materials and fuels, and lack of dynamic 
leadership" (Kiers, 1980:100). Kiers goes on to state that the steel industry 
needs a "change of course" and that "Aggressiveness and boldness must be 
the hallmark of such a course change . . . ." (Kiers, 1980: 104). "The 
industry can be saved, but the medicine for the cure will be bitter and it 
will take imaginative vision, time, money, and, above all, a desire to 
survive" (Kiers,1980: 113). These authors fail to specify however, where 
the new bold and aggressive leadership will be found, or why an industry 
faced with mounting losses should want to survive. 
The Incrementalist Approach 
The incrementalist approach, as noted earlier, would view the current 
state of the American steel industry as the result of the inability, or 
unwillingness, of top management to either gain committment to 
appropriate strategies, or fixing on a particular strategy too soon and 
thereby losing the flexibility to change as circumstances changed. From 
this perspective, steel industry management, used to operating in an 
oligopolistic environment in which they "were virtually assured high 
rates of return given the absence of effective competition and the presence 
of systematic coordination among producers ....", learned to be risk averse 
(Hearn,1988: 187). 
Steel industry managers are seen to have locked themselves into a 
long-term strategy of rounding out existing facilities rather than 
constructing new integrated facilities (Borrus,1983). As the ineffectiveness 
of this strategy became apparent, steel management, rather than 
abandoning it, looked to the government for assistance and protection 
(Melman, 1983; Borrus, 1983). However, as Tiffany (1988) points out, by the 
time that steel management was convinced that for example, "its 
institutional efforts in dealing with external constituencies needed 
fundamental repair" (p. 185) it was too late. 
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Thus, while the life cycle perspective assumes that the industry is at the 
end of a life cycle and the contingency approach assumes that management 
has erred but can recover some of the lost glory of the industry; the 
incrementalist approach assumes that "the opportunity for change may 
already have been lost in steel" (Tiffany,1988: 190). Industry managers, in 
an attempt to "stabilize" the environment — first on their own and then 
with government assistance — relinquished the organizational flexibility 
needed to change. In the 1980s it appears unlikely that that flexibility can 
be recovered. As with the contingency approach then, management is at 
fault — not for failing to adapt, but rather for adopting a risk-averse 
strategic posture which is expressed in "a desire to be second with proven 
technology" and to "maximize immediate profits" (Hearn 1988: 188). The 
difference, as Tiffany (1988) points out, is that this approach holds out little 
hope for any recovery. 
Commonalities Among the Explanations 
In focusing on identifying strategic errors, either those leading to 
decline or those in managing the decline, these approaches fail to 
investigate many of the organizational and industry pressures which 
allowed industry leaders to continue to act in an apparently mistaken 
manner in the face of continuing negative economic information. These 
forms of explanation overlook an intriguing question: why did the 
strategists not see what is (now) so apparent to everyone else? That is, how 
is it possible that virtually all the strategists in the industry failed to "read" 
the environment "correctly?" 
Thus, instead of attempting to understand the changes which have 
occurred — the current plight of the steel industry — these analytical 
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approaches attempt to place blame for these changes, and thereby place 
blame for the decline of some segments of the American economy. In 
their eagerness to locate the cause of the "decline" of the U. S. steel 
industry these forms of explanation ignore interesting questions, as noted 
above, that the interpretive perspective is well suited to approach — in 
particular questions such as how strategists understood their world and 
how that understanding affected the actions they chose to take. 
Within this framework of placing blame, what do these analytical 
approaches propose that the industry do next? Typically, the prescriptions 
take two forms. First, there is a cry for some form of macro-economic 
policy - perhaps a national industrial policy is needed, at the least some 
form of assistance to allow the industry to modernize. Second, the 
industry should rationalize and restructure. That is, firms should close 
unprofitable plants and focus on upgrading those facilities which are at 
least marginally efficient and profitable (Crandall, 1981). Finally, a third 
option offered as a last resort, is that the firms should diversify so as to end 
their reliance on steel (Hogan. 1983). 
The Need for an Additional Form of Explanation 
The options which are derived from the forms of explanation discussed 
above, while they may "make sense" to strategic management researchers 
blessed with hindsight, offer little to strategic managers caught in the 
"realities" of an industry in decline. The large firms have been closing 
plants in record numbers - on one day U.S. Steel announced the closing of 
fifteen plants (USS Annual Report, 1979); and yet they are still losing 
money or just breaking even. Some of the firms have restructured and 
diversified (USS for example); yet continue to lose money in steel and 
contemplate leaving the industry rather than continuing to drain cash 
from other sectors of the firm. Other firms, faced with the specter of 
Chapter 11, simply lack the funds for diversification if they wished to do so. 
We are still left with the problem of how those in the industry made 
sense of their world and why they chose the actions they did. This research 
project, by taking an interpretive perspective, attempts to understand the 
changes which have occurred from the perspective of those in the industry 
at the time. The analytical approach utilized here provides a form of 
explanation additional to that offered by the three approaches discussed 
above. 
The manner in which the field of strategic management has chosen to 
understand the plight of the steel industry has been imposed from outside 
the industry and attempts to "fit" the changes which have occurred into 
one or another general model of industry or organizational change. 
Instead of understanding the steel industry through the lens of an existing 
model, this project is concerned with discovering and understanding how 
those involved in the industry during the period 1945 to 1985 made sense 
of the events which occurred during that period. It is not an attempt to 
provide a set of general management precepts, but is instead a story of the 
complexities faced by industry leaders attempting to understand a 
constantly changing world and searching for rational actions within that 
world. 
The Purpose of this Study and the Approach to be Taken Here 
Understanding Why 
As outlined above, the forms of explanation offered by much of the 
conventional strategic management literature call attention to the fact that 
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the steel industry did not change in the face of negative economic 
information. These explanations have not however, helped us to 
understand how and why this happened. This project is concerned with 
searching for an understanding or explanation of how those in the 
industry made sense of their world; and how that sense making provided 
a rationale for actions taken, while at the same time limiting the 
consideration of possible alternative actions. The purpose here is not to 
identify a particular set of strategic errors, but to go about the process of 
understanding why management made the choices it did. 
The Approach Taken 
The approach taken in this project is based on a set of assumptions 
which will be outlined below. First, as noted earlier this project takes an 
interpretive perspective. This perspective assumes that an individual's 
actions are closely tied to how that individual understands the world 
(Weick,1979). For an organization, as Daft & Weick (1984) have pointed 
out the manner in which top managers understand their world has a 
profound influence on the actions the organization takes. The definition 
of reality developed by strategists, and which they may have inherited 
from previous strategists, provides the framework for organizational 
action. 
The approach taken here further assumes that those in the steel 
industry choose to interpret and represent their world within a framework 
of their devising. That is, faced with an ambiguous field of experience, 
strategists "make relationships by bringing connections and patterns to the 
action" (Smircich & Stubbart,1985:726). The "environment" which 
strategists are attempting to understand and explain is an environment 
which they have helped to create. Note, that this differs from the view 
taken by conventional strategic management literature which assumes that 
strategists are faced with a broad range of alternatives, limited only by the 
resources of the organization. In the view taken here, the alternatives for 
action are limited by the sensemaking, or definition of reality, which 
strategists have both inherited and devised. 
In attempting to uncover the manner in which managers in the steel 
industry have made sense of their world — to understand the actor's point 
of view — it is necessary to discover the logic, rationale, and belief systems 
of industry leaders. One way of doing this is to analyze the texts — "Letters 
to Shareholders" and "Speeches to Conventions" for example — developed 
and delivered by industry leaders. These texts provide a narrative — a 
chronicle of the explanations, justifications, and rationale for actions taken 
or planned. Further, these texts, as well as contemporaneous accounts in 
the popular press, provide a historical narrative — a narrative which 
chronicles not only the rationale of industry leaders, but also the context in 
which these rationales were developed. 
The approach taken here differs from much of the conventional 
strategic management research not only in its search for understanding 
why management made the choices it did, but also in the subset of the 
steel industry studied. While the three forms of explanation discussed 
earlier all differ in the unit of analysis they focus on, they would all agree 
on a definition of the steel industry which would include the steel 
companies but not the Steelworkers Union. This project focuses on the 
United Steelworkers and United States Steel as individual organizations, 
and as organizations inextricably enmeshed in one another's sensemaking 
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and actions. The argument here is that attempting to understand the 
rationales developed by the CEOs of U. S. Steel, without also 
understanding the interactions which occurred with the Presidents of the 
Steelworkers provides only partial understanding. 
Defining an industry as composed solely of the firms in the industry 
ignores the fact that other organizations -- in particular unions — also have 
a vested interest in the future of the organization and the industry. In the 
case of the steel industry the Union and the Corporation represent the two 
major forces operating in the steel industry during much of the forty year 
period under study. The manner in which U. S. Steel management 
characterized the Union and its goals during this period affected the 
manner in which management made sense of, or "read" the environment. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the Union characterized the 
Corporation and its goals may be seen to have reinforced the Corporation's 
"reading" of the environment. 
Ignoring the Steelworkers and the manner in which their sensemaking 
and actions intertwined with those of U. S. Steel would continue to place 
the Union on the sidelines in any consideration of the changes which have 
occurred in the steel industry. Understanding those changes means also 
understanding the role of the Union as a major player in the steel industry. 
Implementing Questions 
The implementing questions discussed below were derived from the 
assumptions and theoretical view discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
interpretive perspective, as noted earlier, leads to the consideration of 
questions of "how" industry leaders understood their world. Additionally, 
these questions reflect the assumption that this understanding profoundly 
20 
influenced the actions the organizations took. Finally, these questions 
focus attention on the intertwining of the sensemaking and actions of the 
Union and the Corporation. 
The first part of this study is concerned with discovering the narratives 
of those inside the steel industry. This section relies on the concept that 
written statements may be taken to be representations of the sense-making 
of those presenting the statements (Rabinow, 1986). The questions to be 
investigated here are as follows: 
1. How do U. S. Steel (USS) and the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA) each characterize themselves? 
a) Explanations/ Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the industry 
2. How do the USS and the USWA characterize each other? 
a) Explanations/ Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the industry 
3. How much overlap is there between the narratives identified 
through questions 1 & 2 for the USS and the USWA? 
4. How much overlap in terms of concepts and relationships within 
the narratives is there from CEO to CEO for the USS and from 
President to President for the USWA? 
The second part of this study is concerned with the actions taken by the 
two organizations and how those actions relate to the narratives 
uncovered in the first part of the study - is there a relationship between the 
manner in which steel industry leaders appear to make sense of their 
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world and the actions they choose to take. The questions to be investigated 
in this part of the study are: 
5. What are the strategic actions which each CEO or President took, 
particularly with respect to the major events which occured during 
his tenure? (For example Truman's attempt to nationalize the 
industry) 
6. Do the strategic actions taken by each side reflect the patterns of 
expressed beliefs identified in the public statements? 
The concepts and beliefs identified through these questions will aid in 
understanding the insider's view of the steel industry. The manner in 
which steel leaders make sense of their world certainly, as the psychologists 
remind us, influence their choice of action within that world. Actions 
which to those of us outside the industry appear to be "mistaken", may be 
"correct" within the context created by those in the industry. This can aid 
in our understanding of how the industry developed over the forty year 
period under study, and how changes were viewed, and understood, by 
those in the industry. 
Significance of this Study 
The significance of this study for strategic management theory and 
research is as follows: 
• the interpretive perspective which underlies this project 
provides another approach, in addition to contingency theory 
and the life cycle approach, to researching and 
understanding how an organization's strategy develops 
and evolves. 
• explicitly includes the union as an important 
strategic actor in the industry. 
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• develops an empirical base for understanding how the 
manner in which strategists "make sense" of, or enact, their 
environments constrains the possibilities for action on the 
part of the organization. 
• explicitly treats organizational and industry history as 
important elements in the development and maintenance of 
strategic frames of reference. 
• utilizes methods from history and narrative analysis in a 
longitudinal study to analyze archival data to understand the 
evolution of strategies in a particular industry and subset 
of organizations. 
The significance for strategic management practice is that this study: 
• provides evidence of the influence of organizational history 
on the evolution and formulation of strategies. 
• provides evidence of the influence of patterns of top 
management succession on the evolution and formulation of 
strategies. 
• raises again the need to incorporate a broader variety of 
perspectives in the strategy formulation process. 
• develops a cautionary tale for managers in other industries. 
Outline of this Study 
As noted above this study attempts to provide a different form of 
explanation to that offered by conventional strategic management for the 
choices made, and the strategic actions taken, by strategic managers in the 
U. S. steel industry during the period 1945 to 1985. The research questions 
stated above provide a means for pursuing an understanding of how 
strategists developed a rationale for the actions they took during this 
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period. The remainder of this study, as it attempts to answer these 
questions, unfolds in the following manner. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a summary of the history of the U. S. steel 
industry, and particularly U. S. Steel and the United Steelworkers, for the 
period 1901 (the year in which U. S. Steel was founded) through 1985. 
Chapter 4 discusses previous studies of the steel industry, as well as the 
relevant literature in strategic management which provides a theoretical 
basis for this study. Chapter 5 discusses and explains the methods used in 
this study. Chapters 6 and 7 present the results of the analysis of the data 
for U. S. Steel and the United Steelworkers respectively, and attempts to 
answer research questions 1,2 and 4-6. Chapter 8 both sums up the 
findings and compares the results for the two organizations and answers 
research question 3. Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the contributions of this 




HISTORY OF THE U. S. STEEL INDUSTRY: 1900 -1945 
U. S. Steel Industry: 1900 - 1920 
United States Steel Corporation 
Formation of the U. S. Steel Corporation. In 1901, J. P. Morgan with 
Judge Elbert Gary, formed the world's first billion dollar corporation. U. S. 
Steel was the combination of National, Carnegie, and Federal Steel, as well 
as some smaller steel and steel finishing companies (Hogan, 1971: 472). 
"The Corporation", as U. S. Steel was known from its founding, was 
capitalized at $1.4 billion and controlled approximately 60% of the steel 
industry. "Never before had so many large companies been drawn into 
one unified operation; not even the famed Standard Oil Company 
approached it in size and scope" (Hogan, 1971:463). 
The formation of U. S. Steel marked the end of a decade of mergers in 
the steel industry. The 1890's had been a period of intense competition 
among the largest firms in the industry. Carnegie Steel was the leader in 
basic steel production and in 1900, Carnegie, like many of his competitors, 
began to move toward becoming a fully integrated steel operation. 
Furthermore, he threatened to build his own rail lines, offering the 
possibility of increased competition and price cutting in both rails and steel 
(Hogan 1971). 
"In the ultimate analysis, it was economic force exerted by Carnegie and 
feared by Morgan that produced the United States Steel Corporation" 
(Hogan, 1971: 470). Carnegie had announced plans to build a giant steel¬ 
finishing plant on the shores of Lake Erie, a move which represented "not 
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only a stage of forward integration and a threat to create excess capacity, but 
also suggested that Carnegie would no longer be confined to dominating 
business in the Pittsburgh area" (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 62). Many of the 
other steel firms were overcapitalized and could not survive a competitive 
battle of the type that Carnegie was about to launch. Excess capacity would 
lead to price wars which in turn might lead to a major economic panic. 
Morgan, by combining his "steel group" with Carnegie's and with the 
Moore group (American Tin Plate, National Steel, American Sheet Steel, 
and American Steel Hoop), could avert any price war and the threat of 
ruinous excess capacity (Hogan, 1971). 
If the merger represented a means of avoiding economic chaos, it also 
reflected an "industrywide evolution toward complete vertical 
integration" (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 62). The firms which were brought 
together to form U. S. Steel had been customers and suppliers of one 
another. The merger was touted as a triumph of efficiency - a firm in 
which "a single set of managers could control costs at every stage of the 
business" (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 62). U. S. Steel at its inception had 
"everything necessary from raw materials through plant and equipment 
needed to produce all types of finished steel products" (Hogan, 1971: 477). 
Additionally, the firm owned its own transportation facilities - steamships, 
barges, and railroads - making it virtually self-sufficient in its production 
capacity. 
Rationalization and Expansion. U. S Steel pursued a program of 
rationalizing and expanding facilities through World War I. From 1901 to 
1905 U. S. Steel dismantled or abandoned thirty-three plants which it 
considered obsolete (USS Annual Reports: 1901 - 1905). At the same time. 
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the firm began construction of a number of new, modern, facilities, 
including expanding the South Works in Chicago and the construction of a 
cement plant in Indiana. By 1911, the Gary Steel Works was virtually 
completed - the "first large integrated steel mill ever to be constructed with 
a capacity to produce over one million tons of steel ingots" (Hogan, 1971: 
508). Other steel mills were built, most notably in Duluth, and new 
production capacity for the cement division was added. 
The Corporation paid for much of this expansion through the use of 
surplus income and the sale of some bonds. As can be seen from tables 2.1 
(p. 28) and 2.2 (p. 29) profits during this time period were sufficient to 
allow dividends to be paid to stockholders and to pay over $600 million for 
expansion and acquisitions during the first two decades. Internal financing 
of new projects was the rule-of-thumb at U. S. Steel. 
All of these acquisitions and expansions did not however, indicate a 
desire to push for additional market share. Rather, Judge Gary in 1908 
declared "We are perfectly satisfied to limit the amount of our business to 
our proportion of capacity and to do everything possible we can to promote 
the interests of our competitors" (Tarbell, 1925: 212). In fact, U. S. Steel was 
content to actually lose market share as its competitors grew. From 1901 to 
1920 U. S. Steel's production as a percentage of total U. S. production fell 
steadily (AISI, 1980). It should be pointed out however, that during this 
time period U. S. Steel remained twice as big as its nearest competitor (See 
table 2.3, p. 30). 
U. S. Steel and the Sherman Anti-trust Act. In 1911, the U. S. 
Government, apparently alarmed by the size of U. S. Steel and the 
possibility of the restraint of trade, filed suit to obtain the dissolution of U. 
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S. Steel under the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The Government's argument 
was twofold - first that U. S. Steel controlled well over 50% of the steel 
industry (See table 2.3, p. 30), and second that it was able to control prices 
(principally through the Gary dinners) and thus restrict competition 
(Tarbell, 1925). 
The Corporation argued that its share of the industry had been 
declining as the independents grew, and that rather than control prices it 
stabilized them. The price of steel rails, which had fluctuated from $17.62 
to $32.29 in the years 1890-1900, had since 1901, remained at $28.00. Judge 
Gary argued that in fact, U. S. Steel acted to keep prices down at a time 
when demand outstripped supply, and that U. S. Steel "exerted a powerful, 
suggestive influence on prices - an influence that was often good, helpful 
and advantageous" (Hogan, 1971: 536) 
Table 2.1: United States Steel Sales and Profits: 1901-1910 
Year Sales Profits Profit as a % of Sales 
1901 $N.A. $60.6 
1902 423.1 90.3 21.3% 
1903 398.1 55.4 13.9 
1904 324.9 30.2 9.3 
1905 409.2 68.6 16.8 
1906 484.0 98.1 20.3 
1907 504.4 104.6 20.7 
1908 331.6 45.7 13.8 
1909 441.1 79.0 17.9 
1910 491.8 87.4 17.8 
Source: United States Steel Corporation Annual Report for 1950,pp. 28-9 
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Table 2.2: United States Steel Shipments, Sales & Profits: 1911-1920 
(Net Tons in Thousands) (Dollars in Millions) 
Year Products 
Shipped 
Sales Profits Profit as a 
% of Sales 
1911 10,340 $431.7 $55.3 12.8 % 
1912 13,771 533.9 54.2 10.2 
1913 13,383 560.8 81.2 14.5 
1914 9,938 412.2 23.4 5.7 
1915 12,868 523.7 75.9 14.5 
1916 17,105 902.3 271.5 30.0 
1917 16,919 1,284.6 224.2 17.5 
1918 15,570 1,344.6 125.3 9.3 
1919 13,470 1,122.6 76.8 6.8 
1920 15,534 1,290.6 109.7 8.5 
Source: United States Steel Corporation Annual Report for 1950, pp. 28-9 
The Government's case finally fell on the lack of complaints from the 
competition. Many competitors had, as the judges pointed out, united "in 
testifying that the business conduct of the Steel Corporation has been fair .. 
. (Hogan, 1971: 537). Further, "The situation is indeed singular and we 
may wonder at it, wonder that the despotism of the Corporation, so 
baneful to the world in the representation of the Government did not 
produce protesting victims ...." (Hogan, 1971: 537). Finally, the pricing 
policies of U. S. Steel were found to be both beneficial and similar to those 
followed by the railroads under the directions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. (Hogan, 1971) This was not the last time the Corporation 
was to be attacked because of its size, but it had been successful for the 
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Independent Steel Producers 
Growth and Development. U. S. Steel was not the only large steel firm 
formed during the first twenty years of the century. "Of the 13 largest iron 
and steel companies in 1967, all but 1 was in operation in 1917. Of those 12, 
8 were already among the 10 largest in the industry in 1917" (Chandler, 
1977: 362). Among these firms were Bethlehem, Armco, Republic, and 
Jones & Laughlin. The only new integrated steel firms organized since 
1917 have been LTV and National, and both of those were formed as the 
result of merging existing firms. (See table 2.4, p. 32) 
The development and growth of the independent producers, in light of 
U. S. Steel's domination of the industry, can be attributed to two 
circumstances. The first was Judge Gary's awareness of the public distrust 
of "big business", as evidenced by the number of dissolution suits brought 
by the Government during the first decade of the century. The second 
circumstance was the remarkable growth in demand for steel during the 
period 1900 -1920 (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 63). 
Two new industries became major consumers of steel between 1900 and 
1920 - automotive and electric machinery. Growth in the production of 
automobiles (4192 units in 1900 to 2.2 million units in 1920) also pushed 
growth in the oil and gas industry (Hogan 1971). Consumption of steel in 
the automotive industry rose from 10,000 net tons in 1904 to over 1 
million tons in 1919. As the demand for steel by the automotive industry 
increased so did the demand for steel by the oil and gas industry. Steel 
derricks replaced wooden ones and iron pipes were used to transport 
petroleum. Petroleum production increased from 179 million barrels in 
1908 to 265 million barrels in 1914 (Hogan, 1971). 
Table 2.4: Eight Largest U. S. Steel Companies — Selected Years 
RANK* 1904 1938 1978 
1 U. S. Steel U. S. Steel U. S. Steel 
2 Jones & Laughlin Bethlehem Bethlehem 
3 Cambria Steel 
[Bethlehem] 
Republic Steel National Steel 
4 Lackawanna 
[Bethlehem] 
Jones & Laughlin LTV {Includes 
Jones & Laughlin 
and Youngstown) 
5 Colorado Fuel 
and Iron 





Sheet and Tube 
[LTV] 
Armco 
7 Republic Inland Steel Inland Steel 
8 Maryland Steel 
[Bethlehem] 
Armco Steel Wheeling- 
Pi ttsburgh 
Sources: Lawrence, P. R. & Dyer, D. Renewing American Industry (1983), 
p.67. 
Hogan, W. T., S.J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in the 
United States. Vols. 2 & 3 (1971) 
* Raw Steel Capacity. 
Name in brackets is the company into which the firm merged. 
The other new industry which used increasing amounts of steel was the 
electrical machinery industry. Electrification of the U. S. increased steadily 
since 1900 and this increase (from 6.0 billion kilowatt hours in 1902 to 24.8 
billion kilowatt hours in 1912) meant that more steel was required to build 
central power stations, power dams, and the machinery and equipment 
required by the industry. As other industries, shipbuilding, containers, and 
agricultural equipment to name a few, became more automated the 
demand for electricity increased with a concommitant increase in the 
demand for steel (Hogan, 1971). 
U. S. Steel, as large as it was, and with its access to tremendous amounts 
of capital could not fill this demand on its own. Production of steel in the 
U. S. "more than quadrupled from 11.4 million to 47.2 million net tons" 
between 1900 and 1920. Further, the percentage which this constituted of 
world steel advanced from 37% to 59% " (Hogan, 1971: 649). This growth 
opened the way for competitors who were not as well capitalized but were 
able, given U. S. Steel's ability to stabilize prices, to produce steel at a profit 
for certain markets. 
Bethlehem Steel. Bethlehem Steel was in many respects typical of the 
independent steel producers. The company had plants on both coasts and 
was primarily involved in shipbuilding. Bethlehem also became a major 
munitions manufacturer during World War I. These war contracts were 
instrumental in stabilizing the firm's financial structure. Prior to World 
War I Bethlehem had plowed virtually all its earnings back into the 
company in an effort to make improvements, acquire other firms, and 
obtain orders. Additionally, the firm had gone heavily into debt in its 
efforts to become a major steel producer - in 1913 earnings were $5.7 
million and total funded debt as of the end of 1912 was $32,441,533 (Hogan, 
1971) Similarly, the stock price in 1913 was at about $30, because the 
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company expected to pay no dividends. By 1915 llu* slock price hml jumped 
to $600 and in 1916 the dividend paid was $30 (1 log an, 1971: .'>'><> 558). 
Other Major Producers. The increase in demand for sleel products 
which occured as a result of World War 1 helped to stabilize the finances of 
most of the larger independent firms. Republic and Armco also benefltled 
greatly from wartime orders, as did the relatively tiny Inland Steel, which 
was producing about 21,000 tons in 1900 and 847,000 tons in 1920 - or about 
2% of the nation's steel (Hogan, 1971). All of these firms, like Bethlehem, 
had been heavily in debt prior to the war as they modernized facilities and 
acquired other smaller firms. The war contracts, and the increase in 
exports prior to direct American involvement in the war, allowed the 
independent steel producers to develop a solid financial base from which 
to compete in the 1920's. 
Thus, while Judge Gary was correct in noting that U. S. Steel’s share of 
the industry had declined as the independent producer's share had 
increased, no one independent producer posed any serious challenge to U. 
S. Steel. By the 1920's Bethlehem, Republic, and Jones & Laughlin were all 
firmly entrenched as major steel producers; but they remained "Little 
Steel" in the face of the dominance of "Big Steel" - the U. S. Steel 
Corporation. 
Steel Exports-Imports 
Steel Exports. The only major U. S. exporter of steel during this period 
was U. S. Steel which set up a subsidiary specifically to handle exporting. 
For much of the period prior to World War I U. S. Steel accounted for 
between 80 - 90% of all U. S. steel exports (Hogan 1971). U. S. Steel’s 
prominence as an exporter was due to a number of elements. First the 
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firm produced specific products for specific countries. Nails for example, 
were produced and packaged according to the specifications of each country 
(Hogan, 1971: 782). Second, the firm maintained approximately 268 
agencies in over 60 countries - selling steel products abroad was a serious 
endeavor. Finally, U. S. Steel maintained staffs of skilled workmen in 
some countries; not only selling the steel to, but also constructing the 
bulding for, the customer (Hogan, 1971). 
U. S. Steel's exporting success was not solely due to its efforts in selling. 
It was also due to its adherence to the common practice of "dumping" 
steel at lower prices in other countries. It was common for producers in 
Europe and the U. S., during the period from 1900 to 1910, to quote lower 
prices for export sales than for the home market. Two general principles 
were said to govern the quoting of prices in foreign countries - 1) the 
general level of competition and 2) the tariffs in existence (Hogan, 1971: 
785). As with the domestic market, U. S. Steel argued that it had to be free 
to price its products to meet the competition. Unlike the domestic market 
however, U. S. Steel could not simply set the price and expect everyone 
else to follow. 
In order to achieve the goal of building up "a permanent and 
continuous export trade with a view to providing markets which at all 
times may be relied upon to absorb a fair proportion of the total 
production. . . " (U. S. S. Annual Report, 1906: 26). U. S. Steel was quite 
willing to undercut the home producers. In 1904 Great Britain, Germany, 
Belgium, and France formed an international rail pool in an attempt to 
stabilize prices. "The one vital flaw in the scheme is that the U. S. Steel 
Corporation and the other American works which export rails are not 
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parties to the agreement” (Hogan, 1971: 788). The same report goes on to 
call American competition "reckless" and willing to quote prices £1 under 
the British and German prices in order to secure an order (Hogan, 1971: 
788). 
Steel Imports. While U. S. Steel was actively pursuing the export 
market, iron and steel imports to the U. S. fluctuated according to business 
conditions. During the years following a depression, for example after the 
depression of 1907, domestic steel prices fell as did imports. Imports 
fluctuated between $20 million to $40 million in the years 1900 - 1910, 
while exports rose from $102 million to $201 million during the same 
period. The steel industry attributed much of this difference to the stiff 
tariffs in effect but in fact, imports rarely competed with domestic products 
and generally rose only when domestic producers were unable to meet 
demand (Hogan, 1971). 
From 1909 to 1914 there was a great deal of agitation for the revision of 
existing tariffs, with steel industry representatives fighting a losing battle to 
retain high tariffs. Many of the arguments used between 1910 and 1913 are 
similar to those used by the industry in the 1980s. 
Foreign producers, it was noted, had lower labor costs and 
lower raw material handling costs that enabled them to 
undersell domestic producers in this country. .. . The 
American price ($39) was a cost price, however, while the 
other European prices ($37.40) were "recent market selling 
prices at a time when the mills are full of orders. 
Other segments of the steel industry (e.g., iron ore, 
machine tools, etc.) also presented vigorous cases in which 
they foresaw increased foreign competition, American 
unemployment, and economic difficulties. Imports which 
had seldom risen above the half-million-ton level (as 
opposed to exports which averaged well over 1 million tons) 
were predicted to rise ominously and rapidly. Foreign 
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competition was going to seize upon the opportunity 
presented by the Underwood Bill and flood the country with 
its products (Hogan, 1971: 799-800). 
The advent of World War I, which followed closely upon the passage of 
the new tariff bill (which did reduce tariffs on steel products), made it 
impossible to detect any impact of the Bill. As was noted above, U. S. 
exports of steel products rose sharply during the war years as the European 
countries ran short of raw materials and steel-produdng capacity. These 
factors combined with the need for munitions drove U. S. exports to a 
record level of close to 6.5 million tons in 1917 (Hogan, 1971: 801-802). 
Although exports declined after the war, imports to the U. S. remained a 
fraction of U. S. exports, giving the U. S. a favorable balance of trade. 
In terms of percentage of production the European producers during 
this period consistently exported more than did the U. S. producers. In 
part, as Hogan (1971: 804-806) points out, this was a matter of economic 
necessity. European producers simply did not have the domestic markets 
which U. S. producers enjoyed. Exports for the U. S., even for U. S. Steel, 
were always a secondary market - a means of getting rid of excess 
production and ensuring that mills were kept running at full capacity. U. 
S. producers became a significant force in the international market by 1920 
as U. S. production rose from 37 to 59% of world steel production, but the 
primary consideration was always the domestic market (Hogan, 1971). 
Steel Labor 
The mergers and acquisitions which brought many of the large steel 
companies into being in the early 20th century also changed the nature of 
the relationship between management and labor. The fate of large 
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numbers of steelworkers was now in the hands of a few large corporations 
rather than the small fragmented firms which had characterized the 
industry prior to 1901. Further, as the industry became more mechanized, 
many of the jobs traditionally held by skilled workers could be filled by 
unskilled labor at a much lower wage. 
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers. The 
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers was the 
dominant union in the industry in 1901. The union was comprised 
exclusively of skilled workmen, and had been an influential force in the 
industry prior to mechanization (Hogan, 1971). In 1901, 1904, and 1909 the 
Amalgamated Association tried unsuccessfully to strike the industry, each 
time losing more ground. By 1910, when the last strike collapsed the 
Amalgamated Association was defeated as a force for labor in the industry. 
The Amalgamated had been "weakened by a fatal inconsistency" 
(Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 65). The Amalgamated continued to admit only 
skilled workers at a time when the industry was turning more and more to 
unskilled immigrants "eager to work in almost any conditions" (Lawrence 
& Dyer, 1983: 65). 
Working Conditions. The steel companies made some attempts to 
improve working conditions in the mills and to stabilize labor- 
management relations. Public pressure, particularly following the release 
of the report of the Stanley Committee in 1912, forced the companies to 
undertake "widespread programs for accident prevention and insurance 
(Hogan, 1971: 453). U. S. Steel instituted an effective "Safety First" program 
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which in a four year period reduced serious accidents by 43%. As the cost 
effectiveness of such a program became apparent other firms followed suit 
(Hogan, 1971). 
The issue which most outraged the public was the twelve-hour day 
which was accompanied every two weeks by a 24-hour "long turn". All of 
the major firms operated their blast furnaces on a 24-hour day, 7-day week 
basis, necessitating either two 12-hour shifts or three 8-hour shifts. The 8- 
hour day was instituted in some plants without a significant increase in 
labor costs. U. S. Steel however, continued to maintain that the 12-hour 
day was necessary for efficient operations, and most mills retained the 12- 
hour day until 1923 (Hogan, 1971; Lawrence & Dyer, 1983). 
Changes in Labor-Management Relations. The outbreak of World War 
I brought about a number of changes in labor-management relations. One 
immediate impact of the hostilities was to virtually halt immigration -- 
the source of much of the unskilled labor in the mills. This in turn, led to 
a severe labor shortage at a time when the companies were being called 
upon to produce at full capacity. Labor unrest over conditions in the mills 
increased, and as the impact of the labor shortage became apparent, 
demands for higher wages also increased. A number of violent strikes 
broke out throughout the industry, and companies began to grant wage 
increases in an attempt to alleviate the unrest (Hogan, 1971: 454-456). By 
1918 employers were complaining that wage increases in steel were so high 
as to cause labor unrest in other industries. 
One of the effects of the labor problems during the war years was to 
make the companies place a higher value on the unskilled labor than they 
had previously. The realization that they were dependent upon 
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immigrants, and that immigration could be cut off at any point, brought an 
increase in welfare programs on the immigrant worker’s behalf (Hogan, 
1971: 456). At the same time, the workers began to realize their value to 
the companies and were less willing to submit to the harsh working 
conditions which they had accepted prior to the war. 
Early Organizing Efforts. In 1917 the American Federation of Labor 
began to organize the steelworkers on a national basis. The National 
Committee for Organizing the Iron and Steel Workers was an attempt "at 
a centralized and united drive to organize steel, once it was recognized that 
the craft unions were powerless to fulfill this function" (Hogan, 1971: 457). 
Union membership continued to increase after the war, and "by May, 1919, 
80,000 steelworkers had been organized" (Hogan, 1971: 457). 
The companies attempted to counteract the union drive by maintaing 
wartime pay rates, and even increasing wages, in spite of the post-war 
slump. However, as the postwar recession continued and production was 
cutback and unemployment increased, which in turn increased labor 
unrest. Between November, 1918 and March, 1919 the labor force at 
Bethlehem Steel was reduced from 28,000 to 11,000 workers (Hogan, 1971: 
458). The National Committee, which by now represented approximately 
20% of the workforce, attempted to appease its members by holding a 
general conference in May, 1919. The membership however, wanted more 
immediate action, and 98% of the membership voted to strike. 
In August 1919 a list of twelve general demands was presented to Judge 
Gary, who refused to engage in collective bargaining with the Committee. 
While the Committee leadership (Samuel Gompers, William Z. Foster, 
and John Fitzpatrick) attempted to find a solution other than striking. 
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pressure from the rank-and-file for a strike increased. On September 21, 
1919 275,000 steelworkers quit the mills, and by the end of September the 
number on strike was about 350,000 (Hogan, 1971: 458). Chicago, 
Youngstown, Wheeling, Cleveland, and Johnstown districts 
werecompletely shut down, and "75% to 85% of the mills in the Pittsburgh 
area were affected" (Hogan, 1971: 458). 
The Effect of the "Red Scare". At first Gary’s refusal to bargain worked 
in favor of the strikers in public opinion. However, Gompers lack of 
support for the strike became known, and more importantly William 
Foster’s radical background became a public issue. Foster, in 1911, had 
published a pamphlet Syndicalism in which he attacked capitalism. This 
element, combined with Bolshevist revolution in Russia, increased the 
public perception that the strike was "a struggle between the American 
system and way of life and that of the Soviets represented by Foster" 
(Hogan, 1971: 459). 
As the "red scare" became more of an issue in the strike, the strikers 
lost both public support, and any hope of government intervention. The 
fear of a Bolshevist revolution began to obscure the very real concerns of 
steelworkers over hours, working conditions, and the right to be 
represented by a union. This was further complicated by the fact that the 
Committee was a loose federation of many union, most of whom were 
seeking their own goals and interests. Thus, while some steelworkers may 
have belonged to Marxist or Bolshevist groups, others were represented by 
the very conservative Amalgamated Association which was opposed to the 
strike as being in violation of its remaining contracts. 
By January 8,1920 the strike was called off, although close to 100,000 
workers remained out of the mills (Hogan, 1971: 459). The companies had 
managed to keep the union out of the mills for the time being, but the 
issues which had driven the workers to strike in such large numbers were 
still unresolved. 
U. S. Steel Industry: 1921 - 1944 
United States Steel Corporation 
The 1920s: Growth and Prosperity. In the decade of the 1920's U. S. Steel 
both shared in, and helped to promote, the economic growth of the United 
States. During this period the Corporation spent $700 million on capital 
investments for modernization programs, and new plant and equipment 
(Hogan, 1971). The increased demand for steel was spurred in large part by 
the increase in the production of automobiles from 2.2 million in 1920 to 
5.3 million in 1929. The increase in auto sales also led to growth in the 
petroleum industry - another heavy user of steel products. The Federal 
Highway Act of 1921 also increased demand for steel as 60,000 miles of 
concrete highway were laid during the 1920’s. Construction of skyscrapers 
such as the Chrysler Building and the Empire State Building was also 
booming during the 1920’s, and the market for structural steel increased 
dramatically. Finally, the home appliance industry expanded rapidly 
during this decade with production of electric refrigerators increasing from 
10,000 in 1920 to almost 800,000 in 1929 (Hogan, 1971: 878-880). 
The capital expenditure program was carried out at the same time as a 
corporate rationalization program through which U. S. Steel concentrated 
the operations of its subsidiaries at a few major geographic points. As new 
plants were built, expanded, or modernized, the smaller, high-cost. 
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obsolete plants of each division were abandoned and later dismantled or 
sold (Hogan, 1971: 892). At the same time, U. S. Steel continued to acquire 
new companies in steel and related areas; and continued its diversification 
with the purchase of Atlas Portland Cement, which was an expansion of an 
existing division, and the purchase of the Oil Well Supply Company which 
took the Corporation into a new field - oil and gas equipment (Hogan, 
1971: 894-5). 
The earlier policy of internal financing of capital expenditures 
continued and U. S. Steel financed its expansion primarily through 
depreciation charges and reinvestment of profits. As can be seen from 
table 2.5 (p. 44). although sales dropped following World War I, 
particularly during the depression years of 1921 and 1922, the Corporation 
continued to earn a profit sufficient to pay dividends and to carry out a 
massive capital investment program. 
The 1930s: Economic Depression. If U. S. Steel participated in the 
economic growth of the 1920's, it, along with the rest of the steel industry, 
"reflected the economy's sick state in the 1930's" (Hogan, 1971: 1193). As 
national and personal income declined so did the purchase of the durable 
goods made of steel. Mills were closed as production fell (see table 2.6, 
p.45), and the capital expenditure program of the 1920's gave way to 
expenditures for maintenance and modernization of that equpment which 
was absolutely necessary for the Corporation to maintain its position in the 
steel markets (see table 2.7, p. 45) (Hogan, 1971:1194). 
The one major capital expenditure program which U. S. Steel did carry 
out during the 1930's was the replacement of "obsolete sheet, strip and 
tinplate facilities with modern equipment" in an effort to regain the sheet 
and tinplate business it had lost during the 1920's (Hogan, 1971: 1195). In 
large part, this investment program was necessitated by ’’revolutionary 
advances in rolling technology in the middle 1920's and early 1930's" 
(Hogan, 1971: 1195). The continuous hot strip mill (developed by Armco in 
1924) and the cold reduction process (developed by Wheeling) led "to 
significant improvements in finished product characteristics, and this 
attracted market demand to those steel companies who installed the new 
facilities" (Hogan, 1971: 1195-6). By the mid-1930's it was apparent that U. 
S. Steel would have to upgrade its facilities as its market share in sheet 
steel (which was used in auto manufacturing) had fallen to about 10%, 
even if it meant borrowing $100 million to finance the project (Hogan, 
1971). 
Table 2.5: United States Steel Shipment, Sales and Income: 1920-1930 
Year Products Shipped Sales Income Income as a 
(Thousand Tons) (Millions) (Millions) 
% of sales 
1920 15,534 $ 1,290.6 $ 109.7 8.5% 
1921 8,758 726.0 36.6 5.0 
1922 13,127 809.0 39.6 4.9 
1923 15,870 1,096.5 108.7 9.9 
1924 12,704 921.4 85.1 9.2 
1925 14,753 1,022.0 90.6 8.9 
1926 15,771 1,082.3 116.7 10.8 
1927 14,310 960.5 87.9 9.2 
1928 15,400 1,005.3 114.1 11.3 
1929 16,813 1,097.4 197.5 18.0 
1930 12,798 828.4 104.4 12.6 
Source: United States Steel Corporation, Annual Report for 1950,.p. 29. 
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Table 2.6: U. S. Steel Industry and U. S. Steel Corp. Production Figures: 
1931-1940 (Millions of Tons) 
Year Industry Ingot % of Industry U. S. Steel Ingot % of U. S. S. 
Production Capacity Production Capacity 
1931 29.0 N.T. 37.6 % 11.3 N.T. 37.5 % 
1932 15.3 19.5 5.5 17.7 
1933 26.0 33.0 9.0 29.4 
1934 29.1 37.4 9.7 31.7 
1935 38.2 48.7 12.5 40.7 
1936 53.5 68.4 18.9 63.4 
1937 56.6 72.5 20.8 71.9 
1938 31.7 39.6 10.5 36.4 
1939 52.8 64.5 17.6 61.0 
1940 67.0 82.1 22.9 82.5 
Source: Hogan, W. T., S.J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States. Volume 3: Parts IV and V. (1971), p. 1194. 
Table 2.7: United States Steel Shipments, Sales, Profits & Capital 
Expenditures: 1930 -1940 
(N.T.s in 000's) ($s in Millions) ($s in Millions) 
Year Products Sales Profits Profits as a Capital 
Shipped % of Sales Expenditures 
1930 12,798 N.T. $828.4 $ 104.4 12.6 % $144.4 
1931 8,399 548.7 13.0 2.4 59.8 
1932 4,324 287.7 (71.2) -2.5 8.0 
1933 6,354 375.0 (36.5) -9.7 9.6 
1934 6,501 420.9 (21.7) -5.2 9.8 
1935 8,086 539.4 1.1 0.2 35.3 
1936 11,905 790.5 50.5 6.4 72.7 
1937 14,098 1,028.4 94.9 9.2 128.9 
1938 7,316 611.1 (7.7) -1.3 70.8 
1939 11,707 846.0 41.1 4.9 26.1 
1940 15,014 1,079.1 102.2 9.5 74.4 
Source: United States Steel Corporation Annual Reports: 1930 - 1940 
Note: Brackets indicate losses; N. T = Net Tons 
The need to break with tradition and borrow money to finance a capital 
project becomes apparent after looking at the sales and profit figures for U. 
S. Steel for the 1930s (see table 2.7, p.45). In four of the ten years the 
Corporation actually experienced a loss, and sales fell from a high of $1.1 
billion in 1929 to $287.7 million in 1932 - the lowest figure in the history of 
U. S. Steel (Hogan, 1971: 1204-5). The modernization of the flat rolled 
facilities was a competitive necessity, but a competitive necessity which 
came in some of the darkest days of U. S. Steel's sales and profit history. 
Corporate Structure. Finally, it must be noted that it was during the 
1930’s that U. S. Steel began to reorganize its corporate structure. As 
Chandler (1977) comments "Until Myron C. Taylor began a massive 
administrative reorganization of the corporation in the 1930 s, the Steel 
Corporation remained little more than a legal consolidation" (Chandler, 
1977: 361). Until Judge Gary's death in 1927 the subsidiaries of U. S. Steel 
had operated virtually as independent companies. Even after Taylor 
undertook the reorganization the Corporation remained 
a hodgepodge of units reflecting its scattered origins. It 
comprised a parent holding company in New Jersey, a central 
management company in Delaware, corporate headquarters 
in Pittsburgh, and a host of subsidiary companies across the 
country. (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 68-9) 
The management company, United States Steel Corporation of 
Delaware stood between United States Steel Corporation (the holding 
company) and its subsidiaries. Its board of directors was composed of its 
own vice president*, the presidents of the principal subsidiaries, and the 
president, chairman of the finance committee, and the chairman of the 
board of directors of the parent company (Hogan, 1971: 1204). The 
principal function of the management company was to be "the 
coordinating body which would pass on appropriations and recommend 
them to the finance committee and also set policy on such items as price, 
purchasing, and industrial relations" (Hogan, 1971, 1204). 
Unionization. One other great change occured in 1937 when U. S. Steel 
signed a labor contract with the Steel Worker's Organizing Committee 
(SWOC), finally recognizing the union "as the principal bargaining agent 
for the employees" (Hogan, 1971: 1204). It is interesting to note that this 
coincides with the completion of Taylor's reorganization of the 
Corporation. 
There are any number of reasons why U. S. Steel chose that moment to 
finally give in to the union after effectively resisting it for so many years. 
Chief among these may be the superiority of the SWOC campaign as 
compared with past unionization efforts combined with the prevailing 
political climate - the Wagner Act had been passed in 1935. Furthermore, 
U. S. Steel had always been subject to greater public pressure than the other 
steel firms simply because of its size. At the outbreak of World War II it 
still controlled about 30% of the steel industry. Finally, 1936 and 1937 were 
recovery years with production at close to 90% of capacity - a strike would 
have been extremely costly. Whatever the reason, U. S. Steel, which had 
for so long led the anti-union campaign for the industry, was the first steel 
corporation to sign a labor agreement with SWOC. 
The 1940s: World War n. The onset of World War II rescued both U. S. 
Steel, and the rest of the industry, from the problems of the depression. 
"In 1940 sales of the corporation passed the billion mark and profits went 
beyond $100 million for the first time in a decade" (Hogan, 1971: 1205). 
Demand for steel products was at an alltime high and production broke all 
records. 
Production may have broken all previous records during the war years, 
and sales almost doubled between 1940 and 1944, but profits declined over 
40% in the same time period (Hogan, 1971: 1211) (See table 2.8, p. 49). This 
paradox can be attributed to a number of circumstances, not least among 
them the rigid Government control of prices while wages were less rigidly 
controlled. Further, war-time taxes were at an all-time high and prices of 
other products and services rose substantially during the war years. Thus, 
while the war years brought U. S. Steel back to full capacity operations, 
unlike World War I the financial stability of the Corporation was not 
improved. 
Independent Steel Producers 
The 1920s: An Era of Prosperity. The independent steel producers had 
come out of World War I in a strong financial condition which allowed 
them to expand and modernize during the 1920s. All of the smaller 
companies were hurt to a greater degree than U. S. Steel by the depression 
in 1921, with Armco's production dropping to 35% of capacity and 
Republic's to about 25% of capacity (Hogan, 1971). As the economy 
recovered so did the independent producers, and by 1929 all of the major 
independent producers had managed to expand their facilities and 
reorganize their operations so that they were assuming a greater role in the 
industry and the economy (See table 2.9, p. 50). 
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Table 2.8: United States Steel Shipments, Sales, and Profits: 1940-1945 
(N. T. in OOP's) (Dollars in Millions) 
Year Products 
Shipped 
Sales Taxes Net Profits Profits as a 
% of Sales 
1940 15,014 $1,079.1 $68.1 $102.2 9.5% 
1941 20,417 1,622.3 168.6 116.2 7.2 
1942 20,615 1,863.0 201.3 71.2 3.8 
1943 20,148 1,972.3 125.9 62.6 3.2 
1944 21,052 2,082.2 105.8 60.8 2.9 
1945 18,410 1,747.3 66.8 58.0 3.3 
Source: United States Steel Corporation Annual Report for 1953, pp. 28-9. 
Mergers and Acquisitions. During the 1920's the independent 
producers continued to expand through acquisitions and mergers. 
Bethlehem for example, acquired Lackawanna and attempted a merger 
with Youngstown. The rationale for acquisitions — for Bethlehem and the 
other producers -- was that it was less expensive and simpler to buy new 
production capacity and the ability to enter markets the firm was not 
currently in, than to build new facilities (Hogan, 1971: 903-906). 
The economic necessity of mergers and acquisitions is best illustrated in 
the case of National Steel - formed in 1929 by the merger of Weirton, Great 
Lakes, and M. A. Hanna Steel Companies. As in the case of Bethlehem and 
other independent producers, the formation of National created an 
integrated steel operation able to compete with U. S. Steel. Hanna was a 
supplier of iron ore and other raw materials to the steel industry; Great 
Lakes was the only major steel producer located near Detroit; and Weirton 
produced a broad range of products for consumers other than the 
automobile industry. Thus, as with Bethlehem's acquisition of 
Lackawanna, National had immediate access to new markets and sources 
of raw materials, as well as increased access to financing for future growth 
(Hogan, 1971: 957-958). 
Table 2.9: Net Income of Selected Integrated Steel Companies in 1929 
Corporation Net Income 
United States Steel Corporation $197,592,000 
Bethlehem Steel 42,242,000 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 21,564,000 
Jones and Laughlin 20,848,000 
Republic Steel 20,226,000 
National Steel 12,573,000 
Inland Steel 11,712,000 
Wheeling Steel 8,005,000 
American Rolling Mill 6,110,000 
Otis Steel 3,687,000 
$344,599,000 
Source: Hogan, W. T., S.J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States. Volume 3: Parts IV and V. (1971), p. 959. 
The 1930s: Contraction of the Industry. The 1930s were a period of 
severe depression and contraction for American industry in general, and 
particularly for the iron and steel industry. As noted above, even U. S. 
Steel experienced losses and had to borrow funds to continue its 
modernization program. In 1932 "total steel production for the United 
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States reached its lowest level since 1901" and the industry was operating 
below 20% of capacity (Hogan, 1971:1212) (see table 2.10, p. 51). Further, 
between 35% to 40% of products shipped during this decade were light flat 
rolled steels, giving a tremendous advantage to firms which had installed 
continuous sheet rolling systems (Hogan, 1971: 1246). 
Table 2.10: Net Income of Selected Steel Companies (in millions of 
dollars): 1930-1939 
Year Bethlehem Republic National Armco Tones & 
Lauehlin 
1930 $23.8 ($3.5) $8.4 $0.11 $9.1 
1931 0.1 (9.0) 4.4 (3.1) (2.3) 
1932 (19.4) (11.3) 1.7 (2.0) (7.9) 
1933 (8.7) (4.1) 2.8 (0.67) (5.4) 
1934 (0.6) (3.5) 6.1 0.96 (3.7) 
1935 4.3 4.5 11.1 4.3 (0.4) 
1936 13.9 9.6 12.5 6.4 4.1 
1937 31.8 9.0 17.8 8.2 4.8 
1938 5.3 (7.9) 6.7 (1.3) (5.9) 
1939 24.6 10.7 12.6 4.0 3.2 
Source: Hogan, W. T., S.J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States. Volume 3: Parts IV and V. (1971), pp. 1212, 1217, 1235, 
1239,1247,1255,1259,1282,1284 
Note: Brackets indicate losses 
The importance of light flat rolled steels during the 1930s meant that 
most of the independent producers, like U. S. Steel, found themselves 
having to invest in modernization programs while experiencing net losses 
(see table 2.10, p. 51). The exceptions were firms like Armco, which had 
invented the continuous rolling system, and National - the only firm to 
operate in the black throughout the 1930s - with its favorable location 
outside of Detroit. Others, like Inland, began huge construction programs 
(spending $14.4 million in 1931) in an effort to regain a position in the light 
rolled market (Hogan, 1971). 
The 1930s was also a period of corporate reorganization for most steel 
firms. The acquisitions and mergers of the 1920s and 1930s had left most 
firms with a loosely knit network of companies involved in different 
aspects of steel production. The independent steel producers had pursued 
an acquisition strategy in order to develop as fully integrated steel 
producers, but had not undertaken the management reorganization 
necessary to coordinate operations. The depression of the 1930s, which 
emphasized the need to cut costs and operate as efficiently as possible, 
pushed many firms to consolidate management activities and to further 
rationalize obsolete or inefficient operations (Hogan, 1971; Lawrence & 
Dyer, 1983). 
The 1940s: World War H The corporate reorganization of the 1930s 
served the firms well during the war years. Steel companies which had 
operated at about 50-70% of capacity throughout the 1930s operated at 
approximately 100% of capacity during the period 1941-1945 (see table 2.11, 
p. 53). Furthermore, ambitious expansion programs were undertaken by 
all steel companies in order to better meet the demand for war materiel. 
These programs, as well as the need to comply with a variety of 
government programs and regulations, led to further consolidation of 
management control of the subsidiaries (Hogan, 1971). 
Table 2.11: Rated Annual Capacity, Actual Production, and Per Cent of 
Rated Capacity for Selected Steel Companies: 1939-1945 
Bethlehem Steel Company 
Year Rated Annual Capacity Actual Production % of Capacity 
1939 11,247,000 N.T. 7,958,636 N.T. 70.8% 
1940 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1941 11,981,400 12,155,476 101.5 
1942 12,700,000 12,451,692 98.0 
1943 12,900,000 13,015,755 100.9 
1944 12,900,000 13,262,348 102.8 
1945 12,900,000 11,831,610 91.7 
Tones & Laughlin Steel 
Year Rated Annual Capacity Actual Production % of Capacity 
1939 N.A. 2,200,000 N.T. 60.0% 
1940 N.A. 3,300,000 85.0 
1941 N.A. 3,900,000 99.0 
1942 N.A. 4,500,000 103.0 
1943 N.A. 5,100,000 102.0 
1944 N.A. 5,100,000 101.0 
1945 N.A. 4,400,000 88.0 
Armco Steel Company 
Year Rated Annual Capacity Actual Production % of Capacity 
1939 N.A. 1,934,987 64.7 
1940 N.A. 2,093,143 69.1 
1941 N.A. 2,744,265 92.8 
1942 N.A. 2,848,739 90.9 
1943 N.A. 3,115,410 96.8 
1944 N.A. 3,040,014 93.1 
1945 N.A. 2,992,020 88.5 
Source: Hogan, W. T., S.J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States. Volume 3: Parts IV and V, (1971), pp.1217, 1224, 1260, 
1266,1287. 
While production and sales increased at a record rate during the war 
years, profits did not. As noted earlier. Government taxes and price 
While production and sales increased at a record rate during the war 
years, profits did not. As noted earlier. Government taxes and price 
controls severely limited the profitability of most steel firms. Wages were 
not controlled as severely as prices, and wage increases during this period 
not only affected profits, but impacted post-war wage expectations. The 
need to further expand facilities also strained corporations whose finances 
were just beginning to recover from the Depression years. World War n, 
while rescuing the steel industry from problems of capacity 
underutilization, did not strengthen the companies financially as World 
War I had. Rather, in 1946 the companies were left with smaller profit 
margins on record levels of production, higher wages than had been the 
case before the war, and new or partially completed facilities, which any 
decline in demand would render useless (Hogan, 1971; Lawrence & Dyer, 
1983). 
Steel Exports-Imports 
The 1920s. Throughout the 1920s steel imports to the U. S. increased, 
rarely falling below 700,000 tons (Hogan, 1971). Steel imports were not 
affected by the increased tariffs of the 1920s, but at the same time the 
percentage gain for imports, when compared to domestic production was 
relatively unimportant (Hogan, 1971: 1090-1091). Thus, the tariffs, which 
were enacted to protect domestic "infant industries" had as a Brookings 
Institute study pointed out virtually no effect on domestic steel production 
(Berglund & Wright, 1929). Exports in the 1920s declined from the record 
levels of the war years, but remained far in excess of imports (see table 2.12, 
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p. 55). Canada accounted for approximately 40% of the U. S. exports, with 
much of the remainder going to the U. K. and South America (Hogan, 
1971). 
Table 2.12: United States Iron and Steel Exports and Imports: 1920 - 1930 




1920 410,857 4,935,137 
1921 123,615 2,213,549 
1922 725,855 2,095,270 
1923 764,240 2,134,062 
1924 577,240 1,924,824 
1925 956,094 1,902,404 
1926 1,084,342 2,186,574 
1927 721,775 2,201,969 
1928 774,212 2,889,549 
1929 736,081 3,063,075 
1930 572,280 2,004,710 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute Annual Statistical Reports: 1923: 
p. 74; 
1926: pp. 75-77; 1931: pp. 77-79. 
The 1930s: Economic Decline. The depression of the 1930s brought 
about a general decline in the level of both steel imports and exports, 
particularly in the first half of the decade. The adoption of the Hawley- 
Smoot tariff in 1930 further increased rates on imported steel products in 
an attempt to protect the domestic industry. However, as Hogan (1971) 
points out 
products whose rates were raised in 1930 decreased in 
production and again the influence of the Depression rather 
than imports produced the effect. It is quite evident that the 
tariff had negligible influence on the production of ordinary 
steel products, one way or the other (Hogan 1971: 1426). 
Exports continued to outstrip imports throughout the 1930s (see table 
2.13, p. 56), although the level of exports of most products declined from 
1930 to 1932 and increased slowly after 1933. The one exception was the 
export of steel scrap which rose dramatically until 1934 and remained at a 
high level throughot the rest of the decade (see table 2.14, p. 57). The 
increase in scrap exports is directly attributable to the decline in industrial 
activity at home and the "lively market abroad for it" (Hogan, 1971: 1427). 
Ironically, between 60-70% of scrap exports went to Japan -- a fact which 
became a sore spot with industry executives after the war when scrap metal 
was in short supply domestically. 
Table 2.13: United States Iron and Steel Imports and Exports: 1931 -1940 




1931 413,610 984,815 
1932 371,440 605,937 
1933 394,249 1,356,356 
1934 298,534 2,832,081 
1935 495,844 3,460,483 
1936 751,162 3,549,654 
1937 600,505 8,508,658 
1938 294,960 5,880,683 
1939 353,237 6,832,054 
1940 64,179 11,981,664 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Reports: 1935:pp. 45-46, 56; 1941: pp. 58-59,70 
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In 1934 the U. S. began to enter into reciprocal tariff agreements with 
other countries for specific products. The lowered rates on many products 
did lead to an increase in imports, but exports continued to increase at an 
even greater rate (see table 2.15, p. 58). This is particularly true after 1937 as 
Europe began to prepare for war and require greater amounts of steel 
products. By 1940 imports to the U. S. were approximately 64,000 tons 
while exports were almost 12 million tons. 
Table 2.14: United States Export of Scrap Steel: 1931-1940 
(Gross Tons) (Net Tons) 
Year Total Tapan U. K. Italy Canada 
1931 136,125 N.A N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1932 227,522 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1933 773,406 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1934 1,835,170 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1935 2360,643 125,213 310,650 432,464 107,458 
1936 2,168,468 1,184356 408,659 319341 71357 
1937 4393,735 2,140389 948,838 427,161 207340 
1938 3358,422 1,547,617 433,829 486,883 103,283 
1939 4,014,572 2,279315 569,288 477,004 196356 
1940 3,161,859 1,079,141 1,085,756 359,434 426389 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Report 1935: pp. 45-46; 1941: p. 57 
United States Tariff Commission Iron and Steel Report, No. 128. 1938pp. 
463, 512, 521. 
World War II. The war years saw a decline in direct imports and 
exports of steel products. However, steel exports in the form of war 
materials and supplies are not included in the official statistics, which 
therefore underestimate the true volume of exports. Imports never 
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reached the 200,000 ton mark, and much of the import volume was scrap 
metal - reflecting the effects of the export of scrap metal during the 1930s 
(see table 2.16, p. 58). The isolation of the U. S. industry from the direct 
effects of the war allowed U. S. steel manufacturers to survive the war 
years intact, and remain the largest source of steel products in the world. 
Table 2.15: United States Iron and Steel Imports and Exports: 1941 -1945 
Year Total Exports Total Imports 
(Net Tons) (Net Tons) 
1941 8,070,304 113,576 
1942 7,421,183 124,211 
1943 7,346,115 186,622 
1944 6,246,845 193,150 
1945 5,205,063 192,634 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Report for 1945 pp. 74-75, 86; 1946: p. 118. 
Table 2.16: United States Exports and Imports of Iron and Steel Scrap: 1941 - 
1945 
Year Total Exports Total Imports 
(Net Tons) (Net Tons) 
1941 904,249 71,978 
1942 141,736 82,240 
1943 55,041 147,206 
1944 95,857 111,060 
1945 95,734 46,271 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Report for 1945 pp. 74-75, 86; 1946:p. 118. 
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Steel Labor 
The 1920s: The Non-Union Era. Labor-management relations in the 
1920s were colored by two issues - the failed strike of 1919 and immigration 
quotas. The failure of the 1919 strike left steelworkers without a strong 
central union to organize further labor action. As the economy recovered 
from the post-war depression, and steel production increased, there was a 
severe "strain on the industry's supply of unskilled labor" (Hogan, 1971: 
861). This led management to develop new worker welfare programs and 
employee representation plans. The combined effect of no strong union 
and improved welfare programs is evident in the decline in the number of 
strikes which occured during the 1920s (76 strikes in 1919, while in 1926, 
1927, and 1928 there were only 2 strikes in each year.) (Hogan, 1971). 
The restrictions on European immigration during the 1920s, as noted 
above, placed severe limitations on the availability of unskilled labor. This 
in turn, made the companies more receptive to demands of labor - even 
without a strong union. The increased demand for steel in the 1920s from 
new industries like automobiles and highway construction made labor 
peace a necessity for most producers. Loss of production due to a strike 
meant possible loss of market share to other producers - something no one 
could afford. 
The Eight-Hour Day. The desire for labor peace on the part of 
management became most apparent in the move toward the eight-hour 
work day — something which had been strongly resisted in the past. Public 
pressure for the adoption of an eight-hour day was one of the few benefits 
derived from the 1919 strike. The investigations into the strike by both the 
U. S. Senate and the Interchurch World Movement had received wide 
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publicity, "and created deep concern over the twelve-hour day" (Hogan, 
1971: 873). Public pressure became so strong that Judge Gary who had 
attacked the eight-hour day as "an attempt to raise wages" (Hogan, 1971: 
872), appointed a committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute to 
"convert the steel industry to the belief that a switch to the eight-hour day 
was desirable" (Hogan, 1971: 873). 
By 1923 President Harding was involved in the controversy, and in a 
letter to Gary stated that 
I am wondering if it would not be possible for the steel 
industry to consider giving an undertaking that before there 
shall be any reduction in the staff or employees of the 
industry through any recession of demand for steel products, 
or at any time when there is a surplus of labor available that 
then the change should be made from the two shifts to the 
three-shift basis (Tarbell, 1925: 297). 
The changeover to the eight hour day was accomplished by the end of 1923, 
although Gary complained that it was adding about 10 % to the cost of 
producing steel (Hogan, 1971: 874). 
The 1930s: The Steel Workers Organizing Committee. If the prosperity 
of the 1920s brought labor peace to the steel industry, the Depression of the 
1930s brought unemployment, lower wages, and labor unrest. The 
National Recovery Act (1933), which in 1935 was replaced by the National 
Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), affirmed labor's right to collective 
bargaining. By the end of the 1930s U. S. Steel had signed a contract with 
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) and the unionization of 
"Little Steel" was well under way. 
The initial response of the steel companies to the NRA was to expand 
the program of employee participation plans which Bethlehem and Armco 
had put into place in the 1920s. These plans allowed the companies to 
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retain control of the labor organization while complying with the law. 
Ironically, the employee participation plans served as a training ground for 
many steel union leaders, as well as demonstrating to steelworkers the 
benefits and effectiveness of collective bargaining (Brooks, 1940). From 
1933 to 1936 the plans achieved a number of concessions, in particular wage 
increases and the introduction of vacations with pay. 
At the same time that the companies were promoting employee 
participation plans , rank and file steelworkers were working to organize 
themselves. The initial efforts focused on reviving the Amalgamated 
Association which had been dormant since the 1919 strike. The lack of 
interest on the part of the leadership of the Amalgamated Association and 
the American Federation of Labor however, left the rank and file workers 
without adequate capital, a national organization, or the central leadership 
necessary to conduct any kind of coordinated organizing effort. 
This lack of interest led the Committee for Industrial Organization, and 
the United Mine Workers, to undertake the task of organizing steel. The 
Mine Workers, under the leadership of John L. Lewis, had both the 
resources and the leadership necessary to carry out a national organizing 
drive. By June of 1936 the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, under 
the direction of Philip Murray - vice president of the UMW - was 
organized and ready to begin unionizing steel. 
The Steel Workers Organizing Committee represented a force 
for unionism unlike any other that the industry had 
encountered. Previous attempts to set up an independent 
labor organization in the steel industry were not properly 
planned or coordinated and generally lacked adequate 
financial support. Behind the SWOC drive stood the CIO and 
the United Mine Workers, as well as the knowledge and 
experience gained from the defeat of the earlier union drives. 
Further, economic and political conditions were favorable for 
a union movement. Between June, 1936, when the drive 
commenced, and May, 1937, steel operation rose from 71% to 
89% of capacity, the number of workers increased by 50,000, 
and payrolls rose 50%. The Wagner Act of 1935 and 
organizations, such as the La Follette Civil Liberties 
Committee, were additional helpful factors (Hogan, 1971: 
1170). 
The companies, through the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), 
opposed the activities of the SWOC. The opposition of the AISI, like the 
company organized employee participation plans, was to the benefit of the 
union movement. Company opposition offered both a platform for 
publicizing the SWOC activities, and a rallying point for workers opposed 
to the company position. By March 1937 the SWOC "had signed 150,000 
steelworkers and had established scores of lodges throughout the steel 
communities" (Hogan, 1971: 1171). 
The union drive was focused on the Carnegie-Illinois subsidiary of U. S. 
Steel. In July 1936 U. S. Steel and its subsidiaries had announced that the 
firm would only pay overtime after a forty-eight hour work week. The 
SWOC branded this as an attempt to force the forty-eight hour week on the 
industry (Brooks, 1940). This announcement by the company served to 
unite progressive and conservative elements of the employee 
representative plan behind the SWOC, and led to some 3,000 workers at 
the Chicago South Works of Carnegie-Illinois joining with "the SWOC in 
a protest demonstration against the company's Associated Employees 
Organization" (Hogan, 1971: 1172). 
Organizing U. S. Steel. By January 1937 the officers of U. S. Steel were 
meeting with the John L. Lewis in an attempt to work out an agreement 
with the SWOC. In March the Carnegie-Illinois subsidiary signed an 
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agreement with the SWOC which recognized the SWOC as the bargaining 
agent for its members and provided for a formal contract between the two 
groups (Hogan, 1971). Following the signing of this agreement SWOC 
membership increased rapidly. 
By April 10,1937, the SWOC was able to report that it had 
negotiated union contracts with 51 steel companiesand that 
492 lodges of the union were functioning throughout the 
nation's steel centers. By May 1 approximately 280,000 
steelworkers in 88 companies had been signed. The week of 
May 3 to May 8 saw 37,048 members enter the union ranks. 
But, despite such successes, the union made littel progress 
among tne large independent steel producers. With the 
exception of Wheeling Steel, none of the large independents 
had signed union contracts (Hogan, 1971: 11/7). 
The SWOC was successful in getting contracts with U. S. Steel and a 
number of the smaller firms because it threatened to strike only one firm 
at a time. In 1936 the industry was operating at 89% of capacity and was 
regaining some of its earlier losses. A strike against any one firm meant 
the possibility of permanently losing orders and revenues - something no 
steel company could afford in the 1930s (Hogan, 1971). 
Organizing "Little Steel". The "little steel" companies (Bethlehem, 
Inland, Armco, National, Republic, and Youngstown) continued to resist 
the SWOC attempts at unionization, and did not sign contracts until 1941. 
The SWOC struck these companies during 1937, but unlike the situation at 
U. S. Steel, striking more than one company minimized the competitive 
threat exerted by the rest of the industry and allowed the companies to 
withstand the strike. The recession which began toward the end of 1937, 
with a resultant drop in employment in the steel industry, contributed to 
the problems the SWOC experienced in organizing "little steel" (Hogan 
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1971). The advent of World War II, and the need for full utilization of 
steel industry capacity, finally forced "little steel" to recognize the SWOC, 
and by 1942 "the stewardship of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee 
had come to an end" and the United Steelworkers of America was formed 
(Hogan, 1971:1184). 
World War II. The USWA began to function on an industry-wide basis 
at a time when the nation required an all-out effort on the part of the steel 
industry to meet the war demand for steel products. As can be seen from 
table 2.17 production and employment expanded rapidly during the first 
years of the war, and no firm could afford to be accused of causing a strike. 
Table 2.17: Production, Employment, and Average Weekly Hours of 
Work in the Basic Steel Industry 1940-1945 
Year Ingot Production Emplovees Average Hours 
Per Week 
(Million Tons) (in thousands) (per emplovee) 
1940 67.0 454.0 36.1 
1941 82.8 507.3 38.5 
1942 86.0 511.4 38.9 
1943 88.8 487.2 42.9 
1944 89.6 456.7 46.6 
1945 79.7 438.8 44.1 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Report for 1950 pp. 11, 30 
During the war years the USWA negotiated a new contract which 
included a number of concessions on the part of the steel companies, in 
particular the establishment of a shift differential in pay, severance pay. 
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and paid vacation time tied to length of service (Hogan, 1971: 1185-1186). 
By the end of World War II the USWA had not only gained important 
concessions from the steel companies, but could said to represent the 
majority of U. S. steelworkers - both factors which placed the union in a 
position of strength as the industry converted to peacetime in the late 
1940s. 
The Condition of the U. S. Steel Industry at the End of World War II 
The Integrated Steel Firms 
The advent of World War II brought the integrated firms back to a 
condition of operating at full capacity, and rescued many firms from the 
problems of the Depression era. The end of the war found the firms 
continuing to operate at near capacity levels (see table 2.11, p. 53), although 
profits for most of the firms during the war years remained relatively low 
(for example U. S. Steel; table 2.8, p. 49). Government price controls 
throughout the war, combined with higher corporate income tax rates, 
kept net income for most firms below five percent during this period. 
Thus, unlike World War I, the war years did not help to stabilize the steel 
industry's financial structure. 
During the war the Government pursued a program of building steel 
mills and leasing them to steel firms to operate with a provision that after 
the war the firms would buy the mills (Tiffany, 1988). By the end of the 
war this expansion program left the U. S. steel industry with approximately 
95 million tons of capacity, far more than the pre-war U. S. economy had 
been able to utilize; and even world steel demand in 1937 - the last year 
before the war build-up had begun - had only been 133.5 million tons 
(Tiffany, 1988). The capacity issue which had prompted the Government 
65 
to build the mills, and the industry to worry about adding capacity in light 
of normal world steel demand, continued to be debated after the war with 
long-lasting consequences for the industry as a whole. The post-war 
debate, and its effect on steel industry plans and investment programs, will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Finally, by the end of the war, most of the integrated steel firms had 
been unionized, partly from a recognition on all sides that strikes, 
walkouts, and lockouts would not be tolerated by the Government during 
the war. While the Government imposed wage controls as well as price 
controls, wage increases were generally considered separately from price 
increases with the result that wages rose faster than prices during the early 
1940s (Hogan, 1971). This was particularly true in an industry like steel, 
where disputes over wage increases could lead to a slowdown in the 
production of a basic component of much of the needed war materiel. 
The integrated firms ended the war paying higher wages than in the 
past, while unable to raise prices sufficiently to cover the increases in wages 
and other goods. Capacity had been expanded, perhaps to dangerous levels, 
but much capacity had also been worn out by the round-the-clock 
production schedule required by the war. Capacity utilization had 
increased, but profits had not. Imports had virtually ceased during the war, 
and the U. S. isolation from the direct effects of the war as noted earlier, left 
the U. S. in the position of being the largest source of steel products in the 
world. The effect of all of these circumstances on the post-war U. S. steel 
industry will described further in Chapter 3. 
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Steel Labor 
The position of steel labor underwent a series of changes during the war 
years. First, much as had happened during World War I, the companies 
found a supply of new labor - immigrants - cut off. Additionally, as the 
war dragged on longer than expected, more and more men of working age 
were called into military service, further depleting the available supply of 
labor. Women began working in the steel mills during this period, along 
with those too old or too young for military service. Finally, the 
companies found themselves installing programs to hire, not only able- 
bodied veterans, but those disabled during the war years. The changing 
composition of the labor force, at the very time when steel mills needed to 
operate at full capacity, meant that management had to pay more attention 
to the welfare of its workforce. 
The effects of these changes are most evident in the fact that the United 
Steelworkers were able to get contracts with virtually all of the major steel 
firms during the war period —even those members of "Little Steel" who 
had been most determined to hold out. The contracts negotiated during 
the war years gave the workers important new benefits such as paid 
vacation time tied to length of service, as well as pay increases. Most 
importantly however, the ability of the USWA to gain industry-wide 
concessions for its members put it in a position of considerable strength at 
the end of the war. 
This strength and the loyalty of the membership, would be tested in a 
number of labor disputes following the war. As the war ended however, 
an important new player — the USWA - had entered the industry. The 
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changes the Union was to bring about, and its effect on the industry as a 
whole in the post war years will discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY OF THE U. S. STEEL INDUSTRY: 1945 -1985 
The Post-War Era: 1946-1950 
The Integrated Steel Firms 
The period immediately following World War n was one of national 
turmoil as the nation readjusted to peacetime and began to help Europe 
and Japan rebuild after the war. On the domestic front, peace brought with 
it the need to rebuild the civilian economy battered by ten years of 
economic depression followed by an all-out war effort. These issues placed 
tremendous strains on the capacity of the U. S. steel industry, which in 
1947 accounted for 56.7% of the world's steel production (Hogan, 1971). 
The Issue of Steel Capacity. The strains on capacity were made worse by 
the fact that steel industry executives, along with most businessmen and 
economists, had expected "a postwar depression similar to that which 
followed World War I" (Hogan, 1971: 1652). Instead, "the trend proved to 
be the reverse, and in place of a deflationary period accompanied by a 
depression, the country was caught in the throes of a sharp inflation" 
(Hogan, 1971: 1652). Additionally, the industry as a whole, was faced with 
the need to expand and modernize production facilities physically worn 
out by the war years. New sources of raw materials had to be located, to 
supplement those like the Mesabi Iron Ore Range severely depleted by the 
war effort. 
1946 was the first full year of peace and demand for steel products was 
high as industries like automobiles returned to the manufacture of civilian 
products for the first time since 1942. As can be seen from table 3.1 (p. 71) 
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however, the industry operated well below capacity, and profit margins 
remained well below the records of the 1920s. In large part, this can be 
explained by the scarcity of steel scrap following the war, and the number 
of strikes both in steel, and in related industries. Production in the steel 
industry itself was shut down for a month at the beginning of the year, and 
disrupted later by the effect of strikes in the coal mines which led to 
shortages of electricity. Additionally, Government price controls and 
excess profits tax remained in effect until November, further depressing 
profits. 
The effects of the strong steel demand in 1946, and the continuing 
pressures on steel firms to increase production, can be seen in the 
investment programs of many of the independent steel producers to 
increase and modernize capacity. Bethlehem, for example, in 1946 
announced a $162.5 million program for the replacement of existing 
equipment and the development of new sources of raw materials. By 1948 
Bethlehem had added over 1 million tons of capacity (Hogan, 1971:1687). 
The other independent steel producers followed similar programs, with 
the result that rated capacity for the industry increased 9.7% between 
January 1,1947 and January 1,1948 (Iron Age, Tan. 6,1949: 200). 
Demand for steel remained strong through 1947 and 1948, and in fact 
the industry was placed in the position of rationing steel. The impact of 
this situation, combined with the firms’ ability to raise prices once price 
controls had been lifted, can be seen in the increased profit margins of the 
independent steel producers (see table 3.1 p. 71). The industry however, 
did not expect the strong demand to continue "more than a few years at 
best" (Iron Age, 1/6/1949: 205), and continued to resist demands for more 
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Table 3.1: Production, Sales, and Net Income for Selected Steel Companies 
(Net Tons & Millions of Dollars) 1946 -1950 
Bethlehem Steel 
Year Production % of Capacity Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1946 10.0 N.T. 77.6% $ 791.7 $41.7 5.3% 
1947 12.8 99.3 1,034.9 51.1 4.9 
1948 13.4 97.2 1,315.2 90.3 6.9 
1949 12.6 88.7 1,271.0 99.3 7.8 
1950 15.1 100.8 1,445.4 123.0 8.5 
Republic Steel 
Year Production % of Capacity Revenues Net Income %of 
Revenues 
1946 6.3 N.T. 70.3% $415.8 $16.0 3.9% 
1947 8.0 92.9 649.8 31.0 4.8 
1948 8.6 96.8 772.0 46.4 6.0 
1949 6.8 79.1 656.9 46.4 7.0 
1950 8.6 98.3 881.7 63.8 7.8 
Tones & Laughlin Steel 
Year Production % of Capacity Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1946 3.8 N.T. 80.0% $246.7 $n.i 4.5% 
1947 4.5 95.0 350.1 20.1 5.7 
1948 4.7 97.0 446.1 32.9 7.4 
1949 4.2 87.0 386.0 22.2 5.8 
1950 4.9 102.1 487.4 39.7 8.1 
Youngstown Steel 
Year Production % of Capacity Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1946 3.2 N.T. 81.0% $216.1 $14.3 6.6% 
1947 3.9 98.9 306.2 26.3 8.6 
1948 4.0 99.1 378.0 35.7 9.4 
1949 3.5 85.2 334.3 31.7 9.5 
1950 4.1 101.0 404.0 40.6 10.0 
Source: Hogan, W. T., S. J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States. Volume 4. (1971) pp. 1687, 1709,1747, 1821. 
rapid expansion of capacity. Iron Age in 1949 reflected the industry 
sentiment when it reported "An expensive program of expansion based on 
the figures cited by some of the planners would certainly wreck tomorow's 
market. There are enough threats to steel prices without steelmakers going 
out of their way to commit suicide" (1/6/1949: 204). 
The steel capacity situation was a political issue during much of this 
period, as consumers, unable to meet demand for their products, insisted 
that Washington do something about increasing industry capacity. In 1947 
the Senate Small Business Committee began a series of hearings on the 
steel capacity problem which called increased attention to the issue and 
"enhanced the standing of more radical political elements who were 
demanding government control of the mills" (Tiffany, 1988: 28). 
The industry reaction to these complaints and threats was best 
presented in Iron Age in January 1949. 
Steel capacity will continue to be a political football just as 
long as everyone can't get all the steel he wants. When steel 
begins to come out of everyone's ears — and that date is 
getting closer — the subject will go into hibernation to emerge 
when, as and if there is a sharp recession. 
One reason steel is in tight supply now is that its price 
(including extras) has risen less than most other commodities. 
The steel "shortage" could have been snuffed out long ago if 
prices had been boosted to gray market levels. For their own 
selfish interest, which is also the common interest, steel men 
don't want knowingly to price themselves out of the market. 
They want to make money tomorrow, too. 
Steel company executives can not legally get together to plan 
changes in capacity. Nor would they do so if they could. 
Further expansion depends on a host of things. In essence it 
will come if individual companies see a chance to make 
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money on it — if they can pay for it and get the raw materials 
to supply it (Iron Age. 1/6/49: 204-205). 
The debate over steel capacity took place in the broader context of a 
national debate over two issues — the relationship between small and large 
business in the econonmy, and the desire to achieve full employment. 
Steel, it was agreed by all, was essential to the continued welfare of the 
American economy. However, no one could agree on how to determine 
the appropriate level of steel capacity to ensure a strong economy. Nearly 
all of the Government studies undertaken during this period reached the 
same conclusion -- current steel industry capacity was inadeqaute to meet 
the demands for basic iron and steel products. "Identifying the problem 
was one matter; resolving it was another. No one appears to know . . . just 
how much steel capacity we should have to provide a free market to all 
comers" (Tiffany, 1988: 32). 
The fears the steel producers expressed with respect to the impact of 
capacity expansion proved justified in 1949, when a slight recession hit the 
economy and business began to fall off. The steel strike at the end of 1949, 
and the onset of hostilities in Korea in 1950, led to a recovery for the steel 
industry. Dollar revenues, and capacity utilization figures in 1950 (table 
3.1, p. 76) reflect the increase in business activity as firms rebuilt 
inventories as a result first of the 1949 strike, and second as a precautionary 
measure in anticipation of a defense build-up. 
The period immediately following the war was, for the independent 
steel producers, one of fluctuations in production and sales. Strikes, 
particularly in steel and coal, slowed or shut down production during 
much of the period. The need to expand capacity in response to unusual 
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levels of demand placed new strains on the finances of many of the firms, 
as did the general rise in prices. Wages, in particular, increased as a result 
of the strikes in 1946 and 1949. 
As table 3.1 (p. 71) demonstrates the five years immediately following 
the war were prosperous ones for the industry. However, the price of 
adding new capacity had increased at a faster rate than had steel prices. The 
industry was profitable again, but was still hard pressed to find the 
investment dollars needed to pursue the rapid capacity expansion being 
pressed upon it. The government continued to accuse the industry of 
pursuing a no-growth policy in order to raise prices, while the industry 
continued to defend its policies. The chronic government-industry 
antagonism of this era, so apparent in the argument over capacity, was to 
have a long-term impact on the industry (Tiffany, 1988). 
United States Steel 
The capacity issues which affected the independent producers during 
the post-war years also affected U. S. Steel. Between 1946 and 1949 U.S.S. 
spent in excess of $875 million in modernizing and expanding facilities, 
and developing new sources of raw materials (USS Annual Report, 1949: 
4). The majority of this expenditure went into the improvement and 
expansion of facilities for light-rolled products. Additionally, in 1946 U. S. 
S. purchased the Geneva steel plant in Geneva Utah from the U. S. 
Government - a purchase which gave U. S. Steel a real presence in the 
Western markets for the first time. 
As the industry and the economy recovered from the effects of the war 
and the 1946 steel strike, U. S. Steel, along with the rest of the industry, 
experienced record sales and a high level of earnings. Demand for steel 
was at an abnormally high level during 1947 and 1948 and the effect of this 
demand is evident in the capacity utilization and revenue figures in table 
3.2 (p. 76). Even with record sales and production figures however, profits 
remained below the 9.5% figure of 1940. 
As the steel capacity issue continued to be a prominent concern for the 
American public, and the image of the industry continued to deteriorate, 
U. S. Steel, along with the other integrated producers, began to respond to 
complaints from consumers and the government. In its 1949 Annual 
Report the Corporation stated 
Some prewar critics asserted that U. S. Steel was too large: 
later, as the world emergency and its postwar consequences 
developed, it was contended that the capacity of U. S. Steel 
was too small. As recently as a year ago, the Government 
urged the building of additional steel mills, with government 
funds if necessary. Yet by the third quarter of 1949 the 
demand for most steel products was substantially less than 
the capacity of the steel industry to produce (USS Annual 
Report. 1949: 6). 
U. S. Steel's ability to meet demand however, did not end the debate over 
an appropriate level of steel capacity in the U. S. 
The impact of the 1949 strike can be seen in the decline in both 
production and revenue figures (see table 3.2, p.76). The steel strike was 
however, beneficial for production and revenue in 1950, as inventories 
had been drawn down. Also, as noted earlier, the onset of hostilities in 
Korea created an increase in demand for durable goods and therefore for 
steel products. The need to rebuild inventories and meet record dvilain 
demand is reflected in a capacity utilization rate of 98.2% and record 
revenue and production figures (table 3.2, p. 76). 
Table 3.2: Production, Sales, and Net Income for United States Steel 
(Net Tons & Millions of Dollars) 1946 -1950 
Year Production % of Capacitv Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1946 21.3 N.T. 72.9% $1,496.1 $ 88.6 5.9 % 
1947 28.6 96.7 2,122.8 127.1 6.0 
1948 29.3 93.8 2,481.5 129.6 5.2 
1949 25.8 82.5 2,301.7 165.9 7.2 
1950 31.5 98.2 2,956.4 215.5 7.3 
Source: United States Steel Corporation Annual Report, 1958, pp. 28 & 31. 
The five years immediately following the war were ones of turmoil and 
readjustment for U. S. Steel as they were for the independent producers. 
The strikes, the abnormally high level of demand, and the pressure from 
both consumers and Government to increase capacity, all affected U. S. 
Steel's business. The Corporation however, entered the 1950's in a 
position of strength within the industry, and with a strong commitment to 
meeting its customers demand for a broad range of steel products. 
Steel Exports-Imports 
As can be seen from table 3.3 (p. 77) the United States continued to 
dominate world steel production in the era immediately following World 
War n, although its percentage of world production fell as other nations 
recovered from the war and began to rebuild their industries. In 1949 Iron 
Age commented that "Almost 3 years have been spent in reconstruction. 
modernization and expansion. Great progress has been made. Yet many 
difficult problems confront industry and government in all nations" (Iron 
Age, Tan 6,1949: 191). 
Table 3.3: United States Steel Production and World Steel Production 
1946 -1950 (Net Tons in Millions) 
Year World Production U. S. Production U. S. % of World 
1946 123.0 N.T. 66.6 N.T. 54.3% 
1947 150.1 84.9 56.7 
1948 171.4 88.6 51.7 
1949 176.3 78.0 44.2 
1950 207.8 96.8 46.6 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Report, 1969, p. 8. 
Among the problems which Iron Age discusses are nationalization of 
the steel industry in many nations including Great Britain; shortages of 
technically trained people in many countries including the U. S. S. R.; 
strikes in the U. S. and France; and the development of a steel industry in 
many previously agricultural nations (1/6/49). Yet, in spite of these 
problems world production figures continued to increase through 1950 
(see table 3.3, p.76). 
Iron Age goes on to discuss the variety of reasons which nations have 
for pursuing redeveloping and expanding their steel industries. 
The interesting aspect of the proposed expansion programs is 
that different countries have diaifferent reasons for 
embarking on ambitious programs. Demand for steel is 
strong practically everywhere. Former agricultural countries 
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are being industrialized. They feel that for a balanced domestic 
economy they must become steel producers so that they won't 
be dependent on other nations for their steel supply. 
Countries like Britain, Belgium and Luxembourgare 
increasing production for lucrative e?q>ort returns in addition 
to satisfying domestic requirements. United States and Russia 
are still desparately endeavoring to satisfy tremendous 
civilian needs, with the cold war adding to demands for more 
capacity. (1/6/49:192) 
All of these elements signalled the beginning of a new era in international 
steel trade, as new nations entered the arena, and a new set of rules began 
to come into being. 
Steel Labor 
As noted in chapter 2 the United Steelworkers of America succeeded in 
organizing much of the industry during World War II. As can be seen 
from table 3.4 (p. 79) as war time production eased so did the average work 
week for steelworkers. This in turn, led to lower paychecks for most 
workers. "Although no actual pay cut had taken place, the union in 
September 1945, seized the situation to summon worker support for a new 
wage increase to approximate wartime earnings and compensate for the 
increased cost of living" (Hogan, 1971: 1611). 
The issue of a wage increasein 1945 -1946 was complicated by the fact 
that the Government still controlled prices and wages, and any increases 
had to be approved by the National War Labor Board and the Office of Price 
Administration. The fact that two separate boards had control of wage and 
price increases further complicated matters, and reflected Government 
efforts to separate wages and prices. In fact President Truman announced 
that there was "room in the existing price structure for business as a whole 
to grant increases in wage rates" ( New York Times, October 1945: pp. 1,14). 
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The steel companies refused to bargain without a price increase, and on 
January 21, 1946 the steelworkers went out on strike. 
Table 3.4: Total Employment, Production Workers, Production Workers 
Average Weekly and Hourly Wages, and Production Workers Average 
Weekly Hours in Basic Steel: 1946 -1950 
(In Thousands) (In Dollars) 
Annual Annual 
Average Average Average Average Average 
Total Production Weekly Hourly Weekly 
Year Employees Workers Earnings Earnings Hours 
1946 593.1 516.8 $48.53 $1,289 37.5 
1947 655.8 575.0 56.51 1.443 39.0 
1948 678.6 593.9 62.84 1.586 39.5 
1949 610.1 526.8 63.34 1.651 38.2 
1950 674.4 586.8 67.95 1.700 39.9 
Source: U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, 
Hours, and Earnings, United States 1909 - 1984 Volume 1. March 1985. 
Bulletin 1312 -12, pp. 128 -130. 
The 1946 steel strike was the first "modern" steel strike. The Union, as 
noted in chapter 2, had organized most of the major firms and was 
accepted as an institution in the U. S. business world. The violence and 
strikebreaking tactics of the pre-World War II era were notably absent. 
Further, it became apparent that the major barrier to a settlement was the 
inability of the Government and the companies to agree on a price 
increase, rather than the inability of the Union and the companies to agree 
on a wage and benefit package. A $5 per ton price increase was announced 
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on Friday February 15,1946, and by Monday February 17 the steel mills 
were reopened. 
Finally, the 1946 strike signalled the presence of the USWA as a real 
force in the American business world with an agenda it intended to pursue 
aggressively. Not only was the Union an accepted "institution" like the 
steel companies, but it proved that it had the ability and commitment to 
close down the steel companies for an extended period of time. Philip 
Murray, addressing the Third Constitutional Convention of the USWA 
said 
Some 750,000 members of this Union were involved in a 
strike beginning January 21st and it continued until February 
15, 1946. At no period in the nation's history were there ever 
so many men in one industry involved in a strike as we had 
participating in our recent strike in the steel industry. You 
developed in the course of that strike solidarity, unity, you 
fought shoulder to shoulder and you won your fight and you 
established for the United States of America a national wage 
pattern out of which has flown billions of dollars in monthly 
benefits to workers employed in all types of industry all over 
the United States of America (USWA Proceedings, 1946: 8). 
The determination expressed in the last sentence - that the USWA 
become a vehicle for bettering the lot of all American workers continued 
to be an element in Union-Management Relations for the next few years. 
1947 and 1948 were years of relative labor peace. The high demand for 
steel, the ability of the companies to raise prices, and the need to maintain 
continuous production schedules, meant that the companies were 
unwilling to risk shutdowns and the subsequent public outrage as steel 
remained a scarce commodity. 
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In 1948 the companies attempted to prevent the Union from seeking a 
wage increase by announcing a price reduction on steel products. This 
announcement was made in the interests of holding down inflation. The 
wage increase request was rejected because it "would not in the long run 
bring benefit to anyone; that it would lead to similar wage increases in 
other industries, and to higher prices generally" (USS Annual Report, 1948: 
15). However, as increased wage settlements were announced in other 
industries - notably coal and automobiles - the steel companies found it 
more difficult to resist a wage increase, and a new settlement was 
announced in July - a settlement reached without a strike. 
Labor peace was not to last however, and in 1949 the Union struck for 
forty-two days. The economy in 1949 was experiencing a mild recession, 
and capacity utilization rates were down to about 80% by July (Hogan, 
1971). The steel companies, no longer faced with public pressure to 
maintain full production schedules, were less willing to negotiate wage 
and benefit increases than in the past. At the same time, the Union was 
committed to obtaining better pensions and social insurance programs for 
their members, on a non-contributory basis for the Union. That is, 
pensions and insurance were to be considered a "normal" cost of doing 
business and as such totally absorbed by the companies. The final 
agreement gave the Union a non-contributory pension plan, and a social 
insurance program funded jointly by the companies and workers. 
1950, as noted earlier, was a record year for the companies in terms of 
revenues and production levels. The hostilities in Korea led to increased 
demand for steel and a shortage of workers. The Union was thus in a 
strong position to negotiate a new round of wage increases. Steel prices 
were increasing and a gray market for steel had already developed. The 
Government, which was pressing for joint labor-management efforts to 
stabilize prices and wages, was diverted by the war effort and a 
Congressional election. Thus the Union was able to obtain increased wages 
and the companies were able to announce price increases before the 
Government put controls back in place. 
By 1950 the USWA had proven to be a major force in the U. S. steel 
industry. It had managed to achieve higher wages and improved benefits 
packages for its members - agreements which served as a benchmark for 
many other U. S. industries. Further, the USWA had demonstrated that it 
could, and would, close down production to achieve its ends. The Union 
entered the 1950s in as strong a position as the companies. 
The 1950s - An Era of Prosperity 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
The 1950s were an era of record levels of production and revenues for 
the steel industry as a whole. Following the Korean conflict the civilian 
economy continued to rebound, and demand for steel products remained 
high. The arguments over the need for increased capacity which had 
troubled the industry during the post war years appeared to have ended, as 
by the middle of 1953 "production overtook demand" and the industry 
was able to meet the demand for steel throughout the 1950s (Iron Age, 
January 1954). 
The Continuing Debate over Steel Capacity. The culmination of the 
political argument concerning the production capacity of the steel industry 
as a whole occurred during the years of the Korean conflict, and 
culminated in Truman’s attempt to take control of the mills. Throughout 
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the late 1940s the steel firms had successfully resisted pressure to expand 
capacity too quickly, citing their experiences in the 1930s with excess 
capacity and financial losses (Barnett & Schorsch, 1983; Tiffany, 1988). The 
onset of the Korean conflict combined with an accelerated depreciation 
schedule for defense related plants included in The Revenue Act of 1950 
and The Defense Production Act of 1950, finally persuaded the industry to 
undertake a serious expansion program. Iron Age reported in 1951 "The 5- 
year write-off of taxes on defense plants is a strategic factor in increased 
expansion plans. This inducement to expansion has already greatly 
stimulated steel company plans" (Iron Age, 1/4/1951: 15). Furthermore, 
capacity utilization in 1951 was generally in excess of 100% (see table 3.5, p. 
84). 
The combined effect of these two factors, particularly the accelerated 
depreciation schedule, can be seen in the expansion and investment plans 
outlined for U. S. Steel in table 3.6 (p.93). In 1951 Forbes reported that 
"steelmen estimate it will cost $300 for every ton of additional capacity 
within the next two years. Fifteen years ago (when mills were running at 
about 30% of capacity), it would have cost only $50" (Forbes, 2/1/1951:17). 
Thus, the availability of accelerated depreciation, even for a short period of 
time, at last provided the industry with the incentive the Government had 
been looking for to develop expansion plans. 
The Government was pushing for expansion to 130,000,000 tons of 
capacity, predicting a continued growth in demand for steel for both 
civilian and defense purposes. As Forbes (2/1/1951) reported, not everyone 
agreed with this prediction. "Pressured by the threat of government 
interference, steel men are expanding steel-making capacities far beyond 
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of Net Tons) (Thousands of Dollars) 
Year Production % of Capacity Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1951 4,358 N.T. 100.6% $535,835 $35,004 6.5% 
1952 4,042 89.3 518,575 31,338 6.0 
1953 4,705 99.7 588,920 33,902 5.8 
1954 4,449 90.8 532,045 41,100 7.7 
1955 5,100 103.0 692,683 64,351 9.2 
1956 5,220 101.4 761,800 65,593 8.6 
1957 5,407 90.9 776,736 55,045 7.1 




80.1 1,022,429 77,064 
Jones & Laughlin Steel 
(Millions of Dollars) 
7.5 
Year Production % of Capacity Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1951 5.0N.T. 104% $564.3 $31.0 8.1% 
1952 4.7 83 495.4 19.5 3.9 
1953 6.0 96 624.4 31.0 4.9 
1954 4.6 74 492.9 25.0 5.1 
1955 6.2 100 696.5 50.1 7.2 
1956 6.0 97 742.6 45.1 6.1 
1957 6.0 88 837.6 45.4 5.4 
1958 4.9 66 654.1 23.2 3.5 
1959 4.9 61 765.7 29.5 3.8 
Source: Hogan, W. T., S. J. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States. Volume 4. (1971) pp. 1753, 1754, 1804. 
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the limits of economic safety” (Forbes. 2/1/1951: 14). In fact, it was pointed 
out that demand had fallen in the first half of 1950, and that the increase in 
the latter half "was not due to military orders — but came from the same 
consumers who were playing hard to get in June and July", and concluded 
that there was alot of stockpiling going on (Forbes. 2/1/1951:15). 
Forbes went on to point out that unlike any other industry, the steel 
industry was being asked to produce for both defense and civilian demand; 
and that given a number of other material shortages it was unlikely that 
the predicted demand for 130,000,000 tons of steel existed (2/1/1951). 
Expanding at a steep $300-per-ton clip into a white elephant is 
- to many steel men - a form of industrial suicide. The 
alternative: making way for government subsidized steel, a 
form of industrial nomicide. Recent accelerated depreciation 
allowances are helping pave the way for plant expansions — 
but some steel men still think the industry may be on the 
road to ruin. If they're right, this high-pressured expansion 
might well lead to the nationalization of an emaciated, 
impoverished industry. (Forbes. 2/1/1951: 18). 
Steel Demand and Capacity Expansion. The industry continued to add 
capacity throughout the 1950s (see table 3.6, p. 87), and capacity utilization 
remained generally high until the recession of 1958 (see table 3.5, p.84). For 
the industry in general, capacity expansion took the form of "rounding 
out" existing plants, rather than building new capacity - with the exception 
of U. S. Steel's Fairless Plant on the East Coast. This process of simply 
addng to mills already in existence, while less expensive than building a 
greenfield mill, also meant that U. S. steelmakers continued to utilize 
conventional technologies - particularly the open hearth furnace, as 
compared to the basic-oxygen furnaces being installed in the new 
greenfield mills in Europe and Japan. 
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The strong demand for steel in the period 1950 to 1957 is evident in the 
capacity utilization figures and the profit margins provided in table 3.5 (p. 
84). The changing attitude of steel industry leaders toward growth may be 
attributed as much to the continued strength of demand, as to accelerated 
depreciation policies. In fact, capacity utilization remained strong enogh 
throughout the 1950s, to convince steel industry management that "steel 
companies would have to raise billions of dollars to provide the steel a 
growing, increasingly machine-driven economy would need" (Forbes, 
1/1/1957:117). 
For the industry as a whole this was an era of prosperity, and many 
firms experienced the record years of production, shipments, and profits. 
As the 1950s came to a close however, the sellers market was also drawing 
to a close. The 1958 recession, and the decline in steel shipments led to a 
temporary slowdown of capacity expansion in the 1958 -1959 period. 
Expansion of existing plants had brought the industry to a point where 
Forbes in 1960 could report "Current over-all capacity was probably more 
than ample for at least the next few years" (Forbes, 1/1/1960: 93). Labor 
costs had continued to increase, the integrated steel companies were 
beginning to compete with plastics and aluminum, and every price rise in 
steel sent customers looking for substitute products. The era of prosperity 
was drawing to an end. 
United States Steel 
The capacity expansion which affected the rest of the industry also 
affected U. S. Steel. The Corporation built its last greenfield mill - the 
Fairless works on the Delaware River - and continued to "round out" 
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many existing plants. As can be seen from table 3.6 (p.87) production, 
revenues and profits held strong for the Corporation throughout the 1950s. 
Table 3.6: United States Steel — Revenues, Net Income, Capital 









1951 34.3N.T. $3,524.1 $184.3 5.2% $ 179.3 
1952 29.4 3,137.4 143.6 4.6 352.4 
1953 35.9 3,861.0 222.1 5.8 469.2 
1954 28.4 3,250.4 195.4 6.0 227.4 
1955 35.3 4,097.7 370.1 9.0 239.8 
1956 33.4 4,228.9 348.1 8.2 311.8 
1957 33.7 4,413.8 419.4 9.5 514.9 
1958 23.8 3,472.1 301.5 8.7 448.1 
1959 24.4 3643.0 254.5 7.0 366.1 
Source: United States Steel Corporation, Annual Report 1969 
The nature of U. S. Steel's far-flung operations, which in 1956 produced 
31% of the Nation's steel, meant that "U. S. Steel shares all the problems 
and all the opportunities of the steel industry" (Forbes, 1/1/1957: 119). 
Unlike most of the other firms in the industry, U. S. Steel had plants 
located in areas with steel surpluses (where steel had to be shipped a fair 
distance to customers), as well as in steel deficit areas (Geneva, Utah) 
where this was not a problem. The Corporation, saddled with murderous 
overhead charges" as was most of the industry, and with the need to absorb 
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freight charges during recessionary periods, was more vulnerable than 
most to any swings in the steel market (Forbes, 1/1/1957:119). As Forbes 
went on to point out "Partly this explains why The Corporation's earning 
power has been merely average" (Forbes, 1/1/1957:119). 
U. S. Steel maintained its sales and profit levels throughout the 1958 
recession and the 1959 strike (table 3.6, p.87), but it was apparent by 1959 
that the era of being able to pass cost increases on to consumers was over. 
Competition from aluminum and plastics made worries about market 
share real in the late 1950s. Further, in some markets - structural, plates, 
and bar-mill items - imports were becoming competitive. The 116-day 
strike in 1959, and the reluctance of U. S. Steel and the other firms to "give- 
in" to to the Union stemmed from a knowledge that the industry was 
becoming more competitive (Forbes, 1/5/1960). 
From behind the smokescreen of rhetoric and propaganda 
fogging the steel strike issues last year, one basic fact stood 
form with steel-hard clarity. It was simply this: the steel 
companies were fighting hard against an inflationary wage 
increase chiefly because they knew they could no longer pass 
higher costs on to their customers. 
"For the first time since the war," was the way one 
investment banker close to the industry put it, "steel 
management can't pass the buck. They're worried about 
losing markets to aluminum. They're worried about imports 
in such products as wire, bars, pipe, and structurals. Ana — 
don't kid yourself — they're worried about demand once the 
strike backlogs get worked off (Forbes, 1 /5/1960: 93). 
U. S. Steel experienced record years in the period 1955 to 1957 in terms 
of production, shipments, and profits. The Corporation had built a new 
greenfield mill -- the Fairless plant at an estimated cost of $500 million, 
and modernized and expanded existing facilities. It had made some 
attempts at reorganization to streamline management and move away 
from the traditional holding company pattern it had used since its 
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founding, so that in 1952 the United States Steel Corporation became an 
operating company for the first time since its founding in 1901 (Hogan, 
1971). 
All of these changes were aimed at improving the operating efficiencies 
of the Corporation in an attempt to remain competitive in a changing steel 
market U. S. Steel ended the 1950s in a better competitive position than 
many other steel firms. However U. S. Steel, as indicated by its leadership 
of the fight with the Union in 1959, was as worried as the rest of the 
industry by the changes occurring as the 1950s drew to a close. 
Steel Exports - Imports 
As can be seen from table 3.7 (p. 90) the U. S. dominance of the world 
steel market declined throughout the 1950s, until in 1959 U. S. steel 
producers accounted for only 27.7% of world production. This sharp 
decline can in part be accounted for by the continuation of the trends Iron 
Age discussed in 1949. Steel capacity expanded as Europe and Japan rebuilt 
their industries after the war, and built capacity to satisfy export as well as 
domestic markets. Further, countries in Latin America, the Near East, 
Africa, and the Far East all began to produce steel during this period. 
Throughout the 1950s U. S. steel exports declined as imports increased. 
This was most noticeable in the period from 1957 to 1959. Between 1957 
and 1958 U. S. steel exports dropped from 5.348 million tons to 2.823 
million tons. During the same two years steel imports increased from 
1.155 million tons to 1.707 million tons. "A ratio of almost five to one, 
which existed in 1957, changed drastically in the space of a year to less than 
two to one, as the margin in favor of exports was severely cut" (Hogan, 
1971: 2035-6). 
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Table 3.7: United States and World Steel Production (Net Tons in 
Millions) 1951-1959 
Year World Production U. S. Production U. S % of World 
1951 231.8 N. T. 105.2 N. T. 45.6% 
1952 232.6 93.2 40.0 
1953 257.9 111.6 43.2 
1954 246.2 88.3 35.9 
1955 297.5 117.0 39.4 
1956 311.5 115.2 37.1 
1957 321.7 112.7 35.0 
1958 298.9 85.3 28.5 
1959 337.2 93.4 27.7 
Source: AISI, Annual Statistical Report,! 969 
In 1959, with the 116-day steel strike, steel exports fell to 1.677 million 
tons, "while imports rose to the unpredecented height of 4.396 million 
tons. Most of this tonnage came from West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, Belgium, and Luxembourg" (Hogan, 1971: 2036). At the 
time this was dismissed by some industry observers as an abnormal 
situation due to the length of the strike. In fact, in the analyses of the steel 
industry in the popular press, only Forbes mentions imports, and then as a 
"minor but rather permanent competitive threat" (1/1/1960: 93). 
However, as table 3.8 (p. 91) demonstrates the rate of growth in both 
steel consumption and production was much greater in the other major 
industrialized nations than in the U. S. This factor, combined with the 
destruction of steel producing capacity during the war, necessitated the 
building of greenfield mills, rather than the "rounding out" form of 
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expansion pursued by the U. S. producers. The major industrialized 
countries, outside of the U. S., were thus building production capacity 
which took advantage of new, more efficient technologies. Additionally, 
the relatively high growth rates in consumption forced the firms to add 
new mills while the U. S., as noted earlier, continued to debate the 
appropriate level of steel capacity for a strong economy. 
Table 3.8: Growth in Apparent Steel Consumption and Growth in Raw 
Steel Production (Compound Annual Percentage Rates) 1950 - 1960 
Growth In Apparent Steel Consumption 
Period U. S. Tapan Canada U. K. E. E. C. 
1950-60 0.4 17.3 2.5 3.3 8.3 
Growth in Raw Steel Production 
Period U. S. Tapan Canada U. K. E. E. C. 
1950-60 0.4 16.6 5-9 3.5 7.9 
Source: D. F. Barnett & L. Schorsch, Steel: Upheaval in a basic industry. 
Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. pp. 24-5. 
Note: EEC is the original six - Benelux, Germany, France, Italy. 
In spite of the decline in dominance of world steel production the U. S. 
Steel industry remained the largest single producer in 1959. Imports had 
reached a record level in that year, but could be explained away as a minor 
nuisance. Further, they accounted for only about 4% of the U. S. market - 
certainly not a major concern for U. S. Steel which still controlled about 
30% of the domestic market. The decline in exports probably indicated a 
permanent loss of foreign markets as many nations could now meet their 
domestic steel demand. However, U. S. steel demand was still strong and 
the U. S. firms were kept busy meeting domestic demand. 
Steel Labor 
The 1950s were an era of change for the United Steelworkers of 
America. The last of the great industrial strikes - 1952, 1956, and 1959 - all 
took place during this era. The USWA was able to get for its members 
some of the highest wages and benefits of any industrial worker in the 
world. As table 3.9 (p. 93) indicates the average hourly earnings for 
Steelworkers increased from $1.90 an hour in 1951 to $3.06 an hour in 1959. 
In addition, the USWA was able to get improved insurance and pension 
benefits for its workers during this period. 
The Government, which had intervened in the settlements of the 
strikes in the 1940s, was involved in the 1952 strike, but less so in 1956 and 
1959. In 1952 Truman saw the strike as a threat to national security, as the 
country was involved in the middle of the Korean conflict as well as trying 
to rebuild the civilian economy. When the settlement provided by the 
Wage Stabilization Board was rejected by the industry and the USWA 
finally struck, Truman attempted to nationalize the steel mills and force 
them back into operation. This was struck down by the Supreme Court 
and the mills stayed closed. The strike was eventually settled, but this was 
the last time the Government attempted to force a settlement on the 
industry and the USWA. 
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Table 3.9: Total Employment, Production Workers, Production Workers 
Average Weekly and Hourly Wages, and Production Workers Average 
Weekly Hours in Basic Steel: 1951 -1959 



















1951 714.4 620.2 $77.71 $1.90 40.9 
1952 638.0 541.5 80.00 2.00 40.0 
1953 726.1 620.4 88.29 2.18 40.5 
1954 645.5 546.1 83.92 2.22 37.8 
1955 706.9 604.5 96.80 2.39 40.5 
1956 706.9 595.4 102.87 2.54 40.5 
1957 719.9 600.1 105.57 2.70 39.1 
1958 601.1 486.5 108.00 2.88 37.5 
1959 587.3 470.9 122.71 3.06 40.1 
Source: U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, 
Hours, and Earnings, United States 1909 - 1984 Volume 1. March 1985. 
Bulletin 1312 - 12, pp. 128 -130. 
In 1952, Philip Murray, the first President of the USWA died and was 
replaced by his colleague David McDonald. McDonald was less adversarial 
in his approach to labor-management relations, and there were a number 
of years of labor peace marked by effective collective bargaining. In 1956, 
the middle of the best period in steel industry history, the USWA struck 
again. The strike in part reflected industry concerns about inflation, and 
Union concerns that workers were not being adequately compensated 
given the the fact that the industry was doing so well financially. This 
strike was finally settled without Government intervention. 
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In 1959 the USWA struck for 116-days, the longest strike in the 
industry's history. The 1958 recession had had a negative effect on 
employment in the industry and in 1959 "employment in the industry was 
still 10% less than it was when the 1956 contract was concluded" (Hogan, 
7 
1971: 1638) (see table 3.9, p. 93). The USWA was concerned with the effects 
of automation on employment, and the industry was concerned with 
inflation and its ability to raise prices further. After 97 days Eisenhower 
finally acceded to industry requests and asked for a Taft-Hartley injunction 
to get the industry back to work. "On November 7, the Supreme Court 
upheld the injunction that had been issued on October 21, and McDonald 
ordered the steelworkers to return to the mills, thereby ending the strike 
after 116 days" (Hogan, 1971: 1640). An agreement was finally reached in 
early January 1960, which ended the last great industrial strike in steel. 
By the end of the 1950s the USWA had established itself as a major 
American institution. It had economic power - as evident in the results of 
the strikes - and political power - it was increasingly called upon to endorse 
candidates. The Steelworkers had the highest wages of any manufacturing 
worker in the U. S. The Union had demonstrated its power both in strikes 
and at the bargaining table, and was now part of the industry, as 
demonstrated by the establishment of the joint labor-management Human 
Relations Committee following the 1959 strike. The USWA was no longer 
simply another "outside" force which might go away if the companies 
ignored it. 
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The 1960s - The End of Prosperity 
The Integrated Steel Firms 
In 1961 Forbes reported: 
You will hear otherwise, but 1960 was not really an abnormal 
year for the steel industry - it just seemed so. 
Then what was all the shouting about? Nothing more, 
really, than the passing of some strange illusions: 
•That steel is a growth industry. It isn't; in tonnage terms, 
steel use has gotten nowhere in tne last ten years. 
•That steel prices have to go up each year, as they had 
repeatedly done since World War II. Yet why should they, 
when supply covers demand with plenty to spare? 
•That steel users must restore their inventories from strike- 
depleted levels to a "normal" 16 to 18 million tons. Why so, 
if price rises are not on the way — and producers can be forced 
to do the stocking? 
•That steel production has to run close to capacity, or the 
economy is in a bad way. It doesn't. Steelmen to the contrary, 
1960 was not really a recession year. 
•That steel's massive spending has produced healthy 
earning power. It hasn't. Rising prices, rather than new 
efficiency, boosted steel earnings most in the late 1950s. 
Without higher prices, as last year proved, industry earnings 
have at best moved sideways. (Forbes,!/1/1961: 21). 
This statement presaged conditions for the U. S. steel industry as whole 
throughout the 1960s. The fears expressed by the integrated firms in 1959 
about not being able to pass wage increases along to consumers proved 
true. The industry was not able to raise prices from 1958 until after 1962, 
and then only "on a selective product basis rather than generally across the 
board" (Hogan, 1971: 2085). In the meantime, wages and the costs of other 
goods and services continued to rise putting increased pressure on profits. 
The pricing problem came to a head in 1962 when industry attempts to 
raise prices were strongly resisted by the Kennedy Administration. The 
USWA and the industry had recently completed an agreement calling for a 
2 1/2% wage increase in the first year — a wage increase which the 
government, predicting an accompanying 3.2% increase in productivity. 
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did not view as inflationary. The industry, and particularly U. S. Steel, 
faced with declining profits in 1962 (see table 3.10, p. 97 & 3.11, p. 100), 
needed to improve profits, particularly if the firms were to continue to 
invest in new capacity. 
On April 10, 1962 Roger Blough (CEO of U.S.S.) announced a 3.5% price 
increase. On April 11 five major firms (Bethlehem, Youngstown, Jones & 
Laughlin, Republic, and Wheeling) had followed U. S. Steel’s lead. 
However, by April 13 another five major producers (Inland, Armco, 
Kaiser, Colorado, and McLouth) had not chosen to follow U. S. Steel's lead. 
"On that day a formal announcement was made by Inland Steel that it 
would hold the line on prices because of competitive factors. Kaiser 
followed suit, and then Bethlehem decided to rescind its price increase so 
that United States Steel was left with no alternative but to do the same" 
(Hogan, 1971: 2084). 
As it became apparent throughout 1962 that the pressure not to raise 
prices came less from the Government than from an increasingly 
competitive marketplace, the industry began to search for other measures 
to improve its position. The inability of the firms to improve profits by 
simply raising prices, as they had done in the past, led to the recognition of 
the need to compete more directly both with producers of substitute 
products and foreign steel importers. The steel industry began to find 
however, that its policy of expanding through "rounding out" which had 
added "49 million tons of new capacity ... in the Fifties" had left its 
"overall operations . . . slack and inefficient, its technology retarded, its 
plant antiquated and inefficient" (Forbes , 1/1/1963: 31). With the 
exception of Bethlehem's mill at Burns Harbor, in the early 1960s, and U. S. 
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Steel’s Fairless mill in the 1950s - the last two greenfield mills to be built in 
the U. S. - the expansion had consisted solely of the "rounding out" of 
existing facilities with conventional technology. 
Table 3.10: Production, Shipments, Sales, and Net Income for Selected 
Steel Companies (Net Tons in Thousands & Millions of Dollars) 1960 - 
1969 
Bethlehem 
Raw Steel Products % of 
Year Produced Shipped Revenues Net Income Revenues 
1960 15,941 11,419 $2,178.1 $121.2 5.6% 
1961 14,944 10,045 2,033.9 114.3 5.6 
1962 14,677 13,392 2,072.1 144.5 7.0 
1963 16,109 10,987 2,095.8 102.5 4.9 
1964 19,436 12,762 2,240.7 147.9 6.6 
1965 21,032 14,319 2,579.4 150.0 5.8 
1966 21,275 13,849 2,669.4 170.9 6.4 
1967 20,525 13,056 2,594.1 130.4 5.0 
1968 20,372 14,394 2,862.7 160.5 5.6 







Revenues Net Income 
% of 
Revenues 
1960 7,700 5,384 $1,053.9 $ 52.8 5.0% 
1961 7,251 4,905 965.9 57.0 5.9 
1962 7,779 5,424 1,049.6 40.0 3.8 
1963 8,543 5,899 1,114.2 55.5 5.0 
1964 10,210 6,711 1,272.7 72.3 5.7 
1965 9,894 7,143 1,374.5 77.3 5.6 
1966 10,010 6,877 1,359.8 93.7 6.9 
1967 9,303 6,406 1,266.3 75.2 5.9 
1968 9,749 7,072 1,399.5 78.2 5.6 
1969 10,742 7,354 1,500.3 79.1 5.3 
Source: The 1969 Annual Reports of Bethlehem and Republic Steel. 
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Forbes went on to point out that "Suddenly the U. S. industry 
discovered to its astonishment that European and Japanese producers were 
ahead not only in labor costs but in production efficiency as well" (Forbes, 
1/1/1963: 31). By the mid-1960s even the industry trade magazine Iron Age 
(1964) realized that imports were more than a minor threat, and were 
capturing a larger percentage of the U. S. market every year. The increased 
use of substitute products — particularly aluminum -- and the lower price 
of imported steel helped bring about a situation where in 1969 Forbes could 
ask of the steel industry "What happened to the turnaround that so many 
security analysts were predicting a few years ago?" (1/1/1969: 31). 
In 1968 imports had captured about 17% of the U. S. market; and the 
steel industry ranked "22nd in 23 groups in profitability" (Forbes, 1/1/1969: 
33). The capacity expansion programs of the integrated firms had been 
aimed at meeting an anticipated record increase in demand, which failed to 
materialize, rather than improving profits. By the end of the 1960s the 
integrated firms were faced with ever-increasing competition, little cash 
available for pursuing any diversification projects, an increased level of 
long-term debt, and a depressed stock price. Finally, attempts to win 
Government assistance in curbing steel imports were opposed by other 
industries increasingly reliant upon export markets. The prosperity the 
steel industry experienced in the 1950s appeared to be at an end. 
United States Steel 
The only major difference between U. S. Steel's situation in the 1960s 
and that of much of the rest of the rest of the integrated steel firms was that 
U. S. Steel began seriously diversifying into areas outside of steel. The 
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Corporation had been involved in other businesses since its founding in 
1901, particularly cement and shipping. In the years immediately 
following World War II, the Corporation had purchased Gunnison 
Housing — later renamed United States Steel Homes -- to develop a 
presence in the prefabricated residential construction market (USS Annual 
Reports. 1945 - 1960). 
By the mid-1960s it had become apparent that steel was one of the least 
profitable industries in the U. S. "Over the five years 1959 through 1963, 
the 15 companies in this group (steel) earned a median return of 6.5% on 
stockholders' equity; the median figure for some 300 companies covered in 
this years Forbes survey was 9.7%. Steel, in short, was barely two-thirds as 
profitable as American industry as a whole" (Forbes, 1/1/1965: 22). U. S. 
Steel fared no better than the rest of the industry throughout the 1960s, and 
at times actually did worse because of its committment to be a full line 
producer of steel products (see tables 3.10, p. 97 and 3.lip. 100). The 
inability of the Corporation to change quickly from one product line to 
another — from heavy to light rolled steels, for example -- meant that it 
often had idle capacity. 
Faced with a dismal profit picture in steel, in 1964 the Corporation 
made a serious move into the chemicals industry with the purchase of 
"the assets of the Industrial Chemicals and Protective Coating Division of 
the Pittsburgh Chemical Company" (Hogan, 1971: 1666). In 1966 U. S. Steel 
established a separate division - USS Chemicals, and in 1968 the 
Corporation established USS Agri-Chemicals. In addition to chemicals, by 
1969 the Corporation was involved in a number of areas. The cement 
division was expanded. The aluminum siding and prefabricated housing 
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divisions were also expanded. In 1969 U. S. Steel announced a number of 
new divisions: U. S. Steel Finance Corporation; U. S. Steel Engineering 
and Consulting; and USS Realty Development (USS Annual Report. 
1969). 
Table 3.11: Production, Shipments, Sales and Net Income for U. S. Steel 
1960 - 1969 (Net Tons in Millions, Revenues & Net Income in Millions of 
Dollars) 
Raw Steel Products 
ii n ii ii ii ii n ii n ii ii ii ii n ii ii ii n n ii n ii ii ii ii ii 
Year Produced Shipped Revenues Net Income % of 
Revenues 
1960 27.3 18.7 $3,698.5 $304.2 8.2% 
1961 25.2 16.8 3,336.5 190.2 5.7 
1962 25.4 17.8 3,501.0 163.7 4.7 
1963 27.6 18.9 3,637.2 203.5 5.6 
1964 32.4 21.2 4,129.4 236.8 5.7 
1965 32.6 22.5 4,465.0 275.5 6.2 
1966 32.8 21.6 4,434.7 249.2 5.6 
1967 30.9 19.8 4,067.2 172.5 4.2 
1968 32.4 22.5 4,609.2 253.7 5.5 
1969 34.7 22.4 4,825.1 217.2 4.5 
Source: U. S. Steel, Annual Report, 1969: pages 28 & 29. 
The Corporation - long the leader of the domestic steel industry - was 
now describing itself as "A diversified producer of materials and services" 
(USS Annual Report, 1968). The impetus behind this diversification move 
is clear in the profit figures in table 3.11 (p. 100). In the 1969 Annual 
Report Edwin Gott, the CEO of U. S. Steel, went so far as to call the current 
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profit level of 4.5% "inadequate" for the continuation of "a healthy steel 
industry in this country" (p. 2). Among the programs he outlines to 
improve this condition is one of diversification into "other profitable 
markets" (USS Annual Report, 1969: 2). It is clear from the earlier list of 
new divisions, that by 1969 the Corporation was beginning to cushion itself 
from the cyclical nature of steel demand which had become so problematic 
in the 1960s. 
Steel Exports - Imports 
Steel imports, which as noted earlier had first surpassed exports in 1959, 
continued to grow through the 1960s, reaching a high of 17.960 million 
tons in 1968 - a year in which exports were 2.170 million tons (Hogan, 
1971). The exporting nations, particularly Japan and the EEC, continued to 
expand capacity at home, as demand in their domestic markets continued 
to increase. As can be seen from table 3.12 (p. 102) throughout the 1960s 
growth in production essentially kept pace with growth in consumption in 
Japan and the EEC nations. In the U. S. however, production grew more 
slowly than consumption, allowing exports to decline as imports increased 
to fill the gap in the domestic market. 
The plants in Europe and Japan utilized more modern technology, were 
generally more efficient, and had lower labor costs. In some cases in the 
late 1960s imported steel was priced as much as $45 a ton below U. S. steel 
(Forbes, 1/1/1968). As Iron Age pointed out in 1967, U. S. producers were 
reluctant to abandon "their traditional policy of avoiding price competition 
with imports. American producers take the position that tariff aids and 
dumping practices make it impossible to match foreign prices" (Iron Age, 
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1/5/1967: 81). It was estimated that this position cost the industry "more 
than $1 billion in orders" in 1966 (Iron Age, 1/5/1967: 81). 
Table 3.12: Growth in Apparent Steel Consumption and Growth in Raw 
Steel Production (Compound Annual Percentage Rates) 1960 1969 
Growth in Apparent Steel Consumption 
Period U. S. lapan Canada U. K. 
1960-69 4.3 13.1 6.8 2.5 
Growth in Raw Steel Production 
Period U. S. lapan Canada U. K. 
1960-69 3.8 15A~ 7.1 2.1 
E.E.C. 
5.6 
E. E. C. 
4.6 
Source: D. F. Barnett & L. Schorsch. Steel: Upheaval in a basic industry. 
Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. pp. 24-5. 
Note: EEC is the original six - Benelux, Germany, France, Italy. 
The disparity between steel consumption and production in the U. S., 
noted above, continued throughout the 1960s. As table 3.13 (p. 103) 
demonstrates the increase in imports throughout the 1960s took much of 
the growth in steel demand from the U. S. producers. Even when Japanese 
and European producers offered to reduce exports to the U. S. in 1969 "by 
about 4 million tons, and then increase exports by no more than 5% 
annually", Forbes went on to comment that such a proposal would still 
"take the cream off the growth in domestic steel demand" (Forbes, 
1/1/1968: 46). Of particular interest is the fact that in years when apparent 
consumption dropped in the U. S. — notably 1966 and 1967 -- U. S. 
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production toll, but imports continued to increase, thereby making further 
inroads into the market share of domestic producers. 
Table 3.13: U. S. Foreign Trade in Steel Mill Products I960 -1969 
(Net Tons in Thousands) 
Imports 
as a % of 
Apparent Apparent 



































Source: AISI and U. S. Department of Commerce 
Finally, as is evident in table 3.14 (p.104), the pattern of steel imports 
into the U. S. changed during the 1960s. As imports increased as a 
percentage of total steel consumption (sec table 3.13, p. 103), Japan's share 
of that total increased and the E.E.C. nation's share declined. By the end of 
the 1960s Japan's steel industry had an annual capacity of 75 to 80 million 
tons and was the second largest steel industry in the Free World (Forbes, 
1/1 1968: 47). Much of this capacity consisted of modern plants utilizing 
the most efficient technology, and rapidly making inroads into traditional 
U. S. markets like sheet metal, and even pipes for the Trans-Alaskan pipe 
line. 
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Table 3.14: Imports of Steel Mill Products by Major U. S. Trading Partners 
1960 - 1969 (Net Tons in Thousands) 
Year EEC %of Total Tapan %of Total U. K. % of Total Canada % of 
Total 
1960 2,097 62.4 601 17.9 212 6.3 211 6.3 
1961 1,951 61.7 596 18.9 166 5.2 304 9.6 
1962 2,086 50.9 1,071 26.1 250 6.1 367 9.0 
1963 2,245 41.2 1,803 33.1 349 6.4 583 10.7 
1964 2,585 40.1 2,446 38.0 285 4.4 692 10.8 
1965 4,191 40.4 4,418 42.6 720 6.9 644 6.2 
1966 3,841 35.7 4,851 45.1 748 7.0 692 6.4 
1967 4,842 42.3 4,468 39.0 818 7.1 630 5.5 
1968 7,097 39.5 7,294 40.6 1,302 7.2 1,243 6.9 
1969 5,200 37.1 6,253 44.5 894 6.4 805 5.8 
Source: AISI, Steel Imports — A National Concern, Washington, AISI, July 
1970. p. 63. 
As the 1960s drew to a close it appeared unlikely that steel imports 
would disappear from the American economy. Imports had declined in 
1969 (see table 3.13, p. 103) but still made up a considerable share of 
domestic steel consumption. The steel industry continued to ask the 
Government to restrict steel imports, but as more American industries 
became exporters, the pressure on Congress to resist steel import quotas 
increased. The domestic steel industry would have to search for other 
ways to fight "the import threat." 
Steel Labor 
The USWA in the 1960s consolidated many of the gains it had made in 
the 1940s and 1950s. As can be seen from table 3.15 (p. 105) the average 
hourly wages of steelworkers steadily increased throughout the 1960s — 
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even in years when employment declined. The Human Relations 
Research Committee established jointly with the industry after the 1959 
strike allowed ongoing contact between management and labor, 
particularly with respect to the issue of employment stabilization. This 
regular labor-management contact, combined with the incredible expense 
of the 1959 strike (the USWA had been virtually bankrupted), acted as an 
impetus to compromise and collective bargaining rather than strikes. In 
fact, there were no strikes during the 1960s, although there were strike 
threats made during each round of negotiations. 
Table 3.15: Total Employment, Production Workers, Production Workers 
Average Weekly and Hourlly Wages, and Production Workers Average 
Weekly Hours in Basic Steel: 1960 -1969 



















1960 651.4 528.4 $116.13 $3.04 38.2 
1961 595.5 478.4 122.92 3.16 38.9 
1962 592.8 476.3 127.40 3.25 39.2 
1963 589.9 479.1 133.06 3.31 40.2 
1964 629.2 515.6 138.43 3.36 41.2 
1965 657.3 538.4 140.90 3.42 41.2 
1966 651.9 530.9 144.73 3.53 41.0 
1967 635.2 509.5 143.51 3.57 40.2 
1968 635.9 506.2 154.16 3.76 41.0 
1969 643.8 513.6 166.03 4.02 41.3 
Source: U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, 
Hours, and Earnings, United States 1909 - 1984 Volume 1. March 1985. 
Bulletin 1312 - 12, pp. 128 -130. 
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In general, throughout the 1960s the USWA was able to get increased 
wages as well as improved benefit packages at each round of talks 
including: supplemental unemployment benefits, extended vacation plan, 
more holidays, and a rate retention benefit for employees displaced by 
technological changes in the plants. (USWA Convention Proceedings. 
1960-1969). A key difference between the contract negotiations of the 1950s 
and those of the 1960s was the emphasis on job and income security rather 
than wages. Additionally, in the 1968 contract negotiations local issues 
became a major component of the agreement (Hogan, 1971). 
The 1960s thus marked a period of change in labor-management 
relations in steel. The USWA frequently threatened strikes but always 
signed an agreement before a strike became necessary. In every year in 
which there was a strike threat (for example 1965), steel imports increased 
dramatically (see table 3.13, p. 103), and employmeny declined (see table 
3.15, p. 105) Strikes and work stoppages became a problem for both the 
industry and the USWA. Job and income security became more important 
goals than lengthy strikes followed, as was the 1959 strike, by a slow 
recovery of the industry. The USWA came through the 1960s in a much 
stronger position than did the steel firms, financially, numerically, and in 
terms of its ability to deliver on promises to its members, but the nature of 
those promises had changed, as had the militantly antagonistic stance of 
the Union. 
The 1970s - An Era of Decline 
The Integrated Steel Firms 
On January 1, 1970 Iron Age, the trade journal of the U. S. steel industry, 
published a forecast for the 1970s — "the decade of change" in which "the 
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myth of excess world steel capacity" would, as it had been in 1969, be 
exploded (p. 169). The steel industry of the 1970s would be characterized by 
the following: 
1. A shortage of world capacity could bring a race to catch 
up with demand. There doubtless will be slack 
periods. 
2. Mills will begin to realize a payoff from their massive 
investments of the Sixties. 
3. There will be continuing investments in steel plants in 
developed and not-so-developed countries. 
4. Smaller steel plants will continue to be built to serve 
regional markets with a limited product line. Return 
on these mini-mills is good. 
5. Steel customers, particularly in the U. S., may get into 
the steel business, themselves, making selected 
products for their own use - to take a small but 
important share of the market. 
6. World steel demand by the end of the decade will 
reach 1 billion tons a year. (Iron Age. 1/1/1970: 169). 
Some of these characteristics still held at the end of the decade. Mini- 
mills had expanded and taken a greater percentage of market share. Some 
end-users did develop their own steel production capacity — for example, 
Nucor which initially developed steel mini-mills to serve its steel joist 
business, and only developed as a major mini-mill producer selling to 
other firms after it was able to meet its own steel needs. Further, the less 
developed countries did develop steel industries of their own — for 
example, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, and Korea — and these industries began 
to compete not only with the U. S., but also with Japan and the E. E. C. 
nations. 
In 1980 Iron Age was still predicting 1 billion tons a year — but 1 billion 
tons a year of steel output by 1990 (1/5/1981: MP-28). The increased 
demand simply never materialized in any consistent manner. Neither, 
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were the U. S. firms able to recoup their earlier investments in new 
capacity. In fact, by the end of the 1970s the U. S. steel firms were closing 
plants as industry profits in 1977 fell to less than 2% of revenues. It was 
acknowledged in 1979 that excess world steel capacity was approximately 
13% of total world capacity, and that approximately 20% of U. S. capacity 
would have to be closed (Forbes 1/1/1979). Rather than reaping the 
benefits of earlier investments, the U. S. steel firms found that they still 
needed to modernize to remain competitive. However, as table 3.16 
(p. 109) shows, the major integrated firms lacked the financial stability to 
invest heavily in modernization. 
In 1973 and 1974 the steel industry experienced an upsurge in demand * 
and in fact experienced a temporary shortage of capacity. Iron Age in 1°75 
suggested "there could be a serious steel shortage in 1978 and later years" 
(1/6/1975: 85). This spurred many industry leaders to talk about the need 
for new, more modern, capacity. However, "what they chose to overlook 
was that much of 1974's late surge was only stockpiling by Detroit and the 
appliance manufacturers against a threatened coal strike" (Forbes, 
1/1/1976:134). In 1975 these consumers began to use the stockpiled 
inventories and steel shipments collapsed. Demand never really 
recovered throughout the rest of the 1970s - companies began to close 
plants - and by 1981 the U. S. had less capacity than in 1974 (Hogan, 1°83). 
Many of the problems which had plagued the U. S. Steel industry in the 
1960s continued into the 1970s. Substitute products and imports captured 
more market share and left little room for price increases, and apart from 
the boom years of 1973 and 1974 helped to create excess capacity in steel. 
Industry Week estimated that steel imports in 1977 had captured 
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approximately 19% of U. S. consumption (3/20/1978:66). Capacity 
expansion came to a halt, and, as noted above, some firms began closing 
plants. In 1978 Forbes (1/9/1978) reported that some firms were merging in 
an attempt to rationalize, while others were permanently closing obsolete 
capacity. 
Table 3.16: Financial Data for Selected Steel Firms 1970 -1979 
Bethlehem 
5 year 5 year 5 year 
Average 12 mo. Average 5 year Average 
Return Return Return Average EPS 
Year on Equitv on Equitv on Capital Sales Growth Growth 
1970 8.1% 5.9% 7.2% 4.0% -4.8% 
1971 6.9 5.5 6.2 2.8 -5.5 
1972 7.1 6.5 6.2 1.1 -2.2 
1973 7.3 9.8 6.2 4.1 0.0 
1974 8.0 12.1 6.6 5.9 2.5 
1975 10.0 11.6 8.0 8.3 10.0 
1976 9.8 7.8 7.8 9.8 11.3 
1977 5.1 def. 4.6 11.0 -4.5 
1978 4.5 7.8 4.3 10.8 -8.0 
1979 4.6 13.2 4.4 9.2 -11.3 
National 
5 year 5 year 5 year 
Average 12mo Average 5 year Average 













1971 8.2 5.2 7.1 6.7 -10.7 
1972 7.4 6.1 6.4 7.8 -6.5 
1973 7.5 8.7 6.1 7.7 -4.5 
1974 8.8 15.5 6.9 10.4 0.2 
1975 9.0 7.0 6.9 12.9 3.1 
1976 9.0 7.0 6.8 13.3 5.5 
1977 8.5 4.6 6.5 13.8 5.5 
1978 8.0 7.1 6.2 13.2 4.5 
1979 7.2 10.4 5.5 12.0 -0.6 
Source: Forbes "Annual Steel Industry Analysis", 1971 - 1980. 
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Following the boom of 1974 it became apparent that the steel firms 
which were doing well financially were those which had diversified. In 
1975 steel shipments fell 26% and a firm like Bethlehem "with next to no 
diversification, but traditionally an efficient steelmaker was operating in 
the red" while Armco which had diversified into "everything from 
insurance and leasing to oil-rig equipment and drainage pipe. . . turned in 
respectable numbers and actually improved its return on equity" (Forbes, 
1/1/1976: 133). The emphasis on diversification as a means of improving 
profit continued through the rest of the 1970s, as more firms found it 
difficult to make a profit in steel. 
Another issue which affected steel industry profits throughout this 
period was the need to meet Government pollution control standards. 
The rounding out of capacity which the industry had pursued throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s left the industry with a large number of old coke ovens. 
Bringing these facilities into compliance with EPA regulations was 
expensive, and as can be seen from table 3.16 (p. 109) many firms lacked 
the ability to raise funds. Companies with inconsistent earnings patterns, 
sales growth which reflects the influence of inflation rather than actual 
growth, and a decline in eamings-per-share, are not attractive to investors. 
Pollution controls did nothing to improve operating efficiencies, but did 
raise the cost of operations by "10% to 15% over the life of the facility" 
(Forbes. 1/1/1977: 155). Thus, "steel producers face a real dilemmma over 
finances when the EPA insists they install spanking-new pollution-control 
equipment on tottering old production facilities" (Forbes. 1/1/1977:155). 
Minimills. The one area of the industry which was expanding 
throughout the 1970s was the minimills, or small non-integrated steel 
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manufacturers, which began to appear in greater numbers in the 1970s, and 
to capture market share from the integrated firms. The mini-mills use the 
new electric-arc furnaces and continuous casting technologies and have 
been able to keep costs down on the limited product line they do produce. 
These firms represent virtually the only major increase in new steel 
capacity in the U. S. during this period. In fact, between 1977 and 1981, 
while the integrated firms were removing approximately 12.5 million tons 
of capacity from production, the minimills were adding approximately 4.5 
million tons (Hogan, 1983). With their new efficient technologies, and by 
locating close to customers, the minimills were able to increase market 
share from approximately 3% in 1960 to 20% in 1984, further reducing the 
market share of the large integrated firms (Eichenwald, 1985). By the end 
of the 1970s the minimills had established a real presence in the U. S. steel 
industry. 
United States Steel 
U. S. Steel continued the diversification efforts, begun in the late 1960s, 
throughout the 1970s. By 1975 the Corporation was reporting that the non¬ 
steel segments were accounting for "26% of gross sales and revenues and 
45% of before-tax income" and in 1978 "our nonsteel businesses 
contributed 86% of the operating income 27 % of the total sales" (USS 
Annual Reports. 1975 & 1978). The diversification effort which had begun 
in the 1960s as an attempt to cushion U. S. Steel from the cycles of the steel 
industry was, by the end of the 1970s, supporting the steel segment. The 
reason for this can be seen in table 3.17 (p. 112). 
By the late 1970s, although U. S. Steel was showing an improvement in 
eamings-per-share, net income remained unacceptably low. The 1976 
Annual Report stated "after-tax income averaged 4.8 cents per dollar over 
the last decade . . . This rate of profitability must be improved in order to 
generate and atract the funds for investment to enable U. S. Steel to 
modernize and expand its facilities ..." (p. 2). By 1979 it was apparent that 
this was not going to happen and the Annual Report for that year stated 
"During both the past five year period and the past ten year period, U. S. 
Steel's nonsteel businesses have been profitable and virtually self- 
sufficient in terms of cash flow. The steel business has not" (p. 3). 
Table 3.17: Selected Financial Data for U. S. Steel 1970 -1979 
(Billions of $) (Millions of $) 5yr Average Annual 
Year Revenues Net Income % of Revenues EPS Growth 
1970 $4.9 $147.5 3.0% -5.9% 
1971 5.0 154.5 3.1 -8.0 
1972 5.4 201.0 2.9 -8.0 
1973 7.0 325.8 4.6 -3.5 
1974 9.3 634.9 6.8 3.4 
1975 8.4 559.6 6.7 12.6 
1976 8.7 410.3 4.7 17.5 
1977 9.7 137.9 1.4 18.1 
1978 11.0 242.0 2.2 13.5 
Source: U. S. Steel Annual Reports: 1970 - 1979; Forbes Annual Analysis of 
Steel: 1971 - 1980. 
U. S. Steel participated in many of the problems experienced by the steel 
industry as a whole during the 1970s. The Corporation led the industry in 
trying to get protection from steel imports, and promoted changes in the 
tax laws which would spur investment in basic industries. At the same 
time however, U. S. Steel was using its available investment dollars, not so 
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much to improve its steel business, but to diversify out of steel. In 1976 E. 
B. Speer, then CEO of U. S. Steel, was asked "whether steel or his 
diversified interests will get the lion’s share of his billion-dollar-a-year 
capital spending" and he replied "We’ll put the money where we can get 
the best return" (Forbes,! 71/1976:135). As the 1970s drew to a close, it was 
apparent that the best return no longer came from steel. 
Steel Exports - Imports 
Steel imports to the U. S. continued to increase throughout the 1970s, 
while steel exports hovered for much of the period around the 2 million 
ton mark (see table 3.18, p. 113) (Hogan, 1983). In fact, much of the growth 
in demand for steel in the 1970s was captured by the importers, as can be 
seen from table 3.18, thereby further reducing the market for U. S. 
producers. As noted above, the increase in imports continued to put 
pressure on the domestic firms to keep prices low in spite of increasing 
costs. 
Table 3.18: Steel Imports and Exports for the United States 1970 - 1979 
(Millions of Metric Tons) 
-—————■ ■ ■ “ —————————— ii ii n n ii ii n ii ii n n ii ii 
Exports as a % of 
Year Imports Exports Total Shipments 
1970 12.2 6.4 7.8% 
1971 16.6 2.5 3.2 
1972 16.1 2.6 3.2 
1973 13.9 3.7 3.7 
1974 14.5 5.3 5.3 
1975 11.8 2.7 3.8 
1976 13.0 2.4 3.0 
1977 17.4 1.8 2.2 
1978 19.1 2.2 2.5 
1979 15.9 2.5 2.8 
Source: AISI Annual Statistical Reports (Various Years) 
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By the late 1970s the Government had instituted a trigger-pridng 
mechanism designed to prevent steel from being "dumped" in the U. S. at 
artificially low prices. The TPM was tied to Japanese costs figured in yen 
and then translated into dollars at the current exchange rate. This 
procedure allowed two things to happen: 1) the cost of shipping Japanese 
steel to the West Coast was lower than shipping to elsewhere in the U. S. 
and Japanese imports continued to account for approximately "44% of the 
market there" (Forbes, 1/8/1979:108); and because trigger prices were 
figured in Japanese costs European makers were still able to "dump" steel 
in the U. S. below cost (Forbes, 1/7/1980:198). The trigger-price 
mechanism, supplemented by voluntary quotas on the part of some 
exporters, did lower the level of steel imports. However, as the 1970s drew 
to a close, steel imports continued to account for a substantial portion of 
American steel consumption -- a situation which seemed unlikely to 
change. 
Steel Labor 
In 1973 the USWA signed the Experimental Negotiating Agreement 
with the ten largest steel producers. This guaranteed the USWA wage 
increases in every round of negotiations in return for a no-strike 
agreement. Part of the motivation for this was the fact that steel imports 
gained market share during every contract negotiation year, as consumers 
feared a strike and looked for new sources of steel. 
The USWA also began to work with the industry in calling for import 
restrictions and stricter enforcement of trade laws. Imports, and the pricing 
problems of the industry however, had little effect on the contract 
settlements - the USWA continued to get some of the largest settlements of 
114 
any industrial union - but they did affect employment levels (see table 3.19, 
p. 115). As the USWA saw employment in the industry shrinking in the 
mid-1970s, and its membership declined, the organization began to lose 
some of the economic and political power it had built up in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
Table 3.19: Total Employment, Production Workers, Production Workers 
Average Weekly ana Hourly Wages, and Production Workers Average 
Weekly Hours in Basic Steel: 1970 -1979 




















1970 499.7 $166.40 $4.16 40.0 
1971 573.9 454.6 177.80 4.49 39.6 
1972 568.4 452.6 206.25 5.08 40.6 
1973 604.6 484.8 229.77 5.51 41.7 
1974 609.5 487.3 258.95 6.27 41.3 
1975 548.2 428.1 274.13 6.94 39.5 
1976 549.4 430.5 305.88 7.59 40.3 
1977 554.3 432.6 338.58 8.36 40.5 
1978 560.5 441.7 389.69 9.39 41.5 
1979 570.5 451.3 428.89 10.41 41.3 
Source: U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, 
Hours, and Earnings, United States 1909 - 1984 Volume 1. March 1985. 
Bulletin 1312 - 12, pp. 128 -130. 
Comparing table 3.19 (p.115) with table 3.15 (p. 105), demonstrates the 
extent to which jobs were being lost in basic steel. In the 1960s the number 
of production employees in basic steel was generally above 500,000, a figure 
which was never reached during the 1970s — not even during the boom 
years of 1973 and 1974. Job security, which had become an issue during the 
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1960s, became the major issue of the late 1970s. In a 1978 speech describing 
the provisions of the 1977 contract Lloyd McBride emphasized the 
"Employment and Income Security Program which represented a major 
breakthrough in the fight to protect our members against the loss of work 
and income" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1978: 7). The Steelworkers 
Union, which had ended the 1960s in a stronger position than the 
integrated firms, found itself at the end of the 1970s fighting for members' 
jobs. 
The 1980s - The Endgame Era 
The Integrated Steel Firms 
The 1980s have been an era of further plant closings and bankruptcies 
for many of the large integrated steel firms. In 1985 LTV, the nation's 
second largest steelmaker filed for Chapter 11, and Bethlehem Steel has 
long been thought to be on the brink of bankruptcy. Excess world capacity, 
inefficient plants, high labor costs, substitute products, and low growth in 
demand — all the problems which plagued the industry during the 1970s — 
have caught up with American steel producers- 
In 1980 Forbes reported 
Unless you've just emerged from a five-year nap, its not 
news that the steel industry is in trouble. Competition from 
abroad and from substitute materials is keeping many a steel 
executive awake nights. And things are not likely to get better 
soon. 
\t now, there is about 20% overcapacity in the world — S because the less-developed countries are all trying to 
up their own steel industries. The emergence of a steel 
industry in the less-developed countries, of course, cuts down 
the export market, especially since those newer plants can 
produce steel far more cheaply that the U. S. plants can. And 
at home, the automakers (which use something like 20 % of 
the steel in the U. S.) are cutting back sharply on the amount 
in each car to cut weight and thus boost gas mileage. (Forbes, 
1/7/1980:196). 
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For 1980 the average profit margin for the industry was approximately 
5%, but by 1983 it had fallen to approximately 3.7%. In addition, many of 
the major firms had debt/equity ratios approaching, or greater than, one. 
In 1983 for example, the debt/equity ratio for Bethlehem was 1.0, for LTV 
was 1.3, and for Wheeling-Pittsburgh was 1.1 (Forbes, 1/2/1984:154). 
Financing new plants, or even improvements to existing plants, had 
become virtually impossible. 
In fact, the industry was continuing to contract and rationalize. In 1981 
Iron Age reported the probability of another "poor year for steel. That 
means more diversification, more selling off of assets and more priming of 
product lines" (Iron Age, 1/4/1982: 49). By 1985, Iron Age was talking 
about a permanent shrinkage "of at least 14 million tons annually in the 
steel market" (Iron Age, 1/3/1985: 43). The integrated steel firms had 
never really found a solution to the problems which had been plaguing 
them for the past twenty years. 
Minimills 
The one sector of the domestic steel industry which has continued to do 
well is the minimill segment. Minimills boast: more modern technology 
(electric arc furnaces), lower transportation costs (mills have been situated 
near markets), lower capital spending requirements (they melt scrap metal 
not iron ore), and lower labor costs (they are typically not unionized). 
These companies have been extremely competitive in the limited product 
markets they serve - undercutting both the large integrated producers and 
the steel importers on price. By the mid-1980s the minimills had captured 
approximately 20% of the market. 
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In 1983 when virtually all of the major integrated steel firms showed a 
loss for the year, and Forbes reported a deficit as the industry median profit 
margin; Nucor, the largest of the minimill firms showed a profit margin of 
4.9%. Forbes explained this phenomena in the following way: ’’Those 
companies (minimills) have stayed quite healthy because of lower labor 
costs (most minis are not unionized); lower transportation costs (because 
they tend to be situated close to their markets); and, most importantly, far 
lower capital spending requirements (they melt inexpensive scrap in 
efficient electric-arc furnaces, for the most part)” (Forbes ,1/2/1984:154). 
United States Steel 
In the 1980s U. S. Steel in effect completed the diversification program it 
had undertaken in the late 1960s. In 1979 Roderick, CEO of U. S. Steel, 
announced the closing of 16 plants and partial shutdowns of others in an 
effort to "streamline U. S. Steel’s operations to fewer products and to cut 
out some of the older, less profitable mills" (Forbes, 1/7/1980: 196). 
However, this was not enough to restore the Corporation to financial 
health. In 1984 Forbes reported the comeback of U. S. Steel "thanks to a 
major corporate restructuring. Since the end of 1982 the company has shut 
down one-fifth of its capacity and axed 50% of its administrative work 
force" (Forbes, 1/2/1984:171). 
In addition to these steps, U. S. Steel had reduced the steel segment of 
its business to approximately 35% of total revenues by 1984. In 1982 U. S. 
Steel bought Marathon Oil, a move which contributed greatly to the 
decline in importance of the steel segment. Fortune, in 1983, reclassified U. 
S. Steel as an energy company. In 1984 the Corporation purchased Texas 
Oil & Gas, and continued its move away from steel. Roderick announced 
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in the 1984 Annual Report a "New U. S. Steel" (p. 2). In 1986 the 
Corporation, still the largest steel producer in the U. S., reorganized and 
changed its name to USX. The Corporation, which had long been the 
symbol of the U. S. steel industry, and a major force in the American 
economy, was now a minor player in the global energy industry. 
Steel Exports-Imports 
Imports have continued to be a problem for the large U. S. integrated 
producers. In 1983 for example, imports accounted for approximately 22% 
of the domestic market. Increasingly, imports are coming from new 
producers like Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Nigeria. These countries 
have very modern steel mills, and labor costs which allow them to 
undercut the Japanese and Europeans on price. Obsolescence and 
overcapacity were becoming global problems by the mid-1980s - no longer 
simply an American problem. 
By 1984 steel imports had captured more than 26% of the market. "It 
appears that when the import share reaches a certain percentage, the 
imports determine price conditions even in a good year" (Iron Age, 
1/3/1985: 43). Steel imports were no longer simply a threat to the 
American steel industry, but had become a major element of the industry. 
Steel Labor 
The steelworkers in the 1980s have lost much of the ground they gained 
during the period ending in the 1970s. The membership of the Union was 
down to about 740,000 members in 1984 from a high of 1.5 million in the 
early 1970s (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984). The Union found 
itself granting concessions to the industry in order to retain jobs, and still 
plants closed. The USWA continued to join with the steel firms in an 
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attempt to limit imports - but imports continued to rise and more jobs 
were lost. The failure to unionize the minimills also contributed to a 
decline in employment for union members as the minimills captured a 
greater percentage of the market. In 1984, the USWA had to lay off its own 
staff as the number of dues-paying members continued to fall. 
By 1983 the number of production workers in basic steel had fallen to 
258,000, and total employment had fallen to 279,000 (U. S. Dept, of Labor 
Statistics, 1985). As some of the firms, like U. S. Steel diversified out of 
steel the USWA found itself fighting for survival. In 1984, the newly 
elected President of the USWA — Lynn Williams -- recounted a story of 
unemployment, permanent layoffs, and the decimation of a once proud 
union (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984). He ended his speech by 
suggesting that "our Union must find fresh solutions to new and even 
more complex problems and situations (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1984: 24). Like U. S. Steel, the Steelworkers were now moving out of steel 
and into new industries. 
The Condition of the U. S. Steel Industry in the mid-1980s 
The Integrated Steel Firms 
The period since World War II has seen the demise of a steel industry 
which once produced more steel than all other steel industries on earth 
combined. Low profit margins, government tax policies, the need for 
pollution controls, an industry policy of rounding out facilities rather than 
replacing obsolete facilities, all contributed this decline. By the mid-1980s 
many of the major firms of an earlier ear had disappeared either through 
mergers and acquisitions or bankruptcy. The greatest steel firm — The 
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Corporation — is now an energy company beset by a different set of 
problems. 
Minimills. 
The one bright star in the domestic steel industry in the last ten years 
has been the minimill segment which continues to be profitable, and to 
capture additional market share. At a time when the integrated firms were 
scrambling for cash, many of the minimills were searching for new 
investment projects. As the integrated firms closed plants throughout the 
1980s, the minimills opened them. This is the one sector of the industry 
which has consistently been able to compete with the imports. 
Steel Imports 
Steel imports are now a fact of life in the U. S. Many industries rely on 
imports as they have gotten away from stockpiling steel, and adopted just- 
in-time inventory techniques. In the mid-1980s the domestic integrated 
firms even proposed importing semi-finished steel to be finished at their 
plants and then sold in the U. S. Increasingly, the imports come from the 
less-developed countries like Brazil, Nigeria, and Mexico. Steel 
agreements with Japan and the EEC are no longer effective, when those 
markets are themselves subject to steel imports from countries with lower 
production costs and more efficient plants. 
Steel Labor 
The once proud USWA, like the once proud domestic integrated steel 
industry, found itself in the mid-1980s in shambles. The membership was 
approximately one-half of what it had been a few years earlier, and the 
Union was looking for members in new industries unrelated to steel. It 
too had discovered the value of diversification. The economic and 
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political power it had so carefully developed in the 1950s and 1960s was 
virtually gone. The best the USWA could hope for was to hold on to the 
few remaining jobs in the steel industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL POSITION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Studies of the U. S. Steel Industry 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a brief history of the U. S. steel industry since 
the founding of the U. S. Steel Corporation in 1901 through 1985 — the year 
after David Roderick, the CEO of U. S. Steel announced that with the 
purchase of Marathon Oil and Texas Oil and Gas "A New U. S. Steel came 
into its own in 1984" (USS Annual Report. 1984: 2), and the year before U. 
S. Steel was reorganized into four freestanding divisions — only one of 
which is steel — and renamed USX. This period, and particularly the years 
following World War n, was one of great change for the U. S. steel 
industry. As noted in chapter 1, this era has been the subject of a number 
of studies, some of which will be discussed below. 
History of the U. S. Steel Industry 
Certainly the definitive study of the U. S. steel industry is Hogan's 5- 
volume Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United 
States (1971), which traces the progress of the steel industry from its early 
days in the U. S. through the 1960s. Hogan followed this study with 
periodic updates: The 1970s: Critical Years for Steel (1972); World Steel in 
the 1980s: A Case of Survival (1983); and Steel in the United States: 
Restructuring to Compete (1984). The initial 5 volume study is a detailed, 
clinical, analysis of the development of all areas of the steel industry from 
pricing, to technology, foreign trade, and labor issues. This study rarely 
passes judgement on the actions taken by any group in the industry, and 
offers no prescriptions for future action, but does report events in great 
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detail. In fact, Hogan's 5-volume study of the steel industry resembles the 
medeival chronicles in its choice of a central subject, the steel industry, its 
organization by topic and time period, and most importantly, its lack of 
closure. The five volumes simply end with the 1960s, and do not provide 
any "summing up", or explanation of the "meaning" of the events related. 
This is not true of the three later studies. These studies were written 
after it became apparent that the U. S. steel industry was losing domestic 
market share to steel importers, and was no longer competitive abroad. 
These three works, while still posessing the rich detail of the earlier study, 
have as their central purpose the development of a set of prescriptions for 
the industry. The question which frames these three studies is "how can 
the U. S. steel industry regain its former position of dominance within the 
world steel industry? Hogan's concern in these studies is not so much to 
place blame for the problems facing the industry, as to search for possible 
solutions. 
If Hogan's earlier study provides a detailed history of each aspect of the 
steel industry, with no central concept underlying the study; Tiffany (1988) 
utilizes the concept of institutional divisiveness in recounting a history of 
the complex relationship among the three major institutions — the steel 
firms, the union, and the government — whose actions and policies 
determined, in large part, the fate of the U. S. steel industry. Tiffany 
focuses on the period from 1945 to 1969 — the period in which the U. S. 
steel industry "slipped from a position of undisputed international 
dominance to one of confusion and weakness" (Tiffany, 1988: 3). 
This concept of the role of institutional divisiveness in the decline of 
the steel industry runs through the entire book. Tiffany suggests that the 
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inability of public policy makers, corporate leaders, and labor leaders to 
establish collaborative relations, at a time when foreign producers were 
doing just that, "played an important role in the industry's eventual 
decline" (Tiffany, 1988: 186). He places this discussion in the context of a 
changing international steel market, and the changing role of the U. S. in 
the international arena. 
Tiffany asserts that the foreign policy objectives of the American 
government in the 1950s, specifically the "containment of a perceived 
expansionist Soviet state", necessitated economic assistance to our allies 
which frequently "translated into benefits for foreign steel industries" 
(Tiffany, 1988: 187), prevented the government from heeding calls from 
the domestic producers for aid. At the same time, the U. S. steel industry, 
"painfully aware of the narrowing competitive gap with offshore rivals" 
was never able to convince the government of the need to provide 
assistance for the domestic producers. In large part, he attributes this to the 
"historical burden of distrust that surrounded steel-government relations 
in America" (Tiffany, 1988: 187). 
Hogan's history of the industry is first a straightforward reporting of 
facts, and second a search for answers to the problems confronting the steel 
industry in the U. S. Tiffany's history tells a story of an industry which has 
already lost its opportunity for change. The complex set of business- 
govemment-labor relationships which Tiffany examines and places within 
the context of foreign policy and international trade considerations, 
provides a lesson in how a history of distrust and adversarial posturing 
among these groups could lead to a failure to develop policies and actions 
appropriate to a changing international steel market. 
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The "Crisis*1 in Steel 
There have been few histories of the steel industry, particularly the 
history of the post World War II era — Tiffany and Hogan being notable 
exceptions. There have however, been a number of studies of what 
Crandall (1981) chose to call The U. S. Steel Industry in Recurrent Crisis. 
Crandall, and others, have explored the causes of the decline in the steel 
industry in the 1970s and 1980s, with an eye to first placing blame for the 
decline, and then offering prescriptions for the renewal of the industry. 
As noted in chapter 1, Crandall (1981) and Barnett & Schorsch (1983) 
blame the management of the large integrated steel firms for a series of 
strategic errors. Management is accused of having ignored the 
implications of trends in the global markets, such as the increase in 
production capacity in newly industrializing nations such as Korea; and 
the slow growth in demand in the U. S. market. 
Rather than develop a strategy attuned to slow growth, 
however, the steel industry has clung to an optimistic faith 
that periods of weak demand will be transistory. In a world 
context, the U. S. industry has been victimized by the gradual 
shift of production away from Europe and North America, 
the traditional steel-producing centers. Here again, the U. S. 
industry has sought to avoid the implications of this trend, in 
this case by seeking protection from the government. On both 
fronts, U. S. producers have failed to develop realistic 
adjustment strategies, so that the original American 
advantage has been eroded by the more favorable conditions, 
particularly market growth, enjoyed by foreign competitors 
(Barnett & Schorsch, 1983: 38). 
Note that it is the failure of U. S. firms to develop appropriate strategies, 
not the foreign market growth, which has eroded the earlier advantage of 
the American industry. 
Lawrence & Dyer (1983) offer a similar explanation for the "crisis" in 
steel. As part of a multi-industry study: Renewing American Industry, 
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they analyze the decline of the U. S. steel industry. They go beyond the 
explanations offered by Barnett & Schorsch and Crandall, and look at 
problems of organization and industry structure. Among these are: 
attitudes toward innovation and the adoption of new technology, a neglect 
of marketing, a "pointless struggle against government policies they had 
little hope of changing", and traditional patterns of recruiting and training 
managers which dictate that all managers start at the bottom of the 
organization (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 77). Finally, Lawrence & Dyer state 
"The steel industry environment has changed dramatically since World 
War n, while the major American firms have remained stubbornly 
attached to old strategies and stuck in old organizational forms" (1983: 84). 
Kiers (1980) also places the blame for the industry's decline on the 
management of the integrated steel firms. "How different would the U. S. 
steel industry's development have been if, with more entrepreneurial 
spirit and confidence in the promise of the future, a substantial part of the 
capital expenditures during the 1950s and the early 1960s had been used to 
develop and to build more rapidly the basic oxygen furnaces (BOFs), a 
much faster, cost-effective new process introduced to the American steel 
industry in 1954" (Kiers, 1980: 19). Like the others, Kiers blames the 
industry management for being too conservative in investment policies, 
and at the same time for choosing to ignore the developments taking place 
in foreign steel industries. 
If these studies place the blame for the decline of the industry on 
management, what chance do they see for change and improvement? As 
Lawrence & Dyer indicate in the title of their book Renewing American 
Industry (1983), unlike Tiffany, these authors do not view the steel 
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industry as having lost any opportunity for change. In chapter 1 it was 
pointed out that frequently these authors call on the management of the 
industry to change, to follow their prescriptions, and all will be well. 
However, they fail to point out that the management who they are asking 
to change is the same management whose shortcomings the authors have 
just finished discussing. 
This position is best expressed by Lawrence & Dyer who state: 
The steel industry crisis, so long in building, will not end 
quickly. Firms that wish to recover competitiveness in basic 
steel will not have an easy time of it. They will have to 
explore new ways to manage in the face or increasing 
uncertainty and complexity. Traditinal defensive strategies 
and functional structures are unlikely to be successful in the 
1980s. Rather, the companies must pursue readaptive 
strategies that emphasize innovation as well as efficiency. 
They must also aaopt more differentiated structures that give 
greater voice to personnel in research and development, 
marketing, and public affairs. Recruitment and training 
practices must also be made more consistent with the 
industry's current and future needs" (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 
85). 
This is asking alot of a management who, only a paragraph earlier, the 
authors had accused of being stuck in old strategies and organizational 
forms. 
The Industrial Policy Debate 
Finally, a number of authors write of the "crisis" in steel as a problem 
which has been caused by the lack of a national industrial policy; and a 
"crisis" which could be solved by the development of such a policy. 
Industrial, or more recently "competitive", policy, is "the basic strategy the 
nation intends to follow in maximizing economic growth and meeting 
foreign competition" (Thurow, 1988: 284). The issue of an American 
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industrial policy for steel has been of particular importance as the success 
of other nation's (particularly Japan) policies has become apparent. 
The discussion of an industrial policy for steel divides along the lines of 
whether or not steel should be a protected industry. Some authors like 
Reich (1983), Reich & Magaziner (1983), and Thurow (1988) argue that 
declining industries like steel should not be protected. Thurow (1988) for 
example, argues that: 
the ingredients of an effective industrial policy for steel 
woula start with the realization that some part (low 
technology, standardized products) of the steel industry is in 
the product cycle and should and will move off to low-cost 
foreign producers in Korea and Brazil. . .. When part of the 
industry is viable in the United States as minimills, problems 
may revolve around sites and environmental regulations. . . 
. Part of the industry is in the new high-tech sunrise category 
of powdered mwtals, metal ceramics, etc.,. .. Part of the 
industry may be viable if two or three next-generation big 
integrated steel mills were built at coastal locations 
The first step in an industrial policy for steel would be to 
remove all protection and tell the industry that protection 
would not be reimposed until they had come up with a 
concrete plan to remake the industry into a world-class 
competitive one (Thurow, 1988: 297 - 298). 
Along the same lines Reich (1983) has argued that "policies to protect 
declining industries are not only failing to promote new investment but in 
fact are dragging down the rest of the American economy" (p. 183). In fact, 
Reich argues that the problem is not that industries are declining but that 
adjustments to decline "are not occurring automatically" (1988: 156). That 
is, new industries are not appearing rapidly enough to replace the old, 
declining industries. In this context Reich suggests. 
Diversification into a more competitive industry may be a far 
superior adjustment strategy. But adjustment assistance is 
often provided to distressed industries on the assumption 
that they need it to regain competitiveness rather than simply 
maintain overall corporate profitability. At the very least. 
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companies receiving such assistance should be required to 
specify the investment strategy they will pursue, and the 
public should have an opportunity to decide whether that 
strategy merits public support (1988:158). 
Tiffany (1988) and Reich (1988) both argue that the real problem with 
any form of industrial policy for steel is ideological. Tiffany argues that 
"the American system of institutional relations as it pertained to steel was, 
in fact, never amenable to any such cooperatively defined regime of 
decisionmaking as is assumed under industrial policy" (1988: 186). Reich 
extends the problem of ideology to the economy as a whole "Our collective 
inability to organize ourselves for economic change stems largely from 
ideological blinders which severely limits our vision, forcing us to engage 
in an endless debate over the relative merits of two artificial categories" the 
"free" market, or centralized national "planning". The real choice is 
between adjustment or protection" (Reich, 1988: 160). Let the steel 
industry either adjust or decline further, but do not continue to pursue the 
protectionist policy of the late 1960s and 1970s. 
On the other side, Cohen & Zysman (1987) argue that basic industries 
need to be protected because of the related employment, as much as 
because of the importance of the industries themselves. When basic 
industries, such as steel, close plants, the jobs and income lost are not 
simply those in that industry. As Lawrence & Dyer (1983) point out 
"Youngstown has lost a third of its population in little more than a decade. 
Gone with the people and jobs are city services, schools, repair of roads and 
bridges, even regular airline service" (p. 78). Thus, these authors argue, a 
protectionist policy is necessary to prevent the continued decline of the 
American economy in general. 
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Cohen & Zysman and Lawrence & Dyer argue that letting the "natural" 
decline of the industry continue creates too many other problems for the 
American economy — the adjustment problems Reich discusses. 
However, instead of a policy to ease the adjustment, these authors argue 
for "some coordinated government support" which "will be necessary to 
encourage research and reward investment in this industry which stood 
for so long at the center of the American economy as a major regional 
employer and a large-scale purchaser from and supplier to other basic 
industries" (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 85). 
Jones (1986) has best captured the major elements of the argument for a 
protectionist industrial policy when he states: 
Proponents of protectionist policies for the steel industry 
generally argue that leaving the domestic steel market open to 
import competition would damage national economic or 
political interests. Implicit in these arguments is the view 
that an import-induced contraction of the industry below 
some presupposed minimum level of output (or 
employment) would harm national defense capabilities or 
national economic health. . . . From an economic 
perspective, such arguments claim that there exists a 
divergence between the private market costs of steel imports 
and their social costs as determined by either economic 
distortions or non-economic national goals (Jones, 1986: 4). 
The argument over a national industrial policy for steel is first an 
argument over the type of steel industry the U. S. wants — an industry 
similar to that of the 1950s, dominated by a group of large integrated firms; 
or a restructured industry, with a small integrated firm segment, and a 
larger minimill segment, and the rest of domestic steel demand supplied 
by steel imports. Secondly, and more importantly, the argument between 
the advocates of protectionism and the advocates of adjustment is an 
argument over the future of the American economy. Can the U. S., or any 
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other industrialized nation, afford to move from a manufacturing 
economy to a service economy? The political and academic argument is 
unresolved, and the domestic steel industry continues to restructure and 
rationalize. The ideology which perceives government assistance to 
business as somehow illegitimate (Reich, 1988), persists in preventing the 
development of any form of consistent national industrial policy for the 
steel industry. 
Theoretical Position 
This dissertation differs in the perspective and theoretical position 
taken, from most of the studies discussed above. First, unlike most studies 
of the "crisis" in steel, there is no attempt in this study to fix blame for the 
current situation of the domestic steel industry. As discussed in chapter 1, 
this project is concerned with discovering how steel industry leaders made 
sense of their world and took action based on that sense-making. It is not 
concerned, as are many of the studies discussed above, with what has gone 
wrong or who should be held be responsible. Additionally, there is no 
intent here to enter the debate over the need for an industrial policy — 
whether one of protection or adjustment. 
If this study is similar to any of those discussed above, it is Tiffany's 
(1988) The Decline of American Steel, in that this study is also an historical 
account of institutional relations in a sector of the U. S. steel industry in 
the post-World War II era. Unlike Tiffany however, this study does not 
take as its central concept the notion of organizational divisiveness. If 
anything, the central concept here is the effect of collective strategies 
(Bresser & Harl, 1986), either intended or unintended, on the direction the 
U. S. steel industry took in the years from 1945 to 1985. 
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As noted in chapter 1, this study focuses on U. S. Steel and the United 
Steelworkers in an attempt to understand the rationales developed, and 
actions taken, by both organizations as the steel industry changed over the 
forty years under consideration. These organizations are enmeshed in one 
another's sensemaking and actions, and the strategies of one cannot be 
considered except in relation to the strategies of the other. Further, the 
sensemaking and actions of the USWA and U. S. Steel had a profound 
effect on the entire industry during this period. These organizations 
represent major elements in the industry -- the large integrated steel firms 
and labor — and their strategies frequently set the pattern for the rest of the 
industry. 
Finally, it should be noted that this dissertation focuses on the content 
of the strategies, not the internal political processes through which the 
strategies were formulated. Given the historical nature of this study, and 
the use of archival data, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make assertions 
about the process of consensus-building, or the internal power struggles, in 
either organization, which may have shaped the strategies of these 
organizations. This study is concerned however, with effect of social, inter- 
organizational, processes on the development of strategic actions. Thus, 
the focus here, while not on internal political processes, is processual in 
the sense the interactions of U. S. Steel and the USWA allow us to 
understand the effect of interorganizational processes on strategy 
development. 
The Purpose of this Study 
As noted in chapter 1, this project is concerned with searching for an 
understanding or explanation of how those in the industry made sense of 
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their world, and how that sensemaking provided a rationale for actions 
taken. One purpose of this project then is to attempt to provide a different 
form of explanation — one that addresses questions not investigated by 
more conventional strategic management research — from that offered by 
the conventional strategic management literature for the current state of 
the U. S. steel industry during the period 1945 to 1985 — that is, the steel 
industry did not adapt to a changing environment. 
Theoretical Perspective 
In offering a different way of understanding the current state of the steel 
industry, Ithis study proceeds from a recognition that those in the industry 
choose to interpret and represent their world within a framework of their 
devising. That is, faced with an ambiguous field of experience, strategists 
"make relationships by bringing connections and patterns to the action." 
(Smircich & Stubbart, 1985:726). The "environment" which strategists are 
attempting to understand and explain is an environment which they have 
helped to create. 
Strategists provide a definition of "reality" which allows the 
organization to continue to act within its "environment". Berger & 
Luckmann (1966) posit that this definition of reality becomes in effect a 
"theory" which must be proven to be superior "not by virtue of its intrinsic 
qualities, but by its applicability to the social interests of the group that has 
become its carrier" (1966:111). As the "theory" proves applicable the 
options for action become limited by what is possible within that definition 
of reality. 
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Thus, Berger & Luckmann state: 
If there is a tendency to go on as before anyway, the tendency 
is obviously strengthened by having excellent reasons for 
doing so. This means that institutions may persist even 
when to an outside observor, they have lost their original 
functionality or practicality. One does certain things not 
because they work but because they are right - right that is, in 
terms of the ultimate definition of reality promulgated by the 
universal experts. (1966:108-9) 
In most organizations the role of "universal expert" - "the individual 
who knows the ultimate significance of what everybody knows and does" 
(Berger & Luckmann,1966:108) is taken by strategists. Thus, the definition 
of reality developed by strategists, and which they have inherited from 
previous strategists, provides the framework for action. Note, that this 
differs from the view taken by conventional strategic management 
literature which assumes that strategists are faced with a broad range of 
alternatives, limited only by the resources of the organization. In the view 
taken here, the alternatives for action are limited by the framework, or 
definition of reality, which strategists have both inherited and devised. 
The differences between this approach (social construction model) and that 
taken in the conventional strategic management are illustrated in table 4.1 
(p. 137). 
In attempting to discover and understand the manner in which those 
in the steel industry have framed the experience and events of which they 
are part, this study analyzes and interprets particular examples of discourse 
in the U.S. steel industry. These examples (Letters to Shareholders and 
Speeches to Biennial Conventions) are taken to represent the following: 
1) The discourse which frames the possible actions for 
the U.S. steel industry. 
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2) The frameworks which management uses to explain the 
organization to an audience of important stakeholders. 
3) The frameworks which management in each organization 
uses to develop possible actions. 
This discourse is a representation for, and interpreted by, both the 
presenters of the text, and by the researcher. First, the texts are a means for 
the individual or organization presenting them to describe her or his 
world, and to interpret her or his role and the role of others in that world. 
Second, the researcher takes the texts to be representations of frameworks 
within which strategies are developed and evolve, and interprets them 
within the framework constructed by the researcher. Thus, as Rabinow 
points out "Representations are not, however, sui generis; they serve as 
means for making sense of life worlds (which they are instrumental in 
constructing) and consequently they differ in their functions. The goals of 
the anthropologist and the native are distinct" (Rabinow, 1986:257). 
Finally, the researcher as historian assesses and interprets the events 
which occurred during the time period under study within the framework 
constructed — that of institutional relationships. The final text then will 
reflect the biases which the researcher brings to the search for information, 
and to the interpretation of that information. 
Review of the Literature 
Some of the literature which is relevant to the development of the 
theoretical approach taken in this study is discussed below. The discussion 
of this literature is divided into three models: Conventional Strategic 
Management; Social Construction (both summarized in table 4.1, p. 137); 
and Cognitive Processes. The Cognitive Processes literature is included 
here for its insights into the cognitive biases and limitations which affect 
individual decision-making. The Social Construction model places 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of the Conventional Strategic Management and 
Social Construction Models 
Conventional Strategic Management Social Construction 
View of the Role of the Strategist 
The strategist is an analyzer 
and evaluator who must discover 
the relationships among "real" 
variables and artifacts which 
exist in the "environment". 
The strategist is a shaper 
of contexts, is part of the 
social process of framing 
the stream of experience and 
and events of which the 
organization is part. The 
strategist copes with the 
multiple realities which 
constitute the organization 
and the environment. 
View of the Environment 
The environment is composed 
of real and objective artifacts 
which can be identified 
and measured. 
The environment is socially 
constructed through the 
interactions of organization 
members and the 
interactions of organizations. 
View of the Relationship between 
The organization exists within an 
environment which in turn exists 
independently of the organization. 
The organization adapts to 
the environment by maintaining 
a "fit" between organizational 
needs and environmental constraints. 
Organizations and Environment 
The organization 
symbolically 
constitutes or enacts its 
environment. 
The organization creates and 
maintains a system of 
meaning which permits it to 
frame,understand,and act 
within a stream of 
experience and events. 
View of Strategy Formulation 
Strategies are formulated by 
matching organizational 
resources and environmental 
opportunities. 
Strategies evolve and 
develop within the 
historical context of the 
self-created environment. 
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strategists in the role of having to manage the frameworks and 
interpretations within which the organization acts. Understanding the 
biases and limitations which affect the manner in which individuals and 
organizations make sense of their world, may aid us in better 
understanding how organizational strategies evolve over time. 
Conventional Strategic Management 
The conventional strategic management literature, as discussed in 
chapter 1, is principally concerned with understanding how organizations 
and individuals control the world in which they exist (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979). This literature contains the following set of assumptions. First, the 
organization's environment is objective and real; that is, strategists can 
accurately "know" the elements, and relationships between elements, in 
that environment (Schendel & Hofer, 1979). Second, Simon's (1957) 
concept of bounded rationality accounts for the perceptual constraints and 
biases which "interfere" with strategists ability to "precisely know" the 
environment. Finally strategists are, in some sense, outside the context of 
the organization or industry in which they exist (Andrews, 1987). This is 
evident in the role of strategists in this literature - an analyzer and 
evaluator of information and alternatives, for whom the organization 
exists as another variable to consider, when deciding on which goals to 
pursue and how best to pursue them (Porter, 1980; Quinn,1980; Schendel 
& Hofer, 1979, Andrews, 1987). (see figure 4.1, p. 139). 
The Environment 
In this set of literature the environment, for example, is assumed to be 
"composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relationships 





FOCUS - General Manager or Strategist 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES - "Bounded Rationality"" 
Discover the environment 
ENVIRONMENT - Real and Objective 
Causal relationships exist and can 
be discovered. 
ORGANIZATIONS - Organizing is a rational process 
Organizations are real artefacts with 
boundaries between the organization 
and the environment 
Figure 4.1: Conventional Strategic Management Model 
derived from the natural sciences" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 26). This 
concept that relationships between artefacts are real and can be identified 
and measured is at the heart of the model. In this literature strategic 
management relies on strategists "knowing" what the relationships in the 
environment are in order to "predict" what the results of a particular 
strategy will be (Andrews, 1987). 
In assessing the U.S. steel industry, from this perspective, the 
environment of U. S. Steel, as noted in chapter 1, would include the other 
large integrated firms as well as foreign competitors. The focus of the 
investigation is on the relationship of the competing firms, and 
particularly the impact of foreign competition on the domestic industry. 
Thus, "the relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relationships" to be 
studied and known, would include things like pricing policies, capacity, 
intensity of competition, threat of new entrants, and the stage in which the 
industry is (Andrews, 1987; Porter, 1985). 
The union is included in the environment here as a stakeholder to be 
considered in developing strategy, but is not as important a consideration 
as the competitors (Mitroff, 1983, Freeman, 1984). In this sense, the union, 
like the government, takes second place in the firm's environment. In 
much of the strategic management literature which conforms to the set of 
assumptions described above, the emphasis is on the firm's ability to gain a 
competitive advantage over other firms (Andrews, 1987, Porter, 1985). 
The union is a supplier of labor whose impact on competitive strategy is 
seen to be primarily in terms of wages and work rules. In fact, a reading of 
the predominant text books for the strategy course would lead to the 
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assumption that unions are almost never considered in the formulation of 
strategy (Thompson & Strickland, 1984; Christiansen, et. al., 1985). 
Strategy Formulation 
Strategy formulation within the assumptions of this literature is 
viewed as competitive, as an ongoing attempt to create or maintain an 
advantage over others in the industry. Schendel & Hofer's (1979) strategic 
management paradigm, for example, develops a model in which strategists 
formulate goals for the organization, evaluate and analyze the 
environment, and finally formulate and select the best strategy. Thus, 
strategists direct corporate purpose - control the corporation - from a 
positition where they, and only they, are aware of the entire picture 
(Andrews, 1987). 
The concept of strategy formulation as principally concerned with 
competitive advantage breaks down however, when we consider the 
specific case of the U.S. steel industry. How competitive are strategies 
formulated in an industry where one firm traditionally set prices, for the 
industry, so that the highest cost producer would be able to make a profit? 
Furthermore, during much of the forty year period under consideration 
labor negotiations for the industry were carried out by U.S. Steel and the 
USWA - a practice formalized during the 1970s with the adoption of the 
Experimental Negotiating Agreement. Thus, an industry wide labor pact, 
affecting cost for all firms, was negotiated by the largest,strongest, firm in 
the industry. 
The Role of Top Management 
U. S. Steel's traditional role as the industry leader places a tremendous 
burden on the top management of the firm, in this model. The concept of 
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strategists as directors of corporate purpose (Andrews, 1987), as the only 
managers who can see the "big picture", assumes that strategists know 
more about the organization, the industry, and the future than anyone 
else. Incorporating bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) into this concept 
places some limits upon what is expected of strategists. Bounded rationality 
allows them to make mistakes, to be unable to anticipate all possible 
consequences, but does not completely remove the burden of rationality 
the model imposes - it simply limits it by recognizing that strategists are 
faced with an uncertain world, limited information, and limited time in 
which to make, not an optimal decision, but a satisficing one. 
The Organization Structure 
Given this recognition that individual strategists will not be able to 
make completely rational decisions, the model attempts to structure the 
situation to improve or assist the rationality of strategists. There is an 
assumption that the organization structure acts to force strategists to be 
more rational than the concept of limited rationality might lead us to 
expect. The organization should be structured to provide the most 
complete information possible, so that strategists may make an optimal 
decision within the limitations of information and resources (Chandler, 
1962). 
At the same time however, the organizational structure, and to some 
extent the organizational culture, are simply variables to be manipulated 
by strategists in the process of devising and implementing a strategy. 
Chandler (1962) argues that organizational structure follows from the 
development of organizational strategy. Strategy is viewed as a response to 
changing opportunities and needs in the environment, and taking action 
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to allocate resources to take advantage of those opportunities and to meet 
those needs. As the allocation of resources changes to meet changing 
opportunities, the organizational structure is changed to administer those 
resources efficiently. 
Hall and Saias (1980) however, argue that frequently strategy follows 
structure. They suggest an information transfer process which is not 
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neutral, but is dependent upon the organizational structure. "Incoming 
information is paid greater or less attention by various structural elements. 
When the information is judged interesting, it is subsequently transmitted 
to other elements" (Hall & Saias, 1980:156). Thus it is not the strategy, or 
strategists, which are determining the structure, rather the existing 
structure is developing problems and projects to justify its continued 
existence. Resources are not being allocated and deployed to meet 
environmental needs. Resources are instead being allocated and deployed 
to meet the needs of various groups within the organization - internal 
stakeholders. 
In this view steel industry executives are constrained by the 
organizational structures developed over the years. In fact, this 
explanation has been offered for the situation the industry is currently in 
(Hogan, 1972, 1983, 1984). Top management in the steel industry, it is 
noted, rise through the ranks with no experience at other companies, let 
alone other industries (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983). Thus, they are seen to 
have a vested interest in maintaining the structure which brought them to 
power. The structure, rather than enhancing strategists’ rationality, 
further constrains it. That this is not recognized is simply another example 
of the mistaken thinking of those in the industry. 
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This reliance of strategists upon the organization for information and 
potential actions however, contradicts the concept central to much of the 
conventional strategic management literature of strategists as somehow 
omniscient, both connected to the organization but still able to view it 
dispassionately. Instead, strategists are enmeshed within the structure and 
history of the organization, as appears to be the case in the steel industry, 
incapable of impartial judgement; but rather judging according to criteria 
and standards developed by the organization and industry over time. 
Conclusions 
The burden placed on strategists by this model is both too great and too 
simplistic — too great in that the assigned role, director of corporate 
purpose, is frequently beyond the ability of one person; too simplistic in 
that it does not take into account the fact that strategists are frequently 
individuals who have been part of an organization or industry for many 
years. The presumption that they will suddenly shed the constraints that 
that implies, like a snake shedding its skin, ignores all that psychology tells 
us of the need to hold stable world views, and the role of memory in those 
views. 
The relation between environment and organization in this model is 
not treated as problematic, rather it is simply not dealt with. The 
organization and the environment exist, as natural elements, to be 
observed, measured, and analyzed. The strategist's role, as was noted 
earlier, is to be the observer and analyzer. The model is not concerned 
with the manner in which organizations and industries come into 
existence, and how patterns of relationships evolve among these groups. 
Instead, the concern is with how to control those groups and relationships 
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which are known, never questioning why or how they are known; or what 
it is which is supposed to be known. 
Many of these assumptions about the role of the strategist, the 
organization, and the nature of the environment, are at odds both with 
research findings from other areas of the social sciences, and with day-to- 
day practices in organizations. The model offers neither satisfying 
explanations of ongoing events; nor, more importantly, that which it sets 
out to do, the ability to predict and control future events. 
This is particularly true when looking at the explanations offered for 
the situation of the steel industry in the 1980's. Many of the authors cited 
earlier (for example Barnett & Schorsch and Crandall) have focused on the 
failure of management to accurately foresee changes in use of materials, 
increased global competition, and the levelling off of the post-WWII 
rebuilding of Europe and Asia - all elements which have contributed to 
lower demand for steel. Yet, focusing on management's failure to foresee 
the future and plan for it, does not help us to understand why managers 
continued to ignore these changes once their impact was apparent. In 
turn, the advice which follows from this model - restructure, rationalize, 
and match organizational strengths with environmental opportunities - is 
of little help to help to managers faced with long-term global excess 
capacity, and little if any growth in demand for their product. 
Social Construction Model 
The literature discussed here offers an alternative framework for 
analyzing and understanding organization and strategic actions. It differs 
from the conventional strategic management literature in a number of 
ways. First, the focus is on the history and experience of the organization 
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and the industry, rather than on the role of the strategist. Second, the 
environment is viewed as a stream of experience and events without 
boundaries - a stream which strategists order and interpret. Third, 
organizing is a social process of which the strategist is a part. The 
organization, and the strategist bracket, or impose a framework upon, the 
stream of experience in such a way as to allow them to act. Thus, the 
model is concerned with understanding organizing, rather than 
controlling organizations and environments (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) 
(see figure 4.2, p. 147). 
As the conventional strategic management literature is concerned with 
the "effective regulation and control of social affairs" (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979:26); the enactment, or interpretive, literature is concerned with 
"obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created social world ’as it 
is' in terms of an ongoing process" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:31). 
The Environment 
The focus on "understanding the subjectively created social world" is 
essential to the discussion of organizing and the environment in this 
model. In contrast to the view taken in the conventional strategic 
management literature of the organization and the environment as 
objective artefacts; here, both are presented as social constructions which 
are essentially intangible and "in a continuous process of reaffirmation or 
change" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 260). This view leads the researcher 
away from simply accepting organizations and environments as objective 
things whose relationship can be explored and explained; and to the 
exploration of what it means for individuals to organize and to find ways 
to make sense of the world. 
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Assumptions 
FOCUS - Social Process of Organizing 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES - Enactment or Sense-Making 
Framing or Bracketing the 
world (environment) 
ENVIRONMENT - Continuous stream of experience and 
events. 
Causal relationships are created 
through process of social construction 
ORGANIZATIONS - Organizing is a social process 
Organizations are patterns of beliefs, 
values, and assumptions shared by 
social actors. 
Figure 4.2: Social Construction Model 
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In analyzing and understanding the situation of the steel industry 
today, this view leads away from an assessment of the mistakes made by 
management in not adapting to a changing environment; and to an 
attempt to uncover the patterns of beliefs and actions through which those 
in the industry construct their world (Smircich, Stubbart & Newell, 1984; 
Stubbart & Ramprasad, 1985). The focus shifts from trying to understand 
why steel executives did not discover the changes in the environment, to 
trying to understand how those in the industry interpreted and enacted 
their environment. 
Weick (1979) introduced the concept of enactment to the organizational 
theory literature, and the concept provides a framework for this line of 
research in much the same way that Simon's concept of bounded 
rationality provides a framework for the conventional strategic 
management model. Enacted environments are not objective artefacts to 
be known, and relationships to be discovered; rather they are part of the 
social process of organizing. Enacted environments develop from the 
interpretations and actions of those in the organization, and reflect past 
knowledge and events which have allowed strategists and organizations to 
make sense of the world. 
It is this emphasis on the retention of past knowledge and actions as 
part of the known environment which distinguishes this literature from 
others (Schutz, 1967). If an organization retains knowledge from the past 
which aids it in developing a framework for understanding the present, 
then it is not scanning a "real", objectively knowable, environment for 
opportunities and threats, but bracketing and interpreting events in a 
manner which makes sense for the organization (Daft & Weick, 1984; Ford 
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& Baucus, 1987). The history of the organization and industry are 
important in understanding the range of alternatives open to the 
organization or the industry for the future. 
The Role of Top Management 
The task of management here is to find ways to create a context in 
which action is possible. The emphasis shifts from the need to develop 
cause and effect explanations which allow the strategist to control the 
organization and the environment, to one of understanding the confines 
of past enactments and current assumptions about the world. The 
strategist is not analyzing the "fit” between the organization and the 
environment, but questioning the assumptions through which the 
organization makes sense of the world. In this view it is possible that steel 
industry management has acted in a "rational" manner. That is, when the 
large U. S. steel firms traditionally non-competitive world with the entry 
of new players (Japan, Korea, the EEC) — players unaware of the "rules" 
under which the industry had been operating — the integrated steel firms 
had to find new explanations (unfair competition, lack of government 
protection) to allow them to continue to act. 
The role assigned management here is not without burdens. Strategists 
are charged with questioning the assumptions of the organization —with 
constantly reassessing the map or framework through which the 
organization makes sense of the world. Yet, the psychologists remind us 
that individuals — and organizations are collections of individuals — like 
and need to hold stable world views. How then, can we expect strategists, 
on their own, to constantly question a world view which is comfortable - 
which "makes sense" ? 
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Smircich and Stubbart (1985) elaborate further on the role of strategists 
who are "managing in an enacted world" (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985: 731). 
In their view, strategists do not analyze the environment instead, 
"Strategists need to concentrate on their choices vis-k-vis frameworks and 
interpretations" (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985:729). In analyzing an industry 
learning and understanding what the frameworks are, and have been, may 
lead to a clearer understanding of the choices strategists make. 
In understanding, and working within, the current assumptions of the 
organization, strategists tie themselves to those assumptions. The 
development of a new set of assumptions will almost certainly include 
some aspects of the current assumptions. Memory and analogies are 
powerful elements in the construction of mental maps or frameworks. 
Learning may compel forgetting, as Smircich and Stubbart (1985) say — but 
forgetting what? 
Elements of Strategic Frames 
Values, symbols, language, and drama in organizations develop over 
time - they are elements retained by the organization for their assistance in 
making sense of the world. Questioning choices vis-a-vis the framework 
implies questioning these elements. If these provide the deep images of 
organizational life, as Smircich and Stubbart posit, then strategists may be 
placed in the position of questioning the existence of that life. 
For an industry like steel with a long, rich, history, the retention of values, 
symbols, language and drama form an important part of the current 
framework within which strategies are formulated. Thus, actions which 
make no sense to those of us outside the industry, may in fact make sense 
to those in the industry, given the historical elements of their strategic 
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framework. As Huff (1982) suggests, the particular frame used makes the 
pursuit of some strategic alternatives more probable than that of others - 
the organization sets itself on certain paths (Huff, 1982: 122). The framing 
process sets the direction which the organization pursues, and subsequent 
events or experiences confirm or disconfirm the validity of the frame of 
reference for the organization. 
Huff states that the strategic frame "might be thought of as similar to 
setting the organization on a path of collecting certain kinds of 
information, pursuing certain kinds of markets, and so on. The path is not 
determined by the strategic frame, but successive decisions are made more 
likely by its initial form" (Huff, 1982:122). If the problems the strategic 
frame identifies cannot be solved within that frame, then the organization 
begins the process of changing frames, or enacting a new environment. 
Thus, the organizational framework is not constantly in question. Instead, 
a crisis precipitates that questioning, or shifting of maps. In this view 
management decisions are not wrong, mistaken thinking is not the issue, 
rather frameworks are not changed until the crisis or problem is already 
there. 
Organization and Industry History 
All of this leads finally to the importance of organizational and 
industry history to strategic decision-making. Weick's retained 
enactments, Smircich and Stubbart's organizational contexts, and Huff's 
shared industry meanings develop from past events and explanations. 
These are then used, by strategists in organizations and industries, to 
understand - to make sense of - current streams of experience. The existing 
frameworks can be questioned, but as long as they allow those in 
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organizations or industries to make sense of their world, and most 
importantly to act out that sense-making, the frameworks will not be 
discredited. 
Strategists are caught within the historical sense-making of the 
organization and the industry. As long as what appears to be rational 
action is possible within that frame, it is unnecessary to question it. The 
organization, and the industry, do not function to enhance the rationality 
of strategists. Rather, organization and industry histories, the negotiated 
behaviors and beliefs of actors in organizations and industries , further 
constrain the rational decision-making of strategists by providing a set of 
assumptions about the world, and a limited set of possible alternatives. 
Within those confines, however, the organization and industry 
frameworks act to make it appear that strategists have formulated and 
chosen a rational, optimal, strategy. 
For the case of the steel industry this process of uncovering historical 
frameworks and coming to understand actions as taking place within those 
frameworks, may lead to a better understanding of both stability and 
change within the industry. Prescriptions and advice could then be offered 
which would take into account how the industry got to the present 
situation, and what the possibilities are within those confines. 
Cognitive Processes Model 
The fields of cognitive and social psychology contain extensive research 
on the biases and limitations which affect the decision processes of the 
individual. The focus is on how an individual faced with a complex 
situation frames the problem in a manner which allows him/her to make 
a decision. In other words, these fields describe and analyze the preferred 
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modes by which individuals interpret and understand "reality". The social 
construction model places strategists in the role of having to manage the 
frameworks and interpretations within which the organization acts. 
Understanding how individuals construct frameworks will allow us to 
better understand how strategists carry out their role within the 
organization, (see figure 4.3, p. 154 ). 
Cognitive Processes and Limitations 
There are a number of cognitive processes and limitations which 
appear throughout this stream of research, and which are significant 
elements in the process of sense-making by the individual. Chief among 
these are: attributions, heuristics, biases, memory, selective perception, 
cognitive bolstering, motivations/aspirations, and analogic reasoning. All 
of these processes or biases provide the individual with a means of 
constructing and holding stable world views, or maps of the world in 
which she or he exists; and which in turn, provide a framework for action 
in that world. 
Some of these research findings have begun to enter the strategic 
management literature - for example the work of Schwenk (1984), Barnes 
(1984), and Stubbart & Ramprasad (1984-5). As in the psychology literature, 
the focus is on the cognitive processes and biases of the individual 
strategist, rather than the sensemaking processes used by the organization. 
Strategists exist within some undefined context - neither organizational 
nor industry constraints on decision-making are explicitly considered in 
this model. 
Kiesler and Sproull (1982) discuss three theoretical approaches to social 




FOCUS - Cognitive Processes of Individual Strategist 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES - Individual cognitive limitations 
and biases 
ENVIRONMENT - Strategist operates within some 
unknown context 
ORGANIZATIONS - Strategist exists within some 
unspecified setting 
Figure 4.3: Cognitive Processes Model 
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capabilities. These are: social perception, information processing, and 
social motivation. 
Social perception emphasizes how people encode 
information and use it in explanations. 
Information processing empnasizes the 
organization of information in memory, and the 
third approach is actually a set of theories about 
motivation that makes predictions that bear on 
how people think about their environments 
(Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 552). 
As with the social construction process discussed in the previous 
section, these approaches emphasize the importance of prior experience in 
analyzing current phenomena. Past attributions, analogies, and experience 
with certain types of problems will all affect the manner in which current 
stimuli are processed by strategists. Additionally, the motivational factors 
in planning, the strategists personal stake in the plan, can lead to further 
problem-sensing errors (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 559-560). 
Attributions 
Attributions form an important bias in processing information. 
Attribution theory is concerned with the perception or inference of cause. 
Attributions "constitute the person's understanding of the causal structure 
of the world and, therefore, are important determinants of his interaction 
with that world" (Kelley & Michela, 1980: 460). These attributions allow 
individuals to develop "an organized and meaningful view of the world 
in which they live." (Tetlock and Levi, 1982:68). 
At the individual level, this is similar to the discussion of social 
construction as an organizational process - a process whereby the 
organization develops an organized and meaningful framework which 
155 
allows it to take action. The relationship between causal attributions as 
they appear in "letters to shareholders" and the strategic actions and 
performance of firms has begun to be explored by Bettman & Weitz (1983) 
and Salancik & Meindl (1984). In both instances they posit that annual 
reports are a useful source of information for examining the biases in 
causal reasoning which are part of the strategic behavior of organizations 
(Bettman & Weitz,182). Further, Salancik and Meindl state that 
"attributions do predict the future performance outcomes of firms" (1984: 
252). An understanding of the attributions of a particular firm can be of 
value in understanding its strategic performance. 
Attributions are a form of automatic scanning, or data collection, 
which allows strategists to make sense of their world. Developing 
schemas of causal relationships which involve easily categorized groups, 
based on a single powerful influence, minimizes the amount of new 
information strategists have to process. The "organized and meaningful 
view of the world" which attributions allow strategists to develop, leave 
them free to process in a more effortful way information which does not 
easily fit into the map or framework. 
The social constructions of a firm, industry, or collection of 
organizations, can be understood in part through uncovering the causal 
attributions used by that group. The manner in which other groups are 
categorized,the causal links between pieces of information, will all provide 
clues as to the framework used by the organization for understanding its 
world. In analyzing an industry such as steel, uncovering the pattern of 
these attributions may lead to an understanding of how management 
chose to make sense of its world. 
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Memory 
As information processing capacity is limited, so is memory. "This 
means that ways have to be found for coding, organizing, and storing 
information efficiently in memory" (Hogarth, 1980:94). Additionally, we 
seek out information which we incorporate in existing schemas. 
"Through experience, people develop an understanding of the world they 
live in. Furthermore, they use that understanding to select information, to 
interpret it (i.e. to give it 'meaning') and to anticipate events" (Hogarth, 
1980:94). 
For strategists memory (or history) will play a key role in the collection 
and processing of information. In the same sense that Weick (1979) and 
Smircich & Stubbart (1985) posit organizations retain environments and 
industries develop and retain common knowledge, most strategic 
knowledge is located in strategists' memories. Further, this remembered 
knowledge will drive information searches, problem formulations, and 
the generation of alternatives. Thus, as was discussed earlier; if learning 
compels forgetting, for the strategist choosing what to forget is as important 
as chosing what to learn. What strategists do or do not remember will 
affect the strategic decision-making process. 
Schemas or Cognitive Frameworks 
Attributions form the basic structure of more elaborate schemas which 
allow strategists to frame the information they are processing. These 
frameworks in turn, allow strategists to take shortcuts in gathering and 
processing information. New information can be placed in an existing 
structure of causal relationships. Within these causal structures memory 
plays an important role. Those events which can be easily recalled do not 
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have to be further investigated. Without such structures strategists 
would constantly have to devise new causal explanations about their 
world. 
Analogies 
As strategists impose models, or frameworks, on events, so Steinbruner 
(1974) argues they anchor those models or beliefs in images or analogies 
which come to the surface when making decisions. One has only to think 
of the recurring image of falling dominoes in U.S. foreign policy to see the 
strength of this argument. "The beliefs thus anchored have strength 
independent of direct evidence, a strength which derives from the 
simplicity and coherence of the inference structure they embody and the 
role they play in organizing a great deal of ambiguous information." 
(Steinbruner, 1974: 116). 
Conclusions 
The cognitive limitations and biases which constitute these models 
help us to understand the manner in which individuals comprehend and 
make sense of complex, ambiguous, situations. These research findings 
remind us, as does the concept of bounded rationality, that strategists are 
finally individuals faced with problems and decisions too messy and 
complex to be understood in their entirety by any one person. However, 
the cognitive processes model fails to fully take into account the context in 
which strategists operate. The individual may be responsible for the 





In analyzing the changes which have occurred in the domestic steel 
industry research findings from psychology, combined with the concept of 
socially constructed environments, remind us of the need to uncover the 
patterns of frameworks or models used by those in the industry to make 
sense of their world. It is not the frameworks of those outside the industry 
which shape patterns of action, it is that of those within. Thus, rather than 
imposing our (the researcher's) memory and attributions on the industry, 
we need to discover and understand those of the participants in the 
industry. 
Events, as Ford and Baucus (1987) remind us, " have no inherent 
meaning; beyond their occurrence or possible occurrence, they are 
ambiguous. Events require interpretation regarding their implication to 
what organizations are doing, want to do, or should do" (1987: 370). It is 
individuals, not organizations, who interpret and attach meaning to 
events, and it is individuals who are affected by all of the biases and 
limitations which the psychology literature discusses. 
Strategists however, are individuals placed in an interesting situation - 
their interpretations, and the meaning they attach to events, are used to 
develop organizational interpretations of the environment. "When one 
speaks of organizational interpretation one really means interpretation by 
a relatively small group at the top of the organizational hierarchy" (Daft & 
Weick, 1984: 285). Strategists, or top managers, are the individuals finally 
responsible for the responses and actions taken by the organization - 
understanding how they frame their environment is useful in 
understanding those responses and actions. 
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Assumptions Underlying This Project 
This study is concerned, as noted earlier in this chapter, with the 
development of an alternative explanation of the current state of the U. S. 
steel industry — alternative to that outlined in the section on the 
conventional strategic management model. The assumptions discussed 
here differ from those of the conventional strategic management model in 
a number of ways, particularly in that organization, industry, and 
environment are viewed as problematic social constructions rather than as 
social artifacts which exist independent of any context. The theoretical 
perspective taken here focuses on the individual and organizational 
sensemaking which forms the basis for these social constructions. 
The approach to understanding the relationship between 
organizational and individual interpretations and social constructions 
taken in this study is derived from a set of assumptions put forth by Daft & 
Weick (1984), and Ford & Baucus (1987). First, as noted above, it is 
assumed that strategists are responsible for organization's interpretations 
(Daft & Weick, 1984). Second, it "is assumed that formal organizational 
interpretations are something more than individual decision makers' 
interpretations" (Ford & Baucus, 1987: 367). This last assumption stems 
from the notion that individual decision makers, through a variety of 
mechanisms - organizational experiences and history and social 
interchange, for example - "create collectively shared or consensual 
realities" (Ford & Baucus, 1987: 367). Finally, this study assumes that this 
process of creating "collectively shared or consensual realities" is affected 
by many of the cognitive biases and limitations discussed above. 
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These collective realities form the basis for: (a) the formal 
interpretations of environmental elements by the organization, and (b) the 
development of strategies based on those interpretations. The focus in this 
study is understanding how top management groups (strategists) make 
sense of their environment, and convey that sensemaking; and how that 
sensemaking not only forms a basis for organizational action, but becomes 
the environment to which strategists, and their organizations, adapt. 
Collective Strategies 
A useful framework for analyzing the sensemaking of steel industry 
leaders is the concept of collective strategy (Bresser & Harl, 1986; Astley & 
Fombrun, 1983). Collective strategy can be defined as "a systemic approach 
by collaborating organizations to deal with the variation in their 
interorganizational environment" (Bresser & Harl, 1986: 408). This 
definition of an intended collective strategy is certainly descriptive of the 
relationship between U. S. Steel and the USWA after the signing of the 
Experimental Negotiating Agreement in 1973. As discussed in chapter 3, 
this agreement was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Union and the 
integrated steel firms to stabilize, or "deal with the variation" in, the 
environment of the domestic steel industry. 
In addition to this example of an intended collective strategy, it would 
seem that the concept of collective strategy may be useful in understanding 
the interdependence of the social constructions of the two organizations. 
As noted in chapter 1, the USWA and U. S. Steel were inextricably linked 
during the forty years under study. Neither organization could construct a 
strategic scenario of which the other was not a part. In this sense, each was 
part of the process of creating the consensual realities of the other. The 
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shared reality of each organization by necessity overlapped the shared 
reality of the other. 
One of the assumptions of this study is that organizational experiences, 
history, and social interchange, all affect the development of consensual or 
shared realities by decision makers. This social process does not occur in a 
vacuum, that is, no one organization can develop its own reality 
independent of other organizations. This is particularly true in the case of 
U. S. Steel and the USWA. The concept of collective strategy provides a 
further way of understanding how and why steel industry leaders came to 





As discussed in chapter 1, this longitudinal study of the U. S. steel 
industry was undertaken in an attempt to understand why the domestic 
steel industry is in the condition it is. Further, this project is concerned 
with attempting to uncover and understand the changes which have 
occurred from an insiders view, retaining the multiple perspectives which 
that entails. This is essentially an exploratory project, rather than an 
attempt to test a model. 
The methods chosen for this study must be congruent with the set of 
assumptions discussed in chapters 1 and 4, which form the core of this 
project. The focus of this study is twofold. First, it attempts to discover and 
understand the social constructions or sensemaking through which steel 
industry leaders understood their world. Second, this study is concerned 
with the manner in which that sensemaking affected the actions taken by 
organizations in the steel industry. Therefore, research methods which 
can focus on the multiple realities which comprise the notion of 
organizing and industry, provide an internal view, and allow a historic, 
dynamic, perspective to be used, are most appropriate. 
Two different, but related, research methods were used. A historical 
analysis was undertaken to discover and understand patterns of events 
both in and out of the steel industry for the period 1945 - 1985. This 
involved reading a number of sources, both primary and secondary, in an 
attempt to trace the changes which have occured in the steel industry and 
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assess the reasons for those changes. The period 1945 - 1985 was chosen for 
the following reasons: 
• During this period the U.S. steel industry has moved from a 
world power to a struggle for survival. 
• During thel970's the union and the firms came together in 
the Experimental Negotiating Agreement - an important 
instance of cooperative industrial relations which later failed. 
• This period has seen the introduction of two important new 
actors in the U.S. steel industry - foreign importers and 
mini-mill firms. 
Additionally, a textual analysis was undertaken. This focused 
principally on two sets of documents, the CEO’s ’’Letters to the 
Shareholders" in the United States Steel (USS) Annual Reports and the 
President's "Speeches to the Biennial Convention" of the United Steel 
Workers of America (USWA). The analysis is both narrative - that is, an 
attempt to elicit the elements of the story being told; and structural - an 
attempt to uncover the causal attributions within the documents about the 
organization and the industry. 
Implementing Questions 
The first part of this study, as noted in chapter 1, is concerned with 
discovering the narratives of those inside the steel industry. This section 
relies on the concept, discussed in chapter 4, that written statements may be 
taken to be representations of the sensemaking of those presenting the 
statements. The questions investigated in the first section of this study are 
as follows: 
1. How do U. S. Steel (USS) and the United Steelworkers of America 
(USWA) each characterize themselves? 
a) Explanations/ Justifications of Actions 
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b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the industry 
2. How do the USS and the USWA characterize each other? 
a) Explanations/ Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the industry 
3. How much overlap is there between the narratives identified 
through questions 1 & 2 for the USS and the USWA? 
4. How much overlap in terms of concepts and relationships within 
the narratives is there from CEO to CEO for the USS and from 
President to President for the USWA? 
These questions were investigated through reading and analysing the 
public statements of the CEOs of USS and the Presidents of the USWA. 
First, a structural analysis of the texts was undertaken to discover the most 
commonly used concepts and the frequency of their occurrence. Then a 
form of narrative analysis, adapted for strategic management research, was 
used to identify the use of the concepts, and the relationships among these 
concepts, in the texts under investigation. These methods will be more 
fully discussed below. The patterns of concepts uncovered provide a basis 
for understanding how those inside the industry represent and understood 
their world. 
The second part of this study is concerned with the actions taken by the 
two organizations and how those actions relate to the narratives 
uncovered in the first part of the study - is there a relationship between the 
manner in which steel industry leaders appear to make sense of their 
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world and the actions they choose to take? The questions investigated in 
this part of the study are: 
5. What are the strategic actions which each CEO or President took, 
particularly with respect to the major events which occured during 
his tenure? (For example - Truman’s attempt to nationalize the 
industry) 
6. Do the strategic actions taken by each side reflect the patterns of 
expressed beliefs identified in the public statements? 
This second set of questions allowed the researcher to develop a history 
of the actions of the two organizations (USS & USWA) during the time 
period under study. The method used here was historical, identifying and 
tracing actions and events both within and outside the industry. The two 
sections of the study are connected in the final question which is concerned 
with the relationship between the actions discussed in the second part of 
the project, and the narratives uncovered in the first part of the study. 
Data Collection 
Considerations in Selecting Data Sources 
Due to the historical nature of the project the raw data used were 
documents written by others - both by those in the industry to explain and 
justify their role, and by those outside the industry who offer their own 
explanations of events. An important set of documents analyzed for this 
project (the Letters to Shareholders and Speeches to Conventions) are texts 
written by those in the industry to explain and justify their actions. 
Andrews (1987), and others, have made a strong case that organizations do 
not publicly articulate their strategies. Among the reasons given is the 
"the desirability of keeping strategic plans confidential for security reasons 
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and ambiguous to avoid internal conflict or even final decision" 
(Andrews, 1987: 23). These texts have not been analyzed in an attempt to 
discover strategies, but to discover the narratives and attributions used by 
steel industry leaders when discussing the role which they and others play 
in the industry. 
This is in line with recent studies by Bettman & Weitz (1983) and 
Salancik & Meindl (1984) which have focused on attributions and 
reasoning in corporate annual reports. In both instances the authors have 
argued that annual reports are a useful source of information for 
examining "some biases in the causal reasoning used to assess 
performance" (Bettman & Weitz, 1983: 182). Further, the argument is made 
"that attributions do predict the future performance outcomes of the 
firms" (Salancik & Meindl, 1984: 252). Thus, while organizations may not 
give a complete description of their strategy in Letters to Shareholders or 
Speeches to a Biennial Convention, the attributions in those documents 
can be used to trace a pattern of beliefs and actions. 
Documents Used 
The documents to be analyzed for each section of the study included 
the following: 
Textual Analysis - Patterns of Beliefs 
•Letters to the Shareholders - USS 
•Speeches to the Conventions - USWA 
•Annual Reports - USS 
•Convention Proceedings - USWA 
Historical Analysis - Actions and Events 
•Annual Industry Reports - Standard & Poor's, Moody's 
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•Speeches to security analysts in The Wall StreetTranscript 
•Articles about the steel industry and other events in: 
Business Week, Fortune. Forbes, Wall Street Tournal, 
New York Times. Iron Age, Steel Labor 
•Annual Reports - USS 
•Convention Proceedings - USWA 
The Letters to Shareholders and the Speeches to the Convention are 
presented to the most important stakeholder group for each organization. 
For this reason, the documents are comparable in importance to the 
organization presenting them. Additionally, these texts, being presented 
on a regular basis in the same forum, can be compared over time. This is 
not necessarily the case with magazine interviews or statements to the 
press. Further, the uniformity in the occurence of the Letters and Speeches 
can not be matched elsewhere - some of the CEOs and Presidents have 
given a great many interviews and speeches, others have not. The analysis 
of these two sets of statements is the core of the first part of the study as 
discussed above. 
The remainder of the documents provide a variety of views and 
explanations about the steel industry for the period 1945-1985. The 
magazine and newspaper articles provide evidence of the view of the steel 
industry in the popular business press. Further, they provide a source of 
information about other events and activities - social, political, and 
economic occuring during the period being studied. These documents 
were analyzed for second part of the study, which is concerned with the 
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relationship of actions and events to the frameworks and interpretations 
uncovered in the first part of the study. 
Both the Annual Reports and Convention Proceedings are public 
documents, as are the other documents listed, and are therefore easily 
accessible to researchers. 
Modes of Analysis 
Historical Analysis 
As noted above there were two methods used in this project. The first 
method used was historical, which involved reading and analyzing a 
variety of documents, listed in the data collection section. In this process 
the documents were clustered as to time period and type of events - for 
example, the Korean War and Truman's attempt to nationalize the steel 
industry. The documents were also analyzed in light of some of the 
questions raised above. Additionally, the activities of the two 
organizations were categorized on an annual basis - strikes, mergers, 
closures of plants, layoffs, increase of foreign competition, declining sales. 
This type of analysis was useful in answering three of the research 
questions which form this project. These are: 
(1) What are the major episodes or events which occurred? 
(2) What are the strategic actions of the two organizations 
particularly with respect to the major events? 
(3) Do the strategic actions taken by each side reflect the 
patterns of expressed beliefs identified in the public 
statements? 
For the first question it was necessary to develop a chronicle of events 
which occured both in and out of the industry for the period 1945-85. The 
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second question required an analysis of documents to ascertain what 
actions were undertaken by the two organizations. For the third, the 
actions of each organization must be matched against the patterns of beliefs 
identified through the analysis of the statements for each organization. 
Secondly, a textual analysis was undertaken to analyze and interpret the 
stories which each organization tells to explain and justify its role in the 
industry. This analysis was used, in conjunction with the historical 
analysis, to answer the folowing questions: 
(1) How does each side characterize itself and its role in 
the industry? 
(2) How does each side characterize the other side and its 
role in the industry? 
(3) How much overlap is there between these stories 
identified through the above questions for the four 
regimes? (see table 5.1, p. 171) 
(4) How much overlap in terms of concepts and relationships 
is there from regime to regime for each group? 
Structural Analysis of Texts 
The principal texts to be analyzed here (Letters to Shareholders and 
Speeches to Conventions) are typically framed as an explanation/ 
justification of the past actions of the organization, as well as possible 
future actions. These texts are composed of a number of cause and effect 
statements which attribute organizational actions as either a response to 
the action of some other agent, or as inducing action by the other agent. 
In The Ethnoeraphic Interview (1979) Spradley describes a method used 
to analyze interviews, which can be applied to the documents analyzed for 
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this project. The researcher first identifies domains (for example 
"company") and then searches for the internal structures of the domains, 
through which individuals make differentiations, developing taxonomies 
within the domains. For the domain company the taxonomic analysis 
identifies such sub-groups as start-up, large, and small. Additional 
questions can then be formulated to uncover similarities and differences 
among the categories (Spradley, 1979: Chapters 6-9). 
Table 5.1: Presidents of the USWA and CEOs of USS for the period 
1945 -1985 
Presidents of the USWA 
Philip Murray 1945- 1952 
David J. McDonald 1952 - 1965 
I. W. Abel 1965-1977 
Lloyd McBride 1977-1983 
Lynn Williams 1983 - 
CEOs of USS 
IrvingS. Olds 1945-1951 
Benjamin Fairless 1952 - 1954 
Roger M. Blough 1955 - 1968 
E. H. Gott 1969 - 1973 
E. B. Speer 1973 - 1979 
David Roderick 1979 - 
In an adaptation of Spradley's method, the statements included in the 
Annual Reports and Speeches were first coded as they related to specific 
domains of interest. The two overarching domains for the time period for 
USS were "Improvement of Company Performance" and " Less than 
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Perfect Company Performance." The overarching domains identified for 
the USWA were "Ways to Increase Member Welfare", "Causes of 
Decreased Member Welfare", "Prevent/Hinder us from Reaching Our 
Goals" and "Help/Assist us to Reach Our Goals". 
Each Annual Report and Speech to the Convention was coded by two 
researchers for statements which indicated the internal structure - 
statements of cause or ways/means - of the overarching domains identified 
above. The semantic concepts which the codings uncovered were clustered 
into commonalities as follows for USS: Labor-Management Relations, 
Government Relations, The U. S. Steel Industry, Issues Internal to U. S. 
Steel, Imports/Exports, Other Events; for USWA: Labor - Management 
Relations, Government Relations, The U. S. Steel Industry, Issues Internal 
to U. S. W. A., Other Labor Organizations, Other Events. In general, these 
categories are common to all of the CEOs and Presidents, although Imports 
does not become a category of interest until the 1960s. An example of this 
type of analysis is given in table 5.2 (p. 173). 
Narrative Analysis Defined 
A narrative analysis of each Annual Report and Convention 
Proceedings was undertaken to uncover the major themes of each CEOs 
and Presidents tenure. This narrative analysis was also used as a check on 
the semantic concepts uncovered in the coding process. This process led to 
an identification of the key concerns for each CEO and President within the 
categories identified above. 
Narrative can be defined as composed of the following elements: 
"narrative has two parts: a story (histoire), the content or chain of events 
(actions, happenings), plus what may be called the existents (character. 
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items of setting); and a discourse (discours), that is, the expression, the 
means by which the content is communicated" (Chatman, 1978: 19). As 
Brooks (1985) points out "We live immersed in narrative, recounting and 
reassessing the meaning of our past actions, anticipating the outcome of 
our future projects, situating ourselves at the intersection of several stories 
not yet completed" (Brooks, 1985: 3). 
Table 5.2: Structural Analysis of Text: Benjamin Fairless CEO USS: 
1952 -1954 
Causes of Less Than Perfect Company Performance 
Labor-Management Relations 
•Longest strike in U. S. Steel's 
history (1952) 
•Strike threat necessitating 
the shutdown of facilities 
•Strike in the coal industry 
•Granting of substantial 
wage and employee benefits 
•USWA labor agreement resulted in 
higher wages, improved insurance, 
and pensions (1954) 
Common to the U. S. Steel Industry 
•Customer’s reduction of steel 
inventories as steel becomes 
more readily available 
•Reduction in the output of some 
steel consuming industries 
•Return of seasonal characteristics 
in steel demand 
•Strenuous competition in the 
marketing of steel products 
Government Relations 
•Government regulation of the 
production and distribution of 
U. S. Steel's products 
•Direct and indirect government 
price controls 
•10% of U. S. Steel's production 
still under government control 
(1953) 
•Price controls keep steel prices 
below where they should be 
Other Issues/ Economic 
•Great wave of inflation (1953) 
•Truce in Korea (1953) 
Source: U. S. Steel Annual Reports 1952 - 1954. 
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These statements are certainly useful as a description of the carefully 
crafted texts analyzed in this study. Narrative analysis, or reading for the 
plot is useful in uncovering the themes and attributions of central 
importance to the CEOs and Presidents. Both the USWA and USS use 
these documents to assess the past (justify past actions), anticipate the 
future (explain new actions), and situate themselves at the intersection of 
several stories ( both organizations have a history and hope to have a 
future). If this is so, then there is certainly a plot, or story, contained in 
these texts. 
Chatman (1978) elaborates further on the nature and use of plot when 
he states: 
... plot, story-as-discoursed, exists at a more general 
level than any particular objectification, any given 
movie, novel or whatever. Its order of presentation 
need not be the same as that of the natural logic of the 
story. Its function is to emphasize or de-emphasize 
certain story-events, to interpret some and leave others 
to inference, to show or to tell, to comment or to 
remain silent, to focus on this or that aspect of an event 
or character. ... Each arrangement produces a different 
plot, and a great many plots can be made from the same 
story. (Chatman, 1978: 43) 
The concept of narrative and plot used in this study follows from 
Chatman's discussion. It is the structure which allows the reader to derive 
meaning from the text. It is the task of the both the teller of the tale and 
the reader to work out "a coherent and interpretive relationship between 
"events" (real or imagined) and their significant ordering" (Brooks,1985: 
321). In reading the Letters to Shareholders and the Speeches to the 
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Convention as narrative the researcher is participating with the 
organizations in working out and interpreting that relationship between 
events and their ordering. 
Strategic Management Narrative Analysis 
The heuristics which are the core of literary and historical theories of 
narrative analysis were adapted by this researcher to strategic management 
narrative analysis. In general narrative may be understood to be "the 
symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject matter 
and related by time" (Scholes, 1981:205). This is similar to Chatman's 
definition given in the above section. Strategies, as with management 
generally, are time-bound. They consist of events occurring at a particular 
time, in relation to other events. Additionally, strategies are frequently 
described as having a pattern, either intended or emergent (Mintzberg, 
1973), and the pattern of actions is connected by a particular subject matter 
— in this study, the U. S. steel industry. 
The actions and events which are described in a Letter to Shareholders 
or Speech to a Biennial Convention, are both real -- that is that actually 
happened and can be confirmed by other sources — and symbolic — chosen 
to tell a particular story about the organization. This last issue is an 
important element of strategic management narrative analysis. The letters 
to shareholders and speeches discuss some events and not others. The 
authors choose to "remember" some events, place them in a story, and 
thus make them "real" for the organization. Strategic management 
narrative analysis, unlike historical analysis, assumes that the events, and 
the ordering of the events, contained in the texts are "real" for the 
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organization, and help to confirm the role of the organization in a larger 
social order (White, 1987). 
Strategic management narrative analysis is then a process of first 
identifying the events included in any text, and then identifying the 
ordering of events. The subject matter which connects the events is 
usually first the organization, and then the role of the organization in a 
larger social order — the steel industry. Finally, the events are always 
related by the time period which the text covers, and the time period in 
which predicted future actions should occur. The structural analysis, 
described earlier, is useful in providing a framework for categorizing 
events, and the ordering of events in the texts, across the tenures of steel 
industry leaders. The identification of commonalities, and the changing 
importance of those commonalities, aids in the recognition of the use of 
certain themes over time. 
White (1987) suggests that "In order to qualify as historical, an event 
must be susceptible to at least two narrations of its occurrence. Unless at 
least two versions of the same set of events can be imagined, there is no 
reason for the historian to take upon himself the authority of giving the 
true account of what really happened" (p. 20). Reading the texts of the 
Union and the Corporation provided the researcher with two different 
narrations of the same events. In both instances, the authors chose events 
form a set of "real" events — events discussed in still other texts — and 
ordered them to give a particular meaning to the organization. At times, 
the events and the manner in which they are ordered is similar — at times 
very different. 
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This form of narrative analysis was useful in discovering how each 
organization understands and interprets its role, and that of the other in 
the industry. The story each tells, and the form that story takes, provides 
evidence of the importance assigned to a variety of events and activities. 
Further, reading for plot provides a sense of recurring concepts in the texts. 
Is the same story told repeatedly? Who are the actors? When do they 
change? Do they change? Who are the heroes? Who are the villains? 
Narrative analysis is useful in answering all of the questions noted above. 
Finally, strategic management narrative analysis, by allowing the 
researcher to identify the common themes of each organization, provides a 
means of understanding why at any point in time the two organizations 
experience more or less conflict. The similarities or dissimilarities 
between the narratives; the events included or left out; and the manner in 
which the events are ordered are all important elements in understanding 
the sense-making — and the strategic actions — of the two organizations at a 
particular point in time. If we accept the concept that these two 
organizations were inextricably linked in a number of ways, then the 
differences in their narratives represent very real differences in their 
sensemaking. 
The narratives to some extent represent the manner in which the two 
organization responded to one another. Events and actions take on 
meaning through these responses, and through the narratives themselves. 
In fact, narrative assumes that events have a structure, that they can be 
given "an order of meaning, that they do not possess as mere sequence" 
(White, 1987: 5). Differences in the order of meaning reveal differences in 
the responses each organization makes to the other. As Ford & Baucus 
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(1987) pointed out events have no meaning in and of themselves, they 
must be interpreted. The choice of events, and the interpretation of those 
events in a narrative, give the events and actions of each organization 
meaning, both for itself and in relation to the other. 
Combination of Narrative and Structural Analysis 
The combination of narrative analysis and the structural analysis was 
useful in uncovering ’’native" or insider views and interpretations of 
events. The structural analysis was, as noted above, helpful in providing a 
framework for the narrative analysis of the concepts used by the industry 
leaders to make sense of their world. In uncovering the views of those 
inside the organizations, the relationships among concepts, the ordering of 
events, and the interpretations, identified through the narrative analysis 
clarified the importance of the commonalities and domains identified 
through the structural analysis. 
This combination of methods, and the intersections between the two, 
was useful in answering such questions as the relationship between the 
activities actually carried out and the beliefs expressed in the texts; and the 
relation between changing events and changing concepts, or use of 
concepts. A change in expressed causal attributions for example, may 
indicate the recognition of a need for a new sense-making, or 
interpretation, of the world. 
Summary of Findings and Comparison of Views 
Having undertaken the types of analyses described above for each 
organization, the final step was that of first summarizing the findings for 
each organization, and then comparing the narratives, interpretations, and 
patterns of concepts of the two organizations, and placing them in their 
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historical context. The comparison of the narratives was important in 
understanding how the sense-making of the each organization influenced 
the sense-making of the other, as well as the limiting the available choices 
of action. 
In comparing the narratives presented by the organizations the 
following questions are important. First, are the plots symmetrical or 
assymmetrical? That is, are they simply different sides of the same story, or 
are they telling altogether different stories? Second, how do the concept 
patterns, or causal attributions of the two organizations compare? Do the 
concepts change at the same time, or at different points in time? Do the 
two groups understand and make sense of their world in essentially the 
same way? 
This comparative analysis is useful in understanding and attempting to 
answer such questions as to what extent "environmental" turbulence can 
be attributed to different patterns of causal attributions by the two 
organizations. Further, this analysis is useful in understanding the role 
each assigns to the other in the industry, and how each interprets that role. 
Finally, it aids in understanding how apparently irrational strategic actions 
follow from the manner in which the manager and organization 
understand their world. 
Additionally, the process of comparing the narratives allowed the 
researcher to analyze why steel industry leaders made the choices they did. 
The narratives provide a series of rationales for actions which demonstrate 
how those in the industry understood events at the time they were faced 
with choices. Comparing the narratives of the two organizations helped to 
clarify the effect of industry and organization history and knowledge on 
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the development of strategic actions, and provided a clearer understanding 
of how it was that industry leaders apparently failed to respond to negative 
economic information. 
Outcomes to be Presented 
The first outcome of the methods discussed above was the 
development of a history of events within the steel industry for the period 
1945 - 1985, which is prefaced by a chapter discussing the history of the 
industry from the founding of United States Steel in 1901 to 1945. This 
helps to provide a context for the analysis being reported here. Second, the 
narratives of the USWA and USS are analyzed, in light of the 
relationships among the concepts identified through the structural 
analysis.. From all of these, some conclusions are drawn about how the 
domestic steel industry moved from a position of world dominance to its 
present position. 
The first results reported, as noted above are a history for the period 
1945 - 1985 for the USWA and USS. This is a composite of events and 
trends in the world at large - the Korean War, recessions, increased 
concern about industrial pollution, changing trade patterns, for example; 
and events and trends within the two organizations - changing 
membership in the union, plant closings, strikes, and the purchase of 
Marathon Oil, to name a few. This history provides a context within 
which to place and interpret the narratives and "insiders" views 
uncovered in some of the analyses discussed earlier. 
The narratives and "native" views, were analyzed and interpreted by 
regimes of the USS and USWA. As can be seen from table 5.1 (p. 171) the 
periods in which different leaders were in power in the two organizations 
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is roughly equivalent, and thus provides a natural organizing device. For 
each regime the narratives, the insider concepts, and the relationships 
among those concepts, was compared for the two organizations, as well as 
with the view of outsiders. In addition, the insiders views were compared 
across regimes within each organization for consistencies or 
inconsistencies in the use of concepts, and the relationships among them, 
over time. 
The principal concern, as noted in the section on strategic management 
narrative analysis, was with the congruence of the stories told by those in 
the industry and outside. Simply put, how many different ways are there 
of understanding what it means to be the steel industry? Further, how do 
these different stories come together to create "collectively shared or 
consensual realities" for the steel industry? (Ford & Baucus, 1987: 367) The 
varying stories and shared realities may, or may not, account for some of 
the "environmental" turbulence in the industry. 
Conclusions 
The concepts and beliefs drawn from the stories aided in understanding 
the insider’s view of the steel industry/ The manner in which these people 
made sense of their world certainly, as the psychologists remind us, 
influenced their choice of action within that world. Actions then, which to 
those of us outside the industry or organization look irrational, may be 
understood to be rational within the context created by those in the 
organization or industry. This aids in our understanding of how the 
industry devloped over the forty year period, and how events and actions 
were viewed, and understood, by those in the industry. 
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As important as what is contained within the stories is what is left out? 
It is here that the historical analysis was particularly helpful. What events, 
what activities, were occuring at different times which those outside the 
indutry deemed important, but those within ignored? Further, where do 
those in the industry feel they have influence? What things do they 
believe they can affect? Where are they powerless? The things they choose 
not to discuss are as important in answering these types of questions, as 
those events which they do discuss. 
As mentioned earlier, the final text was shaped by the framework the 
researcher imposed on the documents read, by the researcher’s role as 
interpreter and critic. Thus, while this an exploration of the changes 
which have occured in steel - it is also an attempt to offer a different 
explanation of those changes. Simply tracing patterns of events, and others 
interpretations of those events, provides little understanding without 
attempting to frame those events. 
Finally, as with any history the researcher also has a story, or narrative 
to relate, depending very much on the interpretation given to the 
documents read. If a strategic framework sets an organization on the path 
of gathering certain information and solving certain problems, then the 
framework, the biases and assumptions, the researcher brought to this 
project similarly defined a path of gathering certain types of information 
and making interpretations and assessments based on that framework. 
From a position outside of the industry the researcher can make a critical 
assessment of that industry, but the narrative related is a working out of a 
coherent relation between events and their significant ordering. 
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As part of this narrative the views and explanations developed are 
compared with those of the conventional strategic management view of 
the steel industry. How, for example, does the explanation developed in 
this study differ from the more conventional explanation of the 
transformation of the steel industry? Is it, in fact, possible to understand 
strategies as a function of the sensemaking of industry leaders, rather than 
as a response to external environmental changes? Can strategies be said to 
evolve as an integral part of the history of an organization and industry, 
thereby limiting the strategic alternatives available to the organization and 
industry at any point in time; rather than being viewed as the 
development of alternatives to "fit" the organization to the current 
environmental opportunities? These, and similar questions, help to 
clarify the differences between this view of the changes which have 




UNITED STATES STEEL: ANALYSIS OF LETTERS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS IN THE CORPORATE ANNUAL REPORTS 
1945 -1985 
Introduction 
In seeking to uncover and understand the narratives of the CEO's of 
U.S. Steel for the years 1945-1985 from a reading of the Annual Reports for 
that period, two different methods were used, as discussed in chapter 5. 
The first involved coding the statements included in the Annual Reports 
as they related to specific domains of interest. The two overarching 
domains for the time period were "Improvement of Company 
Performance" and "Less than Perfect Company Performance." 
Each Annual Report was coded by two researchers for statements which 
indicated causes of "less than perfect performance" and the means to 
"improved company performance." This structural analysis of the "Letters 
to Shareholders" uncovered a set of semantic concepts which were then 
clustered into commonalities as follows: Labor-Management Relations; 
Government Relations; The U. S. Steel Industry; Issues Internal to U. S. 
Steel; Imports/Exports; Other / Economic Events. In general, these 
categories are common to all of the CEOs, although Imports/Exports does 
not become a category of interest until the late 1950s. The results of this 
analysis are presented in the frequency charts in appendix A. 
Additionally, a strategic management narrative analysis, as described in 
chapter 5, was undertaken of each Annual Report to uncover the major 
themes of each CEO's tenure. The structural analysis provided a 
framework of concepts used by the CEOs for making sense of their world. 
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The narrative analysis clarified the importance of the commonalities and 
domains across tenures of CEOs. The themes identified, and the manner 
in which those themes changed, is useful in understanding how the 
organization understood its role in the steel industry at any point in time. 
The results of this analysis are presented in appendix B. 
The results of the two methods, taken together, help to answer three of 
the questions which frame this project. These are: 
1. How does U. S. Steel characterize itself? 
a) Explanations/Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the steel industry 
2. How does U. S. Steel characterize 
other key actors? 
a) Explanations/Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the steel industry 
3. How much overlap in terms of concepts, and relationships among 
concepts, is there from CEO to CEO for U. S. Steel? 
Further, the historical analysis of the Annual Reports, and other 
sources such as Iron Age and Forbes was useful in identifying the strategic 
actions which the CEO took during his tenure. This analysis, combined 
with the narrative analysis, allowed the researcher to answer the final 
research question identified in chapter 1: Do the strategic actions taken by 
the organization reflect the patterns of expressed beliefs identified in the 
public statements? 
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As will become apparent from the summary of the results presented in 
the tables which follow, there are a number of themes and stories which 
remain constant over the forty year time period. First, this chapter will 
discuss the concepts and themes for each CEOs tenure, the relation of those 
to the actions taken, as well as the overlap from CEO to CEO. Finally, the 
common themes of the forty year period will be discussed. 
Irvine C. Olds: 1940-1951 
Irving Olds became the CEO of U. S. Steel in 1940 when Edward 
Stettinius went to Washington to work in the war mobilization effort. 
Olds, who had been a Wall Street lawyer, was one of the last men to run U. 
S. Steel who had any extensive business experience outside of the 
Corporation. In 1951 Olds stepped down as CEO but remained on the 
Board of Directors until the 1960s. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analyses 
The results of the structural analysis of the Letters to Shareholders for 
Irving Olds' tenure as CEO are presented in appendix A-l. From this it is 
apparent that Olds attributed poor performance on the part of the 
Corporation first to labor-management issues; second to other/economic 
issues and problems; and third to the government. Only rarely, is poor 
performance attributed to issues internal to U. S. Steel. The internal 
operations and actions of U. S. Steel do however, constitute the dominant 
means to improved performance. Both labor and the government figure 
as minor actors in any effort to improve corporate performance. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
B-l presents some examples of representative statements from the Letters 
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to Shareholders within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis, were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Olds tenure. These themes, and 
their relation to actions taken by Olds will be discussed below. 
Characterization Of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Justifications 
The summary of events, concepts, and themes presented in table 6.1 (p. 
189) reflects the results presented in appendices A-l and B-l. This 
summary is useful in understanding and explaining how Olds 
characterized U. S. Steel during his tenure. Some things stand out 
immediately. One focus was on issues and events "outside” of U. S. Steel, 
particularly as they affected the performance of U. S. Steel. Olds principal 
concern was with the Corporation's relations with the Unions; and 
secondarily with the Government (see appendices A-l and B-l). He was 
less concerned with either the industry as a whole, the general economy, or 
with explaining or justifying the internal operations of U. S. Steel, except as 
they provided a means for improving corporate performance. Finally, a 
major theme was U. S. Steel's role as not only the premier steel 
manufacturer in the U. S. and the world, but as an important actor in the 
American economy. 
Old's explanations or justifications of U. S. Steel's actions generally fall 
within the dominant theme of U. S. Steel as the strongest and greatest 
corporation in the United States, if not the world (see appendix B-l). This 
is particularly apparent in his discussion of the steel industry's readiness 
for the Korean conflict, when he reminds his audience first that the 
capacity of the U. S. Steel industry is equal "to that of the rest of the world 
combined" (USS Annual Report, 1950: 6) and that U. S. Steel alone 
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accounts for about one-third of domestic capacity (USS Annual Report, 
1950: 21). He finds it "difficult to conceive how any enemy, or any group of 
enemies, could present any real problem to this nation so far as steel for 
defense is concerned" (USS Annual Report. 1950:7). 
This theme of U. S. Steel holding a special place in the world, as the 
largest company in the largest steel industry in the world, is evident in a 
subset of that theme: that the actions of the Corporation are taken to 
benefit the Nation. Whether Olds is announcing a reduction or an 
increase in prices, for example, the announcement is always phrased to 
remind the audience that the action is necessary to stabilize the economy, 
and that steel prices are among the least inflationary of any commodity 
prices (USS Annual Report, 1948). 
Finally, Olds frequently speaks as a steel industry representative, even 
in the U. S. Steel Annual Reports, again reinforcing the theme of U. S. 
Steel's special place in the world and the American economy. He defends 
the industry against charges that it is not moving quickly enough to cope 
with shortages of steel products (USS Annual Report,!948); and reminds 
his audience that even if more steel mills were built this would not solve 
the problem of shortages of raw materials and manpower (USS Annual 
Report, 1947-8) Furthermore, he praises the farsightedness of industry 
leaders in securing adequate sources of iron ore in advance of World War 
II and the Korean conflict (USS Annual Report, 1950). It is Olds also, who 
addresses the issue of the unfairness of the Federal Trade Commission 
lawsuit over steel industry pricing policies - pricing policies which have 
been in effect for fifty years (USS Annual Report, 1947-8). 
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Table 6.1: Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 
Shareholders for the tenure of Irving C. Olds CEO of U. S. Steel 1940 -1951 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT: 
•End of World War E 
•Pent-up high demand for steel products in civilian economy 
•FTC lawsuit over base-point pricing 
•Steel strikes in 1946 and 1949 
•Intermittent Government control of prices, production, and shipments 
•U. S. Steel is the dominant firm in the industry 
•U. S. steel industry is the largest in the world 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
•U. S. Steel, as the largest firm in the largest steel industry in the world, 
is one of the greatest corporations in the world 
•U. S. Steel holds a special place in the American economy and 
must carefully exercise its responsibilities to the Nation 
•The fate of U. S. Steel and the American economy are intertwined. 
•U. S. Steel is the steel industry spokesman. 
•U. S. Steel is harassed by "outsiders" - the USWA and the Government 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF U. S. STEEL 
Explicit: 
•Maintain continuously high 
production levels 
•Maintain a good public image 
•Preserve the industry from 
"outside" interference 
Implicit: 
•Maintain USS as the dominant 
firm in the industry 
•Labor peace 
• Maintain the illusion of 
competition in the U. S. 
steel industry 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Accepts strikes by the USWA in 1946 and 1949 
•Accepts strikes by the UMW in 1946,1948, and 1949 
•Testified before Congress in 1950 on pricing policies 
•Resist Government interference in running of the Corporation 
•Modernize and expand facilities 
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On the occasion of the Corporation's Semicentennial Olds said: 
No one knows what the years ahead may hold for the 
United States of America in terms of either peace or war. 
Similarly no one knows what the years may hold for any one 
of the nation's enterprises in which numerous people have 
voluntarily cooperated as stockholders, employes and 
managers to produce for customers an abundance of the good 
things of life. There is, however, no doubt that U. S. Steel 
intends to the limits of its ability to extend into the future the 
service to the nation it has rendered in the past - a service in 
which on its fiftieth birthday it can be forgiven for taking great 
pride (USS Annual Report. 1950: 21). 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Olds states for U. S. Steel during 
this period are outlined in table 6.1 (p. 189), and follow from the theme of 
U. S. Steel's dominance. One implicit goal is to maintain the 
Corporation's position as the dominant company in the industry (see 
appendix B-l). This goal follows from the general explanation of U. S. 
Steel's role in the industry and economy discussed above. A second 
implicit goal is to maintain the "illusion" of competition among U. S. 
steel producers. Until 1949 there was such a shortage of steel (see chapter 3) 
that all producers could sell whatever they could produce no matter the 
price. A third goal, explicit in the texts, is that of maintaining a 
continuously high level of production (see appendix B-l). This is closely 
related to another explicit goal for the Corporation — to maintain a 
positive public image. 
Olds had two other goals for the Corporation during this period, both 
related to the Corporation's relations with other institutions. First, Olds 
wanted to preserve the industry from "outside" interference. This goal is 
evident in the amount of attention he focuses on resisting Government 
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controls and regulation (see appendices A-l & B-l). Additionally, Olds 
holds labor peace as an important goal for the Corporation during this 
period. Again, this goal is evident in the statements reported in appendix 
B-l. The goal of achieving labor peace is closely related to the goal of 
maintaining high production levels, as strikes and work stoppages 
disrupted production. Finally, achieving high production levels and labor 
peace would help to check Government interference, as it would 
demonstrate that the industry could meet the Nation's steel needs on its 
own. 
U. S. Steel and the U.S.W.A. 
One of Olds' chief concerns between 1945 and 1951, as is apparent from 
table 6.1 (p. 189) and appendices A-l and B-l, was the relationship between 
the Corporation and the Union. The USWA struck USS in 1946 and 1949, 
and there were numerous strike threats and work stoppages throughout 
the six years. The discussion of these strikes takes place within the context 
of the theme of U. S. Steel's importance in both the steel industry and the 
American economy. Olds generally characterizes the strikes in terms of 
production and sales lost, and it these concerns which in large part frame 
Olds' characterization of USS's actions with respect to the USWA (see 
appendix B-l). 
A primary goal, as noted above, was the achievement of labor peace, but 
labor peace on U. S. Steel's terms. The strikes did cost the Corporation 
money [the estimate for the 1949 strike was $30 million (USS Annual 
Report. 1949:13)] and lost production at a time when there was tremendous 
public and government pressure for full capacity operations (see chapter 
3). The periods of labor peace were brief, but the results of achieving labor 
191 
peace point up the importance of achieving this goal to U. S. Steel. In 1947 
steel tonnage "lost as a result of work interruptions was approximately 
283,000 tons compared with more than 6 million tons of steel production 
lost by U. S. Steel through strikes and work stoppages in 1946" (USS 
Annual Report. 1947: 13) 
The acceptance of the strikes in 1946 and 1949 by U. S. Steel, reflects the 
conflict between the goal of achieving labor peace and the characterization 
of U. S. Steel as holding a special place in the American economy (see table 
6.1, p. 189), and the USWA as tring to wreck the American economy (see 
appendix B-l). Labor peace was a necessity for smooth operations. 
However, Olds believed that U. S. Steel had a responsibility to the Nation 
to act in a fair and reasonable manner, and more importantly, that its 
actions affected the stability of the national economy (see appendix B-l). 
This characterization meant that much as he deplored the strikes and work 
stoppages. Olds firmly believed that "the wage increase requested by the 
Union would not in the long run bring benefit to anyone; that it would 
lead to similar wage increase in other industries, and to higher prices 
generally" (USS Annual Report, 1948: 15). 
The explanations Olds offers of why the negotiations with the USWA 
broke down all contain the same theme. "U. S. Steel, recognizing the 
seriousness of such a strike to the economy of the nation, did everything 
reasonably within its power to avoid the threatened work stoppage" (USS 
Annual Report, 1945: 15). When the threatened strikes finally occur, it is 
always because "U. S. Steel's proposals were rejected by the Union ..." 
(USS Annual Report, 1949: 13); never because U. S. Steel chose to break off 
the negotiations. Blame for the strikes is squarely placed on the Union. 
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The strikes during this six year period are always concluded after some 
form of Government intervention, typically a Presidential Board of 
Inquiry. Equally typical, is Olds' reaction to the findings of these Boards. In 
1945 he states that "U. S. Steel had never appeared before the Steel Fact- 
Finding Board named by the President, and had never given testimony or 
submitted any evidence to the Board. In view of all of the circumstances, 
U. S. Steel was unable to accept this proposal of the President" (USS 
Annual Report, 1945:15). In 1949 he agreed to a Presidential Steel Board 
"with the express understanding that its recommendations would not be 
binding upon either party" (USS Annual Report, 1949:12-3). Yet, 
eventually the Corporation accepts either the findings of these Boards or a 
slightly modified version of the recommendations (see appendix B-l). 
Olds actions with respect to the USWA during this period are 
consistent with his characterizations of both the USWA and USS. The 
theme of labor-management relations in this narrative is one of 
antagonism and adversarial relations. The goals of the two organizations, 
as depicted by Olds, are inevitably at odds. Olds presents U. S. Steel as 
attempting to stabilize the U. S. economy through its pricing policies, while 
the demands of the USWA are portrayed as inflationary, as well as a major 
cause of decreased corporate performance (USS Annual Report, 1948 & 
1951). Olds accepted the strikes in 1946 and 1949, rather than give in to 
demands he depicts as damaging to the economy. The theme of a "war" 
with the Union is strong throughout this period, and the "battles" or 
strikes are settled by an outside actor -- the Government. 
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U. S. Steel and the U. M. W. 
If Olds was troubled by the USWA during his tenure, the United Mine 
Workers (UMW) was also a source of labor problems. U. S. Steel, like 
many steel firms, owned a large number of coal mines, most of which were 
unionized. Like the USWA, the UMW also had the power to stop steel 
production, and as with the USWA, Olds needed to achieve some measure 
of labor peace to ensure continued operations. Further, the UMW, like the 
USWA, is characterized as a major cause of decreased corporate 
performance during this period. 
The goals, themes, and characterizations which Olds used with respect 
to the USWA are also present in his discussions of the UMW. Coal strikes 
occured in 1946, 1948, and 1949. As with steel strikes, a coal strike 
guaranteed Government intervention - even more so because a coal strike 
threatened to paralyze much of the nation (see appendices A-l & B-l). In 
fact, in 1946 the Government took control of the coal mines and ran the 
mines until June 1947. During this time the UMW, always a more radical 
union than the USWA, continued to strike, leading to "litigation between 
the Government and the Union. . (USS Annual Report, 1946: 15). 
As with the characterization of the USWA, the coal mine strikes occur 
because the Union is acting unreasonably - wanting things which are 
obviously bad for the nation's economy. The strikes are settled only after 
Government intervention, or after it becomes obvious that virtually all 
American industrial activity will be halted due to a lack of coal (see 
appendix B-l). Olds' statement in 1950 is typical of his dealings with the 
UMW. "Out of a background of National Labor Relations Board 
proceedingsm court actions, and the intervention of a Presidential Board of 
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and Inquiry, a new coal wage agreement was executed on March 5,1950,..., 
production was again restored" (USS Annual Report, 1950: 17). Once 
again, the theme is one of a Corporation doing battle with a Union which 
is attempting to damage the American economy — the very economy the 
Corporation is attempting to protect. 
U. S. Steel and the Government 
Olds may have characterized the Unions as the Corporation's greatest 
adversary during this period, but the Government was also frequently 
characterized as in an adversarial relationship with the Corporation (see 
table 6.1, p. 189). If the predominant theme with respect to the Unions was 
the need to achieve some measure of labor peace within the parameters of 
an adversarial relationship; the theme with respect to the Government 
was the need to educate it in the "realities" of the steel business (see 
appendices A-l and B-l). In 1945 and 1946, and again in 1950 -1951, the 
Government controlled prices of steel products, placing limits on the 
ability of the Corporation to realize a profit in spite of increases in steel 
shipments (see chapter 3). 
Price controls were always a problem for U. S. Steel, particularly as 
wages were never controlled as strictly as prices so that wage increases did 
not always lead to price increases (see chapter 3). This concern was at the 
heart of the Corporation's unwillingness to negotiate with the Union in 
1945, and was the beginning of an ongoing theme of attempting to 
"educate" Government officials about the steel industry. 
Its (USS) officials tried to the best of their ability to 
convince representatives of the Government that wages could 
not be separated from prices, and that, if general industrial 
strife was to be avertea, the Government should recognize the 
unfairness, under a regime of governmental price control, of 
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insisting on wage increases that prevented a business from 
being operated at a fair and equitable profit (USS Annual 
Report. 1945:15). 
In Congressional hearings held in 1950 the Corporation points out that 
"the nation's present position of world leadership in industrial production 
is an achievement which has been due in large part to the existence of 
conditions which have fostered the growth of big companies such as U. S. 
Steel. .(USS Annual Report. 1950:8-11). The theme once again, is on the 
Government interfering with U. S. Steel, and taking officials away from 
the business of running the Corporation. 
The Government is characterized as one more obstacle to U. S. Steel 
being run in the most efficient manner possible (see table 6.1, p. 189). The 
restrictions,the price controls, the new tax bills in 1950 and 1951, are all 
portrayed as interfering with competition, restricting business, and causing 
a decline in financial performance at a time when the Corporation needs 
all availible funds to modernize. Most importantly, the Government is 
depicted as siding with the Union against business - business in which 
many ordinary Americans own stock, business which provides 
employment, and a business which is the largest in the world in its 
industry - all in all, a business in which the U. S. should take pride, rather 
than seeking ways to interfere with it (USS Annual Reports. 1945 - 1951). 
Relations with the Government are portrayed within the overriding 
theme of U. S. Steel's greatness — a greatness which the Government is 
portrayed as failing to recognize. The Corporation's actions with respect to 
the Government all take place within a theme of education. The 
Corporation has a limited set of actions it can actually pursue with respect 
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to the Government, other than lobbying and a variety of public pressure 
campaigns. These efforts all occur within a narrative of antagonism and 
misunderstanding — a story of a Government which does not fully 
appreciate U. S. Steel's attempts to stabilize the American economy and 
preserve the dominance of the U. S. steel industry in the world. 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
As mentioned in table 6.1 (p. 189) Olds characterizes U. S. Steel as the 
leader of the American steel industry, and thus, responsible for setting 
prices and policies for the other firms to follow. His goals for the industry 
are the same as those for the Corporation - to preserve it from interference 
from "outside" groups, and to remain the largest steel industry in the 
world (see appendix B-l). An additional goal, and dominant theme, is to 
preserve an "illusion" of competition - and this is reflected in his annual 
statement to the effect that U. S. Steel's capacity and market share, as a 
percentage of the total, has steadily declined since 1901 - indicating that the 
independent producers are becoming ever stronger (see appendix B-l). 
As Olds defends U. S. Steel against a variety of charges from "outside" 
groups, so he defends the industry as a whole. This is particularly evident 
with respect to the issue of "pent-up steel demand". 
Ordinarily the peak demand for steel by one industry is 
paralleled by less man peak demands by other industries. 
Since the end of the war, an abnormal situation has existed in 
that demand for steel has come concurrently from all 
industries. In this sense the supply of steel provided by the 
entire industry has been insufficient to meet this unusual 
combined demand just as an otherwise adequate fire 
department would be insufficient if every house caught on 
fire at the same time (USS Annual Report, 1948: 8-10). 
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Government plans for adding capacity are characterized as impractical, 
and the public should be aware, as the industry is, that "Failure 
continuously to maintain steel making operations close to one hundred 
per cent of rated capacity often has been caused by a shortage of scrap steel" 
as well as labor and other raw materials (USS Annual Report, 1948: 11). 
The steel industry, like U. S. Steel itself, is characterized as knowing best 
how to produce and sell steel - if it did not it would not be the largest steel 
industry in the world (USS Annual Reports, 1945-1951). The theme of a 
strong steel industry embatteld by outside actors, like the theme of a strong 
U. S. Steel, occurs throughout the Letters to Shareholders during this 
period. The public, the Government, and the Unions, need to be 
"educated" as to the "realities" of the steel industry; but as long as the 
industry behaves "responsibly" the industry should be left to pursue its 
goals of remaining the largest steel industry in the world, and serving the 
Nation to the best of its abilities. 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
If the Government and the Unions were all characterized as acting in a 
manner detrimental to U. S. Steel's performance, the actions of the 
Corporation itself were characterized as the major means of improving 
performance (see appendix A-l). The theme that U. S. Steel knew best how 
to improve its own situation is a subset of the theme of U. S. Steel as the 
great Corporation (see table 6.1, p. 189). 
The emphasis on U. S. Steel's ability to improve its performance is 
particularly evident in the statements throughout this period about the 
expansion and modernization of facilities. In 1948 Olds commented 
"Following the war, U. S. Steel embarked upon an extended program of 
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additions to and replacements of facilities" (USS Annual Report, 1948: 13). 
This modernization and expansion program was characterized, not as a 
response to the unusual level of demand due to the end of the war, but as 
part of a continuing effort to improve customer service. 
Similarly, in the area of research and development U. S. Steel was 
characterized as pursuing "the invention and development of new 
products and processes and the improvement of those already established" 
in order to achieve "increases in productive power and . . . advancement of 
living standards. To business enterprises such measures mean more 
saleable products or lower costs" (USS Annual Report, 1950: 12). In this 
area, as in the expansion of facilities. Olds stressed the theme of "U. S. 
Steel's knowledge about steel and steel-making ... acquired by years of 
painstaking research and the technical "know-how" gained from long 
experience in its practical application. .. ." (USS Annual Report, 1950: 14). 
Finally, Olds comments on the ability of the Corporation to locate and 
secure new sources of raw materials. The Corporation had resumed "its 
practice of seeking to obtain full information about all known foreign 
deposits of iron ore which might be utilized in the future" (USS Annual 
Report, 1948:13). In 1950, as the Korean conflict began. Olds congratulated 
U. S. steel on its foresight in this area "It is fortunate that owing to the 
business foresight of U. S. Steel and other members of the steel industry 
there is no foreseeable shortage of known iron ore reserves" (USS Annual 
Report, 1950: 7). 
All of these efforts combined with a restructuring of the Corporation in 
1950 and 1951 were to improve steel production performance (USS Annual 
Reports, 1945 - 1951). The Corporation which in 1951 "completed fifty years 
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of service to the nation" (USS Annual Report, 1951: 3), was subject to 
Government price controls in that year. Additionally, the USWA was 
continuing to make "unreasonable" demands on U. S. Steel, in terms of 
wage increases. In spite of these antagonistic "outside" forces, the 
Corporation continued to strive to "lower costs and improve production 
efficiencies" to "serve the nation" (USS Annual Report, 1951: 16 -21). 
Conclusions 
The dominant theme of Olds’ narrative was the role of U. S. Steel as the 
greatest corporation in the U. S., if not the world. This theme determined 
the nature of the characterizations Olds made about other organizations — 
particularly the USWA and the Government. As discussed above, these 
two organizations were typically depicted as antagonistic to U. S. Steel, and 
constantly attempting to thwart its efforts to act in a manner it knew was 
best for the nation. The actions of U. S. Steel throughout this period can be 
seen to derive from this narrative. The events discussed, and their 
ordering within the narrative, are chosen to characterize U. S. Steel as the 
embattled hero defending its territory against the barbarian hordes. In 
1951, the hreo is still winning, but the barbarians are making inroads. 
Beniamin F. Fairless: 1952 -1954 
Benjamin Fairless, who succeeded Irving Olds as CEO in 1952, was, with 
Olds, the last of a group of executives to head the Corporation who had any 
extensive business experience outside of USS. Since the early 1950's all of 
the top positions have been filled by men who have "spent either all or a 
large part of their business careers with United States Steel" (Hogan, 1971: 
1679). Fairless continued to serve on the Board of Directors after his 
retirement as CEO until his death in 1962. 
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General Results of Structual and Narrative Analyses 
The results of the structural analysis of the Letters to Shareholders are 
presented in appendix A-2. As with Olds, poor performance was generally 
attributed to actions by the USWA, the Government, or economic or other 
issues outside of the control of U. S. Steel. Improvements in corporate 
performance were generally attributed to the efforts of the Corporation 
itself. Once again, labor and government, such strong elements in causing 
poor performance, were minor actors in improving the performance of the 
Corporation. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
B-2 presents some examples of representative statements from the Letters 
to Shareholders within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis, were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Fairless' tenure. These themes, 
and their relation to actions taken by Fairless will be discussed below. 
Characterization Of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Justifications 
The representations of events, themes, and actions presented in table 
6.2 (p. 202) summarize the results presented in appendices A-2 and B-2. 
This summary table is useful in understanding and explaining how 
Fairless, characterized U. S. Steel during his tenure. Like Olds, Fairless' 
primary concern was with the impact of events and issues "outside” of U. 
S. Steel on the performance of U. S. Steel. His characterization of the 
internal operations of U. S. Steel was primarily undertaken to demonstrate 
the efficacy of U. S. Steel's programs to improve its performance. Fairless 
continued the theme Olds had begun, of U. S. Steel — the greatest 
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corporation in the U. S. — besieged by an atagonistic Union and 
Government. 
Table 6.2: Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 




•Government control of prices, wages, and production 
•Strike in 1952 
•Truman's attempt to nationalize the industry 
•Production "catches up" with demand 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
•U. S. Steel is the dominant firm in the largest steel industry in the world 
•U. S. Steel's accomplishments are unequalled by any other corporation 
or even any other nation 
•U. S. Steel's actions affect the stability of the American economy 
•U. S. Steel speaks for the industry on the subject of Government controls 
•U. S. Steel acts responsibly in opposition to inflationary trends 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF U. S. STEEL 
Explicit: 
•Maintain a continuously 
high level of production 
•Develop new steels and 
new uses for steel 
•Maintain a good public image 
Implicit: 
•Maintain USS as the dominant 
firm in the industry 
•Maintain the illusion of 
competitionin the 
U. S. steel industry 
•Labor peace 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Rejects recommendation of Wage Stabilization Board in 1952 
•Accepts 54 - day strike by the USWA in 1952 
•Sponsors radio and television shows 
•Begins joint plant visits with the USWA 
•Program of modernization and expansion of facilities 
•Begin construction of new research center 
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Fairless continued Olds' theme of U. S. Steel as the strongest and 
greatest corporation in the United States, if not the world. This is apparent, 
for example, in his discussion of U. S. Steel's production capacity. "By 
reason of its more than one-half century existence and its large-scale 
operations, U. S. Steel. . . poured its billionth ton of steel. The fifty-one 
year accomplishment... is unequalled by any other company or, indeed 
any other nation . . ." (USS Annual Report, 1952: 4). 
This theme of U. S. Steel's special place in the world is also evident in 
Fairless' stated belief that the actions of the Corporation are taken to 
benefit the Nation. In 1952 for example. Fairless rejected the 
recommendations of the Wage Stabilization Board - a rejection which 
resulted in the longest steel strike experienced by USS up to that time. The 
recommendations of the Wage Board with respect to increases in wages 
and fringe benefits would, it was estimated, result in a 30 cent per 
manhour increase in employment costs - which in turn would result in a 
price increase in steel products, and higher inflation. 
Fairless, like Olds, portrayed himself as acting to stabilize the U. S. 
economy, even at the expense of U. S. Steel sales (USS Annual Report, 
1952). Like Olds, Fairless stresses U. S. Steel's responsibility to the industry, 
the employees, the stockholders, and the Nation, to act in a manner which 
addresses the common good. The need to prevent wage and price increases 
from becoming inflationary, the need for adequate steel capacity, and the 
need to maintain non-union shops for employees - all of these are derived 
from the theme of U. S. Steel's role as a unique and great organization. 
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Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Fairless held for the Corporation 
during this period (see table 6.2, p. 202) follow from the theme of U. S. 
Steel’s greatness and dominance in the steel industry. As during Olds’ 
tenure, one implicit goal is to maintain the Corporation's position as the 
major company in the industry. Similarly, Fairless holds as as an implicit 
goal the need to maintain the ’’illusion’’ of competition among U. S. steel 
producers. Finally, the achievement of labor peace continues to be a major 
goal for the Corporation. 
The explicit goals outlined in table 6.2 (p. 202) also derive from the 
theme of U. S. Steel’s role as the dominant firm in the domestic steel 
industry. First, the need to maintain a continuously high level of 
production is closely tied to the goal of maintaining the number one 
position in the industry. The goal of maintaining a good public image - to 
be perceived as providing a necessary service to the nation at a reasonable 
price - has been a U. S. Steel goal since Judge Gary’s days. Finally, a new 
goal appears in Fairless’ characterization of U. S. Steel — the need to find 
new products and new uses for steel. Again, this is related to the theme 
and goal of maintaining a predominant role in the industry and the 
economy, but reflects a knowledge that the industry is becoming more 
competitive. 
The actions taken by the Corporation in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of U. S. Steel’s narrative about its relations with 
other organizations, as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role in the steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
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U. S. Steel and the U. S. W. A. 
As is apparent from table 6.2 (p. 202) and appendices A-2 and B-2 
Fairless' principal concern during his tenure was with the relationship 
between the Corporation and the Union. A primary goal for Fairless, as for 
Olds, was the achievement of labor peace, but again labor peace on U. S. 
Steel's terms. The 1952 strike cost the Corporation money and lost 
production at a time when there was tremendous public and government 
pressure for full capacity operations (see chapter 3). The strike was the 
longest, at that time, in U. S. Steel's history, and the Corporation estimated 
that it lost 6.9 million tons of production as a result of the strike, effectively 
nullifying all of the benefit available from capacity increases (USS Annual 
Report, 1952: 4). The labor situation was complicated by the fact that at the 
beginning of the Korean conflict Truman had reimposed wage and price 
controls. 
The conflicting goals pursued by Fairless - labor peace and stabilization 
of the national economy - provide a partial framework for the 
characterization developed by Fairless for the Corporation's actions with 
respect to the USWA. Labor peace becomes the predominant theme of 
Fairless' tenure. Following the 1952 strike USS and the USWA instituted a 
number of programs aimed at stabilizing labor-management relations. 
Among these was a program of joint plant visits "to study mutual 
problems and improve relationships" (USS Annual Report, 1953: 15). This 
program was characterized as marking "a new phase in labor relations" 
(USS Annual Report, 1953: 3) and it is certainly the first significant 
departure from the adversarial relationship established by Olds who, at one 
point, reminded everyone that "the employees are allowed to continue 
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working through the goodness of the stockholders, who are entitled to a 
fair return” (USS Annual Report, 1945: 17). 
The Letters to the Shareholders in 1953 and 1954 downplay the theme of 
the USWA as a threat to the Corporation, the industry, and the nation — a 
theme which is found in the earlier Letters. Instead, every effort is made to 
present a picture of two groups working in concert for the greater good 
(USS Annual Reports, 1953 & 1954). The fact that steel demand was past 
the crisis stage where each work stoppage meant a national outcry, is 
reflected in Fairless' willingness to negotiate with the USWA rather than 
let them strike. Furthermore, other industries were giving in to wage and 
insurance demands - the steel industry was simply part of a larger trend 
(see chapter 3). 
Fairless continues to characterize the USWA as antagonistic to U. S. 
Steel's attempts to stabilize the U. S. economy. However, after the 1952 
steel strike, and in the context of an adequate supply of steel, the theme of 
antagonism shifts slightly to one of an attempt to work with an old enemy 
to find common ground. The actions he takes reflects this cahnging 
theme. Instead of automatically accepting strikes and work stoppages, he 
works at negotiating settlements, although the settlements may not be 
those the Corporation initially desired. 
U. S. Steel and the U. M. W. 
Fairless, like Olds was troubled not only by the USWA during his 
tenure, but the United Mine Workers (UMW) had the potential to be a 
source of labor problems. U. S. Steel, like many steel firms, owned a large 
number of coal mines, most of which were unionized. Unlike relations 
with the USWA during this time however, there were no national strikes. 
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In fact, from 1950 through 1954 the national Bituminous Coal Wage 
Agreement was in effect, and USS was essentially unconcerned with labor 
problems in the coal mines. 
U. S. Steel and the Government 
As can be seen from table 6.2 (p. 202) and appendix B-2, the 
Corporation’s relations with the Government continued to be strained 
during Fairless' tenure. Government controls on the steel industry 
continued into 1953, and like Olds, Fairless' primary theme with respect to 
Government relations was the need to educate it in the "realities" of the 
steel business. Following the settlement of the 1952 steel strike Fairless 
stated that 
Concurrently with the settlement of the long steel strike and 
the granting of very substantial wage and employe benefit 
increases, the Office of Price Stabilization, by direction of the 
Acting Director of Defense Mobilization, authorized a general 
increase in the prices of steel products. The increase was said 
by the Government to cover cost increasesincurred prior to 
July 26, 1951. . . . Thus, more than two-thirds of the $5.20 
increase was attributed by the Government to past cost 
increases and less than one-third to the current increase in 
employment costs resulting from the wage settlement. Many 
steel products are consequently priced below the level at 
which they should be priced (USS Annual Report, 1952: 12- 
14). 
This sense of being unable to accomplish this goal of "educating" 
Government officials about the nature of the steel industry changes with 
the election of Eisenhower in late 1952. In fact, after the disastrous year of 
1952 relations with the Government almost had to be rebuilt. Truman's 
attempt, in 1952, to nationalize the steel industry was a direct result of the 
inability of the Corporation and the Union to agre on a new contract (see 
chapter 3). Truman, faced with an industry-wide strike, the continuation 
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of hostilities in Korea, and the need to continue to meet consumer 
demand at home, seized the properties of the steel companies in an 
attempt to keep the plants open. The companies contested the action in 
court, and when the courts found the seizure to "have exceeded the 
constitutional powers of the President" in June, the long awaited strike 
finally ocurred (USS Annual Report, 1952: 16). 
The characterization of the Government continued to be framed within 
the theme of "educating" officials, and portraying the Government as 
interfering with U. S. Steel's right to conduct its business in the "best" and 
"fairest" possible manner. This is particularly true with respect to 
Government intervention in labor negotiations. It is the Government 
which recommends wage increases and insurance plans (USS Annual 
Report, 1952), and it is the Government which sides with the Union 
against U. S. Steel - which is simply trying to make a profit and stay in 
business. 
In 1953 and 1954, as noted above, all of this changes. The election of 
Eisenhower which brought the end of Government controls of the 
industry and the end of the Excess Profits Tax, marked a new era in 
Government relations. U. S. Steel continued to lobby the Government in 
an attempt to receive favorable treatment. However, there remained little 
beyond lobbying and public relations campaigns that the Corporation could 
do to improve its relations with the Government. 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Fairless continues the theme of U. S. Steel as the leader of the American 
steel industry, and therefore responsible for setting prices and policies for 
the other firms to follow. His goals for the industry are the same as those 
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for the Corporation - to preserve it from interference from "outside" 
groups, and to remain the largest steel industry in the world. It is also 
necessary to continue to preserve an "illusion" of competition - and this is 
reflected in his continuation of Olds policy of including in the Annual 
Report a statement to the effect that U. S. Steel's capacity and market share, 
as a percentage of the total, has steadily declined since 1901 - indicating that 
the independent producers are becoming ever stronger (USS Annual 
Reports, 1952 -1954). 
Fairless' characterization of industry actions, like those of the actions of 
U. S. Steel, focus on the theme that the industry knows best how to 
produce and sell steel - if it did not it would not be the largest steel industry 
in the world (USS Annual Reports, 1952 - 1954). In 1953 for example, he 
points out that "During the past four years, the steel industry's rated ingot 
capacity has increased by about 25 per cent.... This greatly increased 
productive capacity was the key factor in bringing to an end in the second 
half of 1953 the steel shortage which had existed since the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea" (USS Annual Report, 1953: 11). This statement is a 
justification of Olds' overriding theme, that if left alone the steel industry 
could, and would, be able to meet the demand for steel in the U. S. 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
During Fairless' three years as CEO one of his principal concerns was 
continuing the program of modernization and expansion of facilities 
begun under Olds. The theme of the Corporation being able to improve its 
financial performance and production efficiency continued to dominate 
the Letters to Shareholders (see table 6.2, p. 202; appendix B-2). In all three 
years Fairless discusses the amount of money the Corporation is spending 
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"for additions to and replacements of its facilities" (USS Annual Report. 
1954: 4). Additionally, he notes in 1954 the "Construction of U. S. Steel's 
new research center at Monroeville, Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh is 
proceeding on schedule .... This is an important phase of U. S. Steel’s 
continuing program to develop new steels and new uses for steel . . . ." 
(USS Annual Report. 1954: 12). 
Another development discussed by Fairless as improving the 
operations of U. S. Steel is the program — noted in the discussion of 
relations with the USWA — instituted as part of the 1952 agreement with 
the USWA for joint plant visits "to gain a better understanding of mutual 
problems and to improve relationships" (USS Annual Report, 1953: 15). 
This program is characterized as marking "a new phase in labor relations" 
(USS Annual Report, 1953: 15) and it is, as noted above, the first significant 
departure from the theme of an adversarial relationship with the USWA. 
An additional element in the theme of U. S. Steel acting to improve its 
performance was the fact that steel production capacity had increased to 
the point in 1953, that with the decline in defense production, "the 
production of most steel products caught up with the requirements of 
customers" for the first time since the outbreak of World War II (USS 
Annual Report, 1953: 8). At the same time however, a new element has 
entered the narrative - the need for marketing (see appendix B-2). 
In 1954, a recession year, capacity utilization fell to 73.2% and 
production fell by 21% (USS Annual Report, 1954). U. S. Steel suddenly 
found itself in the position of having "to assist U.S. Steel's customers in 
the marketing of their products in the American home market" which 
accounted more tha 1/4 of all steel sold (USS Annual Report, 1954:10). The 
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Corporation which in 1951 characterized itself as being pressured into 
adding capacity to meet the demand of both the defense and civilian 
markets, now characterized itself as needing to build markets and work 
with the USWA to guarantee the smooth running of the facilities. It is in 
1954 that the first mention of the need to be able to "meet lower 
competitive prices when necessary and commercially deliverable" 
appeared (USS Anuual Report, 1954: 10). 
Conclusions 
Fairless continues the major themes of Olds tenure, particularly the 
overriding theme of the dominance and greatness of U. S. Steel, both at 
home and abroad. There are some changes in the narrative presented here 
however. First, the theme of an antagonistic relationship with the USWA 
begins to change slightly. Compromisewith the Union begins to enter the 
story as necessary to the continuation of U. S. Steel's role as the number 
one steel firm in the industry. At the same time the Government is 
depicted as less of an opponent -- there is less need to "educate" the 
Government and greater hope in the narrative of understanding. Finally, 
the theme of an industry battling "outside" elements begins to lose 
importance as competition within the industry as depicted as increasing. 
The Corporation is still a hero in its own story, but a hero who is beginning 
to learn the value of peace negotiations and treaties rather than victory in 
battle. 
Roger M. Blough: 1955 - 1967 
Roger Blough was the first CEO who had spent much of his career at U. 
S. Steel, having been a lawyer with the firm of White & Case where he had 
represented USS in the late 1930's and early 1940's before joining the 
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Corporation in 1942. Blough is also of particular interest here as the CEO 
with the longest tenure, who presided during a period of great change in 
the steel industry. Furthermore, it is during Blough's tenure that U. S. 
Steel moves away from a concern with improving facilities in steel, and 
toward an aggressive diversification strategy. 
General Results of Structual and Narrative Analyses 
The results of the structural analysis of the Letters to Shareholders 
during Blough's tenure are presented in appendices A-3 and A-4. The 
analysis of results has been divided into two periods, the first ending with 
the 1959 steel strike and the second covering the period from 1960 through 
Blough's retirement in 1967. A comparison of the results in the 
appendices clarifies the differences between these periods. In both periods 
the USWA and the Government continue to appear as major causes of 
poor performance, as does economic issues. However, following 1959, 
labor issues begin to decline as a cause of poor performance and imports 
becomes increasingly important (see appendices A-3 & A-4). In the area of 
means to improved performance, the efforts of U. S. Steel itself to improve 
performance continue to be important. The Government begins to play 
more of a role after 1960 as an actor in improving performance than in the 
past (see appendix A-4). 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. 
Appendices B-3 and B-4 present some examples of representative 
statements from the Letters to Shareholders within the six categories 
identified through the structural analysis, which combined with the results 
of the structural analysis, were useful in identifying the major themes of 
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Blough's tenure. Again, the themes and tenor of the narrative shifts in the 
1960 - 1967 era from that of the previous era. 
As can be seen from a comparison of appendices B-3 and B-4, in the pre- 
1959 era Blough continued many of the themes, and the general narrative, 
of Olds and Fairless. The themes and narrative of the post-1959 era reflect 
the recognition of a changing world for the U. S. steel industry. These 
themes, and their relation to actions taken by Blough will be discussed 
below, in the context of the differences between the two parts of his tenure. 
Characterization Of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Justifications: 1955-1959 
The representations of events, themes, and actions presented in table 
6.3 (p 214) summarize the results presented in appendices A-3 and B-3. 
Like his predecessors, Blough's dominant theme of the 1955 - 1959 period 
was the characterization of U. S. Steel as the strongest and greatest 
corporation in the United States, and the characterization of the U. S. steel 
industry as the best in the world. A secondary theme, which Blough shares 
with his predecessors during this period, is the attribution of many of the 
problems U. S. Steel encountered to the Union or the Government. The 
1956 strike, and the 116 day strike of 1959, for example, both took place 
during his tenure; and in both instances Blough's approach to negotiating 
with the Union was similar to that taken by Olds and Fairless. 
Blough took over as CEO in the record year of 1955. "In U. S. Steel's 
long history the year 1955 may be recorded as its best year in many respects. 
Shipments of steel products and revenues from sales exceeded those of any 
previous year" (USS Annual Report, 1955: 3). This fact alone appeared to 
justify Blough's continuing use of the theme of the strength of U. S. Steel. 
However, as noted in chapter 3, by 1955 the U. S. steel industry had fallen 
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to about 40% of world production from a high of 57% in 1947. This decline 
had been fairly steady throughout the 1950s (see chapter 3) and was one 
indicator of the declining strength of the U. S. steel industry in the world. 
Table 6.3: Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 
Shareholders for the tenure of Roger M. Blough CEO of U. S. Steel 1955 - 
1959. 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Steel strikes in 1956 and 1959 
•Record years for shipments and production: 1955-1957 
•Recession in 1958 
•Decline in capacity utilization in 1958 and 1959 
•Little Government interference in industry matters 
•Kefauver hearings 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
•U. S. Steel is the largest steel firm in the U. S. 
•The Corporation can raise prices as it needs to 
•The Corporation can raise dividends and give shareholders a fair return 
•U. S. Steel continues to dominate the steel industry 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF U. S. STEEL 
Explicit: 
•Maintain high production 
levels 
•Maintain a good public image 
•Preserve the industry from 
"outside" interference 
Implicit: 
• Maintain USS as the dominant 
firm in the industry 
•Labor peace 
•Maintain the illusion of 
competition 
in the U. S. steel industry 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Accepts strikes by the USWA in 1956 and 1959 
•Appeared at Kefauver hearings 
•Continues emphasis on research and expands research center 
•Expands marketing efforts 
•Modernize and expand facilities 
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The recession of 1958 and the strike of 1959 began a pattern of declining 
sales and steel shipments which continued with some exceptions through 
the 1960s (see appendices B-3 & B-4). In 1958 and 1959 Blough begins to 
move away from blaming the Government and the Union for all of U. S. 
Steel's problems, and starts to develop as an important theme the issue 
ofcompetition both within steel and from substitute products (USS Annual 
Reports, 1958 -1959). 
This period may also be unique in that, as can be seen from table 6.3 (p. 
214), the theme of U. S. Steel's role as a dominant actor in the U. S. steel 
industry and the American economy contained an important subset. 
Blough characterized U. S. Steel as being able to raise prices when and as 
the Corporation could. In turn, this led to a characterization of the 
Corporation as able to give shareholders a fair return on their investment. 
The Corporation was not only characterized as dominant — it was able to 
act as if it was. 
Characterization Of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Justifications: 1960 -1967 
The representations of events, themes, and actions presented in table 
6.4 (p. 216) summarize the results presented in appendices A-4 and B-4. 
The dominant themes in the narrative begin to change during this period 
in a number of ways. Throughout the 1950s the U. S. steel industry was for 
example, characterized as relatively untroubled by "uncontrollable" 
environmental elements like imports (see table 6.3, p. 214 ). As table 6.4 (p. 
216) makes clear, in the 1960 -1967 period the Corporation and the industry 
are characterized as existing in a competitive environment where they are 
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unable to raise prices. The theme of dominance is being replaced by the 
theme of survival. 
Table 6.4: Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 
Shareholders for the tenure of Roger M. Blough CEO of U. S. Steel 1960 - 
1967 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Increasing level of competition from substitute products 
•Increasing level of steel imports 
•Highly competitive steel marketplace 
•Government intervention in steel pricing policies 
•No steel strikes 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
•Unable to raise prices due to competitive pressures 
•A diversified materials producer 
•The Corporation exists in a highly competitive environment 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF U. S. STEEL 
Explicit: 
•Increased efficiency in 
operations 
•Maintain a profitable business 
in spite of adverse conditions 
•Increase research activities 
•Increase marketing activities 
•Diversification 
Implicit: 
•Concerned with the survival 
of the Corporation 




•Diversification into related areas 
•Program of cost reduction 
•Lobbied Government on tax laws and import quotas 
•Expanded international activities through joint ventures 
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The dual theme of survival and competition is a radical departure from 
the earlier theme of dominance and greatness. Olds and Fairless rarely, if 
ever, mentioned competition, and never mentioned survival. The shift 
in themes is apparent shortly after the 1959 strike when in 1960 Blough 
states " No one in U. S. Steel forgets that other materials are competitive 
with steel and that many other very competent companies produce and 
market steel" (USS Annual Report, 1960: 21). Blough continued to expand 
on the theme of the highly competitive nature of the steel market 
throughout the 1960s. 
The Government also returns to the narrative in the 1960s (see 
appendix B-4) as a negative element. In 1961 both the President and the 
Congress "requested that the 12 major steel firms forego any increase in 
steel prices although the new contract with the USWA would raise hourly 
employment costs during the year" (USS Annual Report, 1961: 7). This 
confrontation with Kennedy over the issue of raising prices reintroduced 
the earlier characterization of the Government as interfering with U. S. 
Steel's ability to do business. 
In addition to the negative characterization, the Government is also 
included as a necessary ally in the narrative. In 1964 and 1965 a new theme 
makes its way into the narrative when Blough discusses the "import 
problem" and its effect on domestic steel consumption, as a "formidable 
competitive factor that must be overcome" (USS Annual Report, 1965: 3). 
By 1967 however, "All important product lines and virtually all market 
areas have been affected by steel imports" (USS Annual Report, 1967: 18). 
The "problem" had become so severe that Blough stated that "American 
steel producers are supporting a temporary quota on steel imports", and 
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that. . the conditions required to make free trade work just do not exist 
in the real world steel market of today. Our Government should face these 
facts and hopefully take action to limit the continuing rise in imports" 
(USS Annual Report, 1967: 20). 
Similarly, on the issue of adequate investment capital for the steel 
industry Blough blames the Government for not providing a proper 
climate for investment. By 1966, as imports are increasing and the 
availability of investment dollars is not, it appears that once again a U. S. 
Steel CEO is faced with the need to "educate" the Government. 
Our ability to continue the program (modernizing facilities) 
will depend on the prospects for profit and a proper climate 
for sucn investment. A proper climate for investment 
depends in part on actions by government that encourage 
investment m productive equipment and that provide an 
incentive for the promotion of progress (USS Annual Report. 
1966: 21). 
The Government is thus characterized as both interfering with U. S. Steel 
in some areas, and not moving quickly enough to provide assistance in 
others. 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals: 1955 - 1959 
The explicit and implicit goals which Blough holds for the Corporation 
during this period are included in table 6.3 (p. 214). These goals are 
virtually identical to those held by Olds and Fairless, and are derived from 
the theme of U. S. Steel's predominant role in the steel industry and the 
American economy. In fact, from 1945 through 1959 the goals of the CEOs 
of U. S. Steel are extremely consistent; containing a recognition of the need 
to serve the public, maintain a good public image, the need for labor peace. 
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and the need for U. S. Steel to retain its position as the number one firm in 
the number one steel industry in the world. 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals: 1960 - 1967 
The explicit and implicit goals which Blough holds for the Corporation 
after the 1959 steel strike differ considerably from those of the pre-1959 
period (see table 6.4, p. 216). They reflect the shift in theme away from a 
dominant role to a need to survive. One example of the shift in goals 
following the 1959 steel strike, is that Blough after 1960 discontinues the 
practice of including a statement in the Annual Reports about U. S. Steel's 
capacity as a percentage of total U. S. steel industry capacity. Furthermore, 
after 1964 Blough no longer includes statements about U. S. Steel's capacity 
utilization. 
It is during this period that Blough's goal shifts from maintaining U. S. 
Steel's number one position in the steel industry, to one of attempting to 
maintain a profitable business operation in spite of adverse conditions. 
During the period 1955 to 1959 Blough continued to hold as a goal the need 
to maintain the "illusion" of competition among U. S. steel producers, as 
did Olds and Fairless. However, the "illusion" of competition begins to 
become a reality after the record year of 1955, and slowly Blough's goal 
changes from maintaining an "illusion" to having to contend with the 
effects of the reality (see tables 6.3 p. 214 & 6.4 p. 216). 
Similarly, the goal of maintaining a continuously high level of 
production, which was so important to Fairless and Olds, became less 
important as the 1960s went on. By 1966 the explicit goal was no longer 
one of maintaining production to meet demand, but rather "increased 
efficiency in our operations" (USS Annual Report, 1966: 2). By 1967 it was 
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apparent that even these efforts were insufficient, and profits had fallen to 
4.2 per cent, and the goal of finding profitable operations became 
paramount (USS Annual Report, 1967) (see table 6.4, p. 216). 
The importance of profitability as a theme during the 1960 - 1967 period 
lead Blough to the development of a set of explicit goals which would have 
been foreign to Olds or Fairless (see table 6.4, p. 216). First among these was 
a stress on research and development. Interestingly enough, as research 
efforts produced better steels less steel was needed by the customers to 
produce the same product - something Blough points to frequently when 
discussing price increases - and the research efforts actually worked to 
decrease U. S. Steel's market (USS Annual Reports, 1960 -1967). 
At the same time that research efforts became a more important explicit 
goal, so did marketing. The increased competition from substitutes and 
foreign imports meant that U. S. Steel needed to help customers "utilize 
fully all the values inherent in the 'spectrum of steel'" (USS Annual 
Report, 1962: 13). In practice, this translated into a goal repeated 
throughout the 1960s of increasing and expanding existing markets and 
developing new markets (USS Annual Reports, 1961 - 1967). 
A final explicit goal, which neither Fairless nor Olds discussed, was that 
of diversification. As competition in steel increased, profits declined, and 
the climate for investment in basic industry did not improve, Blough 
began to look for other investment opportunities. By 1967 Blough was 
discussing the construction of new facilities and their importance to "U. S. 
Steel's future well-being as a diversified materials producer" (USS Annual 
Report, 1967: 3). The need to maintain profitable operations - whatever 
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they may be - has superceded the need to remain the dominant firm in the 
steel industry as an important theme in the narrative. 
The actions taken by the Corporation in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of U. S. Steel's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations, as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role in the steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
U. S. Steel and the U. S. W. A.: 1955 - 1959 
The adversarial relationship between the Corporation and the 
Steelworkers continued to be an important theme in the 1955 - 1959 
period. The cyclical nature of steel consumption patterns, which was 
clearly tied to the timing of labor negotiations, affected the production 
efficiencies of the Corporation (see appendix B-3). The period 1955 to 1957 
saw record levels of production and shipments of steel (see chapter 3). 
Each of the Annual Reports for these years also proclaims record revenues 
and income. The next few years however, saw a decline in steel shipments 
and income, and from 1958 to 1962 USS, as well as other major steel firms, 
was unable to raise prices. 
These changing conditions are reflected in Blough's characterization of 
the labor negotiations in both 1956 and 1959. In 1956 "one of the objectives 
of U. S. Steel was to achieve a long-term agreement" (USS Annual Report, 
1956: 15). The necessity for an agreement which provided for "the longest 
period in the history of the relationships with the Steelworkers' Union for 
which U. S. Steel's stel producing operations have provided by contract for 
freedom from strikes" was so great that Blough agreed to a contract 
provision which finally moved the Corporation in the direction of 
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accepting a closed union shop - something adamantly opposed by his 
predecessors (USS Annual Report. 1956: 15). 
1958 had been a year of recession and production had fallen to 59.2% of 
rated capacity. The general economic slowdown had "a particularly 
adverse effect on U. S. Steel as customers tend to reduce inventories of 
steel, and the purchases of durable goods, of which steel is a major 
component, are more likely to be postponed" (USS Annual Report, 
1958:23). In 1959 Blough was no longer talking about the need for a long¬ 
term contract, instead he reminds stockholders that 
The rapid rise in hourly employment cost during the past 
twenty years which had advanced the average steelworker's 
wages and benefits so that steelworkers are among the highest 
paid industrial workers in the world, the increasing pressure 
of foreign competition, and the rising competition from other 
materials, both domestic and foreign, clearly dictated the 
practical necessity of seeking to negotiate a new agreement 
which would be non-inflationary (USS Annual Report, 
1959:12). 
The final agreement did raise employment costs by 3.7% and Blough 
commented that "The problem of negotiating a labor agreement that will 
not increase labor costs is still unsolved" (USS Annual Report, 1959: 14). 
U. S. Steel and the U. S. W. A.: 1960 - 1967 
Following the 116 day 1959 steel strike U. S. Steel's relationship with the 
United Steelworkers stabilized, and there were no major steel strikes in the 
1960s. This stabilization is reflected in the changing characterization of the 
USWA. In 1963 Blough states "Through the functioning of the Human 
Relations Committee, negotiations were again conducted with the United 
Steelworkers of America without emotion-packed headlines, the pressure 
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of a contract termination deadline or third-party intervention" (USS 
Annual Report. 1963:8). Furthermore, as a result of the 1963 agreement 
The settlement will help insure labor peace and 
uninterrupted production in the steel industry until at least 
May of 1965. The absence of a predetermined termination 
date in the basic labor agreement, coupled with its provision 
for a minimum 120-day notice, subsequent to January 1, 1965, 
of any reopening, will minimize the need for customers to 
build inventories as a strike-hedge. This will, in turn, lessen 
the economic disruptions that would otherwise occur as such 
inventories were reduced and thus will benefit customers, 
employes, and U. S. Steel (USS Annual Report. 1963:9-10). 
The goal of labor peace, so difficult to achieve when the major theme of 
the Corporation's narrative had been its own unique role in the industry 
and the economy, became easier to achieve once the Corporation portrayed 
itself as in a fight to survive (see appendices A-4 and B-4). The acceptance 
of strikes which characterized the pre-1959 era was no longer an acceptable 
action after 1959. Compromise became the new order, as the Corporation 
searched for ways to improve operating efficiency and profitability (see 
table 6.4, p.216). 
U. S. Steel and the Government: 1955 - 1959 
As discussed earlier, the Government virtually disappeared from the 
narrative during the Eisenhower Presidency. The Corporation was able to 
raise prices and determine its own production and shipment schedules, 
without worrying about Government intervention for the first time since 
before World War n. As noted in chapter 3, this had a beneficial effect on 
production, shipments, and revenues during this period. In fact, the only 
period of Government intervention was during the 1959 strike - and that 
was only at the urging of steel industry executives. 
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U. S. Steel and the Government: 1960 - 1967 
The steel strike in 1959 and the election of Kennedy in 1960 
reintroduced the Government into the U. S. Steel narrative. 1959 was a 
year of change for both USS and the steel industry as a whole. This was the 
first year in which there is any mention of the impact of foreign imports 
on USS' sales, for example (USS Annual Report, 1959), and it was the first 
year in which imports outstripped exports by a ratio of three- to-one 
(Hogan, 1971: 2036). The increase in imports came at a time of increased 
competition from substitute products, and the two forces acted to keep steel 
prices down (see chapter 3). 
Faced with a continuing decline in net income, and a probable increase 
in employment costs once a new contract was negotiated with the USWA 
in 1962, Blough announced a 3 1/2 % price increase on April 10, 1962 (USS 
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Annual Report, 1962, 7). Three days later U. S. Steel rescinded the price 
increase (see chapter 3). The reaction of Government officials, and the 
measures they were willing to take to prevent an industry-wide price 
increase, were so intense that Blough and other steel CEO's found they 
could not maintain the announced price increase (USS Annual Report, 
1962, 7). 
The concern expressed by the Kennedy Administration over steel price 
increases was simply the latest in a series of attempts by the Government 
since World War II to control inflation through control of steel prices. 
Following the confrontation with Kennedy over prices Blough adopted 
Olds theme of "educating" the Government with respect to the realities of 
the steel industry. In 1962 he stated that "there appears to be some gain in 
understanding in the legislative and administrative bodies of the role of 
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prices, of profits, of taxes, of depreciation, and of the origin and support of 
employment in America" (USS Annual Report, 1962: 21). 
The two themes which occupy Blough with respect to the Government 
during the rest of his tenure are the need for an improved investment 
climate and the growing rate of steel imports into the United States (see 
table 6.4 p. 224 and appendix B-4). In 1966 he comments: 
More than $1.5 billion has been spent in the last five years on 
modernizing old and adding new facilities; some $950 
million is already committed for projects under way at year 
end, and more will be spent as this facility program continues. 
Our ability to continue the program will depend on the 
prospects for profit and a proper climate for such investment. 
A proper climate for investment depends in part on actions by 
government that encourage investment in productive 
equipment and that provide an incentive for the promotion 
of progress (USS Annual Report. 1966: 21). 
By 1967 Blough's concern with the Government role in creating a 
proper investment climate had taken on a particular focus - expenditures 
for air and water quality control facilities. U. S. Steel, while recognizing the 
importance of air and water quality control to the community as a whole, 
also believed that "such expenditures should be considered an operating 
expense as incurred" so that the expense could immediately be written off 
against income tax (USS Annual Report, 1967: 21). 
The recognition by Blough during this period that steel imports were 
taking American markets from American firms lead to increased calls for 
action by the Government. In 1965 steel imports amounted to 
approximately 11.5 percent of consumption and were deemed a 
"formidable competitive factor that must be overcome (USS Annual 
Report. 1965: 3). By 1967 imports held 12 percent of the U. S. market and 
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had become so serious a competitive factor that the issue was given its own 
section in the Annual Report. 
It is over these last two issues - investment climate and steel imports - 
that Blough’s characterization of the Government began to change. 
Blough was still attempting to "educate" the Government in the "realities" 
of the steel industry, as had Olds and Fairless, but the process of 
"educating" takes on a new urgency. Olds had the luxury of a situation 
where consumption outstripped capacity and the Government had to 
compromise with the industry on some issues (see chapter 3) if production 
was to continue. Blough exists in a situation of excess capacity, where the 
Government knows that steel demand will be met from one source or 
another. Further, it is now the Government - not U. S. Steel - which is 
publicly concerned with inflation, and lower prices for steel mean lower 
prices for consumer products. Lobbying and public relations activities took 
on an increased importance as the characterization of the Government 
moved from one of an antagonist to one of an ally. 
The U. S. Steel Industry: 1955 - 1959 
Prior to 1959, Blough, like Olds and Fairless, characterizes U. S. Steel as 
the leader of the American steel industry, and therefore responsible for 
setting prices and policies for the other firms to follow. His goals for the 
industry are the same as those for the Corporation - to preserve it from 
interference from "outside" groups, and to remain the largest steel 
industry in the world. One difference however, is that the "illusion" of 
competition is becoming more of a reality, and Blough begins to talk more 
about the competitive nature of the marketplace, even prior to 1959 (USS 
Annual Reports, 1955 - 1959). 
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The U. S. Steel Industry: 1960 - 1967 
Following the 1959 strike competition from other steel producers, both 
domestic and foreign, and from substitute products, becomes a more 
important theme (USS Annual Reports. 1959-1967). Blough continues to 
speak for the industry, as had Olds and Fairless, but on limited topics. He 
lobbies the Government throughout the 1960's for revised tax laws and 
depreciation schedules which would make investment in steel more 
profitable. Finally, Blough does take a leadership position in the industry 
on the issue of imports. In the early 1960's the product lines affected most 
by imports were not a major concern to U. S. Steel. However, as imports 
captured a greater share of the total U. S. market, Blough began to speak 
out on the"dumping" of steel in the U. S. by foreign producers (USS 
Annual Report. 1964: 3), and by 1967 he is in the forefront a move to have 
the Government impose quotas. 
U. S. Steel is still the industry leader in size and economic power (see 
chapter 3). However, during Blough's tenure the Corporation moves away 
from a concern with the welfare of the steel industry and the American as 
a whole, and towards a concern with its own survival and well-being (see 
tables 6.3 p. 214 & 6.4 p. 216). Blough, unlike Olds and Fairless, cannot 
afford to be generous towards the other firms in the industry. U. S. Steel's 
strategy, pursued since 1901, of allowing other firms in the industry to 
"take" some of its market share, in order to avoid anti-trust accusations, 
had worked only too well. 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel: 1955 - 1959 
Blough, to a much greater extent than either Olds or Fairless, spent time 
and space in the Letters to Shareholders, explaining and justifying changes 
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in the internal operations of U. S. Steel (see appendices B-3 and B-4). An 
emphasis on research and development activities can be seen as early as 
1956, when U. S. Steel announced the opening of a Resaerch Center 
employing 750 people (USS Annual Report, 1956). 
U. S. Steel's research and development activities, including 
both fundamental scientific and applied research, cover the 
full range of steel industry problems from raw materials to 
finishes products and all the intervening processes. They are 
aimed at continuously improving U. S. Steel's products and 
services to the steel-consuming public (USS Annual Report. 
1957:11). 
At the same time that Blough was stressing research and development 
efforts as the means to remain competitive he was also attempting to 
streamline the organization and cut costs. The first structural 
reorganization occured in 1958 as part of an attempt to "facilitate and 
improve corporate management and improve our service to customers 
and to the public generally (USS Annual Report, 1958:6). All of these 
efforts are part of the theme of U. S. Steel's ability to improve its financial 
performance through its own activities. 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel: 1960 - 1967 
As survival replaced greatness as the dominant theme of the Letters, 
the characterization of changes in internal operations as beneficial to 
shareholders took on a new importance as Blough attempted to portray the 
Corporation as doing everything it could to remain profitable, while 
beseiged by uncontrollable "external" forces. He stressed the need for a 
strong committment to both research and development and marketing as 
the marketplace for steel became more competitive (see appendix B-4). 
Research activities were carried out "to improve existing steels and to 
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develop new steels that better serve the needs of customers", and to allow 
the Corporation to "maintain competitive leadership" (USS Annual 
Report, 1961: 12). 
Yet, in carrying out these goals as well as "assisting customers in the use 
of existing and newly developed steels, adapting existing steels to new 
customer products and developing new uses for steel in existing customer 
products"; U. S. Steel also developed the means by which customers 
needed less steel for the same products thereby further cutting their own 
market share (USS Annual Report, 1966: 13). 
This in turn lead to the next major theme which dominated Blough’s 
thinking and talking about the Corporation during this period - the need to 
market steel in an increasingly competitive environment. Marketing 
efforts took a variety of forms during this period, from encouraging the use 
of cans for soft drinks to the development and building of steel houses 
(USS Annual Reports. 1955 - 1967). By 1964 marketing had become such an 
important theme in the U. S. Steel narrative that Blough stressed that 
Eleven separate but closely coordinated marketing groups are 
actively pursuing over 40 marketing programs. The 
marketing programs are designed to expand existing markets 
and build new markets for U. S. Steel's products ana to aid 
our salesmen in their efforts. U. S. Steel also provides 
customers with a steady flow of new improved products and 
new design concepts using steel. (USS Annual Report, 1964: 
14) 
In spite of the attempts to improve U. S. Steel's position in the market 
through research and marketing, and the efforts at cost-cutting and 
improving performance through corporate restructuring; after 1962 it 
became apparent that steel was simply not profitable, as net income 
remained in the 4 to 6 percent range (USS Annual Reports, 1960 - 1967). 
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Additional expenditures for improving and modernizing facilities were 
not providing the cost efficiencies and productivity improvements U. S. 
Steel needed to remain a competitive force in a changing marketplace (see 
chapter 3). 
As profits continued to decline, Blough began the development of a 
new theme — U. S. Steel as a diversified firm not wholly dependent on 
steel revenues (see table 6.4 p. 216). This was a move which had a long¬ 
term impact on the strategy of the Corporation — culminating in the 
purchase of Marathon Oil in 1982. 
In 1965 a new division - USS Chemicals - was announced, and through 
the rest of Blough's tenure USS Chemicals plays a major role in his 
discussion of the Corporation's future, particularly as the division offered 
hope of a new growth market and improved Corporate income. In 
discussing the rationale behind the formation of the division Blough said 
USS Chemicals Division was formed on February 1, 1966 to 
bring together U.S. Steel's chemical marketing and 
production capabilities as a basis for an intensified market- 
oriented effort in the fast growing chemical industry. This 
move represents a basic diversification and a logical step 
arising from U.S. Steel's established and long-term position as 
a major producer of chemical raw materials (USS Annual 
Report, i966:17). 
By 1967 it had become apparent that the situation in steel was not 
improving, and that new avenues must be explored for corporate survival. 
In fact, Blough describes the Corporation as a "diversified materials 
producer" which wants to "increase its participation in the materials 
markets" (USS Annual Report, 1967: 3). This is the first real move by a 
CEO away from the concept of U. S. Steel as the number one steel producer 
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in the United States, and towards the concept of U. S. Steel as a diversified 
corporation participating in a broad range of materials markets - not simply 
steel. 
Conclusions 
Blough's tenure represents a transition phase in the narrative of U. S. 
Steel during the forty year period under study. During the first five years 
of his tenure he continued the themes of his predecessors, and the actions 
he took with respect to other organizations reflect those themes. From 
1955 to 1959 the principal theme remained U. S. Steel's unique role in the 
American economy as a result of its dominant position in the world’s 
largest steel industry. Secondarily, the Corporation remained in an 
antagonistic relationship with the USWA, as the Corporation continued to 
characterize itself as protecting the American economy from the 
inflationary demands of the Union. 
After the 1959 strike, and the surge in steel imports in 1959, the themes 
began to change. Survival and profitability replaced dominance and 
greatness as the overriding theme. The effect of this is reflected in the 
actions of the Corporation with respect to both the USWA and the 
Government. There were no major strikes or work stoppages in the period 
1960 to 1967, in part because Blough found compromise to be necessary for 
survival. The antagonism remained, but labor peace was no longer simply 
a desirable goal — it was a necessary component of the dominant theme of 
survival. Similarly, although the Government is still portrayed as 
opposing the Corporation's efforts to run the business efficiently; the 
Government is also needed as an ally to assist in the fight against imports, 
and to provide an improved investment climate. 
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Finally, the theme of diversification becomes an important subset of the 
theme of survival. As Blough abandons the theme of the unique role of 
U. S. Steel and searches for ways to carry out the theme of survival and 
improved profitability, diversification takes on new importance. Steel, the 
traditional core of the organization’s glory, had begun to lose its brilliance; 
and the shift in themes during Blough’s tenure represents a search for a 
new core of brilliance. The image of the hero of the earlier years, 
defending the organization from attack by evil forces, has now been 
replaced by an image of a warrior fighting to survive. 
Edwin H. Gott: 1968 -1972 
On February 1, 1969 Edwin Gott, formerly President of U. S. Steel, took 
over as CEO. Blough continued to serve on the Board of Directors. Gott 
continued many of the programs begun by Blough. Production and 
shipments of steel products stabilized and then declined, while 
consumption and imports increased overall (see chapter 3). U. S. Steel 
continued a program of diversification, pursuit of new markets for steel, 
and modernization of facilities. Throughout Gott's tenure net income 
continued to decline so that in 1972 earnings were 2.9% of sales. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Letters to Shareholders for 
Gott's tenure are presented in appendix A-5. Gott, as did his predecessors, 
continues to attribute improvements in performance to the efforts of U. S. 
Steel itself. As during the latter period of Blough's tenure, the 
Government is also an agent in the improvement of performance. Steel 
imports are a more important cause of poor performance than in the past, 
and the Government, the economy, and the Union continue to figure as 
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important agents in causing poor performance. Interestingly, the efforts of 
the Corporation itself during this period are now seen as contributing to 
poor performance. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
B-5 presents some examples of representative statements from the Letters 
to Shareholders within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis; which combined with the results of the structural analysis, were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Gott's tenure. These themes will 
be discussed in the context of relations with other organizations during 
this period, and the characterization of U. S. Steel's role in the steel 
industry and the American economy. 
Characterization Of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Tustifications 
If the themes of the last half of Blough's tenure would have appeared 
unfamiliar to Olds and Fairless; the major themes of the narrative of Gott's 
tenure would have appeared foreign to previous CEOs. Table 6.5 (p. 234) 
presents a summary of events, concepts, and themes drawn from the 
results presented in appendices A-5 and B-5. As can be seen from table 6.5 
(p. 234) Gott is much less concerned with the USWA than were his 
predecessors, and much more concerned with the Government. The 
principal theme has definitely shifted from one of dominance in the 
industry, to one of an organization under attack. Organizational survival 
is now a subset of the theme of being besieged by forces which are bent on 
destroying the organization and the industry (see appendix B-5). 
Unlike his predecessors, Gott no longer attributes most of the problems 
U. S. Steel encounters to the Union or the Government. Foreign steel 
233 
Table 6.5 Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 
Shareholders for the tenure of Edwin H. Gott CEO of U. S. Steel 1968 -1972 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Excess capacity in steel 
•Increased level of steel imports 
•Increased competition from substitute products 
•No steel strikes 
•Economic slowdown 
•Government imposed wage and price controls 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
•The Corporation is under attack from many groups 
•Diversified producer of materials and services 
•Diversification is a means to improve financial performance 
•Continued decline in profitability 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF U. S. STEEL 
Explicit: Implicit: 
•Insuring survival of the firm • Becoming a diversified company 
•Improving profitability • Educate the Government in 
the plight of the steel industry 
•No strikes at any cost 
•No further loss of market 
share to imports 
•Pursue diversification 
•Obtain import restrictions 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Settles with USWA in 1971 for 31% increase in wages 
•In 1969 diversifies in a number of new directions 
•Continues R & D program 
•Continues marketing efforts 
•Lobbies Government on a number of issues of importance to steel 
importers and producers of substitute products have now entered the scene 
(see table 6.5). The USWA continues to be an important cause of poor 
performance (see appendix A-5), and Gott discusses the detrimental impact 
of high wages on the Corporation, as in 1970 when he states "Steelworker 
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wages even now are among the highest in American manufacturing, and 
the substantial gap between U. S. and foreign steel labor costs continues to 
widen" (USS Annual Report, 1970: 2-3). However, the theme of an 
adversarial relationship with the USWA has virtually disappeared from 
the narrative, as the domestic steel industry continued to operate below 
capacity throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, and imports made 
inroads into domestic market share (see chapter 3). 
The relationship of the Corporation to the Government also changed 
during this period, and this changing theme reflects the shift to a theme of 
a Corporation besieged. Gott no longer used the theme of U. S. Steel’s 
uniqueness — the greatest corporation in the United States, and the U. S. 
steel industry the greatest in the world. This shift shows most clearly in 
the changing tone with which Gott addresses the Government. The 
superior moral tone with which Olds addressed the Government is gone 
and has been replaced by an urgent plea for help (USS Annual Reports, 
1968 -1972). 
Problems in the steel segment are part of a theme of being attacked or 
besieged by a set of powerful forces beyond the control of U. S. Steel - labor 
agreements, government policies, foreign steel producers, substitute 
products, inflation, and a general slowdown of the economy. Gott, as did 
Blough during the latter half of his tenure, offers a new hope - a new set of 
explanations - as to how the Nation's largest steelmaker is going to return 
to profitability. 
After 1969 the theme of diversification as the principal means of 
improving corporate performance takes hold (see table 6.5, p. 234 & 
appendix B-5). As early as 1968 Gott describes the Corporation as "a 
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diversified producer of materials and services" (USS Annual Report, 
1968:3), and in 1969 he announces the establishment of a number of new 
division in such diverse areas as real estate and financing services (USS 
Annual Report. 1969). U. S. Steel is still committed to steel but is looking 
"to extend our activities into other profitable, growing lines of business 
consistent with our objective of being a diversified producer of various 
materials and services" (USS Annual Report, 1968: 21). 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Gott held for the Corporation 
during this period are outlined in table 6.5 (p. 234) and follow from the 
general theme of a Corporation attacked and besieged. First, Gott no longer 
holds as a goal the need to retain the dominant status of U. S. Steel in the 
industry. Instead, the explicit goals are now insuring profitability and 
survival - with assistance from the Government. This emphasis on 
"survival with assistance", rather than remaining number one in the 
industry, is a continuation of the shift in corporate goals begun by Blough. 
If Gott's primary goal is to assure survival of the Corporation, an 
implicit goal closely tied to this is to "educate" the Government as to the 
plight of the steel industry - and particularly that of U. S. Steel. Other 
Corporate goals follow from this goal of needing to "educate" the 
Government if U. S. Steel is to survive, particularly the pursuit of import 
restrictions. Among the forces attacking the Corporation is the new "evil" 
of imports — a force which cannot be restrained without Government 
assistance. 
Like Blough, Gott is no longer concerned with the need to achieve high 
levels of production in steel. Rather, as can be seen from table 6.5 (p. 234), 
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his new goal is to pursue diversification. By 1969 this goal of being a 
diversified producer of materials was transformed into a goal of being a 
diversified corporation, as can be seen from the 1969 Annual Report. 
A vigorous program to expand activities in other profitable 
markets which nave growth potential is progressing. Start-up 
of five new USS Chemicals plants, formation of new entities 
in the fields of real estate development and financing services 
and expansion of activities for increased participation in the 
housing market were accomplished in 1969. (USS Annual 
Report, 1969: 2) 
Gott has also abandoned the goal of controlling steel wages for the good 
of the economy. The need for labor peace has, as with Blough after 1959, 
led to an implicit goal of no strikes at virtually any cost (see table 6.5, p. 
234). This is derived from the overriding goal held by Gott throughout 
this period — simple Corporate survival. Competition was no longer an 
"illusion" with substitute products cutting into market share and imports 
"siphoning off" most of the growth in steel demand in the U. S. The need 
to "educate" the Government, the need for labor peace, and the increased 
diversification efforts, can all be seen as subgoals of the paramount goal - to 
ensure the survival of "The Corporation". 
The actions taken by the Corporation in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of U. S. Steel's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations, as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role inthe steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
U. S. Steel and the U. S. W. A. 
The relationship between the Corporation and the Steelworkers no 
longer occupied center place in the U. S. Steel narrative during this period. 
Unlike his predecessors, Gott appears to heve accepted the USWA and its 
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demands as part of the cost of doing business (see chapter 3). New labor 
agreements and the wage and benefit increases involved in these 
agreements are reported (see appendix B-5), but without the inflammatory 
language of earlier reports which frequently attempted to portray Union 
demands as somehow detrimental to the Nation. 
Gott does however, continue to utilize the theme of blaming the 
USWA for lower profits and the Corporation's difficulty in competing 
with steel imports. In 1970 for example, anticipating negotiations with the 
USWA in 1971 he says " These negotiations will influence the pattern of 
steel imports during 1971 and the ability of American steel producers to 
compete with foreign steel both at home and abroad. The steel import 
problem continues to be fueled principally by the lower foreign labor costs . 
..(USS Annual Report - 1970: 3). Again, in 1971 he states "The growth 
in steel consumption in recent years has all been siphoned off by imports 
of foreign steel. The foreign steel was produced not by more efficient use of 
labor or by better technology or equipment, but by labor whose hourly pay 
and benefits total from one third to one half those of American 
steelworkers" (USS Annual Report - 1971:3). 
If only the Union would agree not to strike and to accept smaller wage 
increases, then the Corporation would be profitable without constantly 
having to raise prices. Gott, and U. S. Steel exist in a competitive steel 
market characterized by excess capacity, where smaller lower labor costs 
may make a difference between profit and loss (see chapter 3). Yet, this 
same excess capacity means that the Corporation can no longer afford the 
possibility of losing market share during a strike. Gott's actions with 
respect to the USWA are limited to compromise and finding areas of 
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agreement. U. S. Steel is under attack from too many directions, and an 
uneasy alliance with the USWA is better than continuing the adversarial 
relationship of past years. 
U. S. Steel and the Government 
Gott unlike his predecessors, characterizes the Government as an 
"external” force which needs to be brought into an alliance with the 
Corporation. Rather than attempting to put the Government in its place as 
had his predecessors, his concern is with attempting to demonstrate that 
the Corporation's and the Government's interests are the same and they 
should work together to advance those interests. 
This attitude is evident from the beginning of Gott's tenure in 1968 
when he addresses the issues of import retsraints and tax reform. He states 
that 
It is in the interest of the economic health and national 
security of the Nation that this country have a profitable and 
growing steel industry. Neither U. S. Steel nor other 
companies can continue, for long, the massive capital 
expenditures being undertaken to improve steel's 
competitiveness unless the prospect for a profitable return on 
these investments improves. Such a prospect is dependent in 
part upon an effective restraint on steel product imports into 
this country. (USS Annual Report, 1968: 21). 
The theme that the nation's future is somehow tied to the future of the 
steel industry continues throughout Gott's tenure. Each year he continues 
to ask for import restrictions with varying degrees of success, as in 1970 
when he says 
Thus, the conditions which made some form of continuing 
limitations on steel shipments into this country desirable at 
the beginning of 1969 are even more compelling today than 
they were then. The three-year voluntary limitation that 
principal foreign producers placed on their steel exports to the 
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U. S. expires at the end of 1971, and it is essential to the entire 
steel industry that replacement solutions be worked out Promptly bv the U. S. Government (USS Annual Report. 
970:3). 
In addition to petitioning the Government about the import situation, 
Gott was concerned with two other issues during his tenure - tax reform 
and environmental pollution controls. Gott, like Blough, continued to 
expand on the theme that tax reform which would encourage investment 
in basic industry was needed. While there had been some reform in the 
area of accelerated depreciation for plant and equipment, he continued to 
ask the Government to assist in paying for air and water quality control 
projects. In 1969 Gott ends the Annual Report by saying "Federal tax relief 
for such air and water quality control projects should be a matter of special 
concern to everyone. Specifically, such facility expenditures are believed to 
be an operating expense as incurred" (USS Annual Report, 1969: 21). 
Finally, it was during Gott's tenure that the Government imposed wage 
and price controls (see chapter 3). His response to these controls was far 
different from that of his predecessors. Instead of complaining bitterly 
about the impact of these controls on operations and profits Gott states 
Improving our future profitably also depends upon the 
Government's success in controlling inflation. We prefer the 
freedom of the marketplace in all respects, but the forces of 
wage inflation finally oecame so strong that no single 
company or industry could stem the rising tide. Furthermore, 
the resulting deterioration in the ability of American industry 
in general to compete with industries of foreign countries that 
had made use of self-serving currency and trade practices was 
a matter of national concern. Although these problems are 
far from resolved, the Nation's new economic policies 
provide confidence that the Government is fully committed 
to reducing inflation, to improving our international trade 
balance and to improving real economic growth so the 
Nation can again enjoy freedom from direct economic 
controls. (USS Annual Report, 1971: 3). 
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Gott appears to welcome Government intervention in the economy as 
being good for the steel industry - an attitude certainly not shared by his 
predecessors. 
In his last year as CEO, the need for Government cooperation in 
providing a "business climate conducive to economic growth through 
private enterprise" remained a central theme in the Annual Report (USS 
1972: 3). Steel imports had increased and profits had decreased, in spite of 
voluntary restrictions on the part of a number of exporting countries and 
permission from the Price Commission to increase prices. Domestic 
demand for steel is expected to grow at about "2.5% a year and the overall 
world demand to grow even faster." The Corporation, Gott says, "expects 
to participate strongly in this growth in demand" (USS Annual Report, 
1972: 3). 
Yet, all of these elements are dependent upon Government actions, as 
is made clear toward the end of the Annual Report. 
We believe that the continued growth and success of the 
nation will best be fostered by a return to the free market 
system under which our country and its citizens have enjoyed 
the greatest prosperity in the world. We believe there is no 
reason why economic controls cannot be eliminated during 
1973 — provided government spending at all levels is limited 
so as to minimize deficits, and provided salary, wage, and 
benefit demands are in line with productivity improvements. 
We also believe thatgovernment must promote and preserve 
free but fair national and international competition and must 
support and strengthen the climate for private enterprise. 
Only then will there be encouragement to invest — so 
essential to creating jobs and providing the means to solve 
our nation's social and environmental problems (USS 
Annual Report, 1972: 3). 
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Steel Imports 
The issue of steel imports had appeared in the Annual Reports during 
Blough's tenure as CEO, but had, until 1967, been dismissed as an 
annoyance rather than a major threat to domestic market share. During 
Gott's tenure imports become a major force in domestic steel markets (see 
appendices A-5 and B-5). As discussed above, Gott's primary course of 
action with respect to imports was to encourage the Government to 
impose some form of import restrictions. 
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s steel imports continued to 
capture more market share in the U.S., increasing the level of competition 
in the steel industry and leaving the domestic producers with a smaller 
market (see chapter 3). The scope of this problem was apparent even in 
1968 when Gott told shareholders "Total industry shipments increased by 
... .9 percent. However, steel imports increased at an even faster pace -- 
capturing 17 percent of the domestic market.... which was a 55 percent... 
. increase over the record level of 1967. Thus, a disproportionate share of 
the growth in steel consumption has gone to foreign producers" (USS 
Annual Report, 1968: 4-5). 
The theme of imports siphoning off the new growth in domestic steel 
demand continued throughout Gott's tenure, as does the implicit goal of 
not losing additional market share to steel imports (see table 6.5 p. 234). 
This is closely related to the need to avoid steel strikes at all costs 
mentioned above (see table 6.5 p. 234), in spite of the effect of higher wages 
on steel prices. The threat of a strike simply increased the level of imports, 
so that a settlement - almost any settlement - was better than the additional 
erosion of market share. The Government could however, take action to 
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limit the imports, and as market share - and profits - continued to decline. 
Government action appeared to be the only solution to this problem. 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Gott, to a greater extent than his predecessors, was concerned with 
explaining the efforts the Corporation was making internally to insure a 
profitable enterprise. As noted above, profits continued to decline 
throughout Gott's tenure (see chapter 3), making it necessary both to 
assign blame and to attempt to portray the efforts of management in as 
favorable a light as possible within the narrative. 
In 1968, the year Gott became CEO, steel shipments and income were 
actually higher than in 1967. However, imports had captured 17% of the 
market and "a disproportionate share of the growth in steel consumption 
had gone to foreign producers" (USS Annual Report, 1968: 4-5). Thus, 
even with improved shipments overall, USS experienced "widely 
fluctuating levels of business, substantial increases in employment and 
other costs, high start-up costs for many new facilities, further erosion of 
steel markets by imports and intense competition. As a result, there was 
continued profit squeeze" (USS Annual Report, 1968: 3). Income for the 
year was 5.5% of sales. 
Gott's initial response was to continue the program of modernizing 
facilities begun by Blough, as well as the campaign to restrict imports. He 
told the stockholders: 
As is evident from a reading of this Report, steel is and will 
continue to be our primary ousiness. Also evident, however, 
are management's efforts to extend our activities into other 
profitable, growing lines of business consistent with our 
objective of being a diversified producer of various materials 
and services. . . . Neither U.S. Steel nor other companies 
can continue, for long, the massive capital expenditures being 
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undertaken to improve steel's competitiveness unless the 
prospect for a profitable return on these investments 
improves. Such a prospect is dependent in part upon an 
effective restraint on steel product imports into this country. 
(USS Annual Report. 1968: 21) 
U. S. Steel was still committed to steel in 1968, it was not committing itself 
to unprofitable investments 
This became increasingly apparent in 1969 when diversification became 
both a major theme and goal in the Corporation's narrative. In this one 
year U. S. Steel: expanded its operations in chemicals; started USS 
Engineers and Consultants, Inc.; expanded U.S. Steel Homes Division 
(formerly Gunnison); completed purchase of Alside, Inc. - an aluminum 
and residential siding manufacturer; organized USS Realty Development, 
expanded Reactive Metals, Inc. - a producer of titanium and titanium 
alloys - which it owned equally with National Distillers and Chemical 
Corporation; and developed U.S. Steel Finance Corporation and U.S. Steel 
Leasing Co., Inc. (USS Annual Report, 1969) All of this was done in the 
second year of Gott's term as CEO - by the management of a firm which the 
year before had publicly stated its committment to the steel industry. 
The reason for this massive diversification effort was quite simple - 
profits in steel had continued to decline to 4.5% in 1969. As Gott reported: 
In the interest of stockholders, employes, customers and the 
economy of the Nation, this return is inadequate. Wage, tax 
and other cost increases that have outstripped productivity 
and price increase in recent years, and substantial quantities of 
imported steel at prices reflecting lower wage costs and 
government subsidies have contributed to the continuing 
downward trend in profit return for U.S. Steel and, in fact, for 
the steel industry. If we are to continue to have a healthy 
steel industry in this country, this condition must be 
improved and U.S. Steel believes that it can and will be. It has 
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many programs in research, marketing, production and 
diversification geared to this objective. (USS Annual Report. 
1969: 2). 
However, in spite of the expressed optimism about the condition of 
the steel industry, the Corporation chose to hedge its bets by entering a 
number of other industries with higher potential profit margins. 
In 1970 the nature and form of the Letters to Shareholders changes. In 
the past they had been documents of approximately 14 to 20 pages and had 
dealt with almost any topic of potential interest to the Corporation. From 
1970 on the Letters become documents of 2 to 3 pages which focus 
primarily on corporate level issues, leaving the specific divisional matters 
to be addressed in short reports from the divisional presidents. This change 
leaves Gott and his followers free to discuss "global" issues without having 
to report too many specifics. (USS Annual Reports, 1970 - 1972) 
The decline in net income continued throughout the rest of Gott’s 
tenure as CEO, and diversification continued to be both a prominent 
theme and activity of the Corporation, as it attempted to improve its 
profitability (see table 6.5 p. 234). U. S. Steel continued to modernize and 
replace facilities to be able to participate fully in "the growing markets for 
steel" (USS Annual Report, 1971). However, the contribution to Corporate 
profits from the steel segment continued to be a problem. The one 
successful course of action in terms of improving profitability, and one 
which the Corporation continued to pursue, was diversification out of 




The principal themes of Gott's tenure represent a real break with the 
past. Blough moved away from the theme of Corporate greatness and 
toward a theme of survival. Gott expands on the theme of organizational 
survival and develops the image of an organization besieged on all fronts 
(see table 6.5 p. 234 & appendix B-5). This new theme leads to a new set of 
actions in the relationship of the Corporation with other organizations. 
Both the USWA and the Government are treated as allies in the battle 
against imports, although allies who were only tangentially concerned 
with the welfare of U. S. Steel. The new enemy is the steel importers, who 
do not understand the "rules of the game" of the U. S. steel industry. The 
wagons are drawn in a circle, and the Corporation is in the position of 
hoping its allies come to its rescue before it is too late. 
Edgar B. Speer: 1973 - 1978 
Like Gott, Speer had spent most of his career at U. S. Steel in operations 
(Hogan, 1971). He continued the program of diversification begun by Gott 
throughout his tenure. Further, he continued the policy of lobbying the 
Government to enforce the trade laws and restrict imports. The issue of 
pollution controls also grew in importance to the Corporation during this 
period as more and more new investment dollars went to meeting Federal 
environmental regulations. Finally, it was during Speer's tenure that U. S. 
Steel and the other major steel producers entered into the Experimental 
Negotiating Agreement with the USWA. Edgar Speer died in 1978. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Letters to Shareholders for 
Speer's tenure are presented in appendix A-6. Speer, as did his 
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predecessors, continues to attribute improvements in performance to the 
efforts of U. S. Steel itself. For Speer, even more than for Gott, the 
Government is also an agent in the improvement of performance. Steel 
imports continue to be an important cause of poor performance, and the 
Government, the economy, and the Union also continue to figure as 
important agents in causing poor performance. However, the economy 
and the Union, like the Government, also figure as agents of improving 
performance. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
B-6 presents some examples of representative statements from the Letters 
to Shareholders within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis; which combined with the results of the structural analysis, were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Speer's tenure. These themes 
will be discussed in the context of relations with other organizations 
during this period, and the characterization of U. S. Steel's role in the steel 
industry and the American economy. 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Tustifications 
Speer, like Gott, is much less concerned with the USWA and labor- 
management issues (see table 6.6, p. 248), and much more concerned with 
relations with the Government. To a greater extent than his predecessors, 
his principal concern is with the internal operations of U. S. Steel, and 
particularly with what can be done to improve corporate performance. 
Table 6.6 (p. 248) presents a summary of events, concepts, and themes 
drawn from the results presented in appendices A-6 and B-6. 
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Table 6.6: Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 
Shareholders for the tenure of Edgar B. Speer CEO of U. S. Steel 1973 -1978 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Government imposed wage and price controls 
•Net income declining 
•Excess steel production capacity 
•Voluntary steel import agreements with Japan, the EEC, and the U. K. 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
• Development of a 5 year business plan for each segment 
•Weed out marginal facilities and product lines 
•Work to improve income and ROI 
•The Corporation exists in a competitive environment 
•Steel is buffeted by "uncontrollable" forces 
•U. S. Steel is a diversified company 





•Slow down implementation 
of environmental controls 
•Lobby for tax reform 
•Make the Government understand 
the plight of U. S. Steel 
•Restrict steel imports 
Implicit: 
•Become a diversified 
company 
•No strikes at any cost 
•Retain market share 
•"Educate" the Government 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Agrees to the Experimental Negotiating Agreement with the USWA 
•Develops corporate and business-level strategic plans 
•Uses non-steel segments to underwrite the steel business 
The major theme has once again shifted. The Corporation is still 
concerned with survival, but the sense of being besieged has decreased. 
There are actions Speer and U. S. Steel can take to improve the 
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Corporation's position. The development of strategic plans and the use of 
the diversified segments of the firm to underwrite steel, are part of the 
theme of fighting for survival. Additionally, the signing of the 
Experimental Negotiating Agreement in 1973 marks the formal conclusion 
of a treaty with the USWA. Speer states that this agreement was "designed 
to avoid industry-wide work stoppages or lockouts through July 1977. This 
agreement should provide more stable employment for steelworkers, 
improve operating efficiencies and prevent foreign steelmakers from 
taking advantage of strike threats by making additional inroads into U. S. 
markets" (USS Annual Report, 1973: 2-3). 
During the first two years of Speer's tenure shipments and sales of steel 
increased, as did net income. This was attributed to a number of factors, 
among them the increased demand for steel products both in the U.S. and 
worldwide (see chapter 3). In turn, this strong domestic demand held 
imports to 14 percent of the domestic market. 
When demand is high abroad, recent experience has shown 
that foreign steel is only available to American consumers at 
prices well above those prevailing in this country. 
Conversely, when world demand is slack, foreign steel, in 
many cases produced by companies which are government- 
owned or controlled, is available for export to this country at 
unrealistically low prices. 
In the best interest of both American steel producers and 
consumers, the climate for investment in the domestic steel 
industry must be improved; otherwise, added employment 
and investment opportunities will develop abroad rather 
than in this country. (USS Annual Report, 1973:2) 
The need for a favorable investment climate for steel was a major 
theme of Speer's years as CEO (see table 6.6, p. 248). As stated in his first 
Letter to the Shareholders, Speer believed that U.S. Steel "will be able to 
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justify and finance the expansion of steelmaking capacity only if 
prospective profitability of new facilities improves to competitive levels of 
return" (USS Annual Report, 1973:3). By 1975 however, it was apparent 
that investment in steel was not profitable, as the near record level of net 
income occured in a "year in which our shipments of steel products were 
the lowest in 14 years" but, "our nonsteel lines of business accounted for 
26% of gross sales and revenues and 45% of before-tax income" (USS 
Annual Report, 1975:2). . 
The increasing importance of the non-steel lines of business is evident 
in Speer's emphasis on the positive actions the Corporation is taking to 
improve its profitability (see table 6.6, p. 248). The Annual Reports of this 
period contain a discussion of the "business plans" which "are in place for 
each operating responsibility. Improved income and return on 
investment are the central objectives of each of these plans. In line with 
these objectives, we will continue to weed-out marginal facilities and 
product lines" (USS Annual Report, 1978:3). The discussion of business 
plans, which fit into an overall corporate plan for improved income and 
performance, was certainly new to Speer' tenure. While such plans may 
have existed in the past, none of the CEOs publicly discussed them, nor did 
they talk about the need to "weed-out marginal facilities and product lines" 
to the extent Speer does. 
Speer focuses to a much greater extent than did his predecessors on 
what the Government can do to help both U. S. Steel and the steel industry 
(see appendices A-6 & B-6). In particular, as can be seen from table 6.6 (p. 
248), Speer concentrates on the need for tax reform and the need for the 
Government to provide a better investment climate. Secondarily, he 
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continues, as did Blough and Gott, to call for restrictions on imported steel, 
or at least the enforcement of trade laws. (USS Annual Reports, 1973-1978). 
Again, as during Gott's tenure, the steel segment is buffeted by a 
number of "external uncontrollable" forces. Substitute products and 
foreign imports continue to cut into market share. For the Corporation as 
a whole, diversification into non-steel lines of business becomes an 
important theme. If the non-steel businesses accounted for a substantial 
portion of the net income in 1975, by 1978 "our nonsteel businesses 
contributed 86% of the operating income and 27% of total sales" (USS 
Annual Report, 1978: 2). Speer, to a far greater extent than his predecessors, 
was committed to "the establishment of significant nonsteel, but related, 
lines of business to lessen the cyclical effects of the basic Steel 
Manufacturing business" (USS Annual Report, 1975:2). Certainly by the 
end of his tenure it was becoming difficult to justify any additional 
investment in steel, when most of the profits were from the nonsteel 
segments. 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Speer held for the Corporation 
during this period are outlined in table 6.6 (p. 248). These goals reflect the 
changing themes in the U. S. Steel narrative. The relative importance of 
the various actors with whom U. S. Steel interacts has changed, and 
although similar to the relationships prevalent during Gott's tenure, the 
goals outlined here are evidence of the changes in themes which 
continued throughout the 1970's. 
Speer for example, appears to be not at all concerned with U. S. Steel's 
position in the steel industry. Instead, an important explicit goal is the 
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maintenance of profitable operations in whatever businesses the 
Corporation is involved in. This goal of improving profitability and 
return on equity led in turn to an implicit goal of increasing the 
diversification efforts of the Corporation. Like Gott, Speer maintained a 
public committment to steel when he referred to "our principal business of 
steel manufacturing", but at the same time the nonsteel segments were 
becoming of greater importance to the overall profitability of U. S. Steel 
(USS Annual Reports, 1973-1978). As noted above, by 1978 the nonsteel 
segments were accounting for 86% of operating income, and the steel 
segment was, in effect, being underwritten by the other parts of the 
Corporation. 
Along with the goal of increasing profitability, Speer also held the 
implicit goal of "educating" the Government - something he held in 
common with his predecessors. In 1976 for example, he states that 
Many concerned Americans feel that one of the most critical 
challenges facing America today is the creation, in the private 
sector, of enough new, useful, self-sustaining jobs in a non¬ 
inflationary manner. The only way a self-sustaining job 
comes into existence is through investment of savings in 
profit generating tools of production. Savings are invested 
only wnen profit and the prospect of profit are sufficient for 
investors to take the risk involved. Government, essentially, 
does not create ne, self-sustaining jobs, but government can 
foster a climate for investment which will. (USS Annual 
Report, 1976: 2). 
If the Corporation is to survive - and survival can certainly be seen to 
be an important goal throughout this period - compromises have to be 
made and new courses of action must be found. The implicit goal of no 
strikes, and the explicit goals of restricting imports, getting tax reform, and 
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slowing the implementation of environmental controls, are all part of this 
larger goal of survival. 
The actions taken by the Corporation in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of U. S. Steel's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations, as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role inthe steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
U. S. Steel and the USWA 
As discussed above the Experimental Negotiating Agreement to which 
U. S. Steel became a party in 1973 effectively removed the USWA from 
consideration as a key actor in Speer's discussion of U. S. Steel and the 
world it existed in. The original agreement, which guaranteed no 
"industry-wide work stoppages or lockouts through July 1977" (USS 
Annual Report. 1973:2), was extended in 1974 until 1980 (USS Annual 
Report. 1974: 3). After that, there is no reference in the Annual Reports to 
the USWA, and only a brief mention of the impact of rising labor costs on 
profits (USS Annual Reports, 1975-1978). 
This is a very different characterization of the USWA in the U. S. Steel 
narrative from prior years. Speer, unlike his predecessors, was willing to 
accept a situation in which the Union consistently negotiated for increased 
wages and benefits, if it meant no strike threats and no new opportunities 
for importers to increase their market share. Competition, which had been 
an "illusion" for much of the 1940's and 1950s, was now very real, and 
labor peace was a necessity for an industry struggling to survive (see 
chapter 3). 
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U. S. Steel and the Government 
A key theme in the narrative of U. S. Steel during this period was the 
Corporation's relations with the Government (see appendix B-6). If any 
"force" outside of U. S. Steel can take actions which will improve the 
position of U. S. Steel it is the Government, as is apparent from table 6.6 (p. 
248). Many of the issues which Speer believed were important for the 
long-term survival of the Corporation - tax reform, improved investment 
climate, controlling inflation, revised environmental controls and 
enforcement of trade laws - were issues which required the cooperation of 
the Government. Thus Speer, like Gott, characterized the Government as 
an "external" force which needed to be brought into alliance with the 
Corporation, rather than as a "troublesome force" which needed to be 
lectured on its proper role - as had earlier CEOs. 
This appeal for cooperation - the concept that what is good for U. S. 
Steel is also in the best interests of the Nation - is a theme which is evident 
in Speer's first Letter to Shareholders, when he states "In the best interest 
of both American steel producers and consumers, the climate for 
investment in the domestic steel industry must be improved; otherwise, 
added employment and investment opportunities will develop abroad 
rather than in this country" (USS Annual Report, 1973:2). Speer continues 
to focus on the role of the Government in providing an investment 
climate which is favorable to basic industry. He concentrates on the 
increase in Government spending, and the problems it creates for 
investment in the private sector. 
Another important sub-theme was the need for tax reform. If 
Government spending levels were taking money that could be used for 
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investment, then tax laws which discouraged savings and investment 
were exacerbating the problem. In 1975 Speer provided a list of actions the 
Government could take to improve the investment climate. Among these 
was "Tax policies, although improved in recent years, are still biased 
against capital formation and industrial growth. Industry cannot safely 
continue to rely so extensively on long-term debt for needed funds" (USS 
Annual Report. 1975:3). 
Along with general tax reform, the issue of reforming Government 
policies with respect to the installation of environmental controls became 
a more important theme. The installation of these controls was, by 1978, 
costing U. S. Steel approximately $250 million per year - in many years this 
amount was greater than the Corporation's net income. "U. S. Steel is 
committed to improving the environment. But when the economics of 
expenditures under such programs makes the output of the facilities 
unprofitable, the alternative of abandoning those facilities and their 
products will be weighed" (USS Annual Report, 1978: 3). 
At the same time that Government spending and tax policies appeared 
to be deterring investment in steel, foreign imports were also affecting the 
Corporation and the steel industry as a whole (see chapter 3). Again, the 
Corporation turned to the Government for relief in the form of import 
quotas and enforcement of trade laws. Speer was asking for "a fair foreign 
trade policy which enables American industry to compete on a fair and 
equitable basis with foreign producers" (USS Annual Report, 1976: 3). 
American trade policy however, continued to reflect American foreign 
policy as much as it did the desires of domestic industries (see chapter 3). 
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The hope expressed at the end of the 1978 Annual Report that "U. S. 
Steel is dedicated to making 1979 a year of improved results and a base for 
strength and growth in the Eighties" was as dependent upon Government 
actions, as had been Gott's hopes for the future of the Corporation in 1972 
(USS Annual Report, 1978:3). In the 1940s and 1950s the CEOs had searched 
for a solution to the constant wars with labor. In the 1970s U. S. Steel CEOs 
needed to find a means of gaining cooperation from the Government. The 
only actions available to them were lobbying and public relations 
campaigns. As steel declined in importance, U. S. steel became simply one 
petitioner among many. 
Other: Economic Issues 
Closely tied to the theme of gaining the cooperation of the 
Government in improving the situation of the steel industry, were 
concerns about the general economy. As can be seen from table 6.6 (p. 248) 
and appendices A-6 and B-6 economic issues and considerations are 
characterized as evenly split in their impact on corporate performance. For 
much of this time period the economy as a whole was experiencing both 
inflation and recession. Like his predecessors, Speer accepted the fact that 
steel demand relied heavily upon the state of the general economy, and 
typically moved in the same direction as the economy. 
Speer in 1973 and 1974 was able to talk about record levels of steel 
consumption - both domestically and worldwide - and the resultant record 
shipments and sales during this period (USS Annual Reports, 1973-1974). 
In 1974 he went so far as to say " Market surveys indicate that domestic 
producers will need 25 to 30 million tons of additional new raw steel 
capability over the next few years. Fortunately, there is no longer a capital 
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cost disadvantage nor an operating cost disadvantage to producing steel for 
the U. S. here rather than abroad" (USS Annual Report, 1974: 2). 
1973 and 1974 had however, been years of false hope for both U. S. Steel 
and the steel industry. Corporate net income had reached its highest level 
in fourteen years, and demand for steel was forecast as remaining strong - a 
condition unknown since the end of the Korean conflict (see chapter 3). 
These economic elements, combined with the termination of price 
controls led Speer to predict a favorable future for U. S. Steel (USS Annual 
Report, 1974). 
The next year income began to decline, steel shipments fell to their 
lowest level in fourteen years, and the nonsteel lines of business produced 
the bulk of operating profits (USS Annual Report, 1975). While it was 
expected that steel consumption in the U.S. would continue to increase on 
average 2.5% and over 4% worldwide, "markets for many of our other 
products and services are expected to grow at rates even higher than the 
approximate four per cent historic rate of growth in real Gross National 
Product." (USS Annual Report, 1975:2). 
In the last three years of Speer's tenure although steel shipments rose, 
income continued to lag. "This rate of profitability (4.7 per cent) must be 
improved in order to generate and attract the funds for investment to 
enable U.S. Steel to modernize and expand its facilities; to meet 
governmental requirements for the environment, safety, and health; to 
adequately serve its customers; and to sustain and create tax-generating 
jobs." (USS Annual Report, 1976:2). The recession of the mid-1970s, 
combined with higher energy costs, had defeated the hope of a renewed 
domestic steel industry. 
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Steel Imports 
Steel imports remained a major theme in the narrative during this 
period. In 1973 Speer could talk about worldwide shortages and a 
slowdown in imports into the U. S. (USS Annual Report, 1973), but by 1975 
he was again calling for "enforcement of existing laws and regulations" to 
counter or eliminate unfair competition from "foreign producers 
supported by their government's policies" (USS Annual Report. 1975:3). 
Speer continued to lobby the Government for restrictions on steel 
imports, as had Gott and Blough. However, unlike Gott he focuses less on 
a call for quotas as such, and more on a call for enforcement of existing 
laws and fair trade policies to prohibit dumping of steel (USS Annual 
Reports, 1975 - 1978). This shift in language and characterization of the 
importers (see appendix B-6) may represent a recognition that quotas had 
not been universally effective in limiting steel imports. Additionally, as U. 
S. Steel became less dependent on the steel segment for profits, Speer 
became less concerned about market share issues in steel. 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
As can be seen from appendix A-6 the category which occupied most of 
Speer's narratives about U. S. Steel were those things which management 
was doing in the company to improve performance. As the 
"uncontrollable forces" of Government policy and economic swings took 
the Corporation from record highs to record lows in shipments and sales, 
Speer needed to reassure stockholders that management was taking some 
action to assure them a return on their investment. 
The need to assure a reasonable return on investment, which had 
spurred Blough and Gott to consider diversification, was a theme still 
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haunting the Corporation. By 1978 the nonsteel lines of business were 
accounting for 27% of total sales, but 86% of operating income (USS 
Annual Report, 1978:2). Steel was no longer profitable without other lines 
of business to underwrite the steel operations. The factors which Speer 
lists in 1978 as adversely affecting the Corporation's income - "continuing 
cost-price presures from a record level of steel imports, from substantial 
increases in labor and in the costs of purchased goods and services, from 
continuing and high start-up costs of new facilities, and from major 
planned and unplanned maintenance outages" - all affected the steel 
segment to a much greater degree than the nonsteel segments. 
In addition to the continuance of the diversification program, Speer 
also cites a number of other areas in which management is attempting to 
improve corporate performance. Chief among these are the productivity 
and efficiency gains as facilities are modernized (USS Annual Reports, 
1973 - 1978). Further, Speer reminds shareholders the the Corporation 
posseses a "strong base of raw materials .... and talented people" to help it 
"participate fully in market opportunities" (USS Annual Report, 1974: 3). 
From 1975 to 1978 the Annual Reports focus more and more on the 
problems in steel and the growing contribution of the nonsteel segments to 
Corporate profits (see appendix B-6). As noted earlier, the Corporation had 
been pursuing an objective of establishing "significant nonsteel businesses 
.... to lessen the cyclical effects of the basic Steel Manufacturing business" 
(USS Annual Report, 1975:2). By 1978, it had become apparent that U. S. 
Steel could no longer afford to be committed to steel. 
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Conclusions 
The principal theme of Speer's tenure was one of an organization 
struggling to survive, but not of an organization so besieged that it was 
waiting for its allies to rescue it. Uneasy alliances continued to hold with 
both the Government and the Union, but it was increasingly apparent that 
neither organization was going to "rescue" U. S. Steel. Instead, the 
Corporation began to search for more effective means to improve its own 
performance. 
Speer had spent five years lobbying the U.S. Government on trade 
issues and environmental regulations. Energy had become more 
expensive following the Oil Embargo, and the pressure from imports and 
substitute products had not allowed the Corporation to increase prices to 
cover costs. The USWA continued to insist on higher wages and benefit 
packages in each round of negotiations. The one area of hope was the 
diversification effort, as the non-steel businesses accounted for more and 
more corporate profits. The policy of diversification begun by Blough, and 
extended by Gott and Speer, will be carried even further by Speer's 
successor - David Roderick. U. S. Steel had broken the siege, but in doing 
so it was moving away from its traditional line of business and remaking 
itself in an as yet unknown fashion. 
David M. Roderick: 1979 - 
Like Gott and Speer, Roderick had spent most of his business career at 
U. S. Steel. Thus, when he became CEO in 1979 following Speer's death, he 
was familiar with the problems which U. S. Steel had been experiencing in 
the Steel segment, and with the diversification program which Blough had 
begun. It is during Roderick's tenure that the steel segment begins to be 
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phased out, and the diversification effort reaches its logical conclusion. In 
many respects, the actions which Roderick has taken are the natural 
outcome of the programs carried out by the CEO's since World War II. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Letters to Shareholders for 
Roderick's tenure are presented in appendix A-7. Roderick, to an even 
greater extent than his predecessors, continues to attribute improvements 
in performance to the efforts of U. S. Steel itself. For Roderick the 
Government is both an agent in the improvement of corporate 
performance, and a cause of poor performance. Steel imports continue to 
be an important cause of poor performance, and the economy is 
categorized as causing poor performance. The role of the Union is split, 
however the emphasis is on the means by which the Union is aiding the 
Corporation in improving performance. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
B-7 presents some examples of representative statements from the Letters 
to Shareholders within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis, were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Roderick's tenure. These 
themes will be discussed in the context of relations with other 
organizations during this period, and the characterization of U. S. Steel's 
role in the steel industry and the American economy. 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Explanations/Tustifications 
Roderick devotes much of his time to discussing issues internal to U. S. 
Steel and is much less concerned with the USWA and labor-management 
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issues than any of his predecessors except Speer. However, he is also far 
less concerned the Government than his predecessors, and more prone to 
see Government actions as detrimental to the Corporation. Table 6.7 (p. 
262) presents a summary of events, concepts, and themes drawn from the 
results presented in appendices A-7 and B-7. 
Table 6.7: Summary of Concepts, Themes and Events in the Letters to 
Shareholders for the tenure of David M. Roderick CEO of U. S. Steel 1979 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Oil Embargo 
•Continuing high level of steel imports 
•Continuing competition from substitute products 
•Governmental Deregulation 
•Rationalization of the U. S. steel industry 
CHARACTERIZATION OF U. S. STEEL 
•A highly selective steel producer 
•A "new" company 
•An energy company 
•Steel is not essential to the corporation 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF U. S. STEEL 
Implicit: 
•Remake/renew the Corporation 




•Return the Corporation 
to profitability 
retaining a dominant market 
share in steel 
•Rationalize the steel segment 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Close steel plants 
•Buy Marathon Oil and Texas Oil & Gas 
•Sell off assets 
•Lobby the Government for improved tax laws 
262 
The absence of a strong labor-management theme may be a result of 
both the plant closings and the move to a more diversified Corporation. 
By 1981, Roderick had closed a substantial number of steel plants (see 
chapter 3), and begun acquisition of Marathon Oil. The USWA and its 
demands were simply no longer important to the welfare of the 
Corporation. 
The first action Roderick took after becoming CEO was to permanently 
shut down many "marginal operations" putting 11,000 employees out of 
work (USS Annual Report. 1979:2). Roderick, as had his predecessors, 
firmly laid the blame for this action on "outside" actors. 
For many years U.S. Steel and the other steel companies have 
spoken out on the problems of inflation, unfairly priced steel 
imports, lagging productivity improvement, inadequate 
capital cost recovery allowances, direct and indirect control of 
steel prices, and unrealistic environmental control 
regulations. While these problems were not the sole reasons 
behind the shutdowns, they certainly played a major 
cumulative role in many of them. Without solutions to 
these problems, the domestic steel industry will not be able to 
revitalize and earn a competitive rate of return on the 
massive investment required. As a result, the industry will 
most likely be faced with more shutdowns and more lost jobs 
— and the United States will become more dependent on 
foreign producers to supply its steel needs, as it has with oil 
(USS Annual Report. 19/9:2). 
Roderick continues to claim, as had his predecessors, that "Steel is and 
always has been U.S. Steel's principal business and it will continue to be as 
long as it can return a competitive profit" (USS Annual Report, 1980:2). 
Note that he has added a disclaimer; steel will no longer be U. S. Steel's 
principal business when it no longer returns a competitive profit - 
something it has not been doing for several years. Later, in the same 
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Annual Report, he says "Demand in many of our other businesses is 
expected to grow at a faster rate than the Nation's economy. For U.S. Steel 
to grow as fast as the economy, a significant portion of facility investments 
must be directed to those markets having above average growth potential" 
(USS Annual Report, 1980:2). 
By 1980 it is apparent that the Corporation's committment to steel has 
taken on the nature of an obligation. Roderick and U.S. Steel are 
committed to steel because the Corporation has been the largest U. S. steel 
producer since its founding in 1901, and it has a huge investment in steel 
facilities. It is no longer committed to steel because it is profitable, or a 
growth industry, as becomes apparent in 1981 - the year in which Roderick 
announced that U. S. Steel would be acquiring Marathon Oil (USS Annual 
Report, 1981). 
The plant closings and the acquisition of Marathon Oil reflect a 
profound change in the characterization of the Corporation. Unlike Gott’s 
tenure, and to some extent Speer's, the Corporation is no longer waiting to 
be rescued. The new theme is one of a strong organization remaking its 
image, and to some extent inventing a new future. By the 1980s if U. S. 
Steel is to survive then Roderick must find solutions on his own. 
In this sense, he is closer to Olds and Fairless, than to his immediate 
predecessors. Like them he views the Corporation as in control of its own 
destiny, rather than buffeted by a series of "uncontrollable forces", as did 
Speer and Gott. Roderick's emphasis on what management is doing to 
improve performance is in line with themes utilized by earlier CEOs. At 
the same time, his willingness to let go of the steel segment would have 
been foreign to most of them. Roderick, like his predecessors, is concerned 
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with the theme of Corporate survival - and survival in the Eighties meant 
getting out a business segment which had to be subsidized by the other 
lines of business. The Government, the USWA, and even the import 
issue, receded into the background as Roderick brought into being "A New 
U. S. Steel" (USS Annual Report, 1984:2). 
Characterization of U. S. Steel: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Roderick held for the Corporation 
during this period are outlined in table 6.7 (p. 262). These goals reflect the 
changing themes in the U. S. Steel narrative. The relative importance of 
the various actors with whom U. S. Steel interacts has, as noted above, 
changed, and the goals outlined here are evidence of the changes in 
themes which continued throughout the 1980's. 
First, and foremost, Roderick has absolutely abandoned the goal of 
maintaining U. S. Steel’s dominant position in the steel industry. In fact, 
he has virtually abandoned the steel industry. Statements such as "Steel is 
and always has been U. S. Steel's principal business and it will continue to 
be as long as it can return a competitive profit" reflect a willingness to 
rationalize or simply abandon the core business wrhich his predecessors 
lacked (USS Annual Report. 1980:2). 
Roderick's primary goal appears to be to find a wray to make the 
Corporation profitable again (see table 6.6, p. 262). In line with this, 
diversification becomes not only a means of protecting the Steel segment 
from economic cycles; but a means of remaking and renewing the 
Corporation. This change is evident in the emphasis he places on 
diversification - not simply the acquiaition of Marathon, but the 
profitability of the non-steel segments (USS Annual Reports, 1979-1985). 
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In 1982 for example, he states that "The Corporation sustained a net loss in 
1982 of $361 million, due almost exclusively to results in the Steel segment. 
Collectively, our other business segments were profitable, but not enough 
to offset the loss in Steel" (USS Annual Report, 1982:2). 
Finally, Roderick continues the attempt to "educate" the Government - 
but no longer solely in the realities of steel. He appears to have abandoned 
any hope that the Government will assist the steel industry, and focuses 
instead on more general issues. He is still concerned, as were his 
predecessors, with the need for tax reform (USS Annual Report, 1980), but 
increasingly, he is concerned with a new set of issues - energy policy, 
cleanup of toxic waste, and plant closing legislation - issues that would be 
foreign to his predecessors (USS Annual Report. 1985). 
The overriding implicit goal during this period was to remake and 
renew the Corporation. Survival alone was no longer enough - a return to 
the days of profitability was desired. The actions taken by the Corporation 
in pursuit of these goals will be discussed in the context of U. S. Steel's 
narrative about its relations with other organizations, as well as its 
ongoing narrative of its own existence and role inthe steel industry, the 
American economy, and the world. 
U. S. Steel and the USWA 
The USWA was greatly diminished in strategic importance to U. S. 
Steel by the time Roderick became CEO in 1979. Speer, through the 
Experimental Negotiating Agreement, had essentially excluded the Union 
from U. S. Steel's narrative. Roderick, through the plant closings and the 
resultant loss of jobs as well as the increased diversification efforts, 
continued this exclusion. 
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In fact, Roderick rarely mentions the Union which was so prominent 
an actor in his predecessors' statements. In 1982, and again in 1985, he 
discusses the "debilitating effect on the industry of excessive labor costs" 
(USS Annual Report, 1982:3). In both years contract negotiations were 
occuring, and Roderick argued that "other hurdles to profitability are our 
steel employment costs, plainly not supported by today's stel market, and 
work arrangements too restrictive to permit competitive productivity 
standards" (USS Annual Report - 1985:4). 
His predecessors argued that higher wages would lead to higher prices; 
Roderick simply argues that higher wages will lead to more plant closings 
and more lost jobs. (USS Annual Reports: 1979-1985). Roderick is not 
interested in labor peace at a cost, just as he is no longer interested in 
retaining a dominant market share in steel (see appendices A-7 and B-7). 
Instead, he is interested in profitability, and if the USWA would not 
cooperate U. S. Steel would further expand its non-steel segment (see table 
6.7, p. 262). 
U. S. Steel and the Government 
The Corporation's relations with the Government is a less important 
theme during this period than in the past. At the same time, the 
Government is portrayed as having a much more mixed role in U. S. 
Steel's narrative than in the past. Speer believed that there were a number 
of actions and policies the Government could pursue which would be 
beneficial for the industry (see table 6.6, p. 248). Roderick has given up 
hope of obtaining much Government cooperation in reviving the 
domestic steel industry. In 1979 he told the shareholders 
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To modernize, grow with markets and remain competitive, 
capital needs of U. S. Steel and the domestic steel industry in 
the next decade will be more than double the level of 
spending in the past ten years. This can be accomplished if 
there is provision in our tax laws for competitive capital 
recovery allowances, if there are improved cost-price 
relationships, if there is increased productivity, and if trade 
laws are enforced. Until these changes occur, however, it is 
essential to direct available funds where they will provide the 
greatest return. During both the past five year period and the 
past ten year period, U. S. Steel's nonsteel businesses have 
been profitable and virtually self-sufficient in terms of cash 
flow. The steel business has not (USS Annual Report. 
1979:3). 
In 1980 however, he points to "progress .... toward creating a better 
understanding of steel industry problems by all levels of government. The 
recommendations of the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee 
(government, labor and industry) were generally accepted by the outgoing 
Administration and several were endorsed by the incoming 
Administration" (USS Annual Report. 1980:3). Among these 
recommendations were changes "in steel trade policy which led to the 
reinstatement of the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM)" (USS Annual 
Report. 1980:3). 
In 1984, he discussed another attempt to "reduce unfairly traded steel in 
the U. S. market. A massive lobbying program to enact steel quota 
legislation, in which thousands of U. S. Steel employees, pensioners and 
shareholders participated, resulted in a heightened public awareness and 
the formulation of President Reagan's program aimed at limiting finished 
steel imports to 18.5 percent of the domestic market" (USS Annual Report, 
1984: 4). Note that at this time the emphasis is on imports of finished steel 
products, not all steel products. One explanation for this may be that in 
1983 U. S. Steel had announced plans to import semi-finished steel from 
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British Steel - a program which is not mentioned in the Annual Reports 
for either 1983 or 1984 (see chapter 3). 
Like his predecessors then, Roderick continued to lobby the 
Government for relief from steel imports, although the nature of the 
assistance desired changes over time. In fact, the acquisition of Marathon 
in 1982 does appear to be the catalyst for some changes in the depiction of 
the Corporation's relationship with the Government. Tax reform and 
steel import quotas are slowly replaced by an interest in regulation of 
petroleum markets, and toxic waste cleanup programs - areas which are of 
importance to the energy company U. S. Steel had become by 1985 (USS 
Annual Report, 1985). 
Speer needed Government cooperation to pursue his plans for the 
Corporation. Roderick has developed a narrative in which the 
Corporation is much less dependent on steel, and much less dependent on 
the Government. Steel import quotas and incentives to invest in basic 
industry are no longer of central importance to the survival of the 
Corporation. Conditions in the world petroleum marketplace have 
replaced Government actions and policies as essential to Roderick's hopes 
and plans for the continued success of U. S. Steel (USS Annual Report, 
1985). 
Steel Imports 
As discussed above the theme of steel imports occupied a less important 
position in Roderick's narrative than was true of his immediate 
predecessors. He was concerned with the "market disruptions" caused by 
high levels of imports and the resultant problems for domestic producers 
(USS Annual Report, 1980:3). However, unlike his predecessors he did not 
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simply attempt to gain Government support for import quotas. Instead, he 
began to file claims with the Commerce Department and the International 
Trade Commission charging countries with dumping steel in the U. S. 
(USS Annual Report, 1982). 
The filing of unfair trade suits forced the Government to take some 
action and import agreements were negotiated with some countries - 
notably the EEC. That the suits were not much more effective than 
previous efforts had been however, is evident in the 1985 Annual Report 
where Roderick states that aspirations for a prosperous 1986 depend in part 
upon ’’substantive results from the Administration's steel import restraint 
program which has yet to yield the expected reduction of foreign steel into 
our domestic market" (USS Annual Report, 1985:6). 
The import issue is still of importance to the steel segment, however 
the steel segment is no longer of particular importance in the 
Corporation's narrative. In 1984 Roderick identified a number of 
"objectives for the Corporation", among them "We will be a highly 
selective steel producer. We will only produce what is economically 
justifiable" (USS Annual Report, 1984: 4). In 1979 he had stated that unless 
overall conditions for the domestic steel industry changed the U. S. would 
more dependent on foreign producers. By 1984, he appears ready to 
virtually abandon the market to the foreign producers - an action surely 
alien to his predecessors. 
Other: Economic Issues 
If the theme of the effect of steel imports and Federal tax laws on the 
financial performance of the Corporation decreased in importance during 
this period, the theme of the impact of general economic conditions 
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increased (see appendices A-7 and B-7). In the early 1980's the economy 
was experiencing simultaneous inflation and recession - and steel in 
particular, was hard hit. "Most lines of business were seriously hampered 
by inflation, in addition, a severe downturn in the economy limited the 
degree to which price increases could be realized in the marketplace" (USS 
Annual Report, 1980:2). The recession continued into 1981, when 
improved financial results "were achieved despite economic conditions 
which depressed demand for many products" (USS Annual Report, 
1981:2). It is interesting to note that much of the "improved financial 
performance" came, not from operations, but from the sale of assets (see 
table 6.7, p. 262). 
The overall economy did improve in the period 1983 to 1985, although 
a "recessionary climate" continued in the "steel marketplace" (USS 
Annual Report, 1984:2). Energy " -- our Oil and Gas segment" had replaced 
steel as the "major line of business in terms of both revenues and 
earnings", so that a continuing recession in steel, while still affecting 
Corporate profits, was less of a problem than it had been in 1980 through 
1982. (USS Annual Report, 1984:2). 
In 1985 Roderick looks forward to a prosperous 1986 if: prices recover in 
the petroleum and gas industries, a resurgence of capital dpending 
increases demand for steel, and if the Government moves to reduce the 
budget deficit which threatens the "promising growth" in the economy 
(USS Annual Report, 1985:6). The restructuring of the Corporation which 
had been carried out during the 1980s had left U. S. Steel less reliant on U. 
S. Government tax and steel import policies, but more reliant on world 
economic and political conditions. The Corporation may be insulated 
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from the "cyclical nature of the steel business" (USS Annual Report, 
1984:2); but it is now subject to "political developments, both in the United 
States and the Middle East" (USS Annual Report, 1985:4). 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
As table 6.7 (p. 262) demonstrates,a primary theme during the period 
1979 to 1985 was the actions taken by management to improve the financial 
performance of U. S. Steel. As noted earlier, where Speer and Gott looked 
for survival of the Corporation, Roderick aspired to a return to a return to 
profitability and that the Corporation "be as integral to the American 
ecoonomy in 2001 as it was in 1901" (USS Annual Report, 1984:5). 
The emphasis on the effect of internal changes is apparent in Roderick’s 
first Annual Report. "In 1979, your management team, fully supported by 
the Board of Directors, made a number of critical decisions — many 
unpleasant — but nevertheless essential for the long-term prosperity of the 
company" (USS Annual Report, 1979:2). Essentially, these unpleasant 
decisions involved the permanent shutdown of a significant portion of the 
steel operations - putting over 11,000 employees out of work in one year. 
As noted earlier, Roderick continued to press the Government for a 
"provision in our tax laws for competitive capital recovery allowances" 
and the enforcement of trade laws, while continuing to close plants (USS 
Annual Report, 1979:3). The reality of the situation however, was that 
over the past decade "U. S. Steel's nonsteel businesses have been profitable 
and virtually self-sufficient in terms of cash flow. The steel business has 
not" (USS Annual Report, 1979: 3). As U. S. Steel entered the Eighties, 
confident of "a decade of progress" it was becoming apparent that that 
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progress would not be in steel, but in the areas the Corporation was 
diversifying into (USS Annual Report. 1979: 3). 
Steel continued to be a low-growth industry (1.5 -2% per year); and 
Roderick stated "For U. S. Steel to grow as fast as the economy, a significant 
portion of facility investments must be directed to those markets having 
above average growth potential" (USS Annual Report, 1980: 2). In spite of 
this, Roderick continued to claim, as had his predecessors, that "Steel is 
and has always been U. S. Steel's principal business and it will continue to 
be as long as it can return a competitive profit" (USS Annual Report, 
1980:2). 
The announcement of the acquisition of Marathon Oil in 1981 was 
discussed in terms of its positive impact on the steel business, and 
Roderick reassured stockholders that this investment in no way lessened 
the Corporation's dedication to steel (USS Annual Report, 1981). Instead, 
"The addition of Marathon and the advances already made in the current 
lines of business provide new opportunities to increase the economic 
value of U.S. Steel" (USS Annual Report, 1981:3). The acquisition of 
Marathon was completed in 1982, and "altered the structure, product, and 
asset base of the Corporation more dramatically than any other event since 
our founding in 1901" (USS Annual Report, 1982:2). 1982 had been a year 
of severe depression in the steel markets, and the Corporation sustained a 
net loss of $367 million, "due almost exclusively to results in the Steel 
segment. Collectively, our other business segments were profitable, but 
not enough to offset the loss in Steel" (USS Annual Report, 1982:2). 
The net losses of 1982 continued into 1983, with a net loss of $1.16 
billion - a fact not even mentioned until halfway into the Annual Report 
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(USS Annual Report, 1983). This was the largest one year net loss ever 
recorded by any U.S. corporation, and it is interesting that Roderick begins 
the 1983 Annual Report by stating "Despite the lingering recession in many 
steel consuming industries during 1983, the year was marked by notable 
U.S. Steel achievements" (USS Annual Report, 1983:2). The record loss 
was not among them. 
Much of the loss is attributed to employee related costs associated with 
the ongoing plant shutdowns (USS Annual Report, 1983:3). Yet, it is these 
shutdowns, or rationalization of steel operations, which is part of a strategy 
to make the Steel segment more competitive. Apparently, the 
rationalization strategy is making steel more competitive at the expense of 
corporate profits (USS Annual Report, 1983). 
Other actions in the Steel segment - all aimed at making steel more 
competitive - included reaching a new agreement with the USWA and 
filing unfair trade practices suits against seven countries (USS Annual 
Report, 1983). Most interesting however, was the announcement of a 
plan to acquire National Steel Corporation. U. S. Steel had just announced 
a record loss, and it was continuing to rationalize its own steel segment. 
Further, its losses for the year were attributed to employee related costs and 
the "unrelenting menace of steel import." (USS Annual Report, 1983: 3). 
Yet, Roderick announced plans to acquire another major steel producer - 
plans which it knew would be carefully scrutinized by the Department of 
Justice (USS Annual Report, 1983:2-3). 
At the same time U. S. Steel had also announced plans to import semi¬ 
finished steel from British Steel - a plan which is not mentioned in the 
Annual reports for either 1983 or 1984 (Forbes, January 2, 1984: 157). 
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Instead, a capital investment program which consisted of adding two 
continuous casters at two plants was announced (USS Annual Report - 
1984). There was no mention of the proposal that the steel to be run 
through those casters would come from the U.K. This was a particularly 
interesting move on the part of U. S. Steel as, at the same time, they were 
in court pursuing import restrictions. 1983 then, was a year of 
contradictions in the Steel segment, marked by further plant closings, 
while seeking to buy additional capacity; and seeking import restrictions 
while seeking to import steel (USS Annual Report, 1983). 
In 1984 and 1985 it is apparent that steel has diminished significantly in 
importance to the Corporation. One of the objectives for the Corporation 
for the rest of the Eighties is to be "a highly selective steel producer. Our 
emphasis is on what sells - and what sells better because of our special 
expertise. We will only produce what is economically justifiable" (USS 
Annual Report, 1984: 4). This is a far different statement from any made by 
Gott or Speer who were committed to the idea of U. S. Steel being a full 
line steel producer (see table 6.7, p. 262). 
In 1984 "our Oil and Gas segment is now our major line of business in 
terms of both revenues and earnings" (USS Annual Report, 1984: 2). 
Marathon has not only brought better balance to the asset base, but when 
Roderick says that "A New U.S. Steel came into its own in 1984", he means 
that literally (USS Annual Report, 1984: 2). U. S. Steel is no longer a steel 
company, but by 1984 is an energy company. 
Steel remains an element of the Corporation, but "soft steel markets 
and the adverse effects of imported steel have depressed steel earnings to 
the point that our modest steel operating profit does not offset the financial 
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expenses incurred by that segment" (USS Annual Report, 1985:4). The 
Marathon acquisition is noted as a "sound business decision" offering 
opportunities for profit and growth. The Steel segment needs to be 
"revitalized". "Steel employment costs, plainly not supported by today's 
steel market, and work arrangements too restrictive to permit competitive 
productivity standards" are now among the major hurdles to productivity, 
with imports barely receiving a mention (USS Annual Report, 1985: 4). 
Conclusions 
It is interesting to note that in the list of public policy objectives which 
Roderick wished to advance with the Federal Government in 1985 - steel 
imports is absent (USS Annual Report, 1985: 5-6). The Corporation which 
had lobbied the Government on the need to do something about imports 
since the 1960s, had now turned its attention to petroleum issues. By 1985 
U. S. Steel was no longer a steel company as far as its CEO was concerned. 
It was still the largest supplier of steel in the U. S., but being the largest 
supplier in a market characterized by overcapacity, high labor costs, 
increasing imports, and competition from the minimills only leads to 
losses and plant closings. It was the Energy segment which was providing 
profits, and it was this segment which dominated the narrative of U. S. 
Steel in 1985. 
By 1985 the hero has returned and has restored to the organization 
some of its former glory. The siege mentality which characterized the late 
1960s and much of the 1970s has been replaced by a theme of renewal. The 
Corporation, unable to defend itself from the onslaught of the barbarians 





The narrative told by the U. S. Steel CEOs during this forty year period 
contained a number of interesting themes. The principal theme may have 
changed over time, but there were some very consistent elements in the 
narrative. These are important in understanding the remarkable 
consistency with which these CEO’s approached the development and 
implementation of specific courses of action for the firm during this time 
period. 
The first theme which becomes apparent from the analyses of the 
Letters to Shareholders undertaken here, is that it is the U.S. Government 
and the Unions (both the USWA and the UMW) which for many years are 
the cause of most of the problems faced by U. S. Steel. Whether it is 1945, 
1965, or 1985 the Government and the Union are accused of manipulating 
prices and wages, while U. S. Steel portrays itself as acting in the best 
interests of its stockholders, its employees, and the Nation. This theme 
allows U. S. Steel to discuss such actions as the plant closings of the late 
1970's as being caused by the cumulative effects of: inflation, imports, 
inadequate cost recovery allowances, lagging productivity improvements, 
and unrealistic environmental controls (See USS Annual Report, 1979). 
All of these elements are beyond the control of the management of the 
Corporation although, as Roderick points out, U. S. Steel and other 
companies "have spoken out" on these problems (USS Annual Report, 
1979). 
Another consistent theme stresses the inabilityof the Corporation to 
raise prices sufficiently to cover costs, particularly the increased hourly 
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employment costs resulting from labor contracts. The USWA is to blame 
here, as costs are usually described as having outstripped productivity 
gains, thus requiring higher prices. Direct or indirect pressure from the 
Government to restrain price increases in the interest of keeping inflation 
down is also a factor in pricing decisions. It is only after the mid-1950's that 
the influence of "competitive pressures" becomes an element in the 
decision of whether or not to raise prices, and then not as strong an 
element as pressure from the government. 
Finally, there is a continuing interest in investment to modernize and 
expand facilities, even into the 1980's when the firm is closing steel plants. 
U. S. Steel makes it clear that the firm is willing, and committed in dollar 
terms, to continuing to upgrade steel facilities in order to remain 
competitive. However, it is the unwillingness of the Government to 
create an environment which encourages capital formation and 
investment, which forces USS to look for other investments (outside of 
steel). 
Within the context of these general themes each CEO had his particular 
concerns, beliefs, and values which affected the particular narrative and 
course of action he developed for the Corporation during his tenure. The 
manner in which he characterized the role of the Corporation in the 
industry, and the relationship of the Corporation with other important 
players all were important parts of the narrative he told. The results 
presented here are the representations of each CEO about issues and events 
which were of importance to him during his tenure. 
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Diversification to Protect the Steel Segment 
Since 1945 the CEOs of U. S. Steel have been faced with a variety of 
questions concerning the appropriate levels of capacity in steel, and the 
extent of diversification into areas outside of steel. Closely tied to these are 
the issue of the relationships with labor (particularly the USWA) and 
Government, and how to deal with the increasingly world-wide nature of 
steel markets. The manner in which they addressed these problems, 
beginning with Irving Olds in 1945, had a tremendous impact on the 
options available to David Roderick in 1985. 
It is apparent now that during the time Roger Blough was CEO (1955- 
1967) U. S. Steel began to move out of steel, as it became increasingly 
unprofitable. The initial diversification effort took the form of entering 
related businesses or expanding existing subsidiaries. This set a pattern of 
thinking about the need for diversification as a means of "protecting the 
Corporation from the cyclical nature of the steel business" which persisted 
through to Roderick's tenure (USS Annual Report - 1984:2). The 
acquisition of Marathon in 1982, and Texas Oil & Gas in 1984, was simply 
the last stage in a process begun in the mid-1960s. 
At the same time the CEOs from Blough on had spent their careers at U. 
S. Steel and could not simply let the steel segment go. This may be more 
true of Speer and Gott who had spent their careers in operations, than of 
Roderick who had spent his career in finance. The attempts to modernize 
facilities, to obtain relief from the effects of steel imports, and to gain wage 
and work-rule concessions from the USWA, can all be seen as part of an 
effort to maintain the steel operations while pursuing a strategy of 
diversifying out of steel. Again, it was left to Roderick to complete the task 
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of rationalizing the operations, and limiting the steel markets the 
Corporation would operate in. 
Roderick can be seen to have little choice of strategies by the time he 
became CEO in 1979. Many of the actions he and the Corporation took 
have less to do with responding to current conditions, or matching 
"corporate strengths" to "external opportunities"; than they do with 
completing responses to conditions that first became strategically 
important to the Corporation twenty years earlier. Plant closings and the 
acquisition of Marathon have less to do with an objective scanning of the 
"environment", than with acting within the narrow range of options his 
predecessors have left him. 
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CHAPTER 7 
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES 
TO THE BIENNIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
1945 -1985 
Introduction 
In seeking to uncover and understand the narratives of the President's 
of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) for the period 1945-1985 
from a reading of their Speeches to the Biennial Constitutional 
Conventions of the USWA, as reported in the Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Conventions for that period, two different methods were 
used, as discussed in chapter 5. The first involved coding the speeches 
reported in the Proceedings as they related to specific domains of interest. 
The two overarching domains for the time period were "USWA member 
welfare" and "achievement of USWA goals". 
Each Proceedings was coded by two researchers for statements which 
indicated causes of "decreased member welfare"; means to "increase 
member welfare"; conditions which "help us achieve our goals"; and 
conditions which "prevent us from reaching our goals". The structural 
analysis of the "Speeches" uncovered a set of semantic concepts which 
were then clustered into commonalities as follows: Labor-Management 
Relations; Government Relations; The U. S. Steel Industry; Issues 
Internal to United Steelworkers of America; Other Unions; Other Events: 
Economic Issues. In general, these categories are common to all of the 
Presidents. The results of this coding process are reported in the frequency 
charts in appendix C. 
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Additionally, a strategic management narrative analysis, as described in 
chapter 5, was undertaken of each Proceedings to uncover the major 
themes of each President's tenure. The structural analysis provided a 
framework of concepts used by the Presidents for making sense of their 
world. The narrative analysis clarified the importance of the 
commonalities and domains across tenures of Presidents. The themes 
identified, and the manner in which those themes changed, is useful in 
understanding how the organization understood its role in the steel 
industry at any point in time. The results of this analysis are presented in 
appendix D. 
The results of the two methods, taken together, help to answer three of 
the questions which frame this project. These are: 
1. How does the United Steelworkers of America characterize itself? 
a) Explanations/Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the steel industry 
2. How does the United Steelworkers of America characterize 
other key actors? 
a) Explanations/Justifications of Actions 
b) Goals 
c) Attitudes toward the steel industry 
3. How much overlap in terms of concepts, and relationships among 
concepts, is there from President to President for the United 
Steelworkers of America? 
Further, the historical analysis of the Convention Proceedings, and 
other sources such as Forbes and Industry Week, was useful in identifying 
282 
the strategic actions which the President during his tenure. This analysis, 
combined with the narrative analysis, allowed the researcher to answer the 
final research question identified in chapter 1: Do the strategic actins taken 
by the organization reflect the pattern of expressed beliefs identified in the 
public statements? 
As will become apparent from the summary of the results presented in 
the tables which follow, there are a number of themes and stories which 
remain constant over the time period. First, this chapter will discuss the 
concepts and themes for each Presidents tenure, the relation of those to the 
actions taken, as well as the overlap from President to President. Finally, 
the common themes of the forty year period will be discussed. 
Philip Murray: 1938 - 1952 
Philip Murray had been a vice-president of the United Mine Workers 
under John L. Lewis. As noted in chapter 2, the Committee for Industrial 
Organization and the United Mine Workers set up the Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee (SWOC) in 1936 under the of Murray. In 1937 U. S. 
Steel signed a labor agreement with the SWOC. By the end of World War 
II virtually all of the major steel companies had signed labor agreements 
with what came to be known by 1942 as the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA), (see chapter 2) under the Presidency of Philip Murray 
until his death in late 1952. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial 
Convention for Philip Murray's tenure President are presented in 
appendix C-l. Labor-management issues, other unions, and the USWA 
itself are all portrayed as contributing to the achievement of goals. 
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Additionally, the USWA, other unions, and the economy are perceived as 
increasing member welfare. The steel industry is a cause of decreased 
member welfare, and the Government appears to be in a mixed role of 
hindering the achievement of goals, while acting to increase member 
welfare. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
D-l presents some examples of representative statementsfrom the 
Speeches within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Murray’s tenure. These themes 
and their relation to actions taken by Murray and the USWA will be 
discussed below. 
Characterization of USWA: Explanations/Tustifications 
The summary of events, concepts and themes presented in table 7.1(p. 
286) reflects the results presented in appendices C-l and D-l. This 
summary is useful in understanding and explaining how Murray 
characterized the USWA during his tenure. As is apparent from table 7.1 
(p. 286), Murray was principally concerned with the Union's relations with 
steel industry management, with the Government and with other trade 
unions. He was also concerned with what the USWA itself could do to 
attain its goals, and to increase the welfare of its members. 
The dominant theme of Murray's tenure is the adversarial relationship 
between the USWA and steel industry management. This adversarial 
relationship is evident in his 1946 speech to the Convention when he tells 
the membership 
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Despite our success in the course of the past ten years the 
organization has still many things to do. Witness, if you will, 
the struggle through which your Union passed only a couple 
of months ago when you were compelled, through no choic 
of your own, to become involved in the greatest strike this 
nation has ever witnessed. Some 750,000 members of this 
Union were involved in a strike beginning January 21st and it 
continued until February 15, 1946. At no period in the 
nation's history were there ever so many men in any one 
industry involved in a strike as we had participating in our 
recent strike in the steel industry. You developed in the 
course of that strike solidarity, unity, you fought shoulder to 
shoulder. You made the fight, you won the fight and all 
credit to the United Steelworkers of America for this splendid 
victory (USWA Convention Proceedings. 1946:8). 
In addition to the theme of the USWA standing in an adversarial 
relationship to steel industry management; Murray also develops the 
theme that the USWA holds a unique and prominent place in the 
American labor movement. Speaking of the 1946 strike he says of the 
membership "you established for the United States of America a national 
wage pattern out of which has flown billions of dollars in monthly benefits 
to workers employed in all types of industry all over the United States of 
America" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946: 8). Again, in 1950 "You 
won it (the 1949 strike) not only for the members of your own Union but 
you won great gains for peoples in all walks of life . . .. " (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1950:9). 
These two themes - the prominence of the USWA and its adversarial 
relationship with management - allow Murray to justify a variety of 
demands on the steel industry, and business in general. First, strikes are a 
means of forcing American employers to "recognize their social 
obligations" - for example, insurance and pension agreements (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1950:10) (see table 7.1, p. 286). Second, the union 
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Table 7.1: Summary of Concepts, Themes, and Events in the Speeches to 
the Biennial Conventions of Philip Murray President of the USWA 1938 
1952 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Demand for steel outstrips the ability of the industry to produce 
•Steel strikes in 1946, 1949 and 1952 
•Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 
•Government control on labor and new alliance with business 
•Communist infiltration of the unions 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE USWA 
•Concerned with what the USWA could do to attain its goals and to 
increase the welfare of its members 
•The USWA stands in an adversarial relationship to steel 
industry management 
•The USWA holds a prominent place in the American Labor Movement 
•The Union is the only means by which labor can exercise its rights 
•The USWA should effect social change on a worldwide basis 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF THE 
Explicit: 
•Achieve redistribution of profits 
through the economic pressure 
the Union can exert 
•Force business to recognize 
its social obligations 
•Join with the CIO and other unions 
to secure social benefits from 
business and government 
•Eliminate slums, seek better housing, 
USWA 
Implicit: 
•Promote the USWA as the 
premier labor organization 
in the U. S. 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•USWA struck the industry in 1946 and 1949 to force 
the industry to recognize its responsibilities 
•Support the CIO-PAC 
•Join with the World Federation of Trade Unions 
•In 1952, the USWA issued a strike notice to react against the industry’s 
rejecting the Wage Stabilization Board recommendation 
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is the only means by which labor can exercise "its common rights, its 
constitutional rights, its rights to secure redress for wrongs which might be 
perpetrated against it by American employers" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1948: 14). Among these wrongs is a failure to grant labor a 
share of the profits made - in the form of increased wages and benefits 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946-1952). 
Murray is not concerned with business alone, he is also concerned with 
the role of Government in labor matters. Murray characterizes the 
Government as at the same time aiding and defeating labor (see 
appendices C-l & D-l). It is the Government which provides the "rules" 
for labor negotiations during the Korean Conflict - rules which the USWA 
obeys, although it means giving up collective bargaining (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1952:15). At the same time, the Government has 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act "a despicable law, enacted and propagated by 
malicious men to undermine the labor movement of the United States of 
America and to destroy in the meantime our democratic way of life" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1948:14). 
The USWA is characterized as engaged in protecting, not only its 
members, but all workers, from attempts by business and Government to 
infringe on their rights. In this battle it joins with other unions - in 
particular, other CIO Unions - to secure social programs ranging from 
better housing to improved Social Security conditions not for the 
American people alone, but for workers worldwide (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1946 - 1952). The adversarial relationship with management 
and the need to maintain the prominence of the USWA in the labor 
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movement are rooted in this perception of the need to effect social change 
on a worldwide basis. 
Characterization Of The USWA: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Murray held for the USWA 
during this period are outlined in table 7.1 (p. 286), and generally derive 
from the theme of the USWA's adversarial relationship with steel 
industry management. One goal, implicit in the speeches, is to promote 
the USWA as the premier labor organization in the U. S. Throughout the 
speeches he alludes to the steel labor contracts setting "national wage 
patterns" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946 - 1952). A second, more 
explicit, goal is to achieve the redistribution of corporate profits through 
the economic pressure the Union can exert (USWA Convention 
Proceedings. 1946 -1952). This is particularly evident in 1948 when he notes 
that for the industry profits had increased 53% over the previous year, and 
for U. S. Steel profits had increased 73% (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1948:12). 
Related to this is the explicit goal of forcing business to recognize its 
social obligations. Wage increases are one aspect of the contracts Murray 
wants to negotiate, but he is also after a broad range of benefits. His success 
in attaining this goal is apparent throughout the speeches. Finally, Murray 
wants the Union to be a part of a larger movement for social change. He 
wants to join with the CIO and other unions to secure social benefits - not 
simply from business, but from the Government as well. Further, he is 
looking for ways to: eliminate slums, seek better housing, and eliminate 
the poll tax system in the South (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946:9). 
These are all far-reaching programs which do not directly benefit the 
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steelworker, but are part of the overall goal of leading the American 
workforce. 
The actions taken by the USWA in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of the Union's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations, as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role in the steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
The USWA and the U. S. Steel Industry 
The central theme in Murray's narrative, as noted above, is the 
adversarial relationship between the domestic steel industry — especially 
the top management -- and the Union. The industry is consistently 
portrayed as the enemy - determined to prevent the steelworker from 
exercising his rights. In 1946 he reminds the steelworkers of their history 
I believe that it is but fitting that I should remind this 
delegation that on the 17th of June, 1936, you had no Union; 
you nad a mass of company-controlled, so-called independent 
unions. Back there you ana the people you are priveleged to 
represent today were living in a state of economic serfdom. 
Your hours of labor were long, your conditions of 
employment were extremely bad and yuor wages were 
disgracefully low. But, through the crucible of suffering, 
sacrifice, tears and death, you have builded for yourselves this 
mighty economic instrument, the United Steelworkers of 
America, and you have won for yourselves in the course of 
this period your economic emancipation. You are now free 
men and free women, thanks to this Union and thanks to the 
effort that you put forth to attain this lofty objective (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1946: 8). 
In 1946, and again in 1949, the USWA struck the steel industry. In both 
instances Murray discusses the strike as a struggle in which members 
"fought shoulder to shoulder" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946:8) 
in order to win the "things that you were fighting for" (USWA 
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Convention Proceedings, 1950: 10). It is up to the Union to force the 
industry to recognize its responsibilities - to bring management to the 
understanding that "the maintenance of decent standards among the 
workers in American industry rests with American employers" and if it 
requires strikes to force this recognition "then unions must strike" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1950: 10). 
In discussing the 1948 steel labor negotiations Murray focuses 
specifically on U. S. Steel as he does again in 1952. In 1948 he tells the 
members that the representatives of U. S. Steel "agreed with the members 
of your negotiating committees that living costs had gone out of bounds, 
that prices were unreasonable, that the living standards of the Steelworkers 
were depressed" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1948:13). However, the 
Corporation which "extracted from the public pocketbook in the nature of 
profits 73 per cent more for the year 1947 than it did in 1946 .... 
nevertheless stated that a wage increase for American steelworkers at the 
present time would not be good for them" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1948:13). 
In 1952, rather than refusing to consider a wage increase, the industry - 
and specifically U. S. Steel - is accused of simply refusing to bargain. 
Murray reports Benjamin Fairless (CEO of U. S. Steel) as telling a meeting 
of businessmen "We can't bargain these matters out with the Steelworkers 
Union; we must go to Washington" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1952:10). Later, Murray tells the members, in negotiations "the leaders of 
each of the major companies .... followed precisely the line laid down for 
them by Mr. Fairless. So we had no collective bargaining" (USWA 
Convention Proceedines, 1952:11). 
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In both instances Murray depicts the industry, and particularly U. S. 
Steel, as attempting to be all-knowing and greedy. Somehow management 
assumes it knows what is best for the worker says Murray, and it is up to 
the worker - through the Union - to demonstrate how wrong management 
is. At the same time, management wants to keep the profits -earned by the 
workers - for itself. Thus, the Union is characterized as always standing in 
an adversarial relationship with the management of the steel industry. 
The USWA and the Government 
Murray was divided as to whether Government actions and policies 
helped or hurt the USWA (see appendices C-l & D-l). In general, he 
characterized actions such as improvements in Social Security benefits and 
Federal housing programs as benefitting the Union (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1946 -1952). Howver, passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the 
intervention of Government in the collective bargaining process are 
typically portrayed as detrimental to the USWA (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1946 -1952). 
The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947, was depicted by Murray as a 
coming together of business and Government to restrict labor. 
I know that we are not the only troubled union in America — 
that there are many other labor organizations in the United 
States suffering from the same forces, the same concentrated 
forces of wealth, because organized wealth in the United 
States of America today is more powerful than it has ever 
been in the history of the nation. Fortunately or 
unfortunately the big bosses, the monopolists, the forces 
which represent entrenched greed happen to be in the saddle 
for the moment, supported as they are oyu the courts and by 
the Taft-Hartley Act. There has never been a period in the 
nation's history when more writs of injunction have been 
used and exercised against labor since the passing of the Taft- 
Hartley Act (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1948: 14). 
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The 1952 contract negotiations brought Government into the middle of 
the battle between steel management and the Union. Truman asked both 
sides to agree to take the dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board. The 
strike was postponed for forty-five days while the Board mediated the 
dispute. The industry eventually rejected the recommendations of the 
Board, the USWA posted strike notices, and Truman moved to seize the 
steel mills (see chapter 3). 
Murray reacted to the rejection of the Board recommendations by the 
industry as follows: 
We can’t get collective bargaining in the United States today, 
and the President says you can't strike because you will injure 
our national defense efforts. You respect the 
admonitions of the President’s request, ana you go to the 
Wage Stabilization Board because you have no collective 
bargaining. The President says when you go to the Wage 
Stabilization Boardyour case will be considered upon the basis 
of its merits. The Steelworkers' Union accepts the 
recommendations; the industry says no, and at the point at 
which it says no it says , "We will meet with you and we will 
collectively bargain with you now, providing you are 
prepared to bargain down the recommendations of the Wage 
Stabilization Board." 
The Wage Board has already compromised your situation; it 
has given you much less than you hoped to get through 
collective bargaining. (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1952: 
15). 
Roosevelt's New Deal was over. The alliance between labor and the 
Government, forged during the 1930s, had given way to Government 
controls on labor and a new alliance with business. The era in which 
Murray could treat the industry as an adversary threatening the worker 
with "economic serfdom" was giving way to the time when McDonald 
would talk about "the operation of an economy which is a sort of a mutual 
trusteeship" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1954:12). Government 
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could not be relied upon to side with the workers, and the USWA, like the 
Government, needed to forge new alliances. 
The USWA and Other Labor Organizations 
One of Murray's major themes during this period was relationships 
with other trade unions (see table 7.1, p. 286). The need for concerted 
action appears in the 1946 speech when he states "Our mighty Union must 
join with other CIO Unions" in a variety of political activities ranging 
from lobbying Congress for improved social welfare legislation to seeking 
the enactment of Roosevelt's "Economic Bill of Rights" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1946: 9). 
Murray characterized working with other unions as beneficial to both 
the USWA and its membership (see tabe 7.1 p. 286 & appendix D-l). In 
1946 and again in 1948 he stresses the need for supporting the CIO-PAC 
(Political Action Committee) in order to "make possible the attainment of 
our legislative objectives" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946: 9). In 
1948 he calls the CIO-PAC "the finest political instrumentality ever created 
by labor in the United States of America" and asks the members to 
"strengthen this instrumentality by building up and strengthening this 
mechanism" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1948: 17). 
In addition to political action, Murray also calls on the USWA to join 
with other organizations in effecting social change, as discussed earlier. He 
asks for example, for the USWA to join with the World Federation of 
Trade Unions to "elevate the standards of the people, particularly in the 
backward countries — social and living standards, educational standards, 
cultural and other standards" and to "utilize its powerful influence to 
prevent a recurrence of another world blood bath" (USWA Convention 
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Proceedings. 1946:9-10). Similarly, in the U. S., Murray began to work 
toward more joint action on the part of labor leaders to "attain common 
agreement about the things which will best serve the interests of the 
common people here in this great country of ours" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1950:14). 
Finally Murray, as President of both the CIO and the USWA, saw a need 
for concerted action to keeping the Communists out of the American labor 
movement (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946 - 1952). This is most 
apparent in the 1950 speech where he tells the members 
The reason we (the National CIO) are putting our effort into 
the fight is because we want trade unions in America, we 
want American trade unions, we want unions that are free to 
fight the employers, to adjust grievances, to improve living 
conditions and to fight totalitarianism and foreign 
dictatorship. The old UE (United Electrical Workers) is the 
hard core of Red Communism in America — that's what it is. 
It is the type of leadership that debote themselves exclusively 
to serving the interests of international Communism and the 
Soviet Government. Well, we are fighting those boys, we 
are fighting all of their evil, diabolical, traitorous methods of 
undermining America and the American labor movement 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1950: 13). 
Issues Internal to the USWA 
If Murray was concerned with what joint union action could do to 
improve the condition of the American worker, he was also concerned 
with what the USWA could do on its own both to achieve its goals and 
improve the welfare of its members, as well as that of all American 
workers (see table 7.1, p. 286). The Union is characterized as being able to 
use its economic power to force the redistribution of corporate profits in a 
manner which benefitted workers. This was a theme Murray repeated 
constantly (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946 - 1952). It was not 
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simply the negotiating skills of the Union leadership that resulted in 
improved working conditions; it was the ability of the leadership to rally 
the members around certain issues and insure "that spirit of solidarity." 
It became therefore, increasingly important for the Union to maintain 
its image as a "democratic organization" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1946). Murray reminds the members that "we still have in the United 
States of America the right to use the franchise" and "we enjoy that right 
in our labor union elections" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1950: 13). 
This concept that the members elected union officials who were 
responsible to them and their needs became more important as the Union 
moved away from the broad social goals of Murray, and toward the more 
narrowly defined goals expressed by McDonald. 
Conclusions 
The principal theme of Murray's narrative is the adversarial 
relationship between the USWA and steel industry management. Other 
organizations, for example the Government, are characterized according to 
the stance they take in this "war". This theme of going out to do battle 
allows Murray to characterize the USWA as defending the workers from 
the "evil" designs of management. It is the USWA which protects and 
defends the worker — all workers, not just steelworkers -- something the 
worker cannot do alone. This adversarial theme also allows Murray to 
characterize the USWA as banding together with labor unions worldwide 
to better the lot of the worker. The USWA is part of a larger social order, 
and its battles are only one part of a larger war. The "people" have taken to 
the streets and the barricades and won the first battle — but the war for 
social justice continues. 
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David T. McDonald: 1953 - 1964 
David J. McDonald had served the USWA as its secretary-treasurer 
since its founding, and had been a life-long associate of Philip Murray. 
Following Murray's death in November 1952, McDonald was named acting 
President of the USWA, and subsequently elected to a four year term in 
1953. In 1964 McDonald lost a bitterly contested election for the Presidency 
to I. W. Abel. McDonald, as can be seen from table 7.2 (p. 298 ) tempered 
many of the policies and attitudes which Murray held, and changed the 
focus of the narrative of the USWA. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial 
Convention for David McDonald's tenure President are presented in 
appendix C-2. Labor-management issues and the USWA itself are 
perceived as contributing to the achievement of USWA goals. 
Additionally, the USWA is depicted as acting to increasing member 
welfare. The steel industry hinders the achievement of Union goals , and 
the Government continues in a mixed role of hindering the achievement 
of goals, while acting to increase member welfare. The economy during 
this period is also depicted as acting to hinder the achievement goals. 
Other unions have virtually disappeared as an actor in the text. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
D-2 presents some examples of representative statementsfrom the 
Speeches within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis were 
useful in identifying the major themes of McDonald's tenure. These 
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themes and their relation to actions taken by McDonald and the USWA 
will be discussed below. 
Characterization of the USWA: Explanations/Justifications: 
Table 7.2 (p. 298) provides a summary of concepts, events, and themes 
developed from the results presented in appendices C-2 and D-2. 
McDonald is much more concerned with labor-management issues than 
was Murray, and particularly with how these issues can work to the benefit 
of the USWA and its members (see appendices C-2 & D-2). He has not 
completely abandoned the adversarial theme which Murray held, but there 
is a noticeable attempt to "pave the way to a new era of understanding with 
the American steel industry" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1962:12). 
This approach to labor-management relations led McDonald to develop 
a new theme of the Union being "engaged in the operation of an economy 
which is a sort of a mutual trusteeship" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1954: 12). This is a very different theme from the adversarial labor- 
management relations theme utilized by Murray. McDonald is not talking 
about strikes for redistribution of profits to the workers. Instead, he 
describes a situation in which both steelworkers and managers are 
employees of the Corporation or the shareholders, and the claims of all 
must be given full consideration (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1954). 
In characterizing relations with the Government McDonald began to 
turn away from Murray's theme that the Government was allying itself 
with business against the interests of labor. The continuation of the earlier 
theme is evident in the discussion of the passage of the Landrum-Griffin 
Bill which "was not enacted in order to give protection to legitimate labor 
unions. The Landrum-Griffin Bill was enacted to harm legitimate labor 
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Table 7.2: Summary of Concepts, Themes, and Events in the Speeches to 
the Biennial Conventions of David McDonald President of the USWA 
1952 -1964 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Passage pf the Landrum-Griffin Bill 
•Steel strikes in 1956 and 1959 
•Eisenhower presidency was marked by a reluctance to intervene in 
labor-industry disputes 
•Election of Kennedy in 1960 
•Increased unemployment throughout the late 1950's and into the 1960's 
•Increasing automation 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE USWA 
•Concerned with labor-management issues and how these 
issues can work to the benefit of the USWA and its members 
•"Engaged in the operation of an economy which is a 
sort of a mutual trusteeship" 
•Moves away form the need for labor solidarity and toward a view of the 
USWA acting for the welfare of its members 
•Unity within the membership provides the USWA leadership strength 
from which to negotiate without having to strike 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF THE USWA 
Explicit: 
•Negotiate improved contracts 
•Job Security for Steelworkers 
•Organize clerical and 
the technical workers 
Implicit: 
•Find a new approach to labor- 
management relations 
•Work with the government on 
problems of unemployment 
and inflation 
•Strengthen the USWA as an 
American institution 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Establishment of a joint Human Relations Committee with the industry 
•Focus on achieving "Total Job Security" 
•Lobby against the passage of right-to-work laws and other laws 
enacted to limit the rights and powers of Unions 
•Proposed to Congress the enactment of a 32-hour work week 
for all Americans 
•Urged the establishment of a "Continuous Prosperity Commission" to 
advise the President 
•Began to organize the technical and clerical workers in the mills 
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unions like the United Steelworkers of America" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1960: 8). However, McDonald also looks to the Government 
to act on unemployment and inflation, and to promote economic growth, 
all of which will help Union members (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1954-1964). 
Finally, McDonald moves away from the theme of labor solidarity - the 
concept of concerted action with other labor organizations - and toward a 
theme of the USWA acting for the welfare of its members. This is evident 
in 1964 when he lists a number of benefits the Union has gained for its 
members - supplemental unemployment benefits, extended seniority plan 
- and finishes by saying "We have made the Steelworker a whole citizen . . 
. . that in addition to being a worker, he is many other things" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1964: 12). This is a very different statement from 
any made by Murray. 
Characterization of the USWA: Goals 
Table 7.2 (p. 298) outlines the explicit and implicit goals which 
McDonald held for the USWA during this period. Among the explicit 
goals is the continuation of the need to negotiate improved contracts for 
the members. However, the goal of achieving job security has been added, 
as has the goal of organizing the technical and clerical workers as well as 
the production workers in the steel mills. Among the implicit goals is that 
of finding a new approach to labor - management relations. A second 
implicit goal is to work with the Government on the problems of 
unemployment and inflation. Labor and Government could join together 
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to search for solutions for unemployment, such as a proposal put before 
Congress for a 32-hour work week (USWA Convention Proceedings. 1960: 
9). 
The final implicit goal of McDonald's tenure was to strengthen the 
USWA as an American institution. The ability of the USWA to pursue 
new approaches to dealing with the industry and the Government are 
based upon McDonald's often repeated assertion that "The United 
Steelworkers of America are so united they need not picket because they 
know that no Steelworker is going to scab" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings. 1956: 9) This unity within the membership provides the 
USWA leadership economic and political strength from which to negotiate 
without having to strike. 
The actions taken by the USWA in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of the Union's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations, as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role in the steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
The USWA and The U. S. Steel Industry 
McDonald, to a greater extent than Murray, developed the theme of 
labor-management relations as beneficial to the USWA, rather than 
characterizing them as adversarial. McDonald was President of the 
USWA during the last two great strikes in steel - 1956 and 1959 - and in 
both cases gained a number of concessions for the membership. The 
strikes however, were costly and the 116 - day strike in 1959 drained the 
USWA treasury. After 1959, other approaches to labor-management 
relations had to be found. 
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The change in theme from Murray's tenure is apparent in McDonald's 
first speech as President in 1954. "I firmly believe that we must constantly 
change our approach to problems. What was good yesterday is no good 
toady, and will be useless tomorrow I firmly believe that if we are to 
continue to accept the status quo in industrial relations .... we would soon 
find ourselves falling by the wayside" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1954:11). 
McDonald goes on to explain what he means by a change in approach by 
discussing "the operation of an economy which is a sort of a mutual 
trusteeship" (USWA Convention Proceedings. 1954:12). Mutual 
trusteeship differs from the more traditional "bread and butter selfish 
union" which said "Grab what we can, and if necessary put them out of 
business", in that it respects the claims of the owners and managers as 
being equal to those of the workers (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1954: 
12). The system of mutual trusteship was put to the test in 1956 when the 
USWA went out on strike. 
There are those who say how can you support this theory of 
mutual trusteeship, McDonald, when you are forced to call a 
strike in the year 1956? Well, the answer to that is very 
simple? 
Of course, under any sort of system, or no matter what we 
might call it, men have the right to strike. And under this 
system of mutual trusteeship in the year 1956 it was necessary 
for the labor trustees in the great American steel industry to 
call to task the management trustees and force them through 
the means of a strike to live up to their mutual trusteeship 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1956: 9). 
McDonald, during this period, was under pressure from dissident 
groups within the USWA who accused him among other things of 
"consorting with Management" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1958: 
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13). His attempts to find ways to negotiate peacefully, the absence of 
picketers in the 1956 strike, and his willingness to meet with Government 
and business officials, had led to a perception that he was not only 
modifying Murray’s adversarial theme with respect to management, but 
completely abandoning it. 
The USWA did strike in 1959 and did settle on a new contract that gave 
them much of what they had demanded (see chapter 3), but at a 
tremendous cost. Prior to 1959, McDonald had talked about labor peace but 
had been willing to call a strike. After 1959, he hopes that "1959 marked 
the end of the great steel strikes in our country" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1960:10). The costs of the strike had simply been too high. As 
noted in chapter 3 the industry did not rebound after the strike, and by 
McDonald's own account in 1960 "One hundred fifty thousand members of 
the United Steelworkers of America are unemployed. Another 350,000 
members of the United Steelworkers of America are working less than full 
time" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1960: 9). 
One of the outcomes of the 1959 strike had been the establishment of a 
joint Human Relations Committee, through which the Union and the 
industry could maintain constant contact on a variety of issues. In 1962, for 
example, the improvements in the new contract - achieved without a 
strike - are considered to be the result of having "stayed hard at work in the 
operation of our Human Relations subcommittees" and that "through the 
continued operation of this Human Relations Committee .... we will find 
ways and means to make at least the basic steel industry a happier industry 
in which to work" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1962: 12-13). 
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By 1964 McDonald is focusing less on the theme of improved contracts - 
that is, improved wage and benefit packages - and more on what the theme 
of 'Total Job Security" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1964: 13). He tells 
the members 
Of course, we have our pension plans, and, of course, we 
have our insurance plans, and, of course, we have our 
supplemental unemployment benefit plans, and, of course, 
we nave our extended vacation plans. We have many plans, 
many things, in existence. But in some manner or fashion we 
have to put all of these together. We have provided a great 
deal of income and job security, but now we have to raise our 
sights. We have to raise our sights to this new concept of total 
joD security! 
This means that once a Steelworker becomes a permanent 
employe of a corporation he must have complete career 
security, as other career people do. They have complete career 
security. And each individual Steelworker must achieve this 
complete career security. He must be considered a permanent 
part of the industry in which he is employed, a permanent 
part of that industry in which he is employed until he is 
honorably retired at a decent pension (USWA Convention 
Proceedings. 1964:13). 
In 1964 McDonald was faced with the problem of unemployed and 
underemployed steelworkers (see chapter 3). He was no longer negotiating 
with the industry from the position of a tight labor market and high 
demand for steel as had been the case in 1952 for Murray, and during the 
strike in 1956. Wages, insurance and pension plans, and extended 
vacations were of little value to unemployed steelworkers. Strikes were 
expensive and seemed to accomplish little in relationship to the cost. 
The USWA and The Government 
As the theme relations with steel management changed from one of 
enemies to one of "mutual trustees", McDonald also began to change the 
theme of the Union's relations with the Government. The Eisenhower 
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Presidency, as discussed in chapter 3, was marked by a reluctance to 
intervene in industry-labor disputes; and certainly unlike the Truman era, 
any intervention that did occur would be unlikely to favor labor. 
McDonald turned to developing alliances to work on the problems of 
unemployment and inflation. In 1958 for example, there were 260,000 
unemployed Steelworkers out of a total membership of approximately 
1,250,000. The Steelworkers were receiving some of the highest 
manufacturing wages in the country, if not the world (see chapter 3) - but 
not if they were unemployed. In 1960, with unemployment still a 
problem, McDonald proposed that Congress enact a 32-hour work week for 
all Americans (see table 7.2, p. 298). Part of the rationale he offered for this 
was that as "automation progresses hours of work must be shortened in 
order to supply jobs to buy the goods of a great American or Canadian 
industrial plant" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1960: 9). 
The election of Kennedy in 1960 brought new changes in the 
relationship of the Union and the Government. McDonald found himself 
being called to the White House as an active participant in an attempt to 
control inflation (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1962). The apparent 
opportunity to work with the Government to develop new programs 
which would lead to a stable economy and new investment in basic 
industry - and in turn more jobs - was one which McDonald impressed 
upon the membership as being of the greatest importance. Here at last, was 
the chance to regain the assistance of the Government in promoting labor 
issues, which had been lost during the Truman Presidency. 
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Other: Economic Issues 
During McDonald's tenure the state of the general economy, 
particularly unemployment, became of great concern to the Union (see 
table 7.2, p. 298 and appendix C-2). McDonald's theme focuses on the 
manner in which changes in the economy prevent the USWA from 
reaching its goals and increasing the welfare of its members (see appendix 
C-2). This is particularly true of unemployment. In 1954, "as of mid- 
August 227,000 of our members were unemployed. Almost another 
200,000 were working less than 40 hours a week" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1954:13). 
Unemployment continued to be a concern throughout the late 1950s 
and into the 1960s, as the industry did not rebound after the 1959 steel 
strike. In 1960, a year which should have seen a resurgence in demand for 
steel following the 116-day strike in 1959, "one hundred fifty thousand 
members of the United Steelworkers of America are unemployed. 
Another 350,000 members of the United Steelworkers of America are 
working less than full time" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1960: 9). 
Again in 1962 he tells the members "I do know that in basic steel alone 
within the past five years there has been a diminishing of unemployment 
of almost 100,000 people. So we are sure that they are gone never to 
return" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1962: 13). 
As noted above, McDonald lobbied the Government for the enactment 
of a variety of measures which he believed would "solve" the 
unemployment problem. Most notable among these was a continued call 
for a thirty-two hour work week (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1954 - 
1964). This shorter work week, combined with a proposed extended 
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vacation plan, would put more people to work, which in turn would allow 
people to buy the goods produced and to invest in American industry 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1960 - 1962). These proposals however, 
required a unified program on the part of government, business and labor 
to decrease the number of hours of work, while still paying the same 
weekly wage - a program which business was unlikely to endorse. 
Closely tied to this was the beginning of a concern with the effects of 
automation on unemployment in basic industries (see atble 7.2, p. 298). In 
1960 McDonald states "As you automate factories you must remember that 
only human beings have purchasing power; an automated factory is of 
absolutely no value unless human beings can purchase the output of such 
automated factory" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1960: 9). 
The concerns with continued unemployment and structural changes 
occurring in the steel industry which altered the composition of the 
workforce came together in 1964 in a proposal for "Total Job Security" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1964: 13). If the Government would not 
enact a shorter work week, and industry would continue to automate, then 
a steelworker "must be considered a permanent part of the industry in 
which he is employed, a permanent part of that industry in which he is 
employed until he is honorably retired at a decent pension" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1964: 13). Higher wages and benefits are no 
longer enough in an economy in which one-fourth to one-third of the 
members of the Union are chronically unemployed or underemployed. 
Issues Internal to the USWA 
One of McDonald’s primary themes during his tenure was the 
effectiveness of the internal operations of the USWA, and especially what 
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the Union could do to increase the welfare of its members (see table 7.2, p. 
298 and appendices C-2 & D-2). In turn, McDonald is less concerned with 
relations with other unions - except where they may be in competition to 
organize workers (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1954 - 1964). This is 
very different from Murray who, as discussed earlier, was concerned with 
working with other unions to enhance the welfare of workers generally. 
One of the ways in which McDonald proposed to develop and enhance 
the USWA was by organizing the unorganized. In 1954 he tells the 
members 
As these new mills come into operation, a tremendous 
change in the working force occurs. As the number of men 
on the production line increases the number of men on the 
technical and clerical line increases. If you would go to see the 
United States Steel plant or the Geneva works, you will find a 
tremendous change occurring in the caliber of the men who 
are working in those mills. You have engineers now where 
you once had mechanics. You have electronics experts where 
you once had men with a screw driver and a pair of pliers. 
Under those conditions we find that those people are not in 
our bargaining unions. I say to you you have to organize 
them, because if you do not organize them in the 
Steelworkers' Union, our Union will lose by it (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1954:13). 
The need to organize the technical and clerical workers in the mills is a 
theme which continues throughout McDonald's tenure, and reflects a 
growing recognition of the structural changes occurring in the composition 
of the American workforce. In 1960 he again reminds the members that 
"we must not only continue to organize production and maintenance 
workers in all fields of our jurisdiction, but we must organize the clerical 
and technical workers. If we don't do it, we are going to become a minority 
force in our land" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1960: 9). 
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The membership issue, and the need to organize the unorganized, 
became more important after the 1959 strike as it became apparent that 
unemployment among production workers in the steel industry would be 
a chronic problem. Unemployed steelworkers do not pay dues, and the 
USWA treasuries had been depleted by the strike. 
The possibilities for political action and involvement by the USWA 
was another theme during McDonald's tenure. In 1956 he states "We must 
continue to expand our role in the field of political action, and we must 
work in the legislative branches of the nation, in the states and in the 
communities" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1956: 10). One of the 
means of achieving this goal was to train members to be effective 
legislative representatives - to "be able to go into the Houses of the States 
and the State Senates, and talk with the State leaders, and yes, even sit 
down with Governors and explain to those State leaders our needs for 
increased unemployment compensation, better workmen's compensation 
laws, the establishment of fair employment practices acts; better health and 
safety laws, an innumerable laws" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1954: 
11). 
Finally, throughout McDonald's tenure, as during Murray's, the need 
for unity within the ranks of the USWA was a recurring theme. This was 
particularly true in 1958 as the Union was preparing for contract 
negotiations, and a dissident group challenged McDonald's leadership of 
the Union. 
You cannot be weak and divided if you want a retirement 
plan after 20 years of service without respect to age. You 
cannot be weak and divided if you want to enjoy fewer hours 
of work per day and per week. You cannot be weak and 
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divided if you want better pension plans, better insurance 
plans, better supplemental unemployment plans, if you want 
to increase premium pay for week ends, if you want longer 
vacations and if you want to solve the problems of 
automation and if you want more money as take-home pay. 
You cannot be weak and divided, but rather the ranks of this 
great army of the United Steelworkers of America must be 
united as they have never been united before (USWA 
Convention Proceedings. 1958: 10). 
McDonald had maintained the unity and cohesion of the USWA for 
ten years. He had established the Union's position as an organization 
which was at the center of American life - courted by political parties for 
support in elections; its President sitting on important White House 
councils; and its leadership at the center American economic and political 
life. He had moved away from the adversarial relationship with 
management so prevalent under Murray's tenure, and toward finding less 
confrontational ways of negotiating labor contracts - a process which I. W. 
Abel would continue. 
Conclusions 
The principal theme of McDonald's tenure was one of mutual 
trusteeship and cooperation. This was a serious shift away from the theme 
of adversaries locked in an eternal battle which characterized Murray's 
tenure. Social justice began to disappear from the USWA narrative as an 
important theme during this period, to be replaced by the theme of job 
security for members. This shift in the themes was also evident in the 
shift away from a theme of general labor unity, and toward a theme of 
unity within the Steelworkers Union. The battle was no longer on the 
streets and at the barricades, but was taking place behind closed doors 
where new treaties were being negotiated and compromises reached. 
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I. W. Abel: 1965 - 1976 
I. W. Abel had served the USWA as secretary/treasurer during the 
period in which McDonald was President of the Union. Abel had been 
connected with the Steelworkers since the days of the Steel Worker's 
Organizing Committee in the 1930s, and had been an associate of Philip 
Murray as well as of David McDonald. Abel was elected President in 1965 
in a closely contested election. “The contest for the presidency was not 
decided until the latter part of of May, although the voting took place 
February 9. At first, McDonald contested Abel's victory, but eventually 
yielded; and Abel was declared the victor by 10,000 votes" (Hogan, 1971: 
1643). 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial 
Convention for I. W. Abel's tenure President are presented in appendix C- 
3. Labor-management issues and the USWA itself are perceived as 
contributing to the achievement of USWA goals. Additionally, both labor- 
management issues and the USWA are depicted as acting to increase 
member welfare. The steel industry hinders the achievement of Union 
goals , and the Government is in a mixed role of helping and hindering 
the achievement of goals, while also acting to increase member welfare. 
The economy during this period is also depicted as acting to hinder the 
achievement goals. Relationships with other unions reappear as a means 
of increasing member welfare. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
D-3 presents some examples of representative statements from the 
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Speeches within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Abel's tenure. These themes 
and their relation to actions taken by Abel and the USWA will be discussed 
below. 
Characterization of the USWA: Explanations/Justifications: 
The summary of events, concepts, and themes presented in table 7.3 (p. 
313) reflects the results presented in appendices C-3 and D-3. This 
summary is useful in understanding how Abel characterizes the USWA 
during his tenure. Abel is much more concerned with theme of labor- 
management relations and with the theme of theUnion's relations with 
the Government than were his predecessors (see table 7.3, p. 313). Like 
McDonald, he is also very concerned with the theme of the effectiveness of 
the internal operations of the USWA and tangentially concerned with 
relations with other unions. 
Abel's theme with respect to labor-management relations during this 
period, while closer to the adversarial theme of Murray than to the more 
conciliatory theme of McDonald (see appendix D-3), reflects the structural 
changes taking place in the steel industry and the knowledge that collective 
bargaining - not strikes - is the way to achieve Union goals. This change in 
theme is evident in Abel's discussion of preparations for the 1971 contract 
negotiations, where he talks about "going into battle at the collective 
bargaining table to secure the best contracts ever" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1970:14). 
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Additionally, Abel develops a theme of "bread and butter unionism", 
unused by his predecessors. This theme is evident in his discussion of the 
1971 contract: 
I said, for example, that we were determined to win in 1971 
the best contracts in our history. And, my fellow delegates, we 
did exactly that! 
We announced that we would negotiate a wage increase . . . 
not just any old wage increase but a "very, very substantial 
wage increase." 
You know the facts. As a result of settlement that year, every 
Basic Steel member won pay increases of at least one dollar an 
hour during the lefe of the contract.... 
I said two years ago .... that our senior members deserved 
to have more retirenment benefits .... And we ended up 
with a whole array of new pension benefits .... 
I should note that we opened our 1971 bargaining under 
the gloomiest and least promising set of circumstances. We 
were in the midst of a recession. The Basic Steel industry was 
operating at less than 63% of capacity. Our markets were being 
saturated with steel from abroad. The stockpiling of steel 
exceeded all records and layoffs in our major industry began 
earlier than ever during negotiations (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1972:15-16). 
Abel is also moving away from McDonald's theme of cooperation with 
the Government to achieve the goals of the USWA, and toward a more 
confrontational theme. This is evident in 1972 when he provides a list of 
"bills important to us that are long overdue for passage in Congress", such 
as "pension protection; Federal workmen's compensation; national health 
security law; tax reform; protection for the American consumer; no-fault 
insurance; improved mass transit" among others (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1972: 21). 
All of these demands on the Government and on business are made 
within the context of increased unemployment in the steel industry, 
inflation, and a variety of attempts by the Government to stabilize wages 
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Table 7.3: Summary of Concepts, Themes, and Events in the Speeches to 
the Biennial Conventions of I. W. Abel President of the USWA 1965 - 1976 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Recession 
•Steel industry operating at less than full capacity 
•Steel industry characterized by increased unemployment, inflation and a 
variety of attempts by the government to stabilize wages and prices 
•Increasing levels of steel imports 
•Increased use of automation in steel plants 
•The development of a revolutionary collective bargaining concept - ENA 
•Industrial peace in steel for almost 14 years 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE USWA 
•Concerned with labor-management relations and with the 
Union's relationship with the government 
•Reversion to "bread and butter" unionism 
•A more confrontational relationship between USWA and the 
government 
•USWA can no longer afford industry-wide strikes 
•USWA should be perceived as essentially a Union run by its 
membership 
•Organizing in other industries and mergers with smaller unions 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF THE USWA 
Explicit: Implicit: 
•Build and maintain the Union • Maintain a fiscally strong Union 
as an effective bargaining agent *Be an effective lobbyist for 
legislation important to labor 
•Maintain the position of the 
Union as a major force in 
American political and 
economic life 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Continue attempts to find peaceful means of negotiating contracts 
• Reliance on collective bargaining 
•Signing of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA) in 1973 
•Supported the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Law and 
the Pension Security Bill 
•Supported and lobbied for legislation in such areas as national health 
security and workmen's compensation 
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and prices (see chapter 3). Abel develops a much more adversarial theme 
than did McDonald in "demanding" of the industry and the Government 
certain reforms and improvements, while at the same time searching for 
compromises. Abel, like McDonald, realizes that the USWA can no longer 
afford industry-wide strikes. 
Yes, our Union does its share of striking when it is 
necessary . . . when there is no other way to win our just 
demands in collective bargaining. But we don’t engage in 
strkes for the sake of striking! That’s nonsense! Bargaining is 
serious business. We don't needlessly shut off the earnings 
and lifeblood of our members when we can get good contracts 
through hard bargaining (USWA Convention Proceedings. 
1976:19). 
Throughout his tenure Abel's narrative is characterized by the 
knowledge that the USWA leadership must be seen as meeting the needs 
of the membership — he had after all defeated McDonald on precisely that 
issue. However, the era when the Union could strike with the assurance 
of a quick settlement and a recall of all members to work was gone. 
Collective bargaining and legislative action were more effective means of 
improving the welfare of USWA members, while confrontational 
language serves to remind those same members that the Union is still 
engaged in a "battle" for the rights of the worker. 
Characterization of the USWA: Goals: 
The explicit and implicit goals which Abel held for the USWA during 
his tenure are outlined in table 7.3 (p.313). The primary explicit goal is that 
of building and maintaining the Union as an effective bargaining agent in 
the industries in which its members were employed. At each Convention 
Abel reminds the membership of "our victories at the collective bargaining 
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tables. We have negotiated the finest agreements in our history for major 
segments of our members in the basic industries — the best ever in basic 
steel, the best ever in aluminum, the best ever in containers, and the best 
ever in copper; nonferrous" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1974: 10). 
This explicit goal of maintaining the USWA's strength as a bargaining 
agent was tied directly to an implicit goal of maintaining a fiscally strong 
Union. Repeatedly, Abel tells the members "Our financial strength — 
which is always secondary to our human strength — is at a peak level" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1970: 11). Another implicit goal tied to 
the need for financial strength is that of increasing the membership, both 
by organizing in other industries and through mergers with smaller 
unions. 
Finally, the USWA during Abel's tenure held as an implicit goal being 
an effective lobbyist for legislation important to labor. This was related to 
the goal of maintaining the position of the USWA as a major force in 
American political and economic life (see table 7.3, p. 313). This became 
the overriding goal of this period and affected the themes used in 
discussing the relationship of the USWA with other key actors in its world. 
The actions taken by the USWA in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of the Union's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations; as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role in the steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
The USWA and the U. S. Steel Industry 
The theme of labor-management relations occupied Abel to a greater 
extent than was true of either of his predecessors (see table 7.3, p. 313). The 
great strikes in steel were past and Abel could, and did, focus on gaining 
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additional concessions from the industry. Abel returned to a more 
adversarial theme, reminiscent of Murray, when discussing the steel 
industry; while at the same time continuing McDonald's attempts to find 
peaceful means of negotiating improved contracts. 
The tension between these two themes is most evident in the 1970 
speech when the Union was preparing for contract negotiations. "In 1971 
the United Steelworkers of America is going into battle at the collective 
bargaining table to secure again the best contracts ever. And I say to you 
that your Union, and your Officers, will devote all their efforts and their 
energies, and use all our power and all our strength, to secure the contract 
improvements we need and deserve" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1970:14). 
Abel's reliance on collective bargaining -- backed up by a strong, united 
membership — was apparent in his first speech. "Now, at the collective 
bargaining table, we as United Steelworkers of America have learned the 
wisdom of pooling our strength when we confront management" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1966: 19). This sentiment was repeated in 1968 
when he stated "We have built for ourselves and our families a powerful 
organization — the United Steelworkers of America. We have pooled our 
strength at the bargaining table to achieve a standard of living that is the 
envy of the world" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1968: 16). 
The collective bargaining process worked well for Abel and the USWA. 
As appendix C-3 demonstrates labor-management relations were generally 
viewed as favorable for the Union. Certainly, the outcome of the 1971 
negotiations, held at a time when the economy was in recession and 
industry profits were approximately 3% (see chapter 3), demonstrated the 
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efficacy of the process for the Union. In that one contract the USWA got its 
members 
pay increases of at leastt one dollar an hour .... a whole array 
of new pension benefits .... the restoration of the cost-of- 
living escalator .... and many other significant benefits. 
Among these are increment pay adjustments, add-ons to the 
incentive calculation rate, higher Sunday premium pay, 
bigger vacation bonuses, an additional paid holiday, more life 
insurance and broader medical and hospital coverage, a boost 
in sick and accident benefits and increased SUB payments. 
We also revised and bettered the provisions of our Earnings 
Protection Plan, the Savings and Vacation Plan which 
provides for long extendea vacations, and we significantly 
improved provisions in such important areas as 
apprenticeship training, testing, job classification and 
contracting out. (USWA Convention Proceedings. 1972: 16). 
From 1972 until his retirement in 1976, Abel focuses on issues of job 
security for Steelworkers. As he pointed out to the members 
Too many of our members are regular victims of an absurd 
frenzy that seizes the Steel Industry and their customers 
before each round of our negotiations. This frenzy, which 
precedes our bargaining talks, leads to an unnecessary and 
uneconomic build-up of steel stock-piles. The resulting lay¬ 
off period, following our negotiations, gets longer and longer, 
ana more widespread. In the aftermath of the 1971 
settlement, we experienced the longesr post-contract cut back 
in history. 
If ours were an Industry where strikes are commonplace, 
there might be some excuse for this boom and slump . . . but 
there has been no major strike in Basic Steel since 1959! Yet, 
despite this great strike-free record, every time we begin 
contract negotiations, we see the same frantic hedge-buying, 
the same costly build-up of inventories, the same long periods 
of unemployment (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1972: 
17). 
The new theme, as becomes apparent in Abel's speeches in 1974 and 
1976, was to find a way to smooth out production cycles and minimize 
unemployment in steel. Increasing benefit and wage packages were of little 
value to those members laid-off or permanently unemployed. The signing 
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of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement in 1973, with the major steel 
firms, was an attempt to end this boom-bust cycle which was so injurious 
to both the steel firms and the Union. 
The Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA), which Abel called "a 
brand new, revolutionary collective bargaining concept" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1974:10), was essentially a compact between labor 
and management in which the Union agreed not to strike in exchange for 
guarantees of increases in wages and benefits, and the retention of the cost- 
of living escalator. The ENA at last brought labor peace to the steel 
industry, and the maintenance of employment and earnings for 
Steelworkers. "The consensus among our basic steel members on ENA is 
that it has worked wonders in solving the only problem it was intended to 
solve — the disastrous "boom-bust" cycle in employment and earnings that 
regularly almost bankrupted them and robbed them of an opportunity to 
work under the fine wages and conditions achieved in our contracts" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1976: 20). 
Full employment and job security were the negotiating points of the 
mid-1970s. Abel, like McDonald at the end of his tenure, called for "a 
lifetime security program for Steelworkers" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1976: 16). "I think we can safely predict now that more 
emphasis than ever will be placed next year on the need for employment 
and wage security and the reduction of hours worked without loss of pay to 
provide more leisure and more jobs" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1976: 16). Abel had achieved many of the goals of the USWA through the 
signing of the ENA. Collective bargaining could not however, resolve 
structural changes in the economy. 
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The USWA and the Government 
Abel's narrative was much more concerned with relations between the 
Government and the Union than were those of his predecessors. 
Government policies and actions affected working conditions, investment 
patterns, and trade to a greater extent than in the past. The ability of the 
USWA to influence legislation and policy decisions was thus a more 
important theme than at any time during its history. 
Abel characterized the Government as mixed in its ability to help or 
hinder the USWA in the achievement of its goals (see appendix C-3). In 
1966 for example, he addresses the issue of "spiraling inflation" and "the 
myth that unions are responsible for inflation" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1966: 17). In fact, he claims "The wages of union people are 
and have been restrained by government guidelines", while "corporate 
profits and dividends . . . are unhampered by guidelines" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1966: 17). At the same time. Government 
monetary policy was tightening the money supply and raising interest rates 
which harmed "the average consumer, the wage earner" rather than "big 
business" which "doesn't have to go to money market" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1966:18). 
Unemployment and inflation contiinued to characterize the American 
economy into the 1970s. "In America, where we should have full 
employment and prosperity, we have growing unemployment and rising 
costs of living for the average workers' families" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1970: 10). As in 1966, "it is the government which seeks to lay 
the blame upon our unions, to make labor the scapegoat for the evil results 
of bad economic judgement and restrictive monetary policies" (USWA 
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Convention Proceedings, 1970: 12). "The rich are getting richer and the 
poor getting poorer. Yet, the Nixon Administration makes the claim that 
to stabilize prices and halt inflation, its necessary to hang millstones 
around the necks of workers and their families" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1970:12). 
If the USWA was unable to affect economic policy in a manner it 
deemed beneficial, it could, and did, attempt to influence the passage of 
legislation designed to improve the welfare of workers. Abel actively 
supported the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Law and 
the Pension Security Bill (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1970 -1974). 
Additionally, he supported, and lobbied for legislation in such areas as 
national health security, workmen's compensation, protection for the 
American consumer, and mass transit, as well as civil rights legislation 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1966-1976). 
Finally, the USWA joined with the steel industry to urge Government 
action against steel imports. In 1970 he states "We must continue to push 
for specific legislation which will give us a long-range solution to the 
threat of our jobs and security posed by steel imports" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1970: 18). This theme continues in 1972. "The 
import problem, we have learned through sad experience, canot be 
resolved through collective bargaining. In the final analysis, it is the 
responsibility of our lawmakers to provide the Nation's workers adequate 
protection against the rising tide of imports." (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1972:19). 
Abel spent most of his tenure caught in a theme of an adversarial 
relationship with a national Administration characterized as favoring 
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business rather than labor. Issues of real importance to the future of the 
ffcv 
USWA - inflation, unemployment, and steel imports, among others - 
could only be dealt with through Government policies and actions. Yet, 
Government policies were being influenced by other considerations, and 
other actors, during this period. The USWA still had friends in Congress, 
but it could not influence the development of programs by the White 
House, as had been true in the past. 
Other: Economic Issues 
As discussed above the general state of the economy concerned Abel 
throughout his tenure, particularly the manner in which changes in the 
economy prevented the USWA from achieving its goals (see table 7.3, 
p.313 & appendix C-3). Unemployment and inflation were problems 
throughout this period, as well as increasing levels of steel imports and the 
increased use of automation in steel plants. This was an era of mergers 
and acquisitions, the development of conglomerates and multinationals - 
companies moved some operations offshore and consolidated others. All 
of these changes affected employment levels in steel. 
Abel discusses the nature of the threat to Steelworkers posed by the new 
giant corporations in 1972: 
In one industry after another, big American corporations 
have been exporting their capital, their technology and their 
jobs to low-wage countries abroad. 
They exploit low-paid factory workers abroad andthen flood 
the American market with their products. Many corporations 
boast that they are no longer 'American." Motivated^ purely 
by profit, these multi-national aggregates operate in an 
international no-man's land, practically free of any country's 
taxes and unfettered by any nation's regulations (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1972: 19). 
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Another important theme occupying Abel during his tenure was the 
"problem of productivity in the Steel industry" and its effect on jobs. In 
1972 he reassures Steelworkers that "under our Union agreements" 
productivity is not simply "a cover-up phrase for the elimination of jobs, 
the combining of jobs and the reduction of work crews" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1972: 19). Instead 
The productivity provision in our Basic Steel agreements 
deals with acceptable positive approaches to a serious problem 
affecting most of our members. It's a program aimed at 
removing the threat of unemployment in the Industry by 
cushioning the adverse impact that imported steel is maldng 
on our lives. 
Improvements in production or profits, under this program, 
will not be made at the expense of our members. Productivity 
improvements will flow only from new procedures and 
methods in operations. 
The answer for productivity improvement in the Steel 
Industry, of course, rests with increased growth, a healthy 
Economy, control of steel imports and improved Industry 
performance. (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1972: 20). 
In 1976 inflation and unemployment were still problems plaguing the 
USWA and its members. "On the agenda of unfinished business, our 
immediate concern is full employment" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1976: 15). Issues of automation, productivity, and even the 
impact of steel imports, are secondary to the need to solve the 
unemployment problem. "We of the Steelworkers and the AFL-CIO say 
that full employment -- a job opportunity at a decent wage for each person 
able and seeking work — is an economic necessity. From jobs come the 
wages that generate mass purchasing power" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1976: 21). Abel was still proposing programs for shorter work 
weeks and longer vacations, as had McDonald, but the problems remained. 
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Issues Internal to the USWA 
The final important theme of Abel's tenure was the effectiveness of the 
internal operations of the USWA (see table 7.3, p. 313 & appendix D-3). 
Abel, as noted earlier, had come to power in a closely contested election in 
1965 and was concerned that the USWA be perceived as essentially a 
Union run by its membership. This concern with presenting an image of 
being a democratic organization "owned and governed by the 
membership" is something Abel shares with both Murray and McDonald. 
Dissident groups continued to challenge the authority of the officers, 
particularly with respect to union dues. 
In 1976 the dissidents were still raising concerns about the amount of 
dues and what they were used for. 
Another misconception fathered by dissidents concerns our 
Union dues. They sayUnion dues nave made our Union too 
wealthy ... or that we have too big a Strike and Defense Fund. 
Anyone who irresponsibly attacks union dues is toying with 
the very guts of your Union. He's playing with your Union's 
ability to function effectively on your behalf and on behalf of 
those you are priveleged to represent. 
This Union has been and is first in benefits and wages. Our 
members expect to work under first-class contracts. We can 
get good contracts if we have a firts-class union. 
Let me be quite frank with you this morning and say to you 
that the delegates to this Convention have the right to fix 
union dues. You have the power and authority to suspend all 
membership dues payments, as some have suggested, and no 
one would have to pay one red cent in dues. You know, or 
you should know, tne big steel companies once offered us a 
two-bit union — the Employees Representation Plan .... We 
can go back to the ERP days by simply disabling our Union's 
financial capability. But let's not forget the heavy 
consequences. Just ask yourself how will the Union function? 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1976: 19). 
There had been no industry-wide steel strike since 1959, although a 
number of local strikes had been authorized, and only the International 
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President (Abel) had the constitutional authority to authorize a strike. The 
Strike and Defense Fund stood at over $80 million dollars in the mid-1970s 
- a time when many of the members were on layoff or in the midst of plant 
shutdowns. Finally, the USWA was no longer solely a Steelworkers 
Union, but represented workers in anumber of basic industries - 
aluminum, can manufacturing and containers, and copper and nonferrous 
among others. 
The carefully constructed unity and cohesion of the Murray and 
McDonald eras was slowly disintegrating. A changing economy with fewer 
jobs in basic manufacturing industries threatened the membership. The 
political power and influence which Murray and McDonald had courted 
had also waned during a period of pro-business Republican 
Administrations. Most importantly however, the USWA could no longer 
meet the needs of all of its members. McDonald had foreseen this and 
attempted to develop a program of job security. Abel reverted to a "bread- 
and-butter" approach which may have gotten members the "best contracts 
ever" but did not prevent their jobs - and the reason for Union 
membership - from disappearing. 
Conclusions 
The narrative of Abel's tenure contains conflicting themes reflective of 
the changes occurring in the steel industry and the economy as a whole. 
Abel is much closer to the adversarial theme which characterized Murray's 
approach to labor-management relations, while at the same time signing 
the Experimental Negotiating Agreement guaranteeing no strikes. He has 
moved further away from any theme of cooperation with other unions, 
except in terms of mergers and acquisitions to enlarge the membership of 
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the USWA. Finally, the theme of "bread-and-butter” unionism which is 
so prevalent during this period is in large measure a rejection of any 
concept of fighting for social justice for all workers. The battles now occur 
in the rooms where labor and management negotiate new contracts; and 
the only issue of any importance is job security. 
Llovd McBride: 1977 - 1983 
Lloyd McBride was the last President of the USWA to have direct ties to 
the early days of the Union. He had been a member of the USWA since its 
founding and had served as an International Union Officer for a number 
of years. Interestingly, he was the only President, other than the founder 
Murray, who was not first Secretary-Treasurer of the USWA. McBride was 
elected after Abel announced his retirement in 1976. The 1977 campaign 
was acrimonious, as had been the campaign surrounding Abel's defeat of 
McDonald in 1965. McBride, representing the conservative or "bread-and- 
butter" faction of the Union - as had Abel - won by a narrow margin. 
McBride served until his death in November 1983. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial 
Convention for Lloyd McBride's tenure as President are presented in 
appendix C-4. The actions of the USWA itself are perceived as contributing 
to the achievement of USWA goals. Additionally, both labor-management 
issues and the USWA are depicted as acting to increase member welfare. 
The steel industry hinders the achievement of Union goals , as does the 
Government. The Government however, is perceived as acting to both 
increase and decrease member welfare. The economy during this period is 
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also depicted as acting to hinder the achievement goals. Relationships 
with other unions disappear from consideration as having any effect. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
D-4 presents some examples of representative statements from the 
Speeches within the six categories identified through the structural 
analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis were 
useful in identifying the major themes of McBride’s tenure. These themes 
and their relation to actions taken by McBride and the USWA will be 
discussed below. 
Characterization of the USWA: Explanations/Justifications 
The summary of events, concepts, and themes presented in table 7.4 (p. 
327) reflects presented in appendices C-4 and D-4. This summary is useful 
in understanding how McBride characterizes the USWA during his 
tenure. In 1978, McBride's themes are essentially a continuation of Abel's, 
but as can be seen from appendix D-4, the themes of the narrative change 
as conditions in the industry and the economy change. His principal 
themes during this period concern labor-management relations, the 
internal operations of the USWA, and relations with the Government. He 
is however, far more concerned with the Government than any of his 
predecessors had been - particularly with those actions and policies which 
might be helpful to the Union (see table 7.4, p. 327 and appendices C-4 & D- 
4). 
McBride's themes and narrative reflect, to a greater extent than was true 
of any of his predecessors, the changing nature of the world in which the 
USWA exists. It was possible in 1978 for him to still talk about a "basic 
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Table 7.4: Summary of Concepts, Themes, and Events in the Speeches to 
the Biennial Conventions of Lloyd McBride President of the USWA 
1977 -1983 
"EXTERNAL" CONTEXT 
•Structural changes were occurring in the economy 
•Steel imports continued to be a problem 
•Interest rates and tax structure prevented new investments in steel 
•Neither the steelworkers, nor the Steel industry as a whole, was as 
important an element of government economic and social policy as they 
had been during the 1940s 
•Inflation and unemployment continued to be problems, not only in the 
U. S. but throughout the industrialized nations 
•Increased automation led to plant closings 
•The U. S. steel Industry continues to rationalize in 
the face of worldwide excess capacity 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE USWA 
•Recognized that plant closings and layoffs could not be 
solved through collective bargaining 
•Must find ways to work with the steel industry 
and the Government to survive 
•Declining membership and declining political and economic power 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF THE USWA 
Explicit: Implicit: 
•To ensure the survival •Find ways to cooperate with 
of the USWA steel industry management 
•Lobby the Government for *Find ways to cooperate and 
policies and actions which will work with the Government 
benefit the steel industry 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Proposed an "Employment and Income Security Program" 
•Explored new forms of labor-management cooperation 
•The USWA works with the industry to develop programs for those 
out of work 
•Urges the development of "long-term industrial policies" and "programs 
that would eliminate, or at lease minimize, uncertainty in the economic 
decision-making process" 
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steel settlement that brought to our members the greatest wage and benefit 
pakage in the history of our union" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1978:7). However, one of the key provisions of that settlement was "an 
Employment and Income Security Program" which recognized the fact 
that layoffs and plant closings would continue (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1978: 7). 
The recognition that plant closings and layoffs could not be solved 
through collective bargaining led to a different characterization of the U. S. 
steel industry and labor-management relations. The adversarial theme 
used by Abel disappears, and is replaced by a theme similar to McDonald’s 
theme of "an economy which is a mutual trusteeship" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1954 - 1964). McBride is presiding over a Union 
which must find ways to work with both industry and Government if it is 
to survive. 
The structural changes in the economies of the industrialized nations 
which allows any one of them "the productive capability to turn out more 
material goods than can be consumed in its own domestic market" has 
caused an international excess capacity problem in most basic industries 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1982: 9). The industrialized economies 
are no longer expanding at a rate which allows the absorption of imports, 
and "the less developed nations . . . have established production bases, not 
to furnish manufactured goods to the local population so much as to send 
products into more affluent markets. . . " (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1982: 9). 
All of these issues come together in the theme of the effectiveness of 
the actions the USWA can take to improve the welfare of its members. 
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particularly after 1978. After 1978 McBride saw very little that the USWA 
could do on its own - other than continue to lobby the Government for 
assistance to the steel industry (see table 7.4, p. 327 & appendix D-4). 
McBride faces a situation in which the industry is struggling for 
survival (see chapter 3) and has very little it can give Steelworkers - instead 
the industry is looking for concessions from the USWA. There is little 
point in talking about being engaged in a "battle" to protect the rights of 
workers as Abel did, when workers are unemployed and the banks are 
foreclosing on their homes. The "battle" in the 1980s is for survival - of 
the Union and the industry. 
Characterization of the USWA: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which McBride held for the USWA 
during his tenure are outlined in table 7.4 (p. 327). The most important 
explicit goal of McBride's tenure was to ensure the survival of the USWA. 
There is little talk here, if any, of the need to build the organization into an 
effective bargaining agent. Instead, there is a growing recognition that 
there is little to bargain for. This goal of survival leads to a new implicit 
goal for the Union - the need to find ways in which to cooperate with steel 
industry management. McBride recognizes that the "industry has 
competitive problems. We know that and we have not been hesitant to 
explore with its representatives contributions we can make to help 
improve its prospects" (USWA Convention Procedings, 1982: 10). 
Similarly, McBride begins to abandon the goal of lobbying the 
Government for legislation favorable to the Union and workers, for a new 
goal - lobbying the Government for policies and actions favorable to the 
steel industry. McDonald and Abel were concerned with building the 
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USWA into an important and respected American institution. McBride 
sees much of their work falling apart. Union membership in general has 
been declining since 1974, and the decline has been worse in the industrial 
unions as companies have permanently shut down plants (Milton, 1982). 
The industry which had provided the Union with record contracts from 
the 1950s through the 1970s is now struggling to survive, and the USWA 
finds itself allied with its traditional adversary - steel management - in the 
battle to survive. 
The actions taken by the USWA in pursuit of these goals will be 
discussed in the context of the Union's narrative about its relations with 
other organizations; as well as its ongoing narrative of its own existence 
and role in the steel industry, the American economy, and the world. 
The USWA and the US Steel Industry 
Labor-management relations was a less important theme during this 
period than it had been during Abel's tenure, although it was still a 
concern (see tables 7.4, p.327). There was little question during this period 
of an industry-wide strike, and almost no hope of negotiating contracts 
with record wage and benefit packages. Instead, the primary theme becane 
one of saving jobs, and providing benefits for those out of work due to 
plant closings. 
As noted earlier, this theme is apparent even in 1978 when in his 
discussion of the "greatest wage and benefit package in the history of our 
union" McBride includes the "Employment and Income Security Program 
" designed to "protect our members against the loss of work and income" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings , 1978: 7). In 1982 McBride continues to 
talk about the need for programs to protect those out of work. 
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we must force the employers and the government to stop 
thinking in abstractions and balance sheets; and to join us in 
thinking of working men and women as people wanting to be 
productive, integral parts of the social fabric. 
There are answers. They remain only to be found and 
implemented. If we are to close plants, then we must retrain 
the displaced workers for jobs that exist or will be created. 
If there are jobs in other locatiions, then we must help the 
people afford to take those jobs. And, in the process, we must 
attend to the needs of the cities and towns that sheltered and 
nurtured the plants during their productive years. If robots 
displace workers, then we must cut down the hours of work 
(USWA Convention Proceedings. 1982:13-14). 
The shift in themes away from a focus on improved wage and benefit 
packages, and to a focus on aiding the unemployed, reflects the fact that the 
U. S. steel industry was continuing to rationalize in the face of world-wide 
excess capacity, and that jobs were permanently lost. The ENA is still in 
effect but "it was never contemplated that ENA would be effective against 
an conomic recession .... or the consequences of a recession. The ENA 
was designed to dampen the effects of the negotiating cycle. This it has 
done" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1978: 11). 
The continuing problem of unemployment, as well as the spectre of 
more plant shutdowns, led McBride to explore new forms of labor- 
management cooperation. The USWA worked with the AISI on lobbying 
the Government on the steel import issue. Additionally, working as part of 
the Steel Tripartite Committee to develop a coordinated steel industry 
policy represents a new phase of labor-management relations, and a 
recognition that the problems of each segment of the industry are 
interconnected. (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1978 - 1982). 
McBride in the 1980s is no pursuing a theme which characterized the U. 
S. steel industry as providing one of the highest standards of living in the 
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world for Steelworkers. Instead, he is developing a theme which 
characterizes the industry as providing what jobs it can, and working with 
the USWA to develop programs for those out of work. This is a far cry 
from Murray's demands for a redistribution of profits which would favor 
the worker, and is closer to McDonald's concept of an economy run for the 
benefit of all. In the early 1980s there are virtually no profits to be 
redistributed (see chapter 3), and there is the very real possibility that there 
may be no industry to employ Steelworkers. 
The USWA and the Government 
The Government has become the key actor in McBride's narrative of 
the world in which the USWA exists. The industry and the Union were 
both experiencing problems which were beyond their abilities to solve. 
There were structural changes occurring in the economy, imports 
continued to be a problem, interest rates and the tax structure prevented 
new investment in steel - all of these were issues only the Government 
could address. 
McBride, like his predecessors, caharcterized the role of the 
Government as mixed in its ability to either help or harm the USWA (see 
table 7.4 p. 327 and appendix C-4). The Government must satisfy a broad 
group of constituents, and the Steelworkers are not always at the top of the 
list. "As we have stressed when given the opportunity, weak-willed 
enforcement of our nation's trade laws, the giving of trade concessions for 
foreign policy reasons that, ironically, have turned out to be more illusory 
than of substance, have played a major role in our weakened international 
competitive posture" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1980: 14). 
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McBride's narrative is far more concerned with Government trade 
policy than those of his predecessors. The steel import problem which had 
troubled the industry and affected employment throughout the late 1960s 
and into the 1970s, was now permanently changing the U. S. steel industry. 
Imports no longer simply filled a gap or market niche, they had captured 
approximately 20% of the market by 1980 (see chapter 3). Demand for steel 
was growing at between 1-2% per year, and much of that growth was going 
to the importers (see chapter 3). 
In addition to the import issue, McBride urged the Government to take 
a variety of other actions to aid the steel industry. In 1980 he urged the 
development of "long-term industrial policies" and "programs that would 
eliminate, or at least minimize, uncertainty in the economic decision¬ 
making process" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1980: 14-15). And in 
1982 McBride comments that 
And then there is the federal government, which has always 
been so quick to bail out the reSly big corporations with loan 
guarantees, fast tax write-offs, huge over-payments and open- 
ended defense contracts. Yet, it has not come forward with 
one meaningful step to help even the most modern of steel 
producers (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1982: 11). 
The one area in which McBride stresses the ability of the USWA to 
positively influence Government policies and actions was safety and 
health. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, which the USWA had 
been lobbying for since the Kellogg mine disaster in 1972, was finally passed 
in 1977. Similarly, the Union had been effective in getting standards 
established in other areas such as coke oven emission standards. (USWA 
Convention Proceedines, 1978). 
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The ability of the USWA to affect Government policy was limited 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. McBride had greater access to the 
White House during the Carter Administration than during the Reagan 
Administration, but the problems of the steel industry were only one 
among a vast array of economic and social problems the Government had 
to deal with. Cheaper imported steel was good for many other industries; 
inflation had to be brought down, even if it meant high unemployment; 
and tax reform benefited those industries which could provide a 
reasonable rate of return to investors. Neither the Steelworkers, nor the 
Steel Industry as a whole, was as important an element of Government 
economic and social policy as it had been during the 1940s. 
Other: Economic Issues 
Underlying all of the changes occurring in the relationship of the 
USWA to both the Government and Steel Industry management, were 
structural changes in the general economy. Inflation and unemployment 
continued to be problems, not only in the U. S. but throughout the 
industrialized nations, and these became an important theme in the 
USWA narrative. "Today there are some 115 million tons of unused steel 
capacity in just the OECD nations. Four hundred thousand people have 
lost their jobs in the steel sector . . . ." (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1982: 9). 
The impact of automation on the productive capacity of industry, 
which had worried Abel, had come to haunt the labor leaders of the 1980s. 
Today industrial nations are engaged in frantic competition to 
supplant labor with automated production. The robot no 
longer is an imaginary device confined to science-fiction 
novels and movies. Robots are building cars. 
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More and more production is being turned out byrelatively 
fewer and fewer people. 
A modern industrial nation, such as any one of the 24 which 
comprise the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the OECD, has the productive capability to turn 
out more material goods than can be consumed in its own 
domestic market. The aim of modem nations, therefore, is to 
export (USWA Convention Proceedings. 1982: 9). 
Increased automation and the need to export goods, combined with the 
slow growth economies of the early 1980s, helped to create a situation in 
the domestic steel industry unlike any experienced by the USWA. 
"Within the American steel industry, major mills have been permanently 
closed. Others operate with reduced or minimal production. The 
operating rate in steel is only around 52 per cent of capacity. About 70,000 
of our members are laid off, and thousand more in support industries also 
are out of work" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1980: 11). Within this 
context the traditional labor-management antagonism which was at the 
heart of the collective bargaining process were no longer functional. 
Issues Internal to the USWA 
McBride was concerned, as were his predecessors, with what the USWA 
could do to improve the welfare of its members. This became an 
increasingly important theme in the early 1980s as plant closings meant 
that more and more of the USWA members were unemployed. Further, 
as the international dimensions of the "steel crisis" became clear, it was 
apparent that negotiating benefits for workers with 20 or more years of 
service would not be enough. 
In 1978, McBride develops a theme which continues through his tenure 
— the need to evaluate and control the investment of pension fund dollars. 
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It is increasingly apparent to us in organized labor that these 
funds are many times invested in business ventures which 
work to our distinct disadvantage and often to our distress. 
With increasing frequency we learn that it is our own 
pension money that is financing the flight of industry from 
northern unionized states to nonunion plants in the sunbelt 
and overseas. Our own money is being used to put our own 
people in unemployment lines (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 19/8:19). 
Beyond attempting to influence the investment of pension fund 
dollars, McBride included limited possibilities for Union action in his 
narrative. The USWA could continue to promote a national full 
employment policy, as it had been doing for the past forty years without 
success. Further, the Union could urge the steel industry to "modernize, 
that they have up-to-date plants and equipment, and they continue to be 
viable and modern" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1980: 17). Beyond 
these, and similar efforts, the problems of the membership could no longer 
be solved at the negotiating table. It would be up to the leaders of the 1980s 
and beyond to find new programs, and new hope for a declining 
membership. 
Conclusions 
The primary theme of McBride's tenure is of the need for cooperation 
with the Government and steel industry management in order to ensure 
the survival of the USWA. The Union can no longer afford the 
adversarial theme of Murray or Abel, as there is very little left to fight for. 
Efforts to expand the USWA membership and its political power have very 
little meaning when the industry is undergoing a permanent contraction. 
General themes of social justice have been replaced by themes of assisting 
unemployed Steelworkers. There is no longer any battle to be fought with 
steel management and the compromises and treaties of the past do not 
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function in the changing conditions of this period. The new war is one of 
survival — and survival of the Union means working with steel 
management to ensure survival of the firms as well. 
Lynn Williams: 1983 - 
Lynn Williams was elected President of the USWA in an election held 
following the deathof Lloyd McBride in late 1983. Williams had been 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Union during the period in which McBride was 
President. Williams is the first President of the USWA to have joined the 
Union in the post-World War II era, thus having no direct ties to the 
founding of the USWA. Finally, Williams is the first Canadian elected to 
the post, although the USWA had represented Canadian Steelworkers 
since its founding. 
General Results of Structural and Narrative Analysis 
The results of the structural analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial 
Convention for Lynn Williams' tenure as President are presented in 
appendix C-5. Labor-management relations are perceived as contributing 
to the achievement of USWA goals. Additionally, both labor-management 
issues and the USWA itself are depicted as acting to increase member 
welfare. The Government however, is perceived as acting to both increase 
and decrease member welfare, as well as both helping and hindering in the 
achievement of goals. The economy, the steel industry, and other unions 
disappear from consideration of having any effect. 
These categories, and the frequency with which statements in each 
category occur, provide a framework for the narrative analysis. Appendix 
D-5 presents some examples of representative statements from the 
Speeches within the six categories identified through the structural 
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analysis, which combined with the results of the structural analysis were 
useful in identifying the major themes of Williams’ tenure. These themes 
and their relation to actions taken by Williams and the USWA will be 
discussed below. 
Characterization of the USWA: Explanations/Justifications 
The summary of events, concepts, and themes presented in table 7.5 
(p.339) reflects the results presented in appendices C-5 and D-5. This 
summary is useful in understanding the manner in which Williams 
characterizes the USWA during this period. Williams generally 
characterizes the actions and policies of the USWA as reflecting the need to 
find ways of addressing the problems experienced by McBride toward the 
end of his tenure (see table 7.5, p. 339 and appendix D-5). One theme of 
Williams’ narrative focuses on labor-management issues and the role of 
the Government as did that of his predecessors. However, the principal 
theme is concerned with what the USWA can do to improve the welfare of 
its members (see table 7.5, p. 339). 
Williams begins his 1984 speech by asking the members to ’’understand 
that: —New problems require new answers, and that —New times require 
new programs" (USWA Convention Proceedines, 1984: 16). Since 1980 he 
reports that "our employed membership has been reduced by 400,000. Our 
average dues-paying membership has stabilized over the past several 
months and has not moved above 740,000", which was approximately the 
membership level in 1942 (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 17). 
Within the context of the decline in membership Williams has had to 
search for new approaches to labor-management relations, and this search 
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leads him to develop a theme which is both aggressive, and yet leaves 
room for compromise. 
The United Steelworkers is willing to work with cooperative 
employers who understand our job security and dignity 
concerns. There is a yearning by our members for democratic 
involvement in the workplace. There is a willingness by 
union members to help make an enterprise more viable . . . 
because theyknow that without a viable enterprise, there will 
be no job security. 
Table 7.5: Summary of Concepts, Themes, and Events in the Speeches to 




•Rise in conservatism 
•Rationalization of the steel industry 
•Continued increase of steel imports 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE USWA 
•What can the USWA do to improve the welfare of its members 
•USWA taking a much more active role in "changing the balance of 
political power" 
IMPLICIT & EXPLICIT GOALS OF THE USWA 
Explicit: Implicit: 
•Find ways to renew the USWA ®Make the USWA a viable 
organization 
STRATEGIC ACTIONS 
•Urges the government to enforce trade laws and impose quotas on 
steel imports 
•Calls for "strict, realistic, enforceable quotas on steel imports" 
•Calls for a national industrial policy which includes input from the labor 
union 
•Searches for programs to revitalize the Union 
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But to accomplish this, will require new management attitudes and a 
social contract with workers and their unions that eliminates traditional 
differences between workers and management (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1984: 22). 
If Williams characterizes steel industry management and the 
Government in a manner reminiscent of McBride, his characterization of 
what the USWA can do for its members is not. McBride saw little hope of 
any positive action in 1980 and 1982, other than saving those jobs which 
could be saved. Williams sees a number of possibilities for action, in 
addition to lobbying the Government and attempting to find compromise 
solutions with employers (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984). 
Williams is leading a Union greatly diminished in numbers and in 
financial strength. There is little left to save, and the traditional solutions 
no longer work. He can afford to be more aggressive than McBride, and his 
characterization of USWA actions reflect this. McBride promoted a policy 
of concessions where it was felt that they would help the firm. Williams 
has drawn "the line on wage and benefit concessions" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings - 1984: 20). 
Characterization of the USWA: Goals 
The explicit and implicit goals which Williams held for the USWA 
during this period are outlined in table 7.5 (p. 339) The primary goal which 
characterizes Williams' tenure to date is a need to find a way to revitalize 
the USWA. Survival alone is no longer enough, as the Union is barely 
able to survive in the mid-1980s. 
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Our union stands at a critical crossroads. On the one road 
ahead there lies the possibility for unlimited growth in areas 
of unorganized workers within our traditional jurisdictions 
and in new expanded jurisdictions where we already have a 
foothold. We cannot afford to take the road of doing nothing 
at this convention, which would lead us to further decline in 
membership and influence (USWA Convention Proceedings. 
1984:19). 
In turn this goal leads Williams to explore a number of new directions 
both for the USWA, and for its relations with other key actors in its world. 
The USWA and the U. S. Steel Industry 
In the area of labor-management relations, Williams develops a much 
more aggressive theme than did McBride. He is not adversarial as was 
Abel, but he is not willing to make concessions and to work with 
companies who are simply going to close the plant no matter what 
happens (see appendix D-5). 
Years of respect in tough bargaining relationships have been 
sacrificed by some corporate managers who have sought to 
place our members against an economic wall, even when 
their competitive situation has not warranted such tactics. 
We have, can, and will respond in kind to those who want it 
that way. We can deal one of two ways with management. 
With those who are fair and honestly seek just agreements, 
we will conduct ourselves in a like manner. Those who use 
bluff and intimidation will meet a militant union which is 
ready to fight intelligently and creatively for the rights of its 
members (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 20). 
Williams' concept of finding intelligent and creative ways to fight for 
the rights of members takes the USWA in different directions. Williams' 
is not, as he states throughout his speech, adverse to working with the steel 
companies on programs of mutual benefit. The USWA joined with 
Bethlehem Steel in filing "a petition under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade 
Act with the U. S. International Trade Commission, claiming serious 
injury to our domestic industry and steelworkers. We asked for a five-year 
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quota limiting steel imports to 15 percent of the American market (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1984: 23). 
In other areas Williams has begun to explore the efficacy of corporate 
campaigns. He discusses the campaign against Phelps Dodge Corporation 
and its attempt to break the unions on strike in its copper mines. 
We have learned that the Wall Street creditors are the 
company's only hope for survival. Phelps Dodge has 
continued production at its mine with strikebreakers, in spite 
of the presently low copper prices — .... — generating losses 
by the company of $46 million more than if the mines had 
been shut aonduring the strike period. 
As you know, unions have various kinds of client 
relationships with the institutional creditors of Phelps Dodge. 
Many of these creditors hold strike funds, union pension 
funds and health and welfare funds in their accounts. 
Consequently, union money may be subsidizing the debt of 
this anti-union company without labor's knowledge or 
consent. 
We have questioned these financial institutions about the 
credit worthiness of Phelps Dodge — while we of the labor 
movement question our continued relationships with them. 
We are going to ask the banks how a company, like Phelps 
Dodge — which lost more than $57 million so far this year -- 
can continue to receive creditor support, when there is 
nothing but a record-breaking loss to show them (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1984: 21). 
Williams is taking the USWA in new directions in its relationship with 
management. He is committed to doing more than simply getting record 
wage and benefit packages - something that is not possible in many of the 
industries the USWA is involved in - but is willing to find ways "to help 
make an enterprise more viable" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 
21). However, "The Steelworkers Union will use all of its modern arsenal 
to bring additional pressure to bear on companies that refuse to enter into 
fair and equitable collective bargaining agreements" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1984: 22). 
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The USWA and the Government 
Williams also develops a more adversarial theme in his dealings with 
the Government than did McBride or Abel. It is clear to Williams in 1984 
that the Reagan Administration is not interested in the problems of the 
unions (witness the PATCO incident); nor is the Administration interested 
in the problems of basic industry (the rejection of the ITC 
recommendations with respect to steel import quotas) (see chapter 3). The 
USWA still has friends in Congress, but the best the Union can hope for is 
that "Chairman Rostenkowski and Speaker O'Neill will do all they can to 
get the bill (Fair Trade in Steel Act) enacted before Congress adjourns" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 23). 
In the "present reactionary and regressive legislative climate" the 
USWA can hope for little from the Government (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1984: 16). Government economic policies have created a 
situation in which "more than 30 million working people have suffered 
one or more episodes of unemployment" and "hundreds of thousands of 
workers who have returned to work are in much lower-paying jobs than 
ever before" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 17). 
Williams continues however, to call for "strict, realistic, enforceable 
quotas on steel imports", similar to "what our foreign competitors in 
Europe, Japan, and the Third World already have" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1984: 23). Further, he continues McBride's call for a national 
industrial policy which includes input from the labor unions. Within the 
current political climate however, Williams sees little hope of any change. 
Thus, he urges Steelworkers to "participate to our fullest ability in the 
political process. We must all become political activists" (USWA 
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Convention Proceedings, 1984: 16). The only real hope for any form of 
Government assistance for the steel industry lies in changing the 
Government. 
Issues Internal to the USWA 
Williams devotes most of his 1984 speech to the theme of what the 
USWA itself can do for its members (see appendix D-5). The time has 
passed to attempt to maintain the Union's position as an important 
American institution. The dues-paying membership is at its lowest point 
since the founding of the USWA, and "For the first time in our 42-year 
history we were forced to lay off many of those who served the union" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 18). The time had clearly come to 
"find fresh solutions to new and even more complex problems and 
situations" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 24). 
Williams discusses a number of programs to revitalize the Union. He 
characterizes the USWA as taking a much more active role in "changing 
the balance of political power" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984:16). 
The Union cannot "stand by and watch our spirits ebb and our strength 
wither away -- but we must fight, and struggle and organize, and build and 
rebuild in every way we can!" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984:16). 
Additionally, Williams proposes that the USWA "make changes in our 
constitution to adapt to the problems of the present and to meet our 
traditional priority for organizing the unorganized!" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1984:19). 
The hope for the future of the USWA lies in the theme of moving in 
new directions. Employment in the traditional jurisdictional areas will 
never rebound to past levels - if anything, as worldwide excess capacity in 
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many of them continues to be a problem further rationalization will mean 
even fewer jobs (see chapter 3). Not only should the USWA organize new 
industries, but Williams goes even further by announcing "Our union 
should have an "open door" policy for all unorganized workers in the 
Western Hemisphere who want a union of our reputation" (USWA 
Convention Proceedings, 1984: 20). 
Williams is interested in the future of the USWA as a viable 
organization - not simply as the bargaining agent for steelworkers. "I 
believe our union will be diminished if we restrict our vision. The glory 
of the Steelworkers is that we have actively identified with the less 
fortunate and those prevented from achieving an acceptable standard of 
living. We must remain their spokesperson" (USWA Convention 
Proceedings, 1984:20). As the domestic stee industry is moving in new 
directions - diversifying into new areas in the 1980s - so does the 
Steelworkers Union. In 1984, steel is no longer the industry to be actively 
involved in for either the companies or the USWA. 
Conclusions 
The principal theme of this period of Williams tenure is one of an 
aggressive search for a new identity for the USWA. The Union has hit a 
low point in membership and power, and alliances formed with steel 
management and the Government are proving of little value in the effort 
to survive. New directions must be found and new battles must be fought 




These are a number of common themes which emerge from this 
analysis, and are important in understanding the remarkable consistency 
with which these Presidents approached the development and 
implementation of specific courses of action for the Union during this 
time period. 
The first common theme which becomes apparent from an analysis of 
the Speeches to the Convention is that it is the steel industry, "big 
business" and the U. S. Government which are the cause of most of the 
problems faced by the USWA. Whether it is 1945,1965, or 1985 the steel 
companies, and to a lesser extent the Government, are accused of: being 
unwilling to negotiate contracts "within the rules of the game", attempting 
to destroy the Union, and generally joining in actions against the interests 
of the American working man or woman. This theme allows USWA 
leaders to discuss such actions as strikes and work stoppages as being 
caused by an industry unwilling to grant workers the "satisfactory working 
conditions" to which they are "entitled". The Union is in turn portrayed 
as being engaged in an ongoing batle with management to protect and 
extend "the rights of workers". 
A secondary theme which is common to most of the Presidents is that 
the Government and the business community in some fashion act 
together to allow the "rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer". This 
theme appears in discussions of right -to-work laws; the need for a national 
full employment act (Humphrey-Hawkins Bill); the increase in mergers 
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and acquisitions; and finally, the need for "a system of managed steel 
trade” (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984:24). 
Finally, all of the Presidents are concerned with portraying the USWA 
as essentially a democratic organization. In virtually every speech the 
point is made "that this is a democratic institution owned and governed by 
the membership" (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1966:13). At various 
points in time this concern also extends to "keeping the Communists out" 
(USWA Convention Proceedings, 1946 & 1964); and generally keeping the 
Convention free of outside influences (USWA Convention Proceedings, 
1976 & 1987). 
Within the context of these general themes each President had his 
particular concerns, beliefs, and values which affected the direction in 
which he steered the Union, the role of the Union in the steel industry, the 
role of the USWA in the American labor movement, and the relationship 
of the Union with other important players. The results presented here are 
an analysis of the narratives of each President about issues and events 
which were of importance to him during his tenure. 
Serving the Membership 
In the period from 1945 to 1985 the Presidents of the United 
Steelworkers of America had to confront the issue of how best to serve the 
Union membership. In spite of union contracts with the major firms in 
many basic industries, and union shops where possible, the USWA exists 
only as long as its membership believes that there is some value connected 
with that membership. The efforts of the USWA leadership to provide 
meaningful services to the members led them into a network of 
relationships with steel industry management and the Government. The 
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manner in which the Presidents, beginning with Philip Murray in 1945 
approached relationships with these organizations, affected the options 
available to Lloyd McBride and Lynn Williams in the 1980s. 
It is apparent now that the adversarial relationship with the steel 
industry begun by Murray, and continued by Abel, while functional in the 
1940s became disfunctional by the 1970s. The initial needs of the members 
for higher wages and better working conditions eventually gave way to a 
need for job security in an industry in which capacity and employment 
were shrinking. The attempts to find a compromise — notably the ENA — 
failed when the guarantees of wage increases in return for no strikes did 
not prevent the companies from closing still more plants. Similarly, the 
Employment and Income Security Program of the late 1970s - while 
assisting the older Steelworkers - did little for the rest of the membership, 
and placed restraints on corporate income that might have been used for 
modernization of plants 
The efforts to cooperate with the steel industry - first on the part of 
McDonald after the 1959 steel strike, and later on the part of McBride and 
Williams - were hampered by the remnants of the adversarial relationship 
of the earlier years. It is evident in Williams' speech that neither 
organization really believes that it has the others best interests at heart. 
There is a yearning by our members for democratic 
involvement in the workplace. There is a willingness by 
union members to help make an enterprise more viable ... 
.because they know that without a viable enterprise there will 
be no job security. 
But, to accomplish this, will reauire new management 
attitudes and a social contract with workers and their unions 
that eliminates traditional differences between workers and 
management (USWA Convention Proceedings, 1984: 22). 
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All of the Presidents of the USWA, until Williams was elected, had 
been present at the founding of the Union, and all remembered the early 
struggles to gain recognition and acceptance. This memory can be seen, 
particularly in the case of McDonald and Abel, to influence the manner in 
which they continued to negotiate with the industry for higher wage and 
benefit packages, even when it had become apparent that the industry 
could no longer afford these. 
McBride and Williams were left with a situation in which much of the 
membership was chronically unemployed or underemployed - a situation 
which had begun to manifest itself after the 1959 Steel Strike. The attempts 
to work with the industry to develop policies and actions which would 
preserve employment came at a time when the largest firm in the industry 
— U. S. Steel — was moving out of the steel industry. The choices available 
to them were limited — let the Union die out as its traditional industries 
closed or downsized, or move into organizing new industries. The course 
Williams is charting in 1984 takes the USWA away from its traditional role 
as the largest industrial union in the AFL-CIO, but may ensure its survival 
as an organization. 
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CHAPTER 8 
A COMPARISON OF THE NARRATIVES OF THE UNITED 
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA AND UNITED 
STATES STEEL 
The results of the structural and narrative analyses of the Chairman’s 
Letters to the Shareholders in the Annual Reports of U. S. Steel (USS) and 
the President’s Speeches to the Biennial Constitutional Conventions of the 
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) are presented in chapters 6 and 7 
respectively. 
The analysis of results presented in those chapters undertook to answer 
the following questions for each organization: 
1. How do the USS and the USWA each characterize themselves? 
2. How do the USS and the USWA each characterize other 
key actors in their worlds? 
3. How much overlap in terms of concepts and relationships is 
there from CEO to CEO for the USS and from President to 
President for the USWA? 
4. Do the strategic actions taken by each organization reflect 
the patterns of expressed beliefs identified in the 
public statements analyzed? 
This chapter will compare the results of these separate analyses to 
determine to what extent the manner in which the two organizations 
made sense of their world was similar. The questions which frame this 
comparison are as follows: 
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1. Are the narratives symmetrical or asymmetrical? 
That is, is the narrative presented by each organization 
simply a different side of the same chronicle of events or 
altogether different chronicles of events? 
2. Are the points at which each organization punctuates its 
narrative the same or different? 
3. How does each organization respond to the others' 
punctuation points? 
In exploring these questions a set of punctuation points — periods 
where the dominant themes identified for each organization change -- 
have been identified. These points will be discussed in terms of the 
changes each organization was making, and how the other organization 
responded. In addition, Adams & Mueller's "The Steel Industry" (in W. 
Adams Ed. The structure of american industry, pp. 74 - 125; 1984) was used 
as a an "outside" assessment of punctuation points in the industry. 
Additionally, the assessments of strategic management analysts for each 
period are included, to compare the strategic actions of the organizations 
with those prescribed by the analysts. This last comparison allows the 
researcher to explore how those in the industry rationalized their actions at 
the time, as opposed to the actions the analysts propose should have been 
taken. 
1945: The End of World War II 
The USWA 
Murray and the USWA, pursued a set of actions in the late 1940s based 
on the theme that management had to be forced to recognize its 
responsibilities and treat labor in a just and fair manner (see table 8.1, 
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p.354). Corporate profits were earned primarily through the efforts of 
labor, and should be redistributed in a manner more representative of 
labor’s contribution. In order to achieve this, the USWA had to take a 
hard line with management, and if strikes were necessary to achieve these 
goals - then the USWA would strike. Industry management was an 
impediment in the pursuit of economic and social justice, not just for 
Steelworkers, but for all workers, and the Government increasingly 
appeared to be taking the part of management against the worker. The 
USWA was engaged in a war to bring about social change, and each strike 
was a victory against the forces opposing them. 
The USWA characterizes itself as engaged in an offensive war for social 
and economic justice. The problems of the Corporation, and its attempts to 
"educate" the Union in the "realities" of the steel industry are simply 
propaganda on the part of U. S. Steel in this war. The "low profit margins" 
of which the Corporation complains, are portrayed here as increasing at a 
phenomenal rate each year (see chapter 7) without benefit to labor. 
U. S. Steel 
During this same period Olds and U. S. Steel pursued a set of actions 
based on the theme of U. S. Steel’s continuing domination of the steel 
industry (see table 8.1, p.354). U. S. Steel was the largest steel company in 
the largest steel industry in the world, and while the Corporation 
continued to lose market share to other producers, this was to avoid anti¬ 
trust lawsuits - not to diminish the importance of the Corporation. 
Capacity and the maintenance of production were major strategic concerns, 
as the high demand for steel following the war brought interference from 
"outside" groups. Investment in plant and equipment designed to meet 
352 
this demand became an important action, as did lobbying the Government 
for relief from controls - or tax reform which would provide more money 
for such investment. 
U. S. Steel during this period characterizes itself as pursuing a strategy 
of providing an essential product to the Nation as best it can. It is beset by 
"outside" forces, or villains - principally the USWA and the Government 
who believe that they know better how to run the industry and utilize the 
profits engendered through the operations of the firm. It is engaged in an 
attempt to "educate" these organizations in the "reality" of the steel 
industry, and is frustrated at the inability of the two organizations to 
understand the immense problems faced by the Corporation. 
Adams & Mueller 
Adams & Mueller's assessment of the condition of the steel industry at 
the end of World War II is essentailly the same as that of U. S. Steel. It was 
the largest steel industry in the world at the time and the only one not 
faced with the need to rebuild capacity lost during the war. This put the 
industry in a very strong position during a period in which steel demand 
was very strong. 
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement 
It should be apparent from this brief description of the themes of each 
organization that during this period the narratives, or chronicles of events, 
were in many respects symmetrical - or simply different sides of the same 
story. In both instances the organization is acting in "the best interests of 
the Nation", and both represent themselves as protecting the Nation 
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1953: The Operation of an Economy which is a Sort of a Mutual 
Trusteeship 
Introduction 
All of this changed in 1953, when the themes in the USWA narrative 
changed. This marks the first punctuation point, or change in theme, and 
coincides with a change in leadership at the USWA. Following Murray's 
death in late 1952, McDonald became President of the USWA. Murray's 
narrative, as discussed in chapter 7, had as its principal theme the 
adversarial relationship between the Union and steel industry 
management. McDonald abandoned that theme in 1953 and began 
discussing the need for joint labor-management cooperation (see chapter 
7). U. S. Steel however, did not abandon its theme of an adversarial 
relationship with labor until much later. Table 8.2 (p.356) outlines the 
major points of each organization's narrative in the early 1950s. 
As can be seen from table 8.2 (p.356) the two organizations are 
developing different themes about their own role in the steel industry, as 
well as about that of the other organization. McDonald is actively 
searching for a new approach to labor-management relations, while 
Fairless is still pursuing labor peace on his own terms. In part, these 
different themes, and courses of action, stem from the different 
characterizations each organization made about themselves. 
1953: McDonald and Mutual Trusteeship 
The USWA. In 1953 McDonald broke with the themes utilized by 
Murray to characterize the USWA and its role. McDonald characterized 
the USWA, not as an enemy of business, but as a mutual trustee in the 
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moved away from the prominence of the claims of labor, and towards a 
position which assumed that the claims of the owners, the managers, and 
the workers all had equal weight, and that one should not benefit at the 
expense of another. 
This theme led to the development of a set of actions which pursued 
new approaches to labor-management relations. In both 1956 and 1959 the 
USWA did strike, but it was not to force business to recognize its social 
obligations, rather it was necessary "to call to task the management 
trustees" (USWA Convention Proceedings - 1956:9). In fact, the USWA 
did not picket the steel plants in 1956 in an attempt to stress the fact that 
the strike was a disagreement among trustees rather than a battle for 
workers' rights. Many of the initial demands and concerns of the USWA 
had been met by 1954, and although the Union was still pursuing better 
contracts for its members, it depicts itself as a more "reasonable" 
organization searching for compromise positions. 
The USWA in the mid-1950s had found its place as an accepted 
American institution. It no longer needed to characterize itself as leading 
the war of "the worker" against "Big Business", but instead portrays itself 
as an active participant in the management of the industry and the 
economy. This change in themes leads McDonald away from Murray's 
depiction of the Union as needing to be vigilant in its surveillance of 
Corporate America, and toward a depiction of the USWA as involved in 
high-level decision-making about the future of Corporate America. 
Steel labor and management are now characterized as joint trustees in 
the management of the economy. McDonald begins to talk about the large 
number of small investors who own shares in American corporations (see 
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chapter 7). The issue of a "fair return" to shareholders has moved out of 
the realm of simply making the rich richer, and into the realm of 
providing the worker with a return on his investment. The Steelworker 
now reaps the benefit of improved profits through both improved wages 
and dividends - and the Union needs to protect both. 
U. S. Steel. Fairless continues to characterize U. S. Steel as the 
dominant steel firm in the largest steel industry in the world, and as such 
responsible for guiding the industry and the economy (see table 8.2, p.356). 
Additionally, the firm is still involved in "educating" the outside actors - 
principally the USWA and the Government in the realities of the steel 
industry. U. S. Steel is still characterized as in control of its own destiny, 
and troubled by outsiders who interfere with the efficient running of the 
business. The Corporation needs to complete the expansion begun to meet 
the Korean War demand, and then be allowed to sell the steel from these 
facilities at a price which will provide a profit for the Corporation and its 
shareholders. 
There is no sense in this narrative of being engaged in a "mutual 
trusteeship" — instead, the Corporation is still engaged in a contest of wills 
with both the Union and the Government. There is however, in Fairless' 
narrative more acceptance of the USWA than in the past (see chapter 6). 
As McDonald is developing the theme of mutual trusteeship, and the need 
to work with the industry; Fairless is working with the USWA to establish 
a program of joint plant visits to "study mutual problems and improve 
relationships" (USS Annual Report 1953:3). The 1952 strike had been long 
and costly, the Korean conflict was ending, and steel demand was 
stabilizing. Fairless is more willing than was Olds to pursue labor peace. 
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but not to the extent of allowing the USWA an active voice in running the 
industry. 
Fairless does downplay the theme of the USWA as a threat to the 
Corporation, the industry, and the nation which had been so prevalent in 
the earlier Letters, and is more willing to negotiate instead of simply 
rejecting Union demands. The Annual Reports for this period contain a 
characterization of labor-management relations as an attempt to work 
toward the common good. The theme is shifting slightly from one of 
contending with an adversary to one of beginning treaty negotiations with 
an old enemy. 
Strategic Management Analysts 
Adams & Mueller continue their portrayal of the industry as strong and 
an important economic force throughout this period (see table 8.2, p. 356). 
Steel demand remains strong, and the environment is perceived to be 
essentially stable. Other analysts, while agreeing with this depiction of the 
industry during this period, criticize the types of investments made by the 
company. Instead of "rounding out" existing facilities, the analysts assert 
that the industry should have targeted its investment toward performance 
improvements (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983; Barnett & Schorsch, 1983) (see table 
8.2, p. 356). 
This assessment fails to take into account however, the fact that the 
industry had been under tremendous pressure to meet both civilian and 
military demand in the early 1950s and that "rounding out" existing 
facilities was a quicker means of meeting that demand (see chapter 3). 
Once investment dollars had been committed to this form of expansion, it 
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was difficult for the industry to change to newer technologies and to build 
new plants. 
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement 
Both Fairless and McDonald develop themes in their narratives about 
the need for improved labor-management relations. The period of 
unusual demand for steel is over, and the Steelworkers are now among 
the highest paid industrial workers in the world. The Corporation is 
modernizing and expanding facilities and employment in the steel 
industry is strong (see chapter 3). Neither imports nor substitute products 
are a problem for the industry at this point, as Europe and Japan are still 
rebuilding after World War II. In fact, as Adams & Mueller (1984) point 
out, it was a period of remarkable stability, with U. S. Steel ’’the 
acknowledged price leader in the industry" (p. 91) -- an industry in which 
"a chief executive could avoid the ordeal of closing down a poorly located 
or inefficient steel plant, and with few exceptions . . . feel comfortable with 
the endless "rounding out" (p. 111). 
It would appear that there was little or no incentive for the Corporation 
to search for a new approach to labor-management relations. Yet, 
McDonald and the USWA began a process of moving to a new stance with 
respect to management -- looking for a voice in the industry. In part, the 
need for this new theme on the part of the USWA stems from some issues 
discussed in chapters 3 and 7. The Union had been engaged in a series of 
strikes in the years immediately following World War n, had organized all 
of the major integrated steel firms, and had resolved many of the wage and 
working condition issues it had initially been set up to deal with. 
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McDonald recognized that the Union needed to find a new role for itself 
both within the steel industry and American society. 
Fairless, while recognizing that the conditions which had surrounded 
the strikes of the 1940s and early 1950s were changing, continued to rely on 
the theme of U. S. Steel as the greatest corporation in the U. S. if not the 
world. He recognized the need for labor peace in order to maintain 
smooth operations in a market where the Corporation could sell almost all 
the steel it could make. However, he continued to want to dictate the 
terms of that peace. The decline in the antagonistic language in the Letters 
with respect to the USWA indicates a greater acceptance of its existence, but 
Fairless is not prepared to go as far as McDonald in his quest for peace. 
McDonald talks about management, not as an enemy, but as employees 
of the stockholders just as the production employees are. Fairless talks 
about joint plant visits as a means of developing better understanding of 
mutual problems. These characterizations demonstrate the differences 
which existed between the two. McDonald's search for a new approach to 
labor-management relations was in large part rebuffed. Fairless was not 
prepared to admit commonalities between labor and management outside 
of mutual problems at the plant level. In this period of strength for the 
industry as a whole the opportunity to develop improved relations 
between these two organizations was lost. The history of an adversarial 
relationship between the two proved stronger than the attempts of a 
Union President to develop a more cordial atmosphere wher the two 
organizations could work together to benefit the industry as a whole. 
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fhe Post-1959 Steel Strike Era 
The next punctuation point, or change in theme, for either 
organization occurs following the 1959 steel strike. The effects of the 
length of the strike and the costs to both organizations are reflected in the 
narratives of each, but particularly in the changed themes of U. S. Steel. 
Table 8.3 (p. 363 ) outlines the dominant themes in the narratives of the 
two organizations during this period. 
During the period following the 1959 strike the two organizations each 
focused on issues of concern to the particular organization. Increased 
profits and job security replaced the themes of a dominant position in the 
industry and mutual trusteeship of the economy (table 8.3, p. 363). At the 
same time, as Adams & Mueller point out a number of elements were 
changing for the industry as a whole. 
1959: The Last Great Industrial Strike 
Adams & Mueller. Adams & Mueller do not discuss the strike as a 
great turning point for the steel industry. In part this is expected as their 
focus is on the economics of the industry ~ particularly market structure, 
demand, and technology. They do however, briefly discuss the changes 
which occurred in the 1960s in these areas. In particular, they describe the 
steel firms in the 1960s as 
plagued by a managerial rigidity that preckuded a 
fundamental reassessment of corporate plans when the 
external environment was undergoing rapid change. When 
that change occurred in the 1960s, the industry found itself 
"with enormous capacity, much of it recently built and very 
little of it embodying new technology. A history of 
concentrated market structure, nonaggerssive conduct, and 
technological lethargy had left the industry vulnerable to 
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U. S. Steel. After 1959 the Corporation begins to portray itself as 
engaged in competitive battle for market share with other steel producers - 
both domestic and foreign - as well as with producers of substitute products 
(see table 8.3, p. 363). The Government becomes more of a villain during 
this period as it prevents U. S. Steel from raising prices, and does not enact 
tax reform favorable to basic industry. The USWA however, becomes less 
of a villain as it works with the Corporation to find ways to avoid strikes 
and the swings in steel demand that accompany these strikes. 
In the period following the 1959 Steel Strike, the "illusion" of 
competition became a reality, (see chapter 6) and new themes had to be 
incorporated into the narrative. The reality of increased competition led 
U. S. Steel into new areas, such as an increasing emphasis on research and 
development efforts and marketing as central to the organization's strategy 
in the 1960s. Additionally, U. S. Steel begins to pursue an active cost 
reduction program as it finds it can no longer raise prices to cover 
increasing costs. The theme changes from one of allowing others to 
capture market share to one of needing to protect the existing market share 
against competitive inroads by steel importers and producers of substitute 
products. 
The cyclical nature of steel consumption patterns reflected the cyclical 
pattern of steel labor negotiations (see chapters 3 & 6). This pattern forced 
Blough into searching for ways to achieve a long-term agreement with the 
USWA - or at least an agreement that would last longer than eighteen 
months. The Corporation could no longer afford the boom and bust cycle 
of steel strikes — imports increased each time there was even a threat of a 
strike. 
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After 1959 U. S. Steel also began to search for a new characterization of 
itself as well as the USWA. Steel demand is no longer at a level where 
there will be severe shortages if production is stopped for too long a period, 
and the demand is beginning to be met by other sources - foreign producers 
and substitute products. A new set of actors becomes more prevalent in U. 
S. Steel's narrative. Importers and producers of substitute products become 
the new villains in the story told by U. S. Steel. They are the groups forcing 
an unwanted, and unlooked for, competitive position on the Corporation, 
and they are attacking its dominance in the industry. If U. S. Steel is no 
longer the dominant firm in the largest steel industry in the world, what is 
its role? The narrative of this period reflects a certain amount of confusion 
about the Corporation's new role. 
The USWA. The narrative of the USWA during this period develops 
a theme of job security and needing to work with the industry to maintain 
what jobs there are (see table 8.3, p. 363). Layoffs have become a permanent 
part of steel industry employment, and higher wages do not benefit 
workers who are unemployed. The development of a Joint Human 
Relations Committee with U. S. Steel is an attempt to structure a 
permanent negotiating body to avoid the problems of cyclical negotiations 
as labor agreements come to an end. 
The narrative of the USWA contains some references to the new actors 
discussed by U. S. Steel — the new actors who are changing the nature of 
the U. S. steel industry. A more important element in the narrative of the 
Union than imports or substitute products however, is the growing use of 
automation in the industry. Imports and substitute products may be 
capturing market share, thereby affecting employment in the industry; but 
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automation in steel mills means less people to do the same job - and this is 
a more immediate threat. Further, the threat of automation serves as a 
negotiating point with management in the domestic industry - but the 
USWA does not negotiate with foreign producers. Stopping imports is 
someone else's job. 
The USWA narrative focuses during this period, on issues of 
importance to the membership. As U. S. Steel is attempting to find a new 
role for itself in the industry, the USWA is clarifying its role — to protect 
the jobs of its members. The primary theme is not the management as the 
enemy, but the need for management to understand the needs of workers. 
Strategic Management Analysts 
The analysts continue to assert that the industry should have invested 
in new technologies, and that management had become too conservative 
and risk averse (see table 8.3, p. 363). Again, this analysis, while apparently 
rational in the face of increased competition, fails to take into account the 
investment made by the industry earlier in the 1950s in "rounding out" 
existing plants. Having just completed what they believed to be a major 
modernization program, why buy new, unproved, technologies (see 
chapter 6)? Furthermore, U. S. Steel was actively pursuing a program of 
research and development to improve both processes and steel products. 
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement 
Both organizations agree on the need for change during this period, and 
both agree that the world in which they exist is changing. The response of 
each is to essentially withdraw into itself — into the rigid organizational 
infrastructure Adams & Mueller and other analysts (Lawrence & Dyer, 
1983) describe. The narratives come to resemble each other on some 
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points; although they are very different on others. The predominant 
themes in the narratives for example, reflect a belief that each side is no 
longer fighting to protect "the American way of life", but instead that new 
actors and new problems threaten both. The actions taken in response to 
those threats are however, very different. 
U. S. Steel, while still relying upon its past as a "great American 
corporation", finds that that past alone no longer is sufficient to justify its 
strategies and goals. Its future existence now depends more upon its ability 
to forge new alliances than to rely on old ones. It focuses on the need for 
operating efficiencies and profits, while searching for an identity in the 
newly competitive steel industry. The Corporation can no longer afford 
lengthy strikes, but neither can it afford expensive settlements with the 
USWA. The Union thus, becomes one more reason why the Corporation 
cannot compete on price in the steel market of the 1960s (see chapter 6). 
The Union on the other hand wants to preserve jobs for its members 
and this goal places it at odds with the Corporation. If U. S. Steel needs to 
automate and generally improve productivity, this means potentially 
fewer jobs for Steelworkers. Thus, the Union, while no longer interested 
in lengthy strikes, cannot allow U. S. Steel to act in such a way as to reduce 
employment. It is this link between the narratives and actions of the two 
organizations which the strategic management analysts overlook. Even if 
the Corporation wanted to adopt new technology it had to negotiate the 
implementation of that technology with the Union -- and the USWA 
portrayed these technologies as detrimental to its membership. 
In retreating into their own organizational shells, and striving to 
preserve their own interests, these organizations once again lost the 
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opportunity to develop a joint strategy which would work to the benefit of 
both. The two are inextricably linked at this point -- neither can imagine a 
scenario that does not include the other — but the scenarios are those of an 
uneasy alliance with an old enemy. Once again, the long history of 
adversarial labor-management relations in steel prevented the two 
f 
organizations from developing new narratives and themes which would 
have allowed them to develop new actions. 
1969 — U. S. Steel Diversifies 
The changes in narratives and themes which began after the 1959 steel 
strike led to another major change in 1969. U. S. Steel is no longer 
interested in maintaining its dominant position in the steel industry (see 
table 8.4, p.369). Instead, throughout this era, concerns about profitability 
and survival have replaced concerns about dominating an industry which 
is appears to be in decline. The change in themes signals a change in 
strategic direction toward increasing the emphasis on diversification begun 
during Blough's tenure. In fact, diversification as a means of improving 
profitability and return on equity becomes the central strategic focus for the 
Corporation during the mid-1970s. Publicly, U. S. Steel is still committed 
to the steel industry, but more and more of its net income is derived from 
the more profitable non-steel segment of its operations. The major themes 
of U. S. Steel and the USWA are outlined in table 8.4 (p.369). 
While U. S. Steel was pursuing its diversification strategy, the USWA 
was retreating further into its organizational shell. "Bread-and-Butter" 
unionism became the new theme of Abel's tenure as the Union pursued 
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p.369). As U. S. Steel began its move out of the steel industry the Union 
became more firmly entrenched in the industry. 
The Era of Diversification 
U. S. Steel. During this period, the Corporation began to pursue actions 
within two primary themes. First, profitability continued to decline and 
steel continued to be competitiive. Second diversification was a way to 
solve the profitability problem. Within the steel segment the Corporation 
pursued a strategy of survival with Government assistance. It is the 
Government who must be persuaded to enforce trade laws, enact tax 
reform more favorable to basic industry, and relax environmental control 
regulations. To make a profit in steel the Corporation needs Government 
assistance and cooperation on a variety of strategic issues. 
U. S. Steel's narrative becomes one of a once great corporation besieged 
by a number of "uncontrollable" forces in its traditional business. In order 
to escape the effects of these forces U. S. Steel branches out in new 
directions. This process was begun by Blough after the 1959 steel strike, but 
it is Gott in 1969 who by announcing the formation of a number of new 
divisions signals that U. S. Steel is seriously moving to protect itself from 
the cyclical nature of the steel industry (see table 8.4, p. 369). 
With respect to the USWA, U. S. Steel during this period pursued a 
strategy of labor peace at any cost. Union contracts may be expensive and 
raise costs but steel is becoming increasingly competitive and unprofitable 
anyway. If the Steelworkers are not on strike imports have less of a chance 
of capturing additional market share and further depressing corporate 
profits. The USWA is certainly part of the problem in this narrative, but 
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diversification signals a declining reliance on the Union as well as on the 
steel segment generally. 
The USWA. The USWA has entered an era when strikes are too 
expensive for what is achieved (see table 8.4,p.369). Steelworkers are 
among the highest paid manufacturing workers in the world, so that it is 
difficult to generate public sympathy for any action over wage and benefit 
packages. Finally, unemployment, and underemployment, have become 
common in the industry. In response to this the USWA joined with 
industry management during this period in calling for Government action 
on steel imports (see chapter 7). The Union also began lobbying for 
changes in the tax laws which would provide additional investment 
dollars to modernize the steel industry. Finally, the USWA began to 
organize workers in other related industries such as aluminum and 
copper. 
The USWA narrative during this period becomes one of victories 
through collective bargaining - not strikes. Its demands for higher wages 
and benefits have been met in large part, and it is now seeking some 
guarantees of job security - or at least benefits for those laid off in plant 
closings. The USWA does not depict itself as besieged by uncontrollable 
forces in the sense that the Corporation is. Rather, it depicts itself as a hero 
resting on its laurels. The Union has accomplished a great deal since 1942, 
and is using that history to continue to provide benefits to its members. 
Steel management is no longer the enemy - it is an ally in the effort to give 
Steelworkers the best possible contracts - but it is an ally in pursuit of its 
own ends, and thus not altogether trustworthy. 
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Adams & Mueller. Adams & Mueller characterize this as an era of 
change in the environment of the steel industry (see table 8.4, p. 369). 
Imports and substitute products are taking more market share, and the 
minimills are just beginning to develop as a force in the industry. At the 
same time, the integrated firms were spending money on modernization 
programs in an attempt to catch up. However, "Rather than concentrating 
its funds on plants that held promise of being transformed into world-class 
operations, the industry spread available funds over too many plants, 
many of them of marginal efficiency" (p. 105). The most remarkable thing 
about this investment, they go on to say, "is that, per ton of steel capacity 
installed or replaced, the industry had outspent it European and Japanese 
rivals" (p. 105). 
In an effort to address the import problem the Government established 
a Voluntary Restraint Agreement with Japan and the European 
Community to limit imports. The major effect of this was not to spur the 
steel firms to find ways to improve production processes or increase 
market share, but to allow them to raise prices. "In the four years .... 
while the VRA was in effect, the steel price index rose 26.7 points — or 6.67 
points per year -- which was twice as much as the index for all industrial 
products (including steel)" (p. 94). In the case of U. S. Steel any additional 
cash from the price increases was as likely to go to diversification out of 
steel as into improving its position in the steel industry. 
Adams & Mueller present a picture of an industry whose major firms 
were given an opportunity to modernize and become competitive, but 
chose not to. The money that was invested in steel did not improve the 
competitive position of the industry. ". . . the costly investment effort 
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made by the U. S. steel industry foundered on the lack of integrated, 
organic company planning with respect to plant structure and 
organization. . (p. 105). This was a lost opportunity which would 
continue to haunt the industry through the 1970s. 
Strategic Management Analysts 
In general, analysts agree with Adams & Mueller's assessment that the 
industry should have spent money on modernization not diversification 
(see table 8.4, p. 369). However, given the relatively low profit margins in 
steel (see chapter 3), and the inroads into market share made by importers, 
substitutes, and the minimills, steel did not appear to be an attractive 
investment opportunity for the large integrated firms. In spite of the fact 
that many of the economic projections of the period called for a continued 
growth in steel demand, the integrated firms saw much of that growth 
going to importers (see chapters 3 & 6). Additional investment in steel 
production capacity was not a policy which industry leaders faced with 
excess capacity were likely to pursue. 
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement 
To a greater extent than in the past the narratives of U. S. Steel and the 
USWA reflect very different ways of making sense of the world. Both 
narratives include a whole new set of actors from steel importers, to 
producers of substitute products, to the international banking community 
which funds steel plants in countries which traditionally have no right to a 
steel industry (Brazil, Mexico and Nigeria for example). The set of actions 
each takes with respect to these actors is quite different however. 
U. S. Steel begins to characterize itself during this period as diversified 
producer of materials and services. This is very different from the 
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characterization made by Olds or Fairless of U. S. Steel as the greatest 
corporation inthe greatest steel industry in the world. Gott's narrative 
contains no similar theme. Instead he is searching for a means to 
guarantee organizational survival and profits. 
For U. S. Steel it no longer means much to be the largest firm in an 
industry experiencing declining shipments, revenues, and profits. 
Besieged on all sides in the steel segment, the Corporation takes refuge in 
flight. If steel is only occasionally profitable it is better to find business 
segments which can support steel when it is not profitable. Like the rest of 
the industry U. S. Steel invests in modernization programs. Unlike much 
of the industry, the Corporation hedges its bets by also investing in real 
estate, chemicals, and a variety of other business ventures. If the new 
actors want the steel industry they can have it. U. S. Steel will only remain 
in those areas where it can make a profit. 
The USWA by contrast focuses most of its attention on the steel 
industry during this period. It now characterizes itself as an accepted, and 
important part of American life. It is the largest industrial union in the U. 
S. with approximately 1.5 million members, financially strong, and 
courted by political parties for its endorsement of candidates. The Union is 
no longer concerned with effecting a redistribution of profits, nor even 
with being an active participant in the management of the industry. 
Increased unemployment is a problem in the narrative, but the USWA 
has been asking the Government to do something about unemployment 
since the late 1950s. The Union joins with the Corporation in asking for 
protection from imports, but the USWA can, and does, negotiate contracts 
which help to protect their members from the effects of plant closings. If 
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the Government will not protect the industry, at least, in this narrative, 
the Union can protect its members. 
The effect of imports on unemployment is not as critical an issue 
during this period for the USWA as might be expected because of its own 
strength in negotiating new agreements. The Union, throughout this era, 
is able to get a variety of concessions from management as long as it does 
not go out on strike. The Corporation needs the workers, but more 
importantly needs to guarantee its customers that there will be no 
disruptions in deliveries. The Union, as the price of its alliance, extracts 
the "best contracts ever" time and again (see chapters 6 & 7). 
Both organizations are aware of many of the issues Adams & Mueller 
and other analysts (Kiers, 1980, Crandall, 1981) raise (see chapters 6 & 7). 
However, where the USWA continues to see some hope of revitalizung 
the steel industry, U. S. Steel sees very little. Interestingly, it is the USWA 
during this period which is searching for some means of helping the 
industry recover its competitive edge, just as U. S. Steel is searching for a 
way out of the industry. 
The narratives reflect not only different sense-makings but different 
worlds. The USWA acts on the theme that the Government wants to 
minimize unemployment and cannot let the steel industry simply shut 
down. The Corporation acts on the theme that while looking for 
Government assistance it needs to protect itself. Each organization is 
acting in what it believes to be its own best interests. In the area of steel 
they are still linked, and both see the advantage of no strikes. The 
common bonds that lead to a no strike agreement are not strong enough to 
allow the two to work together to develop a strategy for renewing the 
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industry. The Corporation is concerned with short-term profits and the 
Union with retaining jobs. These interests are in conflict, and neither is 
willing to change the narrative to allow for additional cooperation to save 
both. 
The 1970s - Declining Steel Demand 
Adams & Mueller 
The period which Adams & Mueller identify as a real punctuation 
point for the steel industry is 1974 (see table 8.5, p. 377). 1974 is identified as 
a watershed year in the area of steel demand, which since that time has 
been relatively weak in all of the industrialized nations. Apparent steel 
consumption reached a peak in the U. S. in 1973 (see chapter 3), and 
declined through the rest of the 1970s and early 1980s. "It appears that after 
most of the investment was made to furnish people with homes, 
automobiles, and the supporting infrastructure, less steel was needed to 
support economic growth" (p. 77). 
This decline in steel demand had a number of impacts on the industry 
as a whole according to Adams & Mueller. First, it forced many of the large 
firms to merge and consolidate operations, so that by the 1980s U. S. Steel 
was no longer the dominant firm in the industry. Second, the decline in 
demand has forced most of the major firms to rationalize and restructure 
operations. These two actions mean that a number of plants have been 
closed. Finally, minimills have become a much more important element 
of the industry. These mills have been able to compete with the importers 
and by locating close to customers they have captured a considerable share 
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The loss of market share and control of the industry on the part of the 
integrated firms is blamed on their ignoring the changes occurring in the 
1960s, or responding in an inappropriate fashion. The lack of competition 
and the oligopolistic structure of the structure of the industry Adams & 
Mueller argue "encouraged a cost-plus, target-rate-of-return pricing policy" 
and discouraged innovation and any organic planning on the part of the 
integrated firms (p. 99). 
Strategic Management Analysts 
Other analysts reflect the themes outlined by Adams & Mueller for this 
period (see table 8.5, p. 377). As steel demand declines the analysts assert 
that the industry should rationalize — something it is forced to do as profits 
continue to decline and the excess capacity issue continues to plague the 
industry on a world-wide basis — and to invest in new technologies and 
process improvements. The latter recommendations make little sense to 
companies faced with closing plants and a severe profit squeeze (see 
chapters 3 & 6). 
The Industry in 1974 
Interestingly, neither the USWA nor U. S. Steel appears to view 1974 as 
any particular break point in their histories. Both acknowledge the decline 
in demand and steel production, which combined with world-wide excess 
capacity created an even more depressed steel market. However, the 
themes and narratives discussed in relation to the diversification occurring 
in the late 1960s continue in the mid-1970s (see table 8.5, p.377). If 
anything, both organizations see some hope for improved conditions — U. 
S. Steel through diversification, and the USWA through improved 
contracts. The one new action taken by the two organizations is the 
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signing of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement — which guaranteed 
no strikes in exchange for guaranteed wage increases. The ENA was 
however, simply a formalization of the negotiating pattern of the 1960s. 
The 1980s - The End of Steel 
The 1980s mark another major punctuation point in the narratives of 
both U. S. Steel and the USWA. Beginning in 1979 the predominant 
theme of the U. S. Steel narrative is the abandonment of the steel industry 
(see table 8.6, p.380). If, in the late 1960s, diversification was a means of 
improving performance, in the 1980s it has become an end in itself. For 
the USWA the predominant theme is one of survival (see table 8.6, p. 380). 
It is still attempting to act out of a theme of alliance with the steel 
management to revitalize the industry, but the management is moving its 
organization out of the industry. Additionally therefore, the USWA is 
beginning to pursue its own theme of moving out of the steel industry by 
organizing workers in new industries. The major themes for the two 
organizations are outlined in table 8.6 (p. 380). 
Any idea of remaining the dominant firm in the U. S. steel industry is 
being replaced by a strategy of remaining only in the steel markets where 
the Corporation can be profitable. Organizational renewal and profitability 
have replaced survival as major themes for U. S. Steel.. Diversification is 
no longer being pursued to help cushion the Corporation against the cycles 
of steel demand. It is now being pursued as means of remaking U. S. Steel 
- as a means of developing a "NEW U. S. Steel". (USS Annual 
Report.1984). 
As the Corporation begins its program of rationalizing its steel segment 
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USWA fades. This brings about the need for a new theme, and the search 
for this theme is evident in the confusion about organizational goals 
during this period. At first, McBride continues a theme of alliance and 
looks for ways to work with management to make the firms viable. 
Finally, Williams is forced to develop a theme which takes the USWA out 
of steel as well. 
The End of Steel 
U. S. Steel. The theme the Corporation develops during this period 
takes it in a number of directions that can only be termed the endgame for 
steel (see table 8.6, p. 380). First, U. S. Steel pursues a course of actively 
rationalizing the steel segment. The plant closings begun in 1979 continue 
throughout the 1980s, in spite of the costs associated with the closings, and 
their impact on corporate profits (see chapter 6). Closely related to the 
rationalization of the steel segment was the sale of assets including the 
corporate headquarters building in an effort to raise cash for other 
programs. U. S. Steel was moving out of all of its unprofitable areas. 
In the pursuit of this endgame theme in steel, the Corporation 
essentially ignores the USWA. Roderick is engaged in a course of action to 
remake U. S. Steel, and in the pursuit of that strategy he no longer needs 
the Steelworkers Union. In fact, when in 1984 he announces the 
development of a New U. S. Steel — it is a "New" U. S. Steel that is 
essentially an energy company. Steel has been relegated to second place in 
the strategy of the Corporation that was once the world's largest steel 
producer, and with it the USWA has been brushed aside as unimportant. 
The USWA. The theme followed by the USWA during this period 
reflects some confusion on the part of the Union as to what its new role 
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should be (see table 8.6, p. 380). By the time Williams assumes control of 
the Union in late 1983, it has become apparent that steel will not rebound - 
and more importantly, that U. S. Steel, and other large integrated steel 
firms, are permanently moving out of steel. This brings a change in theme 
for the USWA, as is evident in the development of a strategy for 
organizing workers in growth industries. Membership is at the lowest 
level since the early years of the Union, and if the USWA is to survive it 
too needs to move out of steel (see chapter 7). 
At the same time, Williams begins a hard-line course of action with 
respect to negotiating with management. The concessions the Union has 
made in the early 1980s have neither saved the industry nor Steelworker 
jobs. In adopting a strategy of considering each case on its own merits, 
Williams leaves open the possibility of a strike - something essentially 
unknown in steel since 1959. At the same time the USWA has little to lose 
in striking. 
Like the Corporation, it realizes that steel is in decline - not just in the 
U. S. but on a worldwide basis - and it needs to diversify into new areas. U. 
S. Steel can abandon its steel segment, but the USWA cannot totally 
abandon its members still employed in steel. Unlike the Corporation, the 
USWA still needs to find a way to make steel a viable enterprise. 
Adams & Mueller. By the 1980s Adams & Mueller see little hope for 
the integrated segment of the U. S. steel industry (see table 8.6, p. 380). The 
firms failed to follow an appropriate strategy when they had the chance in 
the 1960s. The only option left is to see who can survive, and let the 
minimills and importers continue to increase their share of the market. 
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Strategic Management Analysts 
Unlike Adams & Mueller, many strategic management analysts see the 
possibility of a revival in steel under certain conditions (Kiers, 1980; 
Lawrence & Dyer, 1983; Barnett & Schorsch, 1983). The analysts stress the 
need for aggressive and bold leadership, and innovation and efficiency in 
the industry if it is to compete in the 1980s (see table 8.6, p.380). 
Additionally, they stress the need for a desire to survive on the part of the 
firms. It is this last which is apparently lacking in the steel industry in the 
1980s. Certainly U. S. Steel has no desire to survive as a steel company in 
the 1980s, and no longer describes itself as a steel firm. Thus, while the 
possibility for renewal may exist, the large integrated firms have in large 
part abandoned the industry. 
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement 
The themes of the two organizations at this point in time make it 
apparent that they now inhabit different worlds. This is most evident in 
the U. S. Steel narrative during this era. Essentially, the narrative now 
includes steel only at the margin. Throughout the early 1980s the energy 
segment moves to center stage, replacing steel as the focus of the narrative 
(see chapter 6). The Corporation is no longer besieged by "uncontrollable" 
forces, but has once again taken control of its destiny. 
The USWA narrative on the other hand, retains steel as a central focus 
until much later (see chapter 7). The USWA is still including steel 
management as an ally - although steel management is moving the 
Corporation out of steel. The USWA is not really a hero in its own story 
during this endgame period. It has perhaps, allowed itself to be deceived 
into thinking that the Corporation had a long-term committment to steel. 
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and that it wanted to work with the Union to make the plants viable. 
However, the USWA itself begins to move out of steel by the mid-1980s. 
The narratives of the two organizations during this era thus have 
entirely separate fod. While the Union is lost in the morass of the 
declining steel industry, as the Corporation was during the 1970s; the 
Corporation is now cutting its way out of the web which entangled it. The 
two organizations are not simply recounting different sides of the same 
story - as they were in an earlier era - but recounting entirely different sets 
of events. 
U. S. Steel may no longer be THE CORPORATION, but it is also no 
longer interested in dominating the steel industry. Instead, it is now 
actively engaged in divesting itself of unprofitable operations -- in 
whatever line-of-business — and investing in areas that promise future 
growth and profitability. The Corporation has freed itself from the 
historical reliance on steel for its identity, and finally come to believe its 
own description of itself as a diversified producer of materials and services 
(see chapter 6). 
It is the USWA which is now searching for a new legitimacy for its 
polides and actions. Membership is now down to about 740,000, from a 
high of 1.5 million in the mid-1970s. The Union has had to lay off its own 
employees and make a number of cuts due to tight budgets. The dedine in 
finandal and numerical strength was very rapid, much of it occurring in 
the period 1980 to 1984, and the USWA has not had time to adjust to the 
need for a new identity (see chapter 7). 
By the 1980s any possibility of cooperation to save the industry is gone. 
The efforts of both organizations earlier to find areas of compromise failed. 
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From the 1950s on, the narratives diverged and each organization became a 
part of the "problem" for the other. Adams & Mueller in not finding 
much hope for the steel industry in the 1980s reflect the attitudes of those 
in the industry. Both the USWA and U. S. Stel are abandoning their 
traditional areas in 1985. The integrated steel industry in the U. S. has 
diminished to a point of little importance in the economic calculations of 
the nation. 
Conclusions 
Throughout the period 1945 to 1985 the USWA and U. S. Steel have 
been faced with a variety of strategic issues, and the need to develop 
themes and narratives which would help them explain and justify their 
policies and actions to important groups of stakeholders. The narratives 
they developed served not only to explain and justify actions, but also as a 
means of defining the possibilities for new actions. The strategies followed 
by each organization during any period, had to be congruent with the 
narrative and themes for that era, and if new actions were called for new 
narratives had to be developed (for example, the period following the 1959 
Steel Strike). 
Relation to Theory 
The narratives, as discussed here, reflect the attributions each 
organization has made about itself and other actors in its world. For the 
psychologist, as noted in chapter 4, attributions allow individuals to 
develop "an organized and meaningful view of the world in which they 
live" (Tetlock & Levi, 1982:68). These attributions become a form of 
automatic scanning which allows individuals to minimize the amount of 
new information they have to process. Events can be placed within the 
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framework of existing categories and causal relationships, as long as they 
"make sense" and allow for action. New frameworks have to be devised 
when new events and information no longer fit easily into the existing 
patterns. 
This study has assumed that the interpretations of events and the 
attributions developed by top managers in each organization form the basis 
for organizational interpretations and attributions. As noted in chapter 
four, the approach to understanding the relationship between 
organizational and individual interpretations and attributions taken in 
this project is derived from a set of assumptions proposed by Daft & Weick 
(1984) and Ford & Baucus (1987). 
First, it is assumed that "when one speaks of organizational 
interpretation one really means interpretation by a relatively small group 
at the top of the organizational hierarchy" (Daft & Weick, 1984: 285). 
Second, it "is assumed that formal organizational interpretations are 
something more than individual decision makers' interpretations" (Ford 
& Baucus, 1987: 367). That is, individual decision makers (or top 
managers), through a variety of mechanisms - organizational history and 
experiences and social interchange amon others - "create collectively 
shared or consensual realities" (Ford & Baucus, 1987: 367). These 
collective realities in turn, form the basis for interpretations and the 
development of strategies based on those interpretations. 
Narratives and Themes 
The narratives and themes analyzed here are the formal 
representations of those interpretations, attributions, and actions. The 
punctuation points identified represent the points at which the 
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organizational interpretations and causal frameworks changed to 
incorporate new events and information. As new strategies developed to 
deal with new enemies and new alliances, new narratives had to be 
developed to allow the organization to justify the changes occurring. 
It is interesting to note that while the USWA and U. S. Steel were 
telling different sides of the same story at the beginning of the time period 
under consideration, they progressed to the point of telling entirely 
different stories. The organizational interpretations and causal 
frameworks that each developed to understand its world, first led them 
into an era of understanding that they essentially existed in the same 
world - confronted the same enemies and needed the same allies. As that 
world began to crumble however, each interpreted that end in different 
ways, and developed very different stories — based in part on their 
understanding of their individual histories — with which to frame their 
futures. 
The fact that the narratives did diverge, and that the punctuation points 
were rarely the same — or if they were, they were not understood in the 
same way — is important in the interactions of the two organizations. For 
much of the forty years under study the fates of the two organizations were 
intertwined. The actions of one almost inevitably affected the actions of 
the other. As the narratives differed, the actions of each also differed. Each 
organization made sense of its world in a different fashion, interpreting 
the same events differently, or not even paying attention to similar events. 
Some of what has been termed "environmental turbulence" surely stems 
from these different narratives. In the end, not only did the narratives 
diverge — so did the fates of the USWA and U. S. Steel. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
This project began out of an interest in understanding why an industry 
like steel changed from being the major steel industry in the world to a 
condition of near extinction. In the early to mid-1980s, the popular 
business press was filled with stories about the decline of American 
manufacturing, particularly the decline of the once-great American steel 
industry (Forbes, Business Week, Fortune). During the same period a 
number of academics, particularly those in the areas of management and 
economics, were writing about the "decline" of the American steel 
industry (e.g.:Kiers, 1980; Crandall, 1982; Barnett & Schorsch 1983). 
The approach taken in most of these studies was one of attempting to 
discover where management went wrong, and why managers did not 
foresee "environmental changes". Barnett & Schorsch (1983) for example, 
begin by stating that "Over the last thirty years, the American steel industry 
has been transformed from a symbol of industrial might into a symptom of 
industrial blight" (p.4). They go on to say "Firms in the traditional 
integrated sector, however, have failed to develop a strategy appropriate to 
their actual conditions. A more innovative and yet more realistic strategy 
is required" (p. 8). Similarly, Lawrence & Dyer (1983) state "The steel 
industry environment has changed dramatically since World War II, while 
the major American firms have remained stubbornly attached to old 
atrategies and stuck in old organizational forms" (p. 84). 
This study was an attempt to take a different approach to understanding 
the events which have occurred in the U. S. steel industry during the 
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period 1945 to 1985. In undertaking to provide a different form of 
explanation, this project was principally concerned with searching for an 
understanding of how those in the industry chose to act in the manner 
they did. In other words, could the actions which those of us standing 
"outside" the industry, with the advantage of hindsight bias, describe as 
irrational, be rational within the context created by those "in" the industry 
at the time? 
In the process of carrying out this project however, the project itself was 
changed. The original concept of industry change — of a decline from 
world power to struggle for survival — did not describe what had occurred 
in the segment of the U. S. steel industry with which this project is 
concerned (U. S. Steel and the United Steelworkers). In fact, as the analysis 
of the narratives and actions points out, this became less a study of 
industry change; and more a study of industry stability. That is, instead of 
attempting to understand how things had changed during the forty year 
period being studied, this project attempts to understand why things did 
not change. 
This chapter addresses both the issue of stability in the industry as well 
as the changes which occurred in this study. First, in drawing together the 
findings and discussing the implications of those findings for both strategic 
management researchers and practitioners, the question of understanding 
why leaders in this segment of the steel industry were able to maintain 
such stable narratives will be addressed. Did steel industry management 
simply make a series of "bad" decisions as the more conventional analysts 
assert? Or, did they make reasonable choices at the time given the 
constraints of human psychology and organizational and industry history? 
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Second, the manner in which the project itself was changed will be 
discussed. How does the final outcome differ from what was initially 
envisioned? Why? In what ways does carrying out an interpretive 
research project such as this lend itself to "detours" away from the original 
intent of the researcher? Finally, how was the final form of the project 
influenced by the researcher’s role as interpreter and critic? 
Summary of Research Findings 
Implementing Questions Addressed 
This study posed a series of implementing questions which differed 
fundamentally from the research question which drives the more 
conventional studies; one form of which is "why do so many American 
firms and industries fail, in their maturity to maintain their competitive 
vitality?" (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983: 3). The questions posed here were not 
concerned with answering why steel failed to remain competitive, but 
were concerned with understanding why steel industry management acted 
as they did. 
The questions which this study asked were as follows: 
1. How do the USS and the USWA each characterize themselves? 
2. How do the USS and the USWA each characterize the other 
key actors in their worlds? 
3. How much overlap is there in terms of concepts and relationships 
among concepts from CEO to CEO for USS and President to President 
for the USWA? 
These three questions were the principal focus of the analysis and 
interpretations in chapters 6 and 7. Additionally, these chapters 
endeavored to answer a fourth question of interest here. 
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4. Do the strategic actions taken by each side (USS and the USWA) 
reflect the patterns of expressed beliefs identified through 
the analysis of the public statements? 
Chapter 3, which provided a brief history of the steel industry for the 
period under consideration, with chapters 6 and 7, discussed the question 
of what the major events were during this period, and helped to answer 
the question 
5. What are the strategic actions which each CEO or President took 
with respect to the major events which occurred during 
his regime? 
Finally, chapter 8 was an attempt to answer the following question: 
6. How much overlap is there between the narratives or stories 
identified through the first two questions for the USS and the 
USWA? 
In comparing the punctuation points in the two sets of narratives the 
interactions between the two groups could be assessed, as well as the 
impact of that interaction on the strategies which each organization 
devised. Additionally, the type of comparison which question 6 directs 
allowed the researcher to go beyond simply looking at the interactions of 
the two groups, and explore how the manner in which each group 
understood their role in the industry during any period of time affected the 
nature of the interaction. 
As noted in chapter 4, the focus of this particular study was on trying to 
understand how those in the industry interpreted and enacted their 
environment, rather than on why steel executives did not discover the 
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changes in the environment. The questions discussed above provided a 
means of getting at those interpretations and enactments. 
Research Findings 
In general, the findings presented in chapters 6, 7 & 8 outline the 
evolution of a strategy, or pattern of actions and decisions (Andrews, 1987; 
Mintzberg, 1978), for the two organizations studied. In the case of U. S. 
Steel (chapter 6) the diversification strategy established in the 1960s had a 
profound effect on the strategies of the 1980s. Faced with continuing 
problems in the steel segment, while the majority of corporate profits were 
being derived from the non-steel segment, U. S. Steel management chose 
to complete the program of diversifying out of steel. In large part, the 
strategies of the 1980s were simply the completion of earlier themes and 
choices, rather than the adaptation of a firm to particular environmental 
changes. 
The United Steelworkers (chapter 7) strategy evolved from that 
developed by a group essentially outside the industry and needing to prove 
its value to its members, to one devised by a group inextricably part of the 
industry - whose input is needed to "save" the industry. Interestingly, as 
U. S. Steel's diversification efforts expanded, so did the efforts of the 
USWA to work with industry management to revitalize the steel industry. 
The comparisons presented in chapter 8 describe, not a continual 
process of change, but a series of changes in narratives and themes marked 
by a set of punctuation points — the abandonment of one theme and the 
beginning of another. The steel industry did not, in this analysis, simply 
fail to recognize environmental changes all along and make a series of bad 
decisions which led it further into decline. Instead, as chapter 8 points out. 
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industry managers’ interpretations of events changed slowly, and were 
informed both by their own history, and by their interactions with other 
actors in the industry. 
The findings presented in the three chapters demonstrate the extent to 
which organizational and industry history influence managers' 
interpretations of the world in which they exist, and the possibilities for 
action within that interpretation. Attributions about ones' self, and others, 
are slow to change. The narratives which reflect those attributions are 
important to the organization and to the development of strategic actions. 
The manner in which steel industry managers chose to understand their 
role, and the role of others in the industry, had a long-term impact on the 
strategies they developed. 
Neither U. S. Steel nor the USWA can be said to have anticipated 
environmental changes and developed strategies to deal with those. 
Instead, as is apparent in chapters 6 and 7, new information was frequently 
placed in existing narratives and themes. As long as the organization 
could continue to act, the narrative in use appeared to be an appropriate 
interpretation of the world. When action was no longer possible, when 
the problem became impossible to ignore, the narrative and themes were 
changed to allow a new set of actions. 
If there was any point at which change was possible — a point in time at 
which the narratives might have been used to develop a truly new series 
of actions -- it was 1953. McDonald offered a new means of understanding 
labor-management relations which might have led to a concerted effort to 
manage the industry together. The Corporation however, heard this 
initiative through its own story of antagonism to the Union and rejected 
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the offer. After that point, each organization retreated into its own story 
and the actions which were beneficial to its organization, rather than the 
industry as a whole. 
Thus, in chapter 8, the industry moves through a series of punctuation 
points after 1953 which reflect each organization's understanding of its 
world. The narratives and themes developed at each point contained 
some elements of the previous narrative and themes as well as the seeds of 
the next. The industry, or at least the segment studied here then, did not 
so much undergo a "decline" as series of changes as the organizations' 
understanding of their world changed. Instead of moving inexorably 
through a decline toward death, these organizations experienced a series of 
modifications in direction as new interpretations of the world replaced old 
ones. 
Comparison with Conventional Strategic Management 
An Interpretive Perspective 
The interpretive perspective taken in this project, is concerned with 
what it means for individuals to organize and make sense of the world, 
rather than how organizations and environments can be controlled. 
Strategy becomes then, the set of actions possible within the context of that 
particular sense-making and organizing. In this it differs from the more 
conventional strategic management concept of strategy which assumes that 
"a firm can choose and implement a generic strategy to achieve and sustain 
a competitive advantage" (Porter, 1985: 26). 
The concept of social construction, which is central to this project was 
taken to mean the manner in which the top management of an 
organization "made sense" of the world so that the organization could take 
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action. Additionally, it incorporated the notion that the interpretations 
and social constructions of the two organizations studied here were 
intertwined. That is, the manner in which top managers "made sense” of 
their world was affected by the interchanges with other organizations - for 
example, the Government and either the Corporation or the Union. 
Further, the sense-making process was affected by the history of the 
organization and the history of the interchanges with the other 
organizations (see chapters 6, 7 & 8). 
The perspective taken throughout this project assumes that the top 
management of the organization is not scanning the environment for 
threats and opportunities (Schendel & Hofer, 1979); but is instead placing 
new information into an already developed cognitive framework of the 
organization and the industry. This perspective incorporates many of the 
findings of cognitive and social psychology, as noted in chapter 4, into the 
concept of enactment. That is, individuals make attributions about 
themselves and others in their world, and these attributions form the basis 
of a more elaborate schema which in turn, allows them to frame the 
information they are processing. 
The public statements of the actors were taken to be a form of narrative 
containing a series of themes, which in turn, are central to understanding 
how these managers made sense of their world. Unlike conventional 
strategic management which admonishes managers " to implement 
systematic and impersonal scanning, planning, and analytical processes 
that reduce or eliminate perceptual "biases"" this approach assumes "that 
decision makers use different frames of reference to make sense of events; 
facts do not speak for themselves" (Ford & Baucus, 1987: 367). 
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The narratives used by these managers provided both a means of 
understanding how much information — what aspects of sense-making — 
were repeated over time, and what actions the organization chose to take - 
and how those actions were derived from the framework in the narrative 
and, at the same time, affected changes in that framework. Thus, unlike 
conventional strategic management which regard managers 
interpretations and frameworks as "variance to be removed or 
eliminated”; this approach assumes that ”it is not possible to eliminate 
interpretations, only to alter them, and whether actions based on them will 
work is not knowable a priori” (Ford & Baucus, 1987: 377). 
Comparison with Other Studies of the U. S. Steel Industry 
As noted earlier, this study differs from the more conventional studies 
of the steel industry first in the theoretical perspective taken, and then in 
the type of questions which informed the study. Both of these issues have 
been discussed in the above section. This section will discuss specific 
differences between this study and other studies of the steel industry. 
First, unlike most other studies, the current study does not assert that 
the "present plight of the steel industry" is an example of "what can 
happen when firms fail to adapt to their environments" (Lawrence & 
Dyer, 1983:84). Instead, this study focused on how management 
understood their world, and explained and justified actions within that 
framework. The environment is not treated here as a set of discrete events 
- "future market growth, difficulties with international trade, the need to 
open new sources of raw materials, as well as the necessity to develop and 
apply new technology" - which can be discovered and measured (Hogan, 
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1983: 1). Rather, the environment is assumed to be the interpretations 
managers place upon events. 
This distinction in turn, points up another difference. - the point of 
view taken in this study as opposed to the point of view taken in the 
earlier studies. Kiers (1980) and Barnett & Schorsch (1983), among others, 
take the perspective of the outsider analyzing what has gone wrong with 
the U. S. steel industry. In turn, this perspective informs the purpose of 
their studies which is "to suggest the contours of a more appropriate 
strategy for the industry and the integrated firms" (Barnett & Schorsch, 
1983:8). The implicit assumption here is that in some fashion, the outsider 
can more accurately assess what "the appropriate strategy for the industry" 
is. 
The present study makes no such assumption, and offers no 
prescriptions for the future. In taking the insiders point of view the study 
attempted - not to point out what management had done wrong - but to 
understand why management made the choices it did. Thus, instead of 
suggesting a more "appropriate strategy" for the industry, which assumes 
that the industry has followed an incorrect strategy; this study offers some 
insights into the rationale behind the strategy followed. 
In fact, in reviewing much of the conventional strategic management 
literature, U. S. Steel appears to have followed very closely the 
prescriptions for a firm caught in a mature/declining industry. Porter 
(1980) for example, discusses as options the need for focusing on a market 
niche, harvesting the declining segment of the firm, or simply divesting 
that segment. U. S. Steel has, in the 1970s and 1980s, pursued all of these 
strategies with relation to its steel segment (see chapter 6), as well as 
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increasing its efforts to diversify into related industries. Similarly, the 
USWA - although somewhat later than U. S. Steel - has begun to diversify 
out of its steel segment and into other more profitable areas. 
If these organizations have in fact followed the types of strategies 
strategic management researchers would suggest for their industry, why do 
the analysts persist in labelling the strategies "wrong"? Jones (1986) offers 
one explanation: 
For industrialized or industrializing countries of the world, 
steel is more than an industry; it is a state of mind. Steel is 
economic strength, the symbol of burgeoning 
industrialization; it is the material of which bridges, cities and 
manufacturing industries are built. Steel is, finally, the 
product of a vital, robust workforce, whose muscle becomes 
transformed, through the plates and bars and wires it 
produces, into the national foundation of economic power 
and strength. 
Thus, a downturn in the domestic steel industry 
typicallyprovides highly visible, dramatic evidence of a 
downturn in the entire economy; .... (Jones, 1986: 1-2). 
For many analysts (Hogan, 1983; Barnett & Schorsch, 1983; Lawrence & 
Dyer, 1983; Crandall, 1981; Kiers, 1980) the failure of the steel industry to 
remain strong and vital - to retain a competitive advantage - is indicative 
of the failure of the entire economy to do so. Explanations of 
diversification on the part of the firms - to cushion themselves from the 
cycles of the steel industry - are seen as diversions of funds away from 
revitalization of the industry. Thus, instead of industry managers being 
commended for making "reasonable" strategic choices in a world of global 
excess steel capacity and low growth in steel demand, they are admonished 
for not improving their competitive position in steel. 
A recent study which has not taken this perspective is that of Tiffany 
(1988), which explores "how management, labor, and government went 
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wrong". Tiffany takes as his central concept, not the concept of managerial 
inefficiency which is central to the studies cited above, but the concept of 
institutional divisiveness. 
We have endeavored to show how the absence of any 
ameliorating public programs for steel, combined with the 
steadfast intransigence of corporate and labor leaders, played 
an important role in the industry's eventual decline. By 
contrast, we noted how several foreign nations proved far 
more successful in establishing collaborative relations with 
their own steel producers; one result was improved 
international performance by these offshore competitors 
(Tiffany, 1988: 186). 
The current study differs from the approach taken by Tiffany in that it 
does not focus specifically on issues of institutional divisiveness. Instead, 
the findings presented in chapter 8 focus on the unintended consequences 
of the intertwining of the narratives of the narratives of the two 
organizations. That is, rather than considering U. S. Steel and the USWA 
as permanently at odds with one another, this study treats them as integral 
parts of each others strategic narratives and scenarios. 
Tiffany's study explores the failure of the organizations to develop a 
joint policy to deal with the problems affecting the steel industry, and the 
way in which that failure contributed to the decline of the industry. The 
present study explores the manner in which the organization's different 
ways of understanding the industry, and their role in the industry, affected 
both the actions each devised as well as the interactions between the 
organizations - not with an emphasis on how these differences contributed 
to the decline of the industry, but with an eye to how these differences 
contributed to the changes in the industry which occurred between 1945 
and 1985. 
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Significance of this Study 
This study makes a number of contributions to both strategic 
management theory and practice. The significance of this study for 
strategic management theory and research are as follows: 
• the interpretive perspective which informs this project 
provides an alternative approach to researching and 
understanding how an organization's strategy evolves and 
develops over time. 
• this study explicitly treats the union as a key actor 
in the industry. 
• this study develops an empirical base how the manner in 
which strategists "make sense" of or socially construct their 
world constrains the possibilities for action on the part of the 
organization. 
• explicitly treats organizational and industry history as 
important elements in the development and maintenance of 
strategic narratives or frames of reference. 
• utilizes methods from history and narrative analysis in a 
longitudinal study to analyze archival data to understand the 
evolution of strategies in a particular industry and subset of 
organizations. 
The implications of this study for strategic management research and 
theory are as follows: 
• including the union broadens our understanding of 
industry and introduces an important new actor. 
• the use of research methods from history and narrative 
analysis provide a new means of analyzing data and 
answering different questions from those addressed 
by more conventional strategic management research 
methods. 
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• the interpretive perspective taken here introduces a 
different set of questions to strategic management 
research ~ "how" questions. 
The significance for strategic management practice is: 
• provides evidence of the influence of patterns of top 
management succession on the evolution and formulation 
of strategies. 
• provides evidence of the influence of organizational history 
on the evolution and formulation of strategies. 
• raises again the need to incorporate a broader variety of 
perspectives in the strategy formulation process. 
• provides a cautionary tale for managers in other industries. 
The implications for strategic management practice essentially lie in the 
possibility of different prescriptions for managers and consultants. One key 
implication of this study lies not, in the sense of an inevitable decline, but 
in the need to pay attention to other organization's narratives. Thus, one 
role for a consultant here is to help an organization understand its stories 
and the implications of those stories for action. The cautionary tale this 
study develops demonstrates the problems inherent in not being aware of 
the dangers of being trapped in your own story. 
The Changes in this Project 
As noted earlier, the final form of this project is somewhat different 
from that originally envisioned, and in part this can be attributed to the 
manner in which the project was carried out. I began with the assumption 
that some form of industry change could be traced and that it would be a 
continual process moving the industry from a position of power and 
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strength to a position where it was essentially powerless and weak. As I 
read and analyzed the documents however, it became apparent that instead 
of a continual change process there were a series of changes or punctuation 
points that had occurred, and that industry leaders had in fact exhibited 
remarkable stability in their understanding of their world. 
In many respects, the manner in which this study was conducted 
encouraged a recognition of these changes. Instead of attempting to prove 
a particular hypothesis, I asked a series of research questions which led me 
to try to understand how those in the organizations understood what was 
happening. While I had an existing framework of my own - the concept of 
industry change - through which I read the documents, that concept itself 
changed through my interpretation of those documents. 
As should be evident from the analysis and interpretation in chapters 6, 
7, and 8; those in the industry did not perceive a long slow decline. 
Instead, they understood themselves - at least as I perceive it and have 
represented things - as enmeshed in a situation so complex, and with so 
many actors, that they could only understand and influence some aspects 
of the situation. In turn, I have only been able to understand and represent 
a part of their story. 
As White (1987) has pointed out, it is the historian's task "to enter 
sympathetically into the minds or consciousness of human agents long 
dead, to empathize with the intentions or motivations of actors impelled 
by beliefs and values that may differ totally from anything the hstorian 
might himself honor in his own life. ..." (White, 1987: 67). Throughout 
this project this is what I have attempted to do, and in entering into the 
thinking of those in the industry, I have frequently found myself 
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sympathetic to their plight. Assailed on all sides, criticized for not being 
innovative in steel and for diversifying out of steel, they were frequently 
placed in an impossible situation where no solution was "the right one". 
Santayana said that "those who neglect the study of the past are 
condemned to repeat it." Studying the history of U. S. Steel and the United 
Steelworkers does not in and of itself, lead to a series of proscriptions about 
what to do; but it does provide some lessons for strategists about the 
manner in which an organization’s history can determine its future. I do 
not know that we are not condemned to repeat the history of steel in other 
industries, but perhaps we can learn to question some of the assumptions 
we hold about what industry leaders "should do." 
Finally, as I said in chapter 5, this is a narrative of my devising and was 
influenced by my choice of framework. Hogan (1971) has attempted to 
give a very "factual" representation of the industry with litlle editorial 
comment; Tiffany (1988) has chosen to look at the industry through a 
framework of industry divisiveness; and I have chosen to look at a 
segment of the industry through the framework of trying to understand 
why things changed. Each of us has looked at many of the same 
documents, and each of us has told a somewhat different story. Someone 
else reading these documents may have yet another story to tell. 
This text is, as any history is, unfinished. The organizations continue, 
and they continue to tell new and different stories. As with any narrative, 
it is the task of the reader, as well as the teller of the tale, to work through 
the meaning of the text - to find "a coherent and significant relationship 
between "events" (real or imagined) and their significant ordering" 
(Brooks, 1985: 321). 
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APPENDIX A 
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Appendix B-l: Major Incidents and Representative Statements from the 
Narrative Analysis of the Letters to Shareholders of Irving C. Olds 
CEO of U. S. Steel 1940 -1951 
Labor - Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Strikes by the USWA in 1946 & 1949; Contract 
Negotiations with the USWA in 1945, 1947, 1948 & 1950; Strikes by the 
UMW 1945 - 1949; Contract Negotiations with the UMW 1950. 
Representative Statements: 
U. S. Steel, recognizing the seriousness of such a strike to the economy of 
the nation, did everything reasonably within its power to avoid this 
threatened work stoppage. U. S. Steel repeatedly informed the 
Government of its inability to conclude sollective bargaining negotiations 
with the Union for a wage increase until increases in steel ceiling prices 
were sanctioned. (USS Annual Report - 1945: 15). 
In the negotiations during April 1948, representatives of these subsidiaries 
(USS) advanced the idea that the wage increase requested by the Union 
would not in the long run benefit anyone; that it would lead to similar 
wage increases in other industries, and to higher prices generally. (USS 
Annual Report - 1948: 15). 
The strike began over the inability of the Board of Trustees of the United 
Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund to agree upon 
the pensions to be paid from the Fund established by the contract between 
representatives of the bituminous coal industry and the United Mine 
Workers of America . . . (USS Annual Report - 1948: 17). 
Collective bargaining with the Union was resumed by U. S. Steel, but soon 
came to an impasse due to the insistence of the Union that U. S. Steel must 
accept the recommendations of the Steel Board that it bear the entire cost of 
pensions and insurance, totaling 10 cents an hour. (USS Annual Report - 
1949:13). 
The Union closed U. S. Steel’s coal mines for two weeks in March, 1949, by 
a "memorial period" stoppage, and for one week in June by what is called a 
"stabilizing period of inaction" (USS Annual Report - 1949: 15). 
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Appendix B-l (continued) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: End of WW D; OPA Price Controls: FTC Proceedings; 
Government Intervention in Settling Strikes; Congressional Investigations 
of Steel Industry; Outbreak of Korean Conflict; Reimposition of Price 
Controls 
Representative Statements: 
Its (USS) officials tried to the best of their ability to convince 
representatives of the Government that wages could not be separated from 
prices, and that, if general industrial strife was to be averted, the 
Government should recognize the unfairness, under a regime of 
governmental price control, of insisting on wage increases that prevented a 
business from being operated at a fair and equitable profit. (USS Annual 
Report -1945:15) 
On August 18, 1947, the Federal Trade Commission initiated proceedings 
against the American Iron and Steel Institute and various steel companies, 
over pricing policies including U. S. Steel, charging violations of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, particularly in connection with the basing 
point method of pricing and selling steel products, a practice which has 
been in use in the steel industry for about fifty years. (USS Annual Report 
-1947:10). 
Early in 1950 representatives of U. S. Steel were twice called upon to appear 
before Congressional investigating committees. U. S. Steel witnesses 
showed that the revenue added by the price increases was considerably less 
than the increases, including such pension and insurance costs, which had 
taken place in its costs of operation, based upon the 1949 rate of shipments 
of finished steel products. (USS Annual Report - 1950: 8-11). 
Since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the national policy seemingly 
has been to maintain general production for the civilian economy at high 
consumpton levels while simultaneously providing the capacity to meet 
an increasingly greater demand for defense production. What has 
sometimes been described as a "guns and butter" policy has brought about a 
triple pressure of an abnormal character upon the American steel industry: 
a demand for steel to maintain a booming civilian economy; a demand for 
steel to feed defense production; and a demand for steel for the 
construction of new defense production facilities. (USS Annual Report - 
1951: 7-8). 
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The U. S Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: End of WWII; Incresed Demand for Steel Products; 
Insufficient Capacity to Meet Demand; Outbreak of Korean Conflict; Impact 
of Government Policy to Maintain Civilian Economy and Defense 
Production 
Representative Statements; 
The year 1946 was one of readjustment, following the dislocations brought 
about by the greatest war in history. Throughout the year, the steel 
industry was faced with an enormous pent-up demand for steel products 
desired by customers for delivery at such an early date as to be beyond the 
capacity of the industry to meet. (USS Annual Report - 1946: 3). 
Even through more than half of the world's supply of steel flows from 
mills of the American steel industry, and even though shipments from 
American steel mills were the highest in the history of the American steel 
industry, many steel products during 1948 were in short supply in the 
United States. Ordinarily the peak demand for steel by one industry is 
paralleled by less than peak demands by other industries. Since the end of 
the war, an abnormal situation has existed in that demand for steel has 
come concurrently from all industries. (USS Annual Report - 1948: 8-10). 
An important milestone in the history of the American steel industry was 
reached during 1950. The industry's annual ingot capacity passed the 100 
million ton mark and from time to time during the year the industry 
produced at an annual rate of more than 100 million tons. One hundred 
million tons of steel is 47.2 million tons or nearly 90 per cent more than 
was produced by the American steel industry in 1939 when World War II 
was starting. It is approximately equal to the estimated steel capacity of the 
rest of the world combined. It is difficult to conceive how any enemy, or 
any group of enemies, could present any real problem to this nation so far 
as steel for defense is concerned. (USS Annual Report - 1950: 5-7). 
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Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents; Modernization and Facilities Expansion Programs; 
Corporate Restructuring; Research and Development Program 
Representative Statements; 
As part of a program to provide the most modern equipment, methods 
and processes for efficient, low-cost manufacture and distribution of 
products of a character and quality to meet changing customer 
requirements, U. S. Steel authorized the expenditure of approximately $200 
million during the year 1945 for improvements and replacements of 
properties. (USS Annual Report - 1945: 11-13). 
As a result of carrying forward its large modernization and construction 
program, U. S. Steel has added to its steel ptoductive capacity to the extent 
of more than a fourth between January 1, 1940, and January 1, 1948. (USS 
Annual Report - 1947: 6). 
Some prewar critics asserted that U. S. Steel was too large; later, as the 
world emergrncy and its postwar consequences developed, it was 
contended that the capacity of U. S. Steel was too small. As recently as a 
year ago, the Government urged the building of additional steel mills, with 
the Government funds if necessary. Specialists, qualifiedin market 
research, continually seek to keep U. S. Steel's management accurately 
advised on the growing and changing steel needs throughout the United 
States and the rest of the world. (USS Annual Report -1946: 6). 
Other Events 
Major Incidents: Outbreak of the Korean Conflict 
Representative Statements: 
U. S. Steel has contributed in the past — over the fifty years of its existence — 
and will in the future contribute its utmost to the defense of the American 
people. Its management, however, has never entertained any illusions 
that war created an enduring prosperity. (USS Annual Report - 1950:3). 
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Appendix B-2: Major Incidents and Representative Statements from the 
Narrative Analysis of the Letters to Shareholders of Benjamin F. Fairless 
CEO of U. S. Steel: 1952 -1954 
Labor - Management Relations 
Major Incidents: 1952 Steel Strike by the USWA; Contract Negotiations 
with the USWA in 1954 
Representative Statements: 
U. S. Steel and the Union were unsuccessful in reaching terms of a new 
contract until more than six months after the old contract had expired. 
Hearings were held in January and February 1952 before a special panel of 
the Wage Stabilization Board. On March 20, 1952, the Board recommended 
wage and "fringe benefits" increases which would have increased 
employment costs by approximately 30 cents per man hour as of January 1, 
1953. (USS Annual Report - 1952: 15). 
The plant visits by the company and union officials which had been in 
contemplation since the close of the 1952 steel strike were inaugurated on 
November 17, 1953. These visits provided an opportunity to gain a better 
understanding of mutual problems and improve relationships. (USS 
Annual Report - 1953: 15). 
The plant visits by Company and Steelworkers officials which were 
innaugurated on November 17, 1953, were continued in 1954. These visits 
provided an excellent opportunity to gain better understanding through 
personal contact, between labor and management at the plant level. (USS 
Annual Report - 1954: 15-16). 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Truman's Seizure of the Steel Industry; The Korean 
Conflict; Price and Wage Controls 
Representative Statements: 
The incompatibility of a free economy with government controls over 
steel production and distribution has long been apparent. A major step 
toward decontrol was made at the start of the third quarter of 1953, when 
approximately 80 per cent of steel industry production was freed from 
distribution controls. (USS Annual Report - 1953: 11). 
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Government Relations 
Representative Statements: 
Shortly prior to the effective strike date, the properties of the companies 
were seized by order of the President of the United States under powers he 
claimed to be inherent in the President of the United States. The 
constitutionality of the seizure was contested by members of the steel 
industry in a United States District Court. The United States Supreme 
Court on June 2, 1952, affirmed the judgement of the District Court, 
holding in an epoch-making decision that the President had exceeded his 
constitutional powers in attempting the seizure. (USS Annual Report - 
1952:16). 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: End of the Korean Conflict; End of Government Controls; 
General Recession in the Economy 
Representative Statements: 
During the past four years, the steel industry's rated ingot capacity has 
increased by about 25 per cent or almost 25 million tons. This greatly 
increased productive capacity was the key factor in bringing to an end in 
the second half of 1953 the steel shortage which had existed since the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea. (USS Annual Report: 1953: 11). 
In 1954 lower rates of production by users of steel resulted in lower actual 
consumption of steel products and lesser need for inventories on their 
part. Another important factor accentuating the decline in steel demand 
was the customers' judgement with respect to the desirable relationship 
between inventories and rates of production. (USS Annual Reports - 
1954:9). 
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Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents: Corporate Restructuring; Modernization and Expansion 
of Facilities; Research and Development Program; Raw Materials Program 
Representative Statements: 
As part of its long-range program to insure adequate supplies of mineral 
ores for the future, U. S. Steel is actively pursuing exploration, 
development, research and procurement projects to make new sources of 
such materials available. (USS Annual Report - 1952:9). 
The latest step in simplifying the corporate structure makes United States 
Steel Corporation primarily an operating company for the first time in its 
history. This program of corporate simplification is designed to reduce 
costs, facilitate and improve production, and should result in eventual 
benefits to stockholders, employes, customers and the public generally. 
(USS Annual Report - 1952: 19). 
Construction of U. S. Steel's new research center at Monroeville. 
Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh is preceding on schedule and it will be 
occupied in 1955. This is an important phase of U. S. Steel's continuing 
program to develop new steels and new uses for steel adapted to the 
everchanging needs of customers. (USS Annual Report - 1954: 12). 
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Appendix B-3: Major Incidents and Representations from the Narrative 
Analysis of the Letters to Shareholders in the Annual Reports of Roger M. 
Blough CEO of U. S. Steel: 1955 -1959 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Strikes by the USWA: 1956 & 1959; Contract Negotiations 
Representative Statements: 
The three year labor contract concluded after a thirty-four day strike should 
be a helpful factor in providing the steel needed by all segments of our 
growing nation. However, this three-year labor peace was at a cost which 
does little to contain the continuing waves of inflation. (USS Annual 
Report -1956: 23) 
The principal features of U. S. Steel’s operations in 1959 were the high 
level of operations in the first half of the year reflecting our customers' fear 
of a strike when the labor agreement terminated on June 30; the long 116 
day strike which ended on November 7, 1959, when work was resumed 
under an injunction obtained at the direction of the President of the 
United States in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act provisions; a rapid 
return to high operating levels for the remainder of the year; and 
prolonged negotiations with the union ending with a settlement of the 
dispute on January 4, 1960, on terms recommended by government 
officials. Because of the strike, U. S. Steel operated at less than 60 per cent 
of rated ingot capacity for the second consecutive year. (USS Annual 
Report -1959: 3) 
The rapid rise in hourly employment cost during the past twenty years 
which had advanced the average steelworker’s wages and benefits so that 
steelworkers are among the highest paid industrial workers in the world, 
the increasing pressure of foreign competition, and the rising competition 
from other materials, both domestic and foreign, clearly dictated the 
practical necessity of seeking to negotiate a new agrement which would be 
non-inflationary. (USS Annual Report - 1959:12) 
The problem of negotiating a labor agreement that will not increase 
production costs is still unsolved. Nevertheless, it is a problem that must 
be solvedif the steel industry is to be kept strong, vigorous, and 
competitive and its employees are to be protected against losing their jobs 
to workers in other countries or other industries. (USS Annual Report - 
1959:15) 
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Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Kefauver Committee Hearings 
Representative Statements; 
During 1957 representatives of U.S. Steel appeared before five 
Congressional committees or subcommittees. The appearance before the 
last.... commonly called the Kefauver Committee, occupied six days. 
Its Chairman indicated that the subcommittee was concerned with the 
extent to which so-called "administered prices" in "concentrated 
industries" might be contributing to the domestic economic problem of 
inflation. U. S. Steel supplied to the Subcommittee evidence that the steel 
industry is not a "highly concentrated" industry .... and that 
"administered prices" are a normal and necessary aspect of modern 
business and are not responsible for the inflationary spiral. (USS Annual 
Report -1957: 5-6) 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Increased Competition 
Representative Statements; 
U. S. Steel's business is conducted in intensively competitive markets. 
There is increasing competition from other steel producers, both in the 
United States and in foreign countries, from other materials such as 
aluminum and plastics, and from technological advances which affect 
materials requirements throughout industry. (USS Annual Report - 
1959:12) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Investment; Recession; General Economic Conditions 
Representative Statements: 
Invested savings is the indispensable element required to achieve the steel 
capacity the country needs. Adequate earnings resulting from constant 
improvement in operations and adequate competitive prices, together 
with sufficient tax allowance for depreciation, are necessary if the end 
result of more invested savings so desirable for employment is to be 
achieved. (USS Annual Report - 1955: 23) 
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Economic Conditions (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
At this time, economic conditions being what they are, some individual 
members of that team (USS) have no work and others have less than full¬ 
time work. The seriousness of this situation is fully comprehended and 
the hardships it brings are of deep concern to all. The basic economic 
progress of the nation is, however, certain to continue and it is hoped 
employment conditions will soon reflect that basic progress. (USS Annual 
Report - 1957:23) 
In the latter part of 1957 and early part of 1958 we witnessed a national 
economic slow-down. An economic pause in the general economy has an 
unusually serious effect on the operations of U. S. Steel because our 
customers tend to reduce their inventories of steel, and the purchases of 
durable goods, of which steel is a major component, are more likely to be 
postponed. 
Recovery in general economic conditions brings greater shipments of steel 
and makes available the opportunities for recalling to service many of the 
employees for whom, regrettably, there was little work in 1958. (USS 
Annual Report - 1959: 23) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents: Corporate Reorganization; Research Facilities; Cost 
Reduction Program; Diversification 
Representative Statements; 
The increasingly important role of research and technology in U. S. Steel 
was highlighted in May 1956 when some 5,000 visitors attended the formal 
opening of the new Research Center at Monroeville, Pennsylvania .... 
The latter activity (applied research) assumes added urgency in heavy 
industry in times when cost increases outpace productivity and inadequate 
depreciation allowances threaten the ability of enterprise to maintain itself 
and invest in the future. (USS Annual Report - 1956: 9-10) 
To minimize the need for such price increases, U. S. Dteel has long 
pursued a systematic program of cost reduction. Its postwar expenditures 
of over $3.5 billion for facilities have been incurred largely with a view to 
modernizing equipment and processes so as to increase productive 
efficiency and output. (USS Annual Report - 1957: 6) 
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Analysis of the Letters to Shareholders in the Annual Reports of Roger M. 
Blough CEO of U. S. Steel: 1960 -1967 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations 
Representative Statements: 
Efforts are constantly being made to maintain harmonious relations with 
numerous unions that represent from a few dozen to many thousands of 
employes. . . . Occasions arise, however, when it is necessary for U. S. Steel 
to oppose demands which outwardly appear to be in the interest of certain 
union-represented employes, but which, on examination, prove to be 
basically unsound for all employes, the stockholders, and the public. (USS 
Annual Report - 1961: 15-16) 
.... this lower rate of increase in hourly employment costs of 2 1 /2 per cent 
is still far greater than the historical rate of improvement in shipments per 
man-hour, and continues to contribute to a further squeeze on profits. 
(USS Annual Report - 1962: 16) 
Through the functioning of the Human Relations Committee, 
negotiations were again conducted with the United Steelworkers of 
America without emotion packed headlines, the pressure of a contract 
termination deadline or third-party intervention. (USS Annual Report - 
1963: 8) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Pricing Policies; Imports; Investment Policies 
Representative Statements; 
The resulting deficiency is primarily due to inflation of the cost of new 
facilities while depreciation under existing tax laws continues to be based 
on the original cost of facilities purchased many years ago. The need for 
revision of the tax laws as they relate to depreciation is more vital than 
ever before if industry is to keep existing facilities efficient and to provide 
the new job and product-creating facilities so essential to the growth of the 
nation. (USS Annual Report - 1960: 4-5) 
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Government. RelationsJcontinued) 
Representative Statements; 
In August 1961, certain members of Congress recognized that hourly 
employment costs for steelworkers would be increased by contract in 
October and suggested several measures to prevent a price increase which 
they expected would follow the cost increase. On September 6, the 
President of the United States wrote to U. S. Steel, as well as to eleven 
other steel companies, requesting that each forego an increase in steel 
prices. U. S. Steel answered the President in detail .... This letter made 
clear, as has been done many times before, that costs are only one factor in 
prices. (USS Annual Report - 1961: 7) 
. . . .American steel producers are supporting a proposed temporary quota 
on steel imports. Such a quota would not stop imports, but would only 
limit foreign producers to the same share of the market that they have 
enjoyed in recent years and thus permit both foreign and domestic 
producers to expand their sales in the United States as the market grows. 
Steel is an essential ingredient of a nation’s economic and military 
strength. Other nation's have long recognized this fact and accordingly, 
use various measures to protect and encourage their steel industries. As a 
result, the conditions required to make free trade work just do not exist in 
the real world steel market of today. Our Government should face these 
facts and hopefully take action to limit the continuing rise in imports. 
(USS Annual Report - 1967: 20) 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Increased Competition 
Representative Statements; 
The year 1962 was another year of intense competition for the steel 
customer's order. The year 1962 again demonstrated that while prices are 
influenced importantly by costs and other factors including government 
intervention, they are ultimately determined by the natural forces of the 
market place -- such forces as customer demand, competition from steel 
producers at home and abroad and competition from other materials. 
(USS Annual Report - 1962; 7-8) 
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Steel Imports 
Major Incidents: Increasing level of Imports in the U. S. Market 
Representative Statements; 
Nationwide consumption of steel reached an all-time high, even though 
because of improvements in the quality and strength of steel, a lesser 
quantity is required to do the same job. However, neither U. S. Steel nor 
the industry reached the 1955 record levels of production and shipments 
primarily because customers were building inventories more rapidly in 
1955, and because there were net exports of steel mill products in 1955 
while there were net imports in 1963. (USS Annual Report - 1963: 3) 
A number of products, particularly wire rods, wire products and bars, were 
seriously affected by foreign steel shipped into this country. Imports of 
steel products were approximately 6.8 million tons, almost 20 percent 
higher than in 1963, and exceeded exports by over three million tons -- 
about the same excess as in 1963. This import problem stems in large part 
from "dumping" of steel in this country by steel producers of other 
nations. 
(USS Annual Report - 1964: 3) 
Even though steel shipments by the industry were at a record level for the 
year, as was steel consumption, there was a substantial increase in steel 
product imports and a decrease in steel exports — partially as a result of the 
high demand brought about by protective buying during the prolonged 
labor negotiations. Cost increases and the growth of imports are 
formidable competitive factors that must be overcome. (USS Annual 
Report - 1965:3) 
Steel product imports in 1967 accounted for some 12 1/2 percent of the total 
domestic market and more than 40 percent of the market for some 
products. All important product lines and virtually all market areas have 
been affected by steel imports. Prices of foreign steel sold in the United 
States are substantially below U. S. domestic prices. Limited data available 
indicate that price differences arise primarily because of the large cost 
advantage — principally employment costs — enjoyed by foreign 
steelmakers. While the efficiency of the American steel industry is second 
to none, it has not been able to overcome the significant and growing 
disparity in hourly labor costs. (USS Annual Report - 1967: 18) 
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Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Investment; Recession; General Economic Conditions 
Representative Statements: 
This (record steel consumption) reflects the generally high level of activity 
in the economy — particularly another high year of automobile and truck 
production and a resurgence of sales by the capital goods industries such as 
construction machinery and railroad car building. (USS Annual Report - 
1964: 3) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents: Corporate Reorganization; Research Facilities; Cost 
Reduction Program; Diversification 
Representative Statements: 
A series of steps to simplify and streamline further U. S. Steel's 
organization structure began in January 1964 and will continue over a 
period of months. (USS Annual Report - 1963: 7) 
To improve U. S. Steel's position in expanding world trade, organizational 
changes for the administration of the international business were 
announced in 1963. (USS Annual Report - 1963: 19) 
Early in 1966, U. S. Steel announced the formation of a new chemical 
division known as USS Chemicals. (USS Annual Report - 1965: 17) 
In more recent years, U. S. Steel has been expanding its internatinal 
activities through participation in the ownership of foreign companies 
which operate and sell independently in world markets. (USS Annual 
Report -1965:19) 
A number of new important facilities that incorporate the latest 
technological advances are performing well during break-in. These 
facilities along with many others under construction should contribute to 
U. S. Steel's future well-being as a diversified materials producer. (USS 
Annual Report - 1967: 3) 
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Analysis of the Letters to the Shareholders in the Annual Reports of 
Edwin H. Gott CEO of U. S. Steel: 1968 -1972 
Labor - Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations 
Representative Statements: 
During 1971, labor negotiations will be a matter of particular importance. 
Steelworker wages even now are among the highest in American 
manufacturing, and the substantial gap between U. S. and foreign steel 
labor costs continues to widen. These negotiations will influence the 
pattern of steel imports during 1971 and the ability of American steel 
producers to compete with foreign steel both at home and abroad. (USS 
Annual Report, 1970: 2-3) 
Second half results were also reduced by the costs involved in the 
shutdown and the subsequent start-up of steel operations related to the 
steel labor negotiations and by the steelworkers hourly employment cost 
increases averaging 15% starting August 1. Furthermore, in the fourth 
quarter there was a 44-day coal strike and a substantial cost increase 
resulting from the new labor contract with the United Mine Workers of 
America. (USS Annual Report - 1971: 3) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Steel Imports; Revisions of the Tax Laws; Wage & Price 
Controls 
Representative Statements: 
U. S. Steel therefore urges that the Congress continue to consider a 
definitive legislative solution to this critical problem (restrictions on steel 
imports). (USS Annual Report - 1968: 3) 
Federal tax relief for such air and water quality control projects should be a 
matter of special concern to everyone. Specifically, such facility 
expenditures are believed to an operating expense as incurred. While the 
new tax law provides some relief in connection with such projects, the 
continued progress which must be made in every community requires at 
least accelerated write-off of all air and water quality expenditures. (USS 
Annual Report - 1969: 21) 
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Government Relations (continued) 
Representative Statements; 
Although price increases announced on August 2 covered most steel mill 
products, those which became effective before the Government's wage- 
price freeze of August 15 covered only about half of the steel product line. 
In early December, approval was received from the Price Commission 
permitting price increases for steel mill products up to an average of 3.6% 
through July 1972. (USS Annual Report - 1971: 3) 
Improving our future profitability also depends upon the Government’s 
success in controlling inflation.the Nation's new economic policies 
provide confidence that the Government is fully committed to reducing 
inflation, to improving our international trade balance and to improving 
real economic growth so the Nation can again enjoy freedom from direct 
economic controls. (USS Annual Report - 1971: 4) 
One major concern at the beginning of 1972 -- the possibility of unlimited 
increases in imports of foreign steel -- may have been eased somewhat 
with the extension and improvement of voluntary limitation 
arrangements made by the U. S. Department of State with steel producers 
in Japan, the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom. 
(USS Annual Report - 1972:3) 
We believe there is no reason why economic controls cannot be eliminated 
during 1973 — provided government spending at all levels is limited so as 
to minimize deficits, and provided salary, wage and benefit demands are in 
line with productivity improvements. We also believe that government 
must promote and preserve free but fair national and international 
competition and must support and strengthen the climate for private 
enterprise. (USS Annual Report - 1972:3) 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Steel Imports; Competition; Declining Profits 
Representative Statements: 
The steel industry has its own special and serious problems stemming 
from the large and rapidly growing influx of steel from abroad. (USS 
Annual Report - 1968:3) 
435 
Appendix B-5 (continued) 
The U, S, Steel Industry 
Representative Statements: 
The year 1971 was a difficult year for U. S. Steel — and the steel industry 
generally — with lower steel shipments, erratic and uneconomical 
operating levels, labor negotiations, surging imports, government controls 
over wages and prices, reduced employment and hours of work for 
employes, and lower dividends for stockholders. (USS Annual Report - 
1971:3) 
Steel Imports 
Major Incidents: Voluntary Restraint Agreements; Increased Imports 
Representative Statements; 
The growth in steel consumption in recent years has all been siphoned off 
by imports of foreign steel. Record steel mill product imports of 18.3 
million net tons in 1971 took 18% of the domestic market. (USS Annual 
Report -1971: 4) 
Imports of steel mill products of 17.7 million tons in 1972 amounted to 
over 16.5% of the total domestic market. While imports from 
countries covered by the arrangements generally were within the limits, 
imports from non-participating countries surged from 2.9 million tons in 
1971 to 3.5 million in 1972. (USS Annual Report - 1972: 3) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Economic Activity; Investment Climate; Inflation 
Representative Statements; 
It is in the interest of the economic health and national security of the 
Nation that this country have a profitable and growing steel industry. 
Neither U. S. Steel nor other companies can continue, for long, the 
massive capital expenditures being undertaken to improve steels 
competitiveness unless the prospect for a profitable return on these 
investments improves. 
(USS Annual Report - 1968: 21) 
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Economic Conditions (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
All these expectations, presume that the Government’s efforts to control 
inflation will be successful, that we can at least maintain the existing cost- 
price relationship in the future, and that the levels of stel mill product 
imports are kept economically realistic and in line with the growth of steel 
consumption in this Nation. (USS Annual Report - 1971: 3) 
The continuing high level of economic activity in this nation, the stepped- 
ip demand for steel throughout the world, the need for some inventory 
building by customers, among other factors, all point to record domestic 
steel industry shipments in 1973. (USS Annual Report - 1972: 3) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents: Diversification; Investment Programs 
Representative Statements; 
Extensive research, marketing, product development, facility construction 
and investment programs are being carried forward to advance U. S. Steel 
as a more profitable diversified producer of materials and services. 
The production and sale of a very wide range of steel products is the 
principal business of U. S. Steel, but it is vigorously pursuing profit 
opportunities in the growing markets for ores, limestone, coal, coke, 
chemicals, plastics, fertilizers, cements, buildings and building components 
and in a variety of other materials and services, such as titanium, 
aluminum siding, wood products, land and real estate developments, and 
financing and consulting services. (USS Annual Report - 1968: 7) 
437 
Appendix B-5 (continued) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
A vigorous program to expand activities in other profitable markets which 
have growth potential is progressing. Start-up of five new USS Chemicals 
plants, formation of new entities in the fields of real estate development 
and financing services and exppansion of activities for increased 
participation in the housing market were accomplished in 1969. (USS 
Annual Report - 1969:2) 
We are intensifying employe development, communications and 
participation so that the work of all our people can be more effective and 
satisfying. We continue to eliminate less productive activities so that 
human resources can be redeployed into more useful and profitable 
pursuits. (USS Annual Report - 1972: 3) 
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Narrative Analysis of the Letters to Shareholders in the Annual Reports 
for Edgar B. Speer CEO of U. S. Steel: 1973 -1978 
Labor - Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Experimental Negotiating Agreement 
Representative Statements: 
Important gains were made in 1973 toward solving the traditional three- 
year boom-bust cycle in steel operations and employment caused by fear of 
a national strike at the expiration of the labor contract. An Experimental 
Negotiating Agreement was reached in 1973 by ten of the nation's major 
steel producing companies and the United Steelworkers Union, designed 
to avoid industry-wide work stoppages or lockouts through July 1977. This 
agreement should provide more stable employment for steelworkers, 
improve operating efficiencies and prevent foreign steelmakers from 
taking advantage of strike threats by making additional inroads into U. S. 
markets. (USS Annual Report - 1973: 2-3) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Tax Policy, Economic Controls, Government Spending 
Representative Statements: 
Steel price increases have been limited since the start of economic controls 
in August 1971; they have only partially covered actual cost increases 
which have been far in excess of sustainable long-term gains in 
productivity. Further shortages of steel and other goods and services can 
obly be avoided by a prompt return to a fre-market system which has 
served our nation so well throughout its history. (USS Annual Report - 
1973: 2) 
The share of Gross National Product represented by government spending 
has risen from 21% in 1950 to 35% in 1975. The rapidly expanding 
governmental sector drains funds away from productive investment in 
tax-generating, job-creating tools of production. Continued expansion of 
governmental spending must be balanced with the needs for savings and 
investment. (USS Annual Report - 1975: 2-3) 
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Appendix B-6 (continued) 
Government Relations (continued) 
Representative Statements; 
Tax policies, although improved in recent years, are still biased against 
capital formation and industrial growth. Tax laws must be changed quickly 
to encourage savings and investment. (USS Annual Report - 1975: 3) 
Government, essentially, does not create new self-sustaining jobs, but 
government can foster a climate for investment which will. Some 
government actions which will aid private enterprise in meeting this job 
challenge involve: A sound national energy policy. . . . More realistic tax 
legislation .... A coordinated national policy for environmental control, 
safety and health .... A fair foreign trade policy ... .A better balance 
between government spending and revenues. . . . (USS Annual Report - 
1976: 2-3) 
Late in 1978, the Administration announced a voluntary program of 
wage/price guidelines and other proposed governmental actions as means 
of helping curtail inflation. If the overall objective of reducing the rate of 
inflation is achieved, the entire nation will benefit. Enforcement of the 
nation’s trade laws to preserve fair trade and prevent the dumping of 
foreign steel in the United States will also help achieve the goals of the 
government program. (USS Annual Report - 1978: 2-3) 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Declining Shipments 
Representative Statements: 
Shipments by the American steel industry declined from 109.5 million 
tons of steel mill products in 1974 to 80.0 million tons in 1975. With 
consumption increasing in a recovering economy and as customers bring 
their inventories more in line with their requirements, steel industry 
shipments for the year 1976 are expected to reach or exceed 95 million tons. 
(USS Annual Report - 1975: 2) 
440 
Appendix B-6 (continued) 
Steel Imports 
Major Incidents: General level of Imports 
Representative Statements; 
With worldwide shortages of steel and higher prices realizable in other 
countries, foreign producers shipped 14% or 2.5 million tons less steel to 
the U. S. than in 1972. When demand is high abroad, recent experience has 
shown that foreign steel is only available to American consumers at prices 
well above those prevailing in this country. Conversely, when world 
demand is slack, foreign steel, in many cases produced by companies which 
are government-owned or controled, is available for export to this country 
at unrealistically low prices. (USS Annual Report - 1973:2) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Investment; Cost Increases 
Representative Statements: 
Cost increases, as well as price increases, were important factors in our 
operating results for 1974. The cost of an hour's work was 26% higher at 
1974 year-end than at 1973 year-end. the costs of products and services 
purchased from others were 37% higher than at the previous year-end. 
These cost increases far outstripped the sustainable gains in output per 
man-hour of two to three percent per year. (USS Annual Report - 1974: 3) 
Contrary to the views of many about the magnitude of business and 
industrial profits — that is, income after taxes — the amount available for 
dividends to our stockholders and for reinvestment in the business was 
only 4.7 cents from each sales dollar in 1976. This rate of profitability must 
be improved in order to generate and attract the funds for investment to 
enable U. S. Steel to modernize and expand its facilities;.... and to sustain 
and create tax-generating jobs. (USS Annual Report - 1976: 2) 
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Appendix B-6 (continued) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents: Corporate Planning; Diversification 
Representative Statements: 
Our corporate plans for the future are five-fold: To utilize fully our 
company's foremost asset — our people; to encourage and recognize 
individual accomplishment toward improving products and profits; to 
make more intensive use of existing physical resources, including our 
extensive raw materials reserves and land holdings; to concentrate on 
areas of high growth and profit potential in steel, industrial and 
agricultural chemicals,cement or in any other area where we have 
technological expertise or an advantageous market position; and to 
continue to discharge our social responsibilities in such fields as 
environment, safety and equal employment practices. (USS Annual 
Report - 1973:3) 
Fortunately, there is no longer a capital cost disadvantage nor an operating 
cost disadvantage to producing steel for the U. S. here rather than abroad. 
Substantial amounts of capital will be also be needed to supply the growing 
needs for chemicals, fertilizers, cement and other products of U. S. Steel. 
(USS Annual Report - 1974:2) 
All our lines of business were profitable in 1978. Our nonsteel businesses 
contributed 86% of the operating income and 27% of the total sales. 
Business plans for each of the next five years are in place for each operating 
responsibility. Improved income and return on investment are the 
central objectives of each of these plans. In line with these objectives, we 
will continue to weed-out marginal facilities and product lines. (USS 
Annual Report - 1978: 2-3) 
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Appendix B-7: Major Incidents and Representative Statements from the 
Narrative Analysis of the Letters to Shareholders in the Annual Reports 
for David M. Roderick CEO of U. S. Steel: 1979 - 
Labor - Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Plant Closings; High Wages; Negotiations 
Representative Statements: 
We deeply regret the impact of the plant closings on the more than 11,000 
employees, their families, and the communities in which the facilities are 
located. U. S. Steel's benefit programs will greatly alleviate the financial 
impact of the closings on employees. (USS Annual Report - 1979:2) 
American steelworkers, along with workers in other basic industries, have 
attained wage costs which may be self-defeating. (USS Annual Report - 
1981:3) 
Twice during 1982, the steel industry bargaining team, of which U. S. Steel 
is a member, tried and failed to convince the USWA of the debilitating 
effect on the industry of excessive labor costs. We argued that the only 
alternative to the permanent loss of both steel miolls and steelworker jobs 
was amoderation in labor costs to bring them more into line with those of 
other manufacturing workers. Achieving a new contract that recognizes 
the realities of the marketplace by bringing wage and benefit costs to a 
competitive level remains a major task for 1983. (USS Annual Report - 
1982:3) 
Special achievements in employee relations included a new contract with 
the United Mine Workers - the first strike-free settlement in 20 years; the 
creation of nine centers to provide outplacement and retraining asistance 
to workers affected by plant closings; and a complete revision of employee 
benefits, permitting more employee participation in decisions affecting 
savings, pensions and health care plans while making them more cost 
efective. (USS Annual Report - 1984:4) 
Other hurdles to profitability are our steel employment costs, plainly not 
supported by today's steel market, and work arragements too restrictive to 
permit competitive productivity standards. These are critical 
considerations, and they will be a major focus in 1986 as we negotiate new 
labor agreements with the United Steelworkers of America. (USS Annual 
Report -1985: 4) 
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Appendix B-7 (continued) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Tax Laws; Trade Policy; Regulation 
Representative Statements: 
To modernize, grow with markets and remain competitive, capital neds of 
U. S. Steel and the domestic steel industry in the next decade will be more 
than double the level of spending in the past ten years. This can be 
accomplished if there is provision in our tax laws for competitive capital 
recovery allowances,.... (USS Annual Report - 1979:3) 
The recommendations of the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee 
(government, labor and industry) were generally accepted by the outgoing 
Administration and several were endorsed by the incoming 
Administration. This Committee recommended changes and 
improvements in capital formation (including tax reform), environmental 
and regulatory matters,.. .., and in steel trade policy which led to the 
reinstatement of the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM). (USS Annual 
Report - 1980:3) 
In the area of public policy, the Corporation took the lead in efforts to 
reduce unfairly traded steel in the U. S. market. A massive lobbying 
program to enact steel quota legislation,. .. ., resulted in a heightened 
public awareness and the formulation of President Reagan's program 
aimed at limiting finished steel imports to 18.5 percent of the domestic 
market. (USS Annual Report - 1984:4) 
During 1985, we continued to advance our objectives at the Federal and 
state government levels on such public policy issues as: *tax reform, a 
laudable objective, but which must be formulated in such a way that 
lowered rates are not achieved by shifting the burden to business or by 
eliminating capital incentives which are key to economic growth and job 
creation; •....; •petroleum retail marketing divorcement, proposed 
regulations, primarily at the state level, which would prohibit refiners 
from operating their own retail gasoline outlets — regulations of no merit 
and a reversion to market intervention by government; • Superfund, the 
means for cleanup of toxic waste, a program which we support, but which 
must not become the sole financial burden of the chemical and petroleum 
industries; and, • plant closing legislation, a blatant attempt to intervene in 
business management, which was defeated in the U. S. House of 
Representatives. (USS Annual Report - 1985:5-6) 
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Appendix B-7 (continued) 
The U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Plant Closings 
Representative Statements: 
For many years, U. S. Steel and other steel companies have spoken out on 
the problems of inflation, unfairly priced steel imports, lagging 
productivity improvement, inadequate capital cost recovery allowances, 
direct and indirect control of steel prices, and unrealistic environmental 
control regulations. Without solutions to these problems, the domestic 
steel industry will not be able to revitalize and earn a competitive rate of 
return on the massive investments required. As a result, the industry will 
most likely be faced with more shutdowns and more lost jobs — and the 
United States will become more dependent on foreign producers to supply 
its steel needs, as it has with oil. (USS Annual Report - 1979:2) 
Steel Imports 
Major Incidents: General Level of Imports; Import Quotas 
Representative Statements; 
The reinstated TPM has been strengthened; its new provisions should aid 
in minimizing unfairly priced steel imports. Prevention of market 
disruption caused by these imports is essential if steel producers are to 
have the ability to invest the huge amounts of money needed to keep 
domestic steel producers the low-cost source of supply for U. S. markets. 
(USS Annual Report - 1980: 3) 
Short-term, however, we are in the midst of a recession compounded by 
excessive steel imports;... (USS Annual Report -1981: 3) 
We took decisive steps in 1982 to curtail unfairly traded imports by filing 
complaints with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commission. A settlement was reached in October between our 
government and the European Community steelmakers to limit their 
imports into the United States. Then in December, U. S. Steel joined seven 
other steel producers and the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) in 
filing a complaint against Japanese trade practices. (USS Annual Report - 
1982:3) 
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Appendix B-7 (continued) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Recession; Investment Climate 
Representative Statements: 
Total income from all operations, including profit on sales of assets, was a 
record $1.5 billion. These results were achieved despite economic 
conditions which depressed demand for many products,. . . ., and a 
domestic economy in a recession which deepened toward year-end. (USS 
Annual Report - 1981:3) 
A continued recessionary climate in the steel marketplace was offset by 
increased productivity and efficiency, and despite soft oil prices, our sales of 
refined petroleum products increased in 1984 over a year earlier. (USS 
Annual Report - 1984:2) 
At this time, we have realistic aspirations for a prosperous 1986. However, 
much depends on a number of variables: recovery of prices in the 
petroleum and gas industries; resurgence of capital spending which would 
increase steel demand; and substantive results from the Administration's 
steel import restraint program which has yet to yield the expected 
reduction of foreign steel into our domestic market. In addition, I believe 
that unless our government moves quickly and forcefully to pursue the 
intent of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation to reduce the Federal 
budget deficit, the economy could well falter in its promising growth. (USS 
Annual Report - 1985:6) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel 
Major Incidents: Diversification; Investment Decisions 
Representative Statements: 
In 1979, your management team, fully supported by the Board of Directors, 
made a number of critical decisions — many unpleasant — but nevertheles 
essential for the long-term prosperity of the company. Included in these 
decisions were plans for the permanent shutdown of many marginal 
operations. (USS Annual Report - 1979: 2) 
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Appendix B-7 (continued) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
Our objective is to attain a competitive rate of return on assets employed in 
steel operations and those businesses — the nonsteel segments — whose 
success is not dependent on the Corporation’s being in the steel business. 
(USS Annual Report - 1979:2) 
During both the past five year period and the past ten year period, U. S. 
Steel’s nonsteel businesses have been profitable and virtually self- 
sufficient in terms of cash flow. The steel business has not. Until the 
economics of steel investments improve, the only responsible choice is to 
direct discretionary capital spending in steel toward maximizing return on 
investments already in place .... (USS Annual Report - 1979: 3) 
The difficult decisions made in 1979 to close permanently a number of 
marginal steel and nonsteel facilities enabled channeling of available 
capital into activities generating a competitive return and permitted 
management to concentrate on other business opportunities. (USS 
Annual Report - 1980:2) 
Demand for steel is expected to grow at an average of 1-1/2 to 2 percent per 
year -- less than the rate of growth expected for the economy as a whole. 
Demand in many of our other businesses is expected to grow at a faster rate 
than the Nation's economy. For U. S. Steel to grow as fast as the economy, 
a significant portion of facility investments must be directed to those 
markets having above average growth potential. (USS Annual Report - 
1980: 2-3) 
A major action was undertaken in late 1981 to acquire more profitable 
assets .... On January 7,1982, a U. S. Steel subsidiary purchased 30 million 
shares (approximately 51 percent) of the common shares of Marathon Oil 
Company. This acquisition in no way lessens our dedication to continued 
modernization and upgrading of existing lines of business where such 
investment can earn a competitive rate of return. (USS Annual Report - 
1981:2) 
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Appendix B-7 (continued) 
Issues Internal to U. S. Steel (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
The year 1982 was one of profound change and challenge for U. S. Steel. 
The change accompanied our acquisition of Marathon Oil, a merger which 
altered the structure, product and asset base of the Corporation more 
dramatically than any other event since our founding in 1901. USS 
Annual Report - 1982:2) 
It (acquisition of Marathon) brings to us a number of advantages we never 
enjoyed before -- an energy hedge for our energy dependent steel business 
and raw material support for our chemicals business, to name only two. 
The oil and gas subsidiary's operating performance, showing promise of 
increased gains over the long term, is clearly helping the Corporation 
endure a rough-and-tumble economic cycle. Today, we are a broader- 
based company with more opportunity for growth and profitability, and we 
are less vulnerable to a downturn in any one of our business segments. 
(USS Annual Report - 1982: 2) 
In December, we moved to preserve the best and most modern of our tools 
of production, to close or downsize certain operations and to consolidate 
others. (USS Annual Report - 1983:2) 
Our sales in 1983 totaled $17.52 billion. Net income however, was severely 
impacted by the provision for estimated costs attributable to shutdown of 
facilities -- $1.15 billion with employee related costs representing the largest 
share of this charge. As a result, U. S. Steel sustained a net loss of $1.16 
billion for the year. (USS Annual Report - 1983:3) 
A New U. S. Steel came into its own in 1984. At the beginning of the 
decade, we put in place a strategic plan designed to reshape the Corporation 
and bring better balance to our asset base. Today -- half into the Eighties -- 
our Oil and Gas segment is now our major line of business in terms of 
both revenues and earnings. Steel, however, remians a substantial part of 
our profile. We are the nation's largest steelmaker, and we intend to be 
the premier supplier of those steel products we make. As we diversified, 
we cushioned the Corporation from the cyclical nature of the steel business 
in order to provide a more stable return on investment to stockholders. 
(USS Annual Report - 1984: 2) 
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Appendix D-l: Major Incidents and Representative Statements from 
Narrative Analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial Convention of Phillip 
Murray: 1945-1952 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Steel Strikes of 1946,1949,1952 
Representative Statements: 
You won it (1949 Steel Strike) for not only the members of your own 
Union but you won great gains for peoples in all walks of life. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1950:9) 
They ( American Employers) must recognize their social obligations and if 
unions in America have to strike to force them to do it, then unions must 
strike. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1950:10) 
The steelworkers in this situation respected the rules adopted for their 
guidance by their Government, the Steel industry has not. The steel 
industry has arrograntly defied and willfully violated, not the rules of the 
game, but the rules of common decency. (USWA Convention Proceedings 
-1952:13) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Taft-Hartley Act; Social Security Legislation 
Representative Statements: 
It is a despicable law (Taft-Hartley Act) enacted and propagated by malicious 
men to undermine the labor movement of the United States of America 
and to destroy in the meantime our democratic way of life. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1948:14) 
The Congress of the United States, as it was constituted last year, said to the 
representation of labor it is not the business of the Federal Government to 
protect its citizens, and we are not going to improve Social Security. And 
then you won your strike-then you won your strike- and almost a 
miraculous change in the entire situation took place. They are all 
supporting improved Social Security legislation because they don't want 
to pay all the bill, you see, into these pensions over the payroll. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1950:11) 
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Appendix D-l (continued) 
United Steelworkers of America 
Major Incidents: Wage Negotiations; Communist Infiltration 
Representative Statements: 
You are now free men and women, thanks to this Union and thanks to the 
effort that you put forth to attain this lofty objective. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1946:8) 
You established for the United States of America a national wage pattern 
out of which has flown billions of dollars in monthly benefits to workers 
employed in all types of industry all over the United States of America. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1946:8) 
But it (USWA) must never permit, so long as it continues to live, the 
intrusion of ideological ideas or beliefs into trade union matters. 
This union will not tolerate efforts by outsiders—individuals, 
organizations, groups—whether they be Communist, Socialist, or any other 
group, to infiltrate, dictate, or meddle in our affairs. . . .we will not permit 
any limitation on the free and democratic right of full discussion of trade 
union problems in our own ranks. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 
1946:11) 
Periodically, I have found it necessary to redirect the attention of these 
scandal-seekers—and of our own members—to the clear principles of the 
constitution of CIO and of such affiliates as this mighty organization of 
steelworkers. We have only contempt and indignation for those who dare 
to impugn our patriotism and our Americanism. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1946:12) 
U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Wage Negotiations 
Representative Statements: 
I point out those figures (profit/price in industry) to the delegation to 
emphasize the unusually profitable position which the industry occupied 
in the course of current negotiations and to further indicate the ability of 
the industry to pay a reasonably substantial increase in wages without 
increasing its prices. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1948:12) 
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U. S. Steel Industry (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
In the year 1952, the steel industry and other corporations interested in the 
promotion of the steel industry’s program have used the taxpayers’ money 
for political purposes—the most unprecedented thing that has transpired in 
the history of our country. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1952:14) 
We were dragooned to Washington by the industry...for the fourth time in 
10 years this Union accepted a recommendation of a governmental agency. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1950:17) 
Other Labor Organizations 
Major Incidents: Communist Infiltration; Leadership Responsibilities 
Representative Statements: 
Our mighty Union must join with other CIO Unions in assuming direct 
leadership for the elimination of the vicious poll tax system now 
prevailing in the Southern states....a decent minimum wage law for people 
now employed in the sweatshops of America.attainment of 
Congressional legislation seeking better Social Security conditions for all of 
the people of this country....seek better housing....eliminate the slums not 
only in the cities and the steel district...seek the enactment of justifiable 
legislation to secure for the veterans of World War II a better GI Bill of 
Rights. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1946:9) 
The instrument of the World Federation of Trade Unions must be used to 
elevate the standards of the people, particularly in the backward countries- 
social and living standards, educational standards, cultural and other 
standards. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1948:9) 
The old UE is the hard core of Red Communism in America-that’s what it 
is. It is the type of leadership that devote themselves exclusively to serving 
the interests of international Communism and the Soviet Government. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1950:13) 
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Narrative Analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial Conventions of David 
J. McDonald President of the USWA: 1953-1964 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Negotiation Process; Agreements 
Representative Statements; 
....if the steel industry leaders really want to live up to their American 
obligation and really get along with the United Steelworkers of America, if 
they want to have the decent harmonious relationship that we have 
dedicated ourselves to build, I call upon them to say these words in the 
National Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce, and 
simply say "Cut it out, boys" and it will end like that. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1958:10) 
I believed that through the operation of the Human Relations Commitee 
in basic steel, we would pave the way to a new era of understanding with 
the American steel industry, and that I hoped , as a consequence thereby 
that forever great national strikes would be terminated in our fair land. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1962:12) 
It would have been absolutely impossible for us to achieve these benefits, 
that I have talked about had we not been able to negotiate agreements with 
the major elements of the Basic Steel Industry, the aluminum industry, 
and the can manufacturing industry, to name but three. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1964:15) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Unemployment; 32-Hour Work Week 
Representative Statements; 
We have for months now beeen trying to convince our Government that 
something must be done to meet these problems of 
unemployment.Also, I don't forget the Legislation which is being 
proposed in the various States to hamstring us legislation like the so called 
right-to-work laws or this new fangled one which is now coming up called 
the semi-featherbedding law...some people who call themselves the United 
Steelworkers of America, have spoken out publicly in favor of laws which 
would destroy their Union and destroy their earning power, just because 
they carry rancor and hatred and bitterness in their hearts. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1958:11) 
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Government Relations (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
Laws must be enacted which will give people a right to invest in 
America....another way which we can help all of our people is by the next 
President of the United States establishing a Continous Prosperity 
Commission....just a small group, those people who are actively right in 
the heart of the economic life of our land and those people who actually 
determine the economic and in many instances the political future of our 
land and have them be an active Continous Prosperity commitee which 
will meet with the President of the United States perhaps every two 
months. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1960:10) 
Our Government and the American labor movement have been working 
diligently on this problem (displaced workers), but it seems to me that we 
cannot do this job alone, our Government and the American labor 
movement. It seems to me that the time has come when business must 
takeover its social obligation also...Rather, I would characterize our 
Administration as being frustrated by too many enemies-enemies within 
Congress and enemies within the business community. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1962:13) 
United Steelworkers of America 
Major Incidents: Infiltration; Expanding Membership; Union Employees 
Representative Statements; 
Most of the intellectual writers today conceive the trade union movement 
to be split down the middle into two distinct groups. One of those groups 
has the Marxian approach. The other group has a strictly bread and butter 
base. We of the Steelworkers are not of either of those groups. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1954:12) 
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United Steelworkers of America (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
They (business organizations and steel industry) are going to use 
spokesman from every source that they can find in this attempt to seperate 
the working people from the union leaders; and, of course, spearheading 
these drives are such organizations as the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the National Chamber of Commerce, and this new ugly 
one which is now rearing its head called the Constitutional Educational 
League, and on this point may I just interpose for a moment....Some of the 
men who are leaders of several of the great corporations in the steel 
industry are joining with this outfit and spreading bitterness, poison, and 
hateful propaganda, and right now they are concentrating on California 
where the inquitious right-to-work law comes up for a vote within a very 
few months. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1958:9) 
We have suffered together during great shutdowns in the various 
industries where we hold membership. We sweated out together the 116- 
day shutdown in Basic Steel in 1959. You went broke and I went broke 
with you. You cried and I cried and finally on January 4,1960, we exalted 
in a great victory, having won the greatest strike in Steel which ever 
occured in the history of our land...We have made the American and 
Canadian community understand that the Steelworker is a citizen of the 
communtiy. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1964:12) 
Wc saw Communist groups operating within our own confines and you 
and I rose up as loyal Steelworkers and we destroyed those cell groups and 
we kicked the Communists out of the Steelworkers Union. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1964:15) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Unemployment 
Representative Statements; 
I haven't forgotten that there are 260,000 members of the United 
Steelworkers of America who are today without employment. I haven t 
forgotten that there are approximately 114,000 of our members who are 
today working on short work weeks, and I have not forgotten that in our 
land there are about five million people without jobs. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1958:10) 
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U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Misuse of Funds 
Representative Statements; 
The supporters of this great movement have no desire to discount the 
magnitude of the task or the possible opposition of the financial interest 
represented in the steel industry. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 
1956:10) 
But I think it behooves the members of the United Steelworkers of 
America who hold shares of stock in these corportions to attend these 
stockholders' meetings when they are held within the next few months 
and demand an accounting from the chairmen of the board as to how 
much money he is spending in the councils of the NAM, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and elsewhere to destroy the Union. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1958:11) 
Other Labor Organizations 
Major Incidents: Increasing Membership 
Representative Statements; 
Certainly we have to do something about organizing these non-ferrous 
metal mines in the United States and Canada. The American Federation 
of Labor is considering setting up some sort of organization to move into 
this field. I think they are making a mistake when they do that. We 
intend to complete our work and we would much not prefer not to have 
any interference. It is bad enough to fight the Communists. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1954:13) 
Other 
Major Incidents: Automation 
Representative Statements: 
As you automate factories you must remember that only human beings 
have purchasing power; an automated factory is of absolutely no value 
unless a human being can purchase the output of such automated factory. 
And as automation progresses hours of work must be shortened in order 
to supply jobs to buy the goods of a great American or Canadian industrial 
plant. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1960:9) 
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Analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial Convention of I.W Abel 
President of the USWA: 1965 - 1976 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations; Experimental Negotiating 
Agreement 
Representative Statements: 
In 1971, we will again want a wage increase, and not just another wage 
increase, but a very, very substantial wage increase — a wage increase that 
will redress some of the economic wrongs that we Steelworkers have 
suffered during these last few years. We want a shorter work week. We 
want to enjoy the leisure that our skills and the new technology help to 
make possible. We want still better pensions. We want more equity and 
fair play in the way vacations are scheduled. We are going to propose that 
the whole industry shut down for two weeks each summer, so that 
everybody can have at least two weeks summer vacation. The cost-of- 
living agreement that you took from us ini959 will be restored to us in 
1971! (USWA Convention Proceedings -1970:15) 
I said, for example that we were determined to win in 1971 the best 
contracts in our history. And. my fellow delegates we, did exactly that!....As 
a result of settlement that year, every Basic Steel member won pay 
increases of at least one dollar per hour for the life of the contract.I said 
two years ago, as we prepared for 1971 bargaining, that our senior members 
deserved to have more retirement benefits in their golden years. And we 
ended up with a whole array of new pension benefits-more, in fact, than 
our members ever dreamed possible. Two years ago, at our Convention, I 
served "solemn notice" that the cost-of-living escalator would be restored 
to our contracts. You know the results. We did restore the escalator in our 
agreements. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1972:15) 
Despite our negotiation successes in our 1974 negotiations this Union has 
been taken on by several powerful employers. Although in every case 
these companies can afford to meet our bargaining proposals, they want to 
make their employees second-class citizens of this Union with inferior 
wages and unsatisfactory working conditions. Well, I say to you this 
morning and to them, we won't let them get away with it...The United 
Steelworkers of America can be as militant as required when it confronts 
employers who still live in the stone age of labor-management relations. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1974:13) 
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Labor-Management Relations(continued) 
Representative Statements: 
The time has come to give our members steady work and steady wages 
every week and every year! Not just steady work and wages when the 
book is full. Not just steady work and wages 30 weeks or 35 weeks a year. 
But steady work and wages 52 weeks every year! The only effective and 
meaningful answer to unemployment is a job with a steady income. 
That's when everyone benefits: the worker, the family, the economy, and 
the businessman. And I say, that industry has a responsibility equal to that 
of labor to help achieve an economy with full employment. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1976:15) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Elections; Occupational Safety and Health Act; 
Unemployment; Imports 
Representative Statements: 
The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. Yet the Nixon 
Administration makes the claim that to stabilize prices and halt inflation, 
it’s necessary to hang millstones around the necks of workers and their 
families. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1970:12) 
It is nothing less than a national scandal that this nation does not yet have 
an effective occupational safety and health law. Every year some 14,000 
workers are killed on the job...one reason we're having trouble on this 
legislation, I think you should know, is that the Nixon Adminstration- 
one Mr. Agnew claims represent the workers- is opposed to the Daniels 
Bill. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1970:17) 
....it is the responsibility of our lawmakers to provide this nation's workers 
adequate protection against the rising tide of imports not only in Steel but 
in a whole series of other manufacturing industries. The Burke-Hartke 
bill, which we are backing in Congress, would establish some needed 
regulation in this area (multinational corporations) and provide us with 
needed protection against a growing mountain of low-wage imports. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1972:19) 
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United Steelworkers of America 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations; Improved Benefits; Membership; 
Automation; Imports; Democratic Union; Experimental Negotiating 
Agreement 
Representative Statements: 
It was in that election on February 9, 1965 that his Union proved to our two 
nations and to the world that this is a democratic institution owned and 
governed by the membership. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1966:13) 
We have just emerged from major collective bargaining challenges in Can 
Manufacturing, Aluminum, and Basic Steel with the greatest contracts in 
the history of our Union. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1968:17) 
Also in our Basic Steel Agreement we took a significant step toward 
protecting the earnings of our Basic Steel membership against erosion by 
automation. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1968:20) 
Prepare now for the all-out fight that we shall undertake in 1971. Let this 
great union today resolve to get in fighting trim for the struggles that may 
lie ahead. Our 1971 efforts may mean dollars from our treasury — from the 
treasury of the international and from the treasuries of our local unions. 
And it may mean sacrifices on the part of many of our members and their 
families. There's no other way. (USWA Convention Procedings -1970:14) 
In 1942, we had fewer than 700,000 members. Today, despite jobs wiped out 
by automation and imports, we have close to a million and a half 
members. We have doubled the size of our union. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1972:13) 
Another major challenge facing this union is the need to close the historic 
gap between the pattern of wages and benfits enjoyed by our members 
employed by big corporations and those available to our members in 
smaller companies.we must enlarge our effots to organize the non¬ 
union competitors of our smaller organized companies.(USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1972:18) 
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United Steelworkers of America (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
The most recent step forward, in my judgement, was our ability to develop 
and implement a brand new, revolutionary collective bargaining concept- 
the ENA (Experimental Negotiating Agreement). (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1974:10) 
Our bargaining successes this year must be attributed in some measure to 
the willingness of our Basic Steel Conference to innovate new concepts in 
bargaining. The ENA added a new dimension to our ability to win good 
satisfactory settlements in steel.... ENA gave our members in Basic Steel 
the largest wage and benefit package in the history of our union. There 
was no strike, no prolonged layoffs, no plant shutdowns, and no 
stockpiling. ENA did the job it was supposed to do and let us say so loud 
and clear. And let us not forget that ENA gave our local unions in Basic 
Steel the right to strike for the first time over local issues yet not one strike 
had to be called. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1974:13) 
But there isn't a single thing wrong with our union that cannot be 
corrected by the members themselves through the ample democratic 
procedures available for this purpose. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 
1976:17) 
And I am sure that no one will disagree when I say there is no place for 
violence in this union. Violence is the weapon of the corporate goons 
who tried to smash our union and break up our strikes. Violence is the 
weapon the Fascists and Communists use in other parts of the world to 
destroy free unions and to undermine democracy. Violence is a gift to the 
enemies of the labor movement....a gift to those who are eager to tarnish 
our cause. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1976:18) 
Another misconception fathered by dissidents concerns our union dues. 
They say union dues have made our union too wealthy.or that we have 
too big a Strike and Defense Fund. Anyone who irresponsibly attacks 
union dues is toying with the very guts of your union. We can get good 
contracts if we have a first-class union. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 
1976:19) 
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United Steelworkers of America (continued) 
Representative Statements; 
Let me remind you of a little bit of history. In 1956, as your Secretary- 
Treasurer, I begged delegates at a convention such as this to raise dues. I 
warned our delegates that we could not expect to protect ourselves against 
Big Steel in a do-or-die battle, unless we had union reserves totalling at 
least $50 million. Well, long before we reached that $50 million financial 
reservior , we were forced in 1959, to undergo the longest and bitterest 
strike in the history of our union. Our members walked the picket lines at 
the basic steel plants for 116 days, with no strike benefits. We finally settled 
that bitter strike — but not before this union depleted its treasury, sold its 
property in Washington, lost its cost-of-living contraact provisions and 
surrendered some other hard won gains. It wasn't until we built our 
financial reserves and made this union fiscally strong 11 yeaars later that 
we were able to win back our COLA in 1971. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1976:20) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Inflation; Concentration of Wealth; Imports; 
Unemployment 
Representative Statements; 
It has become a reflex action for the editorial writers and many others to 
blame price increases and inflation on newly-negotiated wage increases, to 
point the finger of blame at our union. Just as day follows night, they 
equate price increases with wage increases....this is sheer nonsense and 
pure propaganda. There were no wage increases for Steelworkers in the 
years 1962, '63, '64, or during the first four months of 1965. Prices during 
that period of three years and four months did not stay level-they increased 
by 4.8%. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1968:19) 
A new, growing threat on the horizon is the fantastic concentration of 
economic wealth that is taking place in our two countries. The disturbing 
thing is that of all the mergers taking place in 1967, 83% were of the 
conglomerate variety. These new conglomerates create a new kind of 
private super-government with tremendous influence over the lives of all 
Canadians and Americans. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1968:25) 
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Economic Conditions (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
Mounting steel imports present an increasing threat, to your jobs and we 
should do something about that. The failure of business and industry to 
share profits with workers through decent wages and with consumers 
through stable prices adds to our economic problems. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1968:25) 
Today, we in the United States have reached the worst possible 
combination of economic developments. We have the most severe 
inflation in 20 years. We have the highest interest rates in 100 years. We 
have the sharpest increase in unemployment in 10 years. Now isn't that a 
proud record. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1970:12) 
Look how the worker has been short-changed. It started in the 1960s, when 
the corporation followed one record profit year with another, for a total 
profit increase in the 1960s of 93 percent. During that same period the real 
buying power of the average worker went up only 10 per cent. Ninety-three 
per cent for rich corporations. Ten per cent for average workers. I say to 
you it is now wonder our economy has problems! 
.the labor department announced that average weekly earnings had 
increased by about $5.50 a week during the last year. Do you know that that 
increase, which amounted to 4.8%, was less than the rise in consumer 
prices. The harsh fact is that he "real" purchasing power of the worker 
again declined. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1970:13) 
We, Steelworkers, offer this challenge to the Nixon Administration and to 
the corporations: If you will keep the cost-of-living down, Mr. President, 
we won't get as penny from this cost-of-living clause. It only works when 
prices rise. As for steelworkers, we'd rather have steady prices than an 
eternal penny-ante rat-race to catch up with rising prices. (USWA 
Convention Procedings -1970:15) 
I should note that we opened our 1971 bargaining under the gloomiest and 
least promising set of circumstances. We were in the midst of a recession. 
Unemployment was up. The Basic Steel Industry was operating at less 
than 63% of capacity. Our markets were being saturated with steel from 
abroad. The stockpiling of steel exceeded all records and layoffs in our 
major industry began earlier than ever during negotiations. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1972:16) 
476 
Appendix D-3 (continued) 
U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations; Industrial Peace; Employment 
Practices 
Representative Statements: 
We have now had industrial peace in Steel for almost 14 years. Yet, despite 
this great strike-free record, every time we begin contract negotiations, we 
see the same frantic hedge-buying, the same costly build-up of inventories, 
the same long periods of unemployment. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1972:17) 
The consent decree, announced by the government, by the courts, nine 
major steel companies, and our Union in April this year, will help us 
complete the job that the United Steelworkers of America set out to do 
many years ago. It is designed to bring employment practices in Basic Steel 
plants into compliance with the Federal civil rights laws. To achieve job 
mobility for minorities and females in the Steel Industry, the Decree 
revises work assignment practices reasonably and on an even-handed 
basis. (USWA Convention Proceedines -1974:15) 
Other Labor Organizations 
Major Incidents: Trade Union Movement 
Representative Statements; 
We work for the preservation and growth of the free trade union 
movement in other countries, as a means of promoting living standards. 
We support the efforts of the United Nations, and representatives of the 
American labor movement who contribute their time and abilities to 
advancing the objectives of the United Nations. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1968:24) 
Other 
Major Incidents: Automation; Multinational Corporations; Republicans 
Representative Statements; 
We must concern ourselves with the continued threat of automation 
because technological progress has an adverse effect on our people, their 
jobs and their earnings. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1968:25) 
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Narrative Analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial Conventions of Lloyd 
McBride President of the USWA: 1977 - 1983 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations 
Representative Statements; 
Included in the basic steel settlement was an Employment and Income 
Security Program which represented a major and unprecendented 
breakthrough in the fight to protect our members against the loss of work 
and income. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1978:7) 
We don't expect business corporations to be in the social welfare business. 
We understand that. We do expect and demand that they stop opposing 
every progressive initiative put forward in the legislative or 
administrative arena. We can't rely on corporations to decide what is best 
for society. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1980:17) 
As you know from your work throughout our jurisdictions, hundreds of 
companies -- even entire industries -- are demanding that we give back 
wages and benefits acquired over many years of good-faith bargaining. We 
examine each case on its own merits, negotiating relief, usually in the form 
of deferred wages or temporary freezes where it is justified. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1982:10) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Inflation; Unemployment; Steel Imports; Regulation 
Representative Statements: 
We not only succeeded in obtaining quotas on specialty steel imports in 
1976 because it was found that excessive imports had injured American 
companies and workers, but we were successful early this year in 
convincing our government to retain the quotas. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1978:12) 
For the record I want to say that we are not opposed to international trade. 
Not at all. We are simply saying that trade must be fair and that it is time 
for our government to take care of its own, and to pursue a trade policy 
that serves our interests and not foreign interests. We found out in 
Vietnam that we cannot be the world's policeman. Neither can we be the 
world's consumer. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1978.15) 
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Government Relations (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
I think we've got to shake free from our fear and paralysis of adopting a 
national energy policy. We must stop being afraid of what others in the 
world will say and do. We must put the interests of our own nations, and 
our own peoples, where they are belong: at the forefront. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1980:15) 
And then there is the federal government, which has always been quick to 
bail out the really big corporations with loan guarantees, fast tax write-offs, 
huge over-payments and open-ended defense contracts. Yet, it has not 
come forward with one meaningful step to help even the most modern of 
steel producers. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1982:11) 
United Steelworkers of America 
Major Incidents: Democratic Union; Contract Negotiations 
Representative Statements: 
As I said, we made collective bargaining history in major negotiations last 
year with our breakthroughs on job and income security while at the same 
time continuing to protect the workers in our major jurisdictions against 
inflation. U.S. News and World Report magazine, in a recent article on 
how the real wages of workers were faring in these inflationary times, 
noted that the workers who were faring best, who topped the list, were 
workers in basic steel. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1978:10) 
"Steelworkers into the Eighties" should give us an opportunity to reflect 
upon the ultimate goals of our union — to secure jobs; to obtain dignity at 
that job; and to achieve and maintain health, both in and outside of the 
workplace. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1978:18) 
The decisions this week will be made by the duly elected delegates who are 
in the hall of this convention and only by duly elected delegates. No one 
else has any business trying to influence our discussions and no one else 
will be given that opportunity. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1978:20) 
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Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Unemployment; Inflation; Steel Imports 
Representative Statements: 
In the 1977 negotiations there was industrial slack in other nations and this 
caused the surge in steel exports to the U.S. by Japan and European 
countries in an effort to make up for the economic situation in those 
coutries. We were not in a recessionary period in the United States in 1977; 
we were, in fact, in a state of recovery, but the renewed import surge 
aggravated the production picture and contributed to the permanent 
closings of some plants and layoffs of our members. Unfortunately, we 
cannot negotiate an end to economic cycles acrss the bargaining table. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1978:11) 
The testing and trouble already have begun, as evidenced by looking at our 
economies. Within the American Steel industry, major mills have beeen 
permanently closed. Others operate with reduced or minimal production. 
The operating rate in steel is only around 52 per cent of capacity. About 
70,000 of our members are laid off, and thousands more is support 
industries are out of work. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1980:11) 
....our governments are persuaded to seek a cure for inflation by inflicting 
unemployment on working people, an especially cruel and unjust remedy. 
At the same time, the U.S. Federal Reserve System inflates the cost of 
money so as to pratically eliminate from the economic scene the business 
of home construction. Government agencies ignore fair trade rules and 
the demonstrated will of Congress, speaking for the people — to permit vast 
quantities of subsidized imports,, which eliminate still more jobs. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1980:11) 
I think we have to acknowledge that it's not fair to place the entire blame 
for our current economic problems on the short-term decisions and 
programs. Indeed, far more important have been long-term structural 
problems, some of our own making and some not wholly within our 
control. As we have stresssed when given the opportunity, weak-willed 
enforcement of our nation's trade laws, the giving of trade concessions for 
foreign policy reasons that, ironically, have turned out to be more illusory 
than of substance, have played a major role in our weakened international 
competitive posture. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1980:14) 
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Economic Conditions (continued) 
Representative Statements: 
Ronald Reagan moved quickly to launch an economic program that 
sandbagged the economy just as it was recovering from its 1980 slump. He 
encouraged high interest rates — in direct violation of his promise to the 
American people — as a means of controlling inflation, regardless of its 
impact on employment. To make matters worse, the Reagan 
Administration persuaded a docile Congress to cut taxes — not uniformly, 
but inequitably, with the bulk of the relief going to those at the top. Reagan 
gambled that they would in turn invest their cash in the modernization of 
American industry. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1982:11-12) 
U. S. Steel Industry 
Major Incidents: Condition of Industry; Demands made on USWA 
Representative Statements: 
So it is essential then that we continue to strive and that our long-range 
best interest is in urging that the industry modernize, that they have up-to- 
date plants and equipment, and they continue to be viable and modern in 
their effort and in their right to contribute in order that they might serve 
our nation in supplying the steel needs of our countries. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1980:17) 
Unfortunately, the demands upon our members often have been 
unwarranted or excessive-or both. The American Steel industry is a case in 
point. This industry has competitive problems...Our response to a request 
for aid by the domestic producers was to offer the kind of relief we believed 
would be of genuine help, and which would have been agreeable to 
members of our Basic Steel Industry Conference. The industry responded 
with demands that were totally unrealistic and unreasonable....But we 
cannot-and will not— accept take-it-or-leave-it demands on wages which 
will have severe consequences on the living standards of our members. 
This we simply will not do. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 1982:10-11) 
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Appendix D-4 (continued) 
Other Labor Organizations 
Major Incidents: Cooperation with International Unions 
Representative Statements: 
The need for expanded cooperation among international unions has 
become a vital necessity in order to meet the bargaining challenges created 
by the advent of national and international conglomerates. (USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1978:12) 
Other 
Major Incidents: Pension Funds; Steel Tripartite Committee; 
Conservatives 
Representative Statements: 
With increasing frequency we learn that it is our own pension money that 
is financing the flight from the northern unionized states to nonunion 
plants in the sunbelt and overseas. Our own money is being used to put 
our own people in unemployment lines. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1978:19) 
We meet their representatives at every legislative level, fighting labor law 
refrom, fighting occupatinal health and safety, fighting environmental 
progress, fighting national health care, fighting liberalized voter 
registration laws, fighting against equal rights. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1980:13) 
We are, for example working through what is known as the Steel 
Tripartite Advisory commitee to study the entire range of serious problems 
faced by the American Steel industry. The commitee combines our union, 
the industry and government. Out of our work should come legislative 
and administrative reccommendations for a much needed national steel 
policy which will include steps to keep the industry modem, viable and 
able to meet the needs not only of our members but of our nations as well. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1980:16) 
.It (our job) is to see to it that billions of dollars in deferred wages, the 
vast pension funds made up of monies earned through the efforts of 
working men and women are invested in ways which will contribute to 
the good of working people and of our societies at large.(USWA 
Convention Proceedings -1980:17) 
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Appendix D-5: Major Incidents and Representative Statements from the 
Narrative Analysis of the Speeches to the Biennial Conventions of Lynn 
Williams President of the USWA : 1983- 
Labor-Management Relations 
Major Incidents: Contract Negotiations; Labor Contract Enforcement 
Representative Statements: 
Years of respect in tough bargaining have been sacrificed by some corporate 
managers who have sought to place our members against an economic 
wall, even when their competitive situation has not warranted their 
attacks. We have, and will respond in kind to those who want it that way. 
We can deal one of two ways with management. With those who are fair 
and honestly seek just agreements, we will conduct ourselves in a like 
manner. Those who use bluff and intimidation will meet a militant 
union which is ready to fight intelligently and creatively for the rights of 
its members. We are sending management these two messages, and we 
hope they read them loud and clear. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 
1984:20) 
The grievance and arbitration procedure is the centerpiece of our 
collective bargaining agreements. The Reagan recession environment has 
led some employers to willfully and repeatedly violate contractual 
provisions. They know know that a clogged grievance and arbitration 
procedure results in delays that will help avoid employer penalties. We re 
not going to let them get away away with it. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1984:21) 
The United Steelworkers is willing to work with cooperative employers 
who understand our job security and dignity concerns. There is a yearning 
by our members for demcoratic involvement in the workplace. There is a 
willingness by union members to help make an enterprise more 
viable....because they know without a viable enterprise there will be no job 
security. But to accomplish this will require new management attitudes 
and a social contract with workers and their unions that eliminates 
traditional differences between workers and management. Our role as a 
union will always be largely determined by the social and economic 
problems of the times and how we deal with them. (USWA Convention 
Proceedings -1984:22) 
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Appendix D-5 (continued) 
Government Relations 
Major Incidents: Steel Imports; Unemployment 
Representative Statements: 
The ITC (International Trade Commission) eventually ruled that unfair 
imports were injuring our steel industry and steelworkers, but later 
recommended a completely inadequate set of remedies to President 
Reagan. Under the law he had the power to accept, reject, or modify these 
recommendations. Given that set of options, is there any real doubt about 
what Ronald Reagan would do. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1984:23) 
I am particularly pleased that the Rostenkowski bill will require the steel 
companies to put their profits from steel back into modernization of the 
steel mills and into retraining of our members who are not back to work. 
(USWA Convention Proceedings -1984:23) 
Throughout 1984, we have been fighting another steel import war, seeking 
relief for our domestic steel industry from the flood of subsidized foreign 
steel which is being dumped on the American market. We want what our 
foreign competitors already have-strict, realistic, enforceable quotas on steel 
imports. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1984:23) 
United Steelworkers of America 
Major Incidents; Loss of Membership; Need to Organize New Industries 
Representative Statements; 
To survive and grow our union must organize and change the balance of 
political power....we must plan our response to technological change, how 
to deal with increased multinational corporate power, and to manage 
world trade in ways that are beneficial to workers and not destructive to 
their jobs and families. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1984:16) 
Since the first year of the Reagan administration our employed 
membership has been reduced by 400,000. Our average dues-paying 
membership level has stabilized over the past several months and has not 
moved above 740,000. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1984:17) 
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Appendix D-5 (continued) 
Economic Conditions 
Major Incidents: Trade Issues 
Representative Statements; 
In North American terms we need a system of managed steel trade just as 
we have such a system in the automobile industry. Canada and the United 
States are each other's best customers. I firmly believe that the last 
objective which any of our members seek is that one should prosper at the 
expense of another. What concerns us rather is that we should have 
arrangements which are fair, which are beneficial to both, and by which we 
can prosper together....We need an arrangement. . . which protects our 
members from the impact of dumped, subsidized, unfairly traded steel, 
often from low wage and virtually slave labor countries throughout the 
world. (USWA Convention Proceedings -1984:24) 
Other 
Major Incidents: Rise of Conservatism 
Representative Statements: 
We meet at a juncture in history in which some say there is a virtual 
realignment of political parties-in which a radical extremist philosophy has 
taken over one of the major political parties in the United States, and in 
which conservative forces continue to dominate the national political 
scene in Canada. (USWA Convention Proceedings - 1984:16) 
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